
A Companion to Richard Hooker

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VOLUME 8



OF
THE LAVVES
of Eccleſiaſticall
Politie.

Eyght Bookes.

(By Richard Hooker.)

Illud immortalitate dignum ingeni
illa humanitas, illa virtus & Cras
morte subita extincta est
Cic: de oratore: l. 3.

Printed at London by *Iohn Windet*, dwelling at the ſigne of the
Croſſe keyes neere Powles Wharffe, and are there
to be ſoulde

Richard Hooker. *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Eyght Bookes*. London: John Windet, [1593]. The first edition, which contains books I–IV only.

A Companion to Richard Hooker

Edited by

Torrance Kirby

With a Foreword by Rowan Williams



BRILL

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2008

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In Memoriam

William Speed Hill

(1935–2007)

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Feast of the Epiphany, 2008

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACL	*A Christian Letter of certaine English Protestantes* (1599), volume 4 of the *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*
Answere	*The Answere of Mr Richard Hooker to a Supplication preferred by Mr Walter Travers to the HH. Lords of the Privie Counsell*, volume 5 of the Folger edition
Notes	Hooker, *Autograph Notes* from Trinity College, Dublin, MS 364, fol. 69–84, vols. 3 & 4 of the Folger edition
Cert.	Hooker, *A Learned Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, vol. 5 of the Folger edition
CT	*Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, ed. H. J. Schroeder, St Louis, MO, and London, 1941
Dublin	Hooker, *Dublin Fragments*, volume 4 of the Folger edition
FLE	*The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*[1]
I…VIII	Books I through VIII, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*
HLQ	*Huntington Library Quarterly*
Inst.	John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, 1559
Just.	Richard Hooker, *A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and how the foundation of faith is overthrown*, volume 5 of the Folger edition
JEcclH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
JW	*The Works of John Jewel*, ed. John Ayre for The Parker Society, Cambridge, 1847
Keble	John Keble, ed., *The Works of…Mr Richard Hooker*, 7th edn., revised R. W. Church and F. Paget, Oxford, 1888
Lawes	Richard Hooker, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*[2]
LCC	Library of Christian Classics
NPNF	*A Select library of the Nicene and post-Nicene fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff. Series 1 and 2, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1956

[1] References to the *Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker* cite volume, page, and line numbers.

[2] All references to the *Lawes* cite book, chapter, and section followed by the standard *FLE* citation. Where the division of chapters and sections differs from Keble, both editions are referenced.

OS	John Calvin, *Opera Selecta*, ed. P. Barth, W. Niesel, D. Scheuner. 5 vols., Munich, 1926–52
Pride	Hooker, *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*, volume 5 of the Folger edition
PL	*Patrologiæ cursus completus: Series Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne. Paris, 1844–1882
PS	Parker Society editions of the works of the English Reformers, 56 volumes, Cambridge, 1840–
Remedie	Hooker, *A Remedie against Sorrow and Feare*, volume 5 of the Folger edition
RHC	Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed., *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community*, 1997
RHER	W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed., *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, 2003
SRH	W. Speed Hill, ed., *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays preliminary to an Edition of his Works*, 1972
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York, 1947
Supplication	Walter Travers, *A Supplication made to the Privy Council*, Oxford, 1612, volume 5 of the Folger edition
STC	Short Title Catalogue
WW	*Works of John Whitgift, DD, Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. John Ayre for the Parker Society, Cambridge, 1851

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Images from Books in the W. Speed Hill Collection of the Works of Richard Hooker, John W. Graham Library, Trinity College, Toronto

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1	The engraved portrait by Faithorne, which first appeared as the frontispiece in the 1662 edition of the *Lawes*. According to W. Speed Hill (*Descriptive Bibliography*, 1970), it was 'obviously a conventionalized likeness…done after a monument put up 35 years after Hooker's death (the inscription is in error)'	26
2	Richard Hooker. *The Works.* Edited with a *Life* of the author by John Gauden. London: Printed by J. Best, for Andrew Crook, 1662. The first complete edition of the *Lawes*. The engraved title page and dedicatory letter to Charles II are dated 1661	40
3	Richard Hooker. *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Book V.* Edited by W. Speed Hill. The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, gen. ed., W. Speed Hill, 2. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977	367

4 *The Causes of the Continuance of These Contentions Concerning Church-Government: Out of the Fragments of Richard Hooker*. Preamble to *A Summarie View of the Government Both of the Old and New Testament*. Oxford: Leon Lichfield, 1641[1] 480

5 Richard Hooker. *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1612 562

6 Engraved title page from the 1705 folio edition of Hooker's *Works*. This engraved title page was created for the first Stansby edition of 1611 and used on all subsequent folio editions through 1723 611

[1] Although this image of the head-title page of "Causes of the Continuance…" is from a copy in the Graham Library Rare Books Collection, not the Hill Collection, there is a copy in the Hill Collection.

FOREWORD

OF THE LAWES OF ECCLESIASTICALL POLITIE REVISITED

Rowan Williams
Archbishop of Canterbury

You have to admit that *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* is not a title calculated to attract a mass readership; and it is still rather difficult to explain just why a book with such a title is a classic of doctrinal reflection, not just a dissertation on how to run churches.[1] As to the first, it has long been recognised that Hooker's many gifts did not include what a modern audience would regard as the popular touch; as to the second, what we have to try and grasp is that for Hooker the question of how to run churches, a matter of literal life-and-death significance in his day, could only be rationally thought through on the most fundamental of theological principles. He is reacting, essentially, to a twofold claim by his opponents, the militant puritan wing of the English Church in the last decades of the sixteenth century. The English state had determined that the reshaping of the Church after the breach with Rome had gone far enough, and that controversy over further reform should stop: challenging the rights of bishops or the survival of certain practices and ceremonies in public worship was not admissible. The puritan position was, first, that the Bible specifically laid down the rules for running churches, so that it wasn't possible to treat certain matters as open to dispute or local variation, and second, that the state had no authority to decide how the Church was to be run unless it specifically subjected itself to the Bible; indeed, it would be very desirable if the entire system of Old Testament law could be enshrined in the law of the state. These are the positions that Hooker sets out to challenge; and he can

[1] This essay is the text of a lecture delivered at the Temple Church, London on 26 October 2005 as one of an occasional series of Temple Talks organised by the Ecclesiastical Law Society. It was first published in the *Ecclesiastical Law Journal* 8 (2006), 382–391, and is reproduced with permission. His Grace is Patron of the Ecclesiastical Law Society and Master of the Bench of the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple.

challenge them effectively only by looking at the very nature of law and what that implies for our understanding of Church and Bible.

This is, of course, a dispute that has suddenly become rather contemporary again. The modern equivalent of the puritan might appear to be the Muslim apologist who cannot see how a believer can recognise real legitimacy in a society not governed by Sharia law, interpreted in a strict and 'primitive' fashion. The question of how a believer in revealed religion can work with a state and a legal system that are not in every respect determined by revelation is a serious one, because it raises the issue of how to live under potentially conflicting authorities. I don't want to claim that Hooker solves all this (as if all that were needed to pacify the Islamist right were an infusion of Anglicanism…). Yet a basic discussion of the nature of divine law and divine revelation should prompt a better-resourced debate. So in what follows, I shall be trying to set out some of Hooker's central convictions about law and revelation, and arguing that what he is opposing is any picture of these things that refuses the work of interpretation or that pretends that history has come to a halt. I hope that what will emerge is a sense that it is possible in the Christian tradition, and perhaps in others too, to hold a robust doctrine of revelation, to stand firm against a particular kind of individualist liberalism in theology and politics, and still to recognise the historical forces that are at work in our reception of revealed truth and the complexities of authority in a world of necessarily changing perceptions and pressures. Perhaps I should say at once that I don't think Hooker will solve our contemporary problems about authority in the Anglican Church in any straightforward way. I doubt whether he could have entertained any idea that the moral law set out in Scripture was anything other than lastingly valid, and, despite arguments to the contrary, I can't see him easily accepting alternatives to patriarchy as the basis of human (and therefore ecclesial) government. Yet there remains something about his approach to the Church's nature and basis that may offer a few pointers for a theology of Christian belonging less obsessively anxious about the humanly policed limits of the Church than some of our current styles of thought.

Anyway, to begin at Hooker's beginning, we must ask with him what the primary character of God's action is, as we learn it from Bible and nature. And Hooker's answer is that God wills to exercise the 'abundance' of his glory—to create as many reflections as possible of his own being. But if the point of the world is the abounding plurality of such reflections, each must exist within limits, since God alone

is infinite; and to say that everything exists within limits is to say that it exists according to 'law'. There is no infinite compatibility between different possibilities; if this happens, that can't. Law is one way of talking about the single line of time within which the universe unfolds, in which the fact that some things happen rather than others determines a single set of possible futures. (Hooker, happily, knew nothing of the infinite number of possible universes proposed by some contemporary physicists; but his point still holds for any one actual universe.)

Law, then, is bound up with the compatible variety of things in the universe. Hooker suggests that the most primitive sense of law, theologically speaking, is God's acceptance of the logic of a limited creation. In creating, God chooses to make a world of limits—that's what creation is; his purpose being to secure the greatest possible variety of imitations of his own being, a complex of realities each (in the language of classical patristic theology) 'participating', sharing, in his own being in a unique way. And it is this fundamental principle of mutual limit that shows us what the character of law will be in every context where the concept applies. 'Compatible variety' means the harmony of genuinely distinct subjects. The 'laws' of nature tell us how all material beings exist together. The laws of society propose how beings with free choice can exist together. The law that regulates the Church tells us how human beings may live in the society of God and the angels.

In such a context, we need ways of distinguishing between different sorts of law as they affect our experience. Some affect us simply as human beings: we can't fly, live without water, or see in the dark. We know how to reason about what's good and bad, possible or impossible, for us at this level; and, extending this a bit further, as Hooker does, we work by general human axioms about how we can bear short-term pain for long-term profit, about doing to others what we'd want them to do for us, respecting parents and acknowledging that 'spiritual' benefits are more real and lasting than material. All this has to do with understanding what we are in relation to the rest of the world, grasping what is distinctive about being human: we are physically limited in specific ways, and we are also so constituted that mental or spiritual reality cannot be ignored in what we say about ourselves. Hooker takes it for granted that recognition of God's existence is part of what is 'natural' to human being in this way; and so is the sense of moral responsibility, the connection between actions and rewards and punishments. This basic grasp of what we are in relation to creator and creation would dictate human behaviour even if human beings didn't live together.

But as a matter of fact we are also by nature sociable; our good can never be fully realised by any one of us living alone. So we next have to discern how common life is to be regulated so as to allow us to do to each other the good we are capable of doing, and to restrain the damage we are equally capable of doing. Our liberty to nourish material life and health needs to be secured, violence and rapacity towards others has to be restrained. And a parallel principle is at work in the 'law of nations', where Hooker alludes to the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' conventions. The former regulates diplomatic immunities and trade, the latter regulates conflict. No commonwealth should have the right to ignore these laws, abusing or neglecting the rights of strangers and travellers or abandoning the customs governing war. Hooker does not specify the latter, but presumably means things like the immunity of non-combatants and ambassadors, the status of treaties and so on. And finally we come to the laws of the Church, which are about living 'sociably' with God; to the degree that natural reason alone does not deliver the whole truth about God, we need God to show us what sort of God he is in order that we may know how to live harmoniously with him. The Church's law is thus 'positive' law rather than natural, but it relates just as much to what we are in our most profound being, images of God destined to become children of God through Jesus Christ.

This is, in scandalously brief outline, the argument of Hooker's first book of the *Lawes*. How do these principles help him in the particular controversy in which he is entangled? The first and most important point is that he is able to distinguish clearly between, as we might put it, laws that are to be kept for their own sake, because they relate to the conservation of humanity as such, and laws that are to be kept for ordinary 'civic' good order. In the state in general, laws against theft and murder and fraud, laws that protect people from assault, exclusion and prejudice, laws that support domestic stability and so on are laws without which no common human life is imaginable. And in the Church, the common life of this 'supernatural' society requires an ethic of generosity, forgiveness, fidelity, and a practice of common prayer. Nothing can change these basics, in Church or state, because such constraints are bound up with God's purpose in creating the world and human beings within it, with a heavenly destiny. But there are then all those laws that contribute to the maintenance of this or that particular society or Christian community. These are not unchangeable, because the outward forms of governance alter with the passage of time; but this does not mean that their authority is relative at any given moment. We

can't be members of a timeless universal human society. We are bound to be citizens of a specific social unit. So those laws that contribute to the good order of that social unit have an equally binding character, though they may be changed by the authority that enforces them for whatever may seem to be good pragmatic reason.

Now in Hooker's eyes, the mistake of his puritan opponents is to think that the Bible is an exhaustive source for laws of both kinds. Every Christian presumably admits that in its definition of God's purposes for creation, the Bible sets out a 'law', an account of the limits within which humanity can properly operate, which is not open to revision. It does this, though, in a way that is, for Hooker, clearly Christ-centred: we don't turn to the Pentateuch for a full definition of the law under which Christians must live, because the Pentateuch itself is part of the historical process of revelation, foreshadowing something greater. Only in the Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity is the full scope of human destiny revealed. But the Bible does not justify us in concluding that it is the sole source of a comprehensive positive law that will regulate for all time in the second of the two legal contexts he has defined. The Bible shows us people who are governed by the contemplation of divine wisdom without reference to Scripture; paradoxically, it displays its own limits when it relates the virtue and insight of its own characters (who never read it). 'The bounds of wisdom are large'[2] God teaches by many means, and we do no honour to God or to the Bible by imagining that all God might ever wish to say to us can be contained in one volume. We learn from nature, from spiritual inspiration, from sheer experience. And God is not glorified if we assume that we can please him only by doing exactly what Scripture specifies and no more.

We can perhaps see here how the principle of divine abundance with which Hooker begins affects his view of the Bible. Creation offers an immeasurable variety of ways of being good—that is, ways of existing so as to show God's own glory and beauty. It is absurd to think that the text of Scripture could exhaust these possibilities. Put very plainly, the Bible does not give us an alibi for the use of common sense, ordinary discretion, imagination, willingness to learn from experience and whatever else belongs to mature human reflection on behaviour. On the contrary, it commends the example of individuals who live like this. The 'sufficiency' or perfection of Scripture, argues Hooker, is a matter

[2] *Lawes* II.1.4; 1:147.5–6.

of its perfect capacity to do what it is meant to do. If we try to make it do more than it is meant to, we destroy its credibility; if we suggest, for example, that nothing except what is commanded in the Bible can be other than sinful, we paralyse a great deal of ordinary human life. A *reductio ad absurdum*—no order could ever be given unless backed by the Bible, and Hooker imagines theologically acute domestic servants waiting for their masters to produce a biblical warrant for ordering them to light a fire or cook a meal. But the underlying point is wholly serious. The Bible is neither a complete nor an incomplete law book. We have to break through the sterile opposition between Catholic and puritan error, Catholics arguing that all sorts of things are obligatory under divine law that are not contained in the Bible, puritans countering with the claim that everything not commanded in Scripture is in effect prohibited. Both extremes, by couching their question in terms of what will please God and further their salvation, miss the main thing, which is that Scripture uncovers the 'abundant' purpose of God in creation and redemption, the glory that human creatures in communion with Christ are made to manifest. Law, then, as the form of compatible variety, is also the form in which God's abundance is to be perceived and experienced. If we take the Bible to be the sort of comprehensive handbook for human behaviour that the puritans (at least as Hooker interprets them) want it to be, we actually deny the central revelation of the Bible itself—that God freely makes a world of finite goods and beauties so as to share his own overflowing goodness and beauty, and that he brings his work to completion in overcoming the rebelliousness of perverted human freedom by 'opening the Kingdom of Heaven' through participation in Christ. Claim everything for the Bible as law book and you end up claiming nothing, Hooker says; you end up trivialising creation and redemption alike.

But this means that, outside the abiding and central truths about what sort of life God's life is and what sort of dignity is given to creatures, human intelligence and ingenuity and prudence have a wide remit. There is not one divinely approved means of human government, in state or Church. Custom and convenience will settle this. Yet once it is settled, it is not for any private person or interest group to seek to change it according to their own conviction. Just as God alone is able to declare the ceremonial laws of the Old Testament no longer in force because he is their author, so with human authorities: duly constituted authority must establish changes. So in the England of the 1590s, there is nothing wrong with obeying the state's ordinances for the running

of the Church, and a great deal wrong with attempts to change them on the basis of what we have now seen to be a thoroughly misleading view of what the Bible is. The English state, for Hooker, is simply the political expression of the life of a local body of Christians, monarchically governed; there is a sovereign power in this realm to which the care of the Church's administration is committed. The refusal of this authority in the name of a supposed scriptural imperative for further reform of the national church's institutions of government is itself an offence against the Body of Christ. It is to elevate the judgement of a 'private' group over the common sense of a whole Christian community which has developed a theologically lawful form of government, the Elizabethan state. It is to deny that the Christian community has a history of perfectly legitimate discernment and discussion and to make the Bible a timeless absolute. But Christian salvation comes from incorporation into the life of Christ the eternal Son, who has shared his life with us through the incarnation; it is not a matter of adherence to a form of words, even inspired and inerrant words. The Bible is true but not a substitute for the living Truth which is Christ's person.

Hooker's willingness to be positive about the history of interpreting and realising the given structures revealed in Scripture does not, of course, commit him to a modern view of the Bible's historical 'conditionedness', nor does it make him some sort of a relativist. We live first by the laws of God's nature and ours, which are not open to negotiation because they are not about any sort of balance of power or interest, not about any dispositions of prudence or convenience; they are simply what is—namely the ground conditions of being. These laws are revealed in scriptural history—that is, they are presented to us as realities disclosed by a particular set of historical narratives, in which are involved a number of laws and enactments for the better realisation of the underlying truth about who and what God and creation are. The new state of affairs that has come into being through these revealing events is not a timeless sealed capsule in which no-one learns or changes, but a corporate life with narrative and memory. Hooker does not quite put it like this, but you can see the possible argument that the unfolding of Christian potential across time becomes another witness to the pervasive theme of abundance, the unceasing discovery of new ways of reflecting God's glory in new stories of discipleship and fidelity.

It is uncomfortably true, as has been repeatedly underlined in modern scholarship, that Hooker is not a detached and angelic expositor of

divine wisdom but a profoundly shrewd polemicist, for whom the very language of reasoned, patient and consensual discussion serves most effectively to deny his opponents a legitimate place in political debate. But there is an inescapable paradox in arguing about the legitimacy of argument itself: Hooker would doubtless have said that against the puritan appeal to timeless law any argument was bound to have the kind of shape that his exhibits—a 'proscriptive' style, denying the other's right to argue. Whether he would be right (about puritans or about the ethics of argument in general) is another matter; but he is certainly out to deny that argument is possible where there is no agreement on what might count as criteria. If the history of human discernment is being ruled out, there are things that will not be allowed to count as making arguments good or bad, valid or invalid. At the least, he is identifying a problem that has become depressingly familiar of late.

So Hooker's immediate political concerns lead him inexorably to what is in effect an appeal to the biblical doctrine of creation: God desires a variety of created goods, so that as many ways as possible will be realised for his glory to be reflected; and this means law, natural, social and ecclesial. The most basic form of rebellion is to refuse the limits that make 'compatible variety' possible, whether this is sinful denial of what is 'naturally' owed to God, self and neighbour, revolt against duly constituted authority in the realm or the attack on episcopal governance. Such rebellion suggests that it is for creatures to define the limits of compatible variety, not God; to redraw the contract of the universe. We can hear Shakespeare's Ulysses in the background on un-tuning the string of order, and the deep metaphysical fear that sedition aroused in Hooker's day.

This set of connections doesn't come all that naturally to us. But it may not hurt to be reminded that the whole notion of law takes for granted more of a world-view than we might have bargained for. If we approach law as simply the process of mutual contract between rational individuals, expressed through a neutral and in principle universal tribunal, we shall miss several things of cardinal importance about our human practice. Certainly law adjudicates conflicts of interest, assuming that no-one's legitimate interest is beyond scrutiny or control. But this in turn assumes that what is good for any one person or group can't be defined once and for all just in relation to that person's or group's views of the matter. No-one's good can be understood as lawfully requiring someone else to suffer or be deprived. So the notion of law, as it were, smuggles into our social practice a basic presupposition about negoti-

ating with the other before you can presume to say definitively what is good for you. And Hooker goes a little further by saying that this is not simply a negative matter, avoiding unnecessary conflicts between groups and persons; lawful society is also society in which each element is likely to need goods and services from the other, and the law regulates and facilitates the flow of mutual usefulness. In this respect, Hooker stands with those who, in the seventeenth century and after, assumed that lawful freedom was not simply the negative liberty of entitlement to rights but the positive liberty of being able to negotiate on your own behalf—that is, he stands closer to the common law heritage of legal thinking than to a rationalist universalism.

Law assumes, then, that we do not 'begin' socially as a set of unrelated atoms, whether individuals, classes, races, or interest groups. Our basic position is one of potential agents in a negotiation through which we discover our welfare, discover something we do not know at the start. As some Hegelian scholars have put it, we begin by staking a position that is inevitably mistaken, and we work through our mistakes in conversation, bargaining and self-examination. These social, civic, and, as Hooker would put it, 'sociable' practices are the actual means of finding out what our common humanity is; they are means of revelation, not quite in the sense that Scripture is such in Hooker's theology, but definitely the process by which God's purpose is clarified. That purpose, for Hooker and his contemporaries, is fully specified by what God tells us, in the history of Israel, in Jesus, and in the record of Scripture. How it is to be lived out in detail in this or that setting requires the sociable exercise of reasoning together. And since therefore one of the things we have to discover is how to live out the fact that we exist in fellowship with God and the angels and saints, the Church on earth must give a value to this sociability, to the civic virtues of reasoned argument and the common life of ordered prayer. Appeal to Scripture as a comprehensive law book in the puritan sense implies that the civic and the social simply do not have the value that Scripture itself seems to give them by its doctrine of creation and of the Body of Christ. Hooker is able, in his fifth book, to make a triumphantly unexpected case for the value of church music and of responsive praying in the liturgy on the basis of the need for our whole selves to be involved in worship and for us to be of service to one another by visibly and audibly responding to each other's words. 'Abundance' is yet again the issue in view: the social character of worship, including song and ritual conversation, shows that we are discovering something

together, and that the full variety of what can be brought to light in God's presence will only appear when we 'own' our complex physical selves and our presence to each other. Hooker is a thinker who begins from the idea that we are engaged in solidarities long before we are properly aware of ourselves as individuals. When we do start to become aware, we are liable to see things wrongly and oddly, and have to learn the truth by the long process of mutual engagement. The problem with the puritan ideology he opposes is that it seeks to bypass the given character of solidarity, through history, custom and what might be called the process of 'settlement', the discernment that emerges over time in a fairly stable community. In this sense, he is someone who seems to give a kind of priority to 'common law' rather than any fundamental theory of universal legal rights. This perspective is what surfaces again in the Catholic liberalism of Lord Acton and his followers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in 'pluralists' like John Neville Figgis—a liberalism utterly at odds with the individualist assumptions usually associated with the term. In this connection, the liberal is someone who is sceptical about centralising and universalising claims for law and political practice, and who understands the life of the state as essentially the negotiation of differences, the creation of a community of communities, to use the phrase beloved of Figgis.

It is a paradoxical route for Hooker's influence to follow, since he is nothing if not an apologist for what seems to us a wholly monolithic state, united in religion and custom. But what I have been trying to suggest is that Hooker's interest in 'abundance' and his picture of law as the condition for compatible variety in fact assume that diversity is the starting point, not a single human source of binding authority. While it is hard to imagine him in the context of a culturally and religiously diverse modern society, and while his justification of state control upon religious diversity presupposes what is now a problematically organic picture of political life, his resistance to the philosophy of timeless legal regulation through Scripture lays some of the foundation for a radically different set of conclusions. What he undoubtedly would not understand is the odd assumption of the modern secularist (much in evidence in the recent British parliamentary debates over the Assisted Dying Bill) that the only 'rational' arguments are those advanced by people who acknowledge no pre-existing solidarities or metaphysical commitments. I suspect that he would see such disputants as the heirs of the puritans, in search of some godless equivalent for Scriptural authority—a set of timeless rules for abstract persons.

And this in turn might suggest a thought or two about our contemporary standoffs between militant Islam and militant Western rationalism. The radical Islamist, like Hooker's opponents, takes Scripture as a text whose history of interpretation can be disregarded—in a way incomprehensible to the traditional Muslim, for whom Sharia law is not a single timeless code, but the deposit of argument and judgement. And the most effective response is not to look for another absolutism but to argue for the virtue of argument, for the 'interactive pluralism' of a society that recognises that it is composed of diverse cultural bodies and convictions, which need to learn their need of each other for the sake of their own flourishing. A merely rationalist universalism of law, confining diversity, religious and otherwise, to the private sphere, isolates and paralyses each community's understanding of the good as surely as it shrinks and trivialises the cultural and religious identities of individuals, reducing personal commitments to consumer options bolted on to a basic 'rational' and secular identity.

Hooker's treatise is thus a good deal more than a museum piece. It poses some very central questions about the nature and purpose of law, questions which bear on many current questions about how to manage a multi-cultural and multi-religious state without adopting an oppressive insistence upon public secularity. Hooker was the ally of a regime which, in modern eyes, was seeking to destroy religious liberty; yet the mode of his defence was potentially a ground for making sense of certain aspects of religious diversity. What allows his system to have such an odd and counter-intuitive application is simply his most basic theological conviction: the world exists so that God may be imitated and participated as diversely as possible. So far from belief in the Incarnation of God the Son limiting the range and vitality of human difference, we now have in this doctrine a ground for discerning how diversity may be harmonised by seeing differences as distinct ways of offering the one eternal gift of God's life to each other so that each distinct subject becomes able to reflect God's life more completely. Belief in the Body of Christ gives us the means of discerning where and how diversity becomes symphonic. Of course it does not do so automatically, and there is no charter here for simple post-modern or consumerist plurality—an abundance of possible possessions surveyed by a set of monolithic, undifferentiated choosing wills. But Hooker's world is one shaped by a maker's intention; and that intention is unmistakeably the diffusion of bliss in a world of history and difference, a world therefore of argument and interpretation, even, we could say, of that intellectual

charity which takes trouble with the recalcitrant stranger in order to make him or her a partner in discourse.

Hooker spent some formative—if appallingly difficult—years in the atmosphere of the Inns of Court. It would be nice to think that his valuation of certain habits of thought and relationship was nurtured here—his concern for responsible interpretation, his concern for the possibilities of (in every sense) civil speech. But the fundamental motor of his thought remains his theology of Christ's Body—that society, the model of every true and functioning society, in which we are constantly learning how to receive at each other's hands and to become ourselves in God's sight, through the crosses and resurrections of 'sociable' existence. Law is the guardian of compatible variety: a bland statement at first sight, perhaps; but if that variety is ultimately the unimaginable diversity of ways in which the beauty of the face of God in Jesus Christ can be made visible—no, anything but bland.

INTRODUCTION

W. J. Torrance Kirby

It is now thirty years since the publication in 1977 of the first volume of the *Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker* under the able direction of William Speed Hill, general editor. Since then—and to a considerable extent spurred on by the appearance of this splendid new critical edition—there has been a remarkable resurgence of scholarly interest in the ideas of this eminent Elizabethan scholar, philosopher, and theologian. As the Select Bibliography of this present volume reveals, a great many books, articles, and collections of essays devoted to the study of Hooker have appeared within this time span, and indeed the circle of interest has grown larger at a steadily increasing pace. The Folger edition of the complete *Works* (including recently discovered MSS and Autograph Notes) including full textual 'Introductions and Commentary' in two large volumes, together with a comprehensive 'Index of Names and Works' cited throughout, took twenty-one years to bring to completion.[1] Prior to the launch of the Folger Edition, an excellent introductory collection of critical essays titled *Studies in Richard Hooker* (1972), also edited by Hill, offered a valuable digest of the current state of scholarly criticism and served to shape the discussion of the last three decades.[2] A significant number of the contributors to this present volume—Hill, Gibbs, Grislis, McGrade, and Stanwood—were key players in the Folger edition and collaborated in that inaugural volume of criticism. Another valuable collection of critical studies was published under the editorship of A. S. McGrade following an international conference held at the Folger Shakespeare Library and Washington National Cathedral in 1993 to mark the

[1] W. Speed Hill, gen. ed., *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, vols. 1–5 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977–1990); vol. 6, 'Introductions and Commentary' in 2 parts, & vol. 7 'Index of Names and Works' (Binghamton, New York: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1993–98). See also by the same author 'Editing Richard Hooker: A Retrospective,' *Sewanee Theological Review. A Celebration of Richard Hooker.* 36.2 (Easter 1993): 187–199.

[2] W. Speed Hill, ed., *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works.* Cleveland, OH: Press of Case Western Univ., 1972.

quater-centenary of the first edition of Books I–IV of Hooker's great treatise *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*.[3] Papers were contributed to the Washington conference by the above mentioned, and in addition by Almasy, Neelands, Patterson, Shuger, and Kirby, thus doubling the number of companions. Other important collections of essays have also appeared in recent years.[4] Most recently, the circle of the present company was enlarged with the publication of another volume of critical studies under the title *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation* with the continuing contribution of several of those mentioned above and with Eppley, Harrison, and Stafford coming on board.[5] With this continuous building of momentum in Hookerian studies over the past generation, the current portrait offered in this Brill *Companion to Hooker* is in some need of explanation, perhaps even justification. Is there really room for yet another collection of interpretative essays?

The present volume aims to be distinctive in its attempt to provide a comprehensive and systematic introduction to Richard Hooker's life, works, thought, and reputation. The aim of the *Companion* is to bring together a representative body of contributors in order to synthesize current trends in criticism and to summarize the state of scholarly debate. Readers of this volume will very quickly discover that a key hermeneutical issue dominating current scholarly debates concerns Hooker's relation to the doctrinal authority of the so-called 'magisterial' reformers of the sixteenth century. To what extent can Hooker be regarded as in the mainstream of Protestant reform? In 1599 an anonymous tract titled *A Christian Letter*, identified only as having been authored by 'certaine English Protestantes, unfayned favourers of the present state of religion, authorized and professed in England,' set out to portray Richard Hooker's theology as inconsistent with

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[3] Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed., *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1997). The editio princeps: *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Eyght Books by Richard Hooker* (London: John Windet, 1593 [*STC* 13712]).

[4] See the recent collection of essays edited by William Haugaard in the *Anglican Theological Review* 84.4 (Fall, 2002). In the past decade other anthologies have appeared in *Churchman* 114.1 (2000), ed. Gerald Bray; the *Journal of Religious History* 21 (1997), ed. Bruce Kaye; see also John E. Booty, ed., *A Celebration of Richard Hooker* (on the 400th Anniversary of Hooker's *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*), *Sewanee Theological Review* 36.2 (Easter 1993); and Donald S. Armentrout, ed., *This Sacred History: Anglican Reflections for John Booty* (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990).

[5] W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed., *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation* (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).

established norms of Reformed doctrinal orthodoxy, chief among them the Thirty-Nine Articles approved by Parliament in 1571. The *Letter* accused Hooker of promoting "Romish doctrine" and "the darknesse of schoole learning," chiefly on the ground of his theological claims concerning the capacity of the human faculties of intellect and will with respect to conditions of both nature and grace. As Diarmaid MacCulloch demonstrates in the final chapter below, Hooker's reputation, especially concerning such matters as these, has fluctuated to a remarkable degree over the intervening centuries. While throughout the later nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries Hooker was almost universally perceived as the defender (and, by some, even the inventor) of an Anglican *via media* between the extremes of Roman Catholicism and continental Protestant Reform, more recently a revisionist interpretation has emerged which casts Hooker in the role of magisterial defender of the essentially Reformed character of the Elizabethan religious settlement. Thus scholarly opinion today might well be described as divided between those who, like the authors of *A Christian Letter*, entertain a deep suspicion of Hooker's credentials as a mainstream Reformer, and others who are equally convinced that these anonymous sixteenth-century critics fundamentally misconstrued his theology as inimical to Reformed orthodoxy. Contributions to this volume reflect fairly evenly this current division of scholarly opinion; and thus, it is hoped, the *Companion* will provide readers with a useful survey of the current state of Hookerian Studies together with a comprehensive introduction to the major themes of Richard Hooker's life, thought, published works, and later influence.

In his account of the 'Life of Hooker' Lee Gibbs reviews past biographies, including works by John Gauden (1662), Izaak Walton (1665), C. J. Sisson (1938), David Novarr (1958), Philip Secor (1999), and Georges Edelen (1999). Gibbs defines Hooker chiefly as a learned philosophical theologian who was also an engaged polemicist. More specifically, he depicts Hooker as defending a Church establishment that he was both helping to bring into existence and also definitively shaping for future centuries. Gibbs concludes that the controversial stance Hooker took on several major issues of his day probably cost him dearly in terms of his own preferment within the very church establishment he sought to defend and helped to create—notably, his positions on predestination, salvation within the Church of Rome, the origin and nature of the episcopacy, and an English constitutional monarchy.

In a chapter introducing 'Works and Editions' Paul Stanwood addresses the principal context and occasion of Richard Hooker's homiletic and literary career, from the Sermons and Tractates to his major treatise *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, and notes the reasons for his undertaking these activities, the support he received, and the immediate audience for whom he designed his works. This chapter considers, moreover, the growth and development of the *Ecclesiasticall Politie* and speculates on the nature and order of its composition by referring especially to Hooker's autograph notes (mainly for Book VIII), and his other preparatory materials. Stanwood continues with an account of the publication of Hooker's works during his own lifetime, as well as posthumously by describing their manuscript and printed traditions in the seventeenth century and concludes by examining subsequent editorial interventions, notably John Keble's in the earlier nineteenth century and the most recent Folger Library Edition.

The following chapter by A. S. McGrade examines Richard Hooker's classical, patristic, and medieval sources and offers an account of the frequency of citation by authors and classes of authors (early and late, Greek and Latin) in the various parts of Hooker's work. McGrade distinguishes between texts brought forward by others (for example, Hooker's reformist opponents or previous apologists for the Church of England cited in the *Lawes*) and texts brought into the English debate by Hooker himself. Distinctive characteristics of Hooker's use of the cited texts are discussed in turn. One such characteristic in particular focuses on Hooker's tendency to give greater attention to historical context than do his opponents or earlier apologists. McGrade also compares Hooker's use of patristic and medieval sources with the use of similar material by major continental Reformation and Counter-Reformation authors.

The Elizabethan period was marked by heated theological exchanges as writers sought to ridicule, discredit, or vilify their opponents. Much was at stake: the religious identity of England, its international allegiances, and the character of the established Church of England. Brown Patterson traces the course of these exchanges, including that between Roman Catholics and defenders of the established Church and that between Puritan nonconformists and conformists to the established Church in a chapter titled 'Elizabethan theological polemics'. Patterson analyses the attacks on episcopacy by the writers of the 'Marprelate' tracts and the challenge presented by advocates of independent, local congregations. Hooker, who engaged in a vigorous debate with the

Puritan Walter Travers, his colleague at the Temple church in the mid-1580s, subsequently lent his formidable talents to an anti-Puritan campaign by writing the *Lawes*. Brown Patterson's chapter shows how important contemporary theological polemics are for an understanding of Hooker's major work.

In a textually specific sequel to Patterson's general account of Elizabethan polemics, Rudolph Almasy explores the rhetorical basis of Hooker's defence of the established Elizabethan Church in his treatment of the 'Rhetoric and Apologetics' of the *Lawes*. Almasy argues that this defence is shaped by the three broad interests of rhetoric: first, the nature or ethos of the rhetor, that is, how Hooker cleverly constructs himself as participant in the debate as well as judge. This proceeds to a general discussion of how and why Hooker came to exercise power over his audiences and his opponents. Secondly, there is the notion of audience itself: who is the audience—or audiences—and how is the opponent constructed to match Hooker's rhetorical purposes as they are directed to such an audience? Thirdly, Almasy provides a description of the discourse itself or, in rhetorical terms, the 'oration' and addresses the question how the discourse is arranged, and how the problem of the defence—in its seven-fold proposition—is conceived, stated, analyzed, and concluded. Although Hooker's discourse reveals a distinctive style and strives for eloquence, it appears finally to be in search of truth or *logos*. Nonetheless, the rhetorical nature of Hooker's discursive performance, as this chapter suggests, always and inevitably colours the search for truth with the matters of power and politics addressed.

With his discussion of 'Sin and Grace,' Ranall Ingalls initiates a sequence of three chapters which address Hooker's theological 'first principles'. Scholarly disagreement concerning the interpretation of Hooker's soteriology centres chiefly upon the question of his relation to the Magisterial Reformation and, in particular, to the authority of Augustine set out in the anti-Pelagian treatises. By taking a close look at a series of sermons preached by Hooker during his tenure as Master of the Temple, and later published under the title *A Learned Discourse on Justification*, Ingalls shows how Hooker's teaching there about original sin, grace through Christ alone, saving faith, and works (*solus Christus, sola gratia, sola fides*) stands over against the teaching of the council of Trent and with the early reformers. According to Ingalls, Hooker's account of the doctrine of grace in terms of justification, sanctification, and glorification constitutes a 'pure evangelical theology'. In particular

he engages Nigel Voak's restatement of John Henry Newman's thesis that Hooker distances himself in his later writings from this early evangelical position and presents a survey of what Hooker says about these matters in the *Lawes* and the *Dublin Fragments*. In response to the 'Newman thesis' Ingalls argues that Hooker works within and interprets the Reformation soteriological consensus to which he adheres without departing from it or from Augustine.

Although Hooker was apparently criticized for unorthodox positions with respect to the 'comfortable doctrine of Predestination,' David Neelands's survey of the topic in all of his published works indicates a careful adherence to the standards of the Reformed Church of England and little evidence for a change of position. Hooker was, nevertheless, of an independent mind with respect to the growing emphasis on the related concept of assurance, and relied much more on Augustine rather than on Calvin for his theological underpinning. Neelands argues that Hooker was able to avoid affirming any sense of a double unconditional decree and was thus able to hold that, in some sense, God's grace is resistible, and also that there might be a temporary faith and justification.

In a third essay treating Hooker's soteriology, Debora Shuger explores the question of how his understanding of assurance differs from that developed in 'puritan' pastoral theology (e.g., by William Perkins and Richard Greenham) in response to the same problem of a conscience anguished and terrified by its own lack of faith. Shuger observes a large overlap between them, but Hooker alone links the pastoral problem to the Thomist epistemic distinction between certainty of evidence and certainty of assurance. Unlike the English Calvinists, Hooker casts the problem less in terms of subjective, personal assurance of salvation than as faith in the objectivity of God's justice, goodness, fidelity, etc.—a shift in emphasis also visible in Samuel Harsnett's amazing momentous 1584 Paul's Cross sermon denouncing double predestination.

All but two of the remaining contributions to the *Companion* address in turn the principal divisions of Hooker's *magnum opus, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*. In the first book of the *Lawes* Hooker constructs a systematic generic division of the different aspects of law. Torrance Kirby considers Hooker's exposition of this governing idea of law in terms of a classical '*logos*' theology where the divine nature itself is identified with the essence of law: 'The being of God is a kind of law to his working.' Kirby summarises Hooker's account of the *summa genera* of law: the eternal law (distinguished by him into 'First' and 'Second'

species), the natural law, and the divine law revealed in the scriptures, with the two latter 'proceeding' from the Eternal Law as their original source. Hooker presents a system of laws as hierarchically ordered emanations consistent with ancient, received Christian Neo-platonic cosmology. The natural law manifests a divine '*processio*' of order in the act of creation from its original source in the eternal law, while the divine law reveals supernaturally the way of redemptive 'return' to the same source. Hooker's exposition of what is arguably the governing paradigm of the entire treatise is most remarkable for its synthesis of the cosmology of Christian Neoplatonism with the doctrinal claims of magisterial Protestant reform.

Egil Grislis takes up the critical Reformation question of the relative authority of natural human reason and the revealed wisdom of the holy Scriptures and in his discussion of 'Scriptural Hermeneutics' in Book II of the *Lawes*. Firmly believing that the Scriptures are the inspired Word of God, and illuminated by the Holy Spirit to believers, Hooker nevertheless acknowledged, that mortal finitude and sin limited human understanding. However, this circumstance was not wholly beyond help. Grislis shows that for Hooker, even natural, sinful reason could serve as an initial guide to a literal understanding of biblical words and texts; assisted by the Holy Spirit, reason redeemed by grace could become an even more reliable guide. The final step to the acknowledgment that the Scriptures are the Word of God, however, was a mystical experience—but not infallible. A high degree of reliability in the act of interpretation was assured by the truly wise and judicious from within the Church, i.e. by adherence to the authority of tradition.

William Harrison takes up the question of Hooker's doctrine of the Church, and shows how the ecclesiology of Book III is rooted in his sacramental theology and his sense of history as affecting cultural contexts. On these grounds, Hooker argues that the church has both extensive powers and significant responsibilities in the world. Harrison draws out the institutional implications of Hooker's hermeneutical stance. Hooker's ecclesiology rests upon his claim that the intellect is native to humanity and has its own abilities unimpaired by sin. However, the church does not act without divine assistance. As a human 'politique societie' the church has the capacity to make laws for itself, on the strength of its God-given reason. Because of the sacramental nature of the church, it depends upon the work of the Holy Spirit to inform its corporate intelligence. Harrison argues that Hooker is one of the early participants in the 'discovery of history' which is at the root of

modernity. He argues, moreover, that Hooker demonstrates the necessity of grounding ecclesiology in the customs inherited by the culture in which it functions and that Hooker makes a compelling case for ensuring that the Church be order in a manner suited to that culture. Thus, for Hooker the reformed English church is right to continue to follow some inherited pre-Reformation practices, while modifying others to fit its own purposes.

An eminently important aspect of Hooker's work was his defence of the liturgy of the Church of England, embodied in its *Book of Common Prayer*. Book V of the *Lawes* by itself is longer by half than the first four books taken together. James Turrell shows how Hooker took great pains to advocate both the necessity of uniformity in worship, decreed by proper authority, and the rightness of the particular liturgical choices made by the leadership of the established church. Turrell's chapter examines a selection of the most significant particular positions Hooker set out in Book V of the *Lawes*, and places them within the context of the ongoing debate between puritans and conformists over ceremonies in the Church of England. Turrell seeks to show ways in which Hooker's arguments went further than those of many conformists, particularly in his advocating the positive theological value of ritual and ceremony. Finally, this chapter notes the ways in which Hooker's arguments prefigured those employed in later liturgical controversies in the early-modern Church of England.

In the midst of the fifth book, Hooker devoted a substantial treatise to a survey of the development of orthodox Patristic Christology as a preparation for his treatment of the sacraments. In his chapter on 'Christology and the Sacraments', David Neelands shows that Hooker adopted a Christological stance developed from the position the fourth-century Father, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and that this related the approach taken in the *Lawes* more closely to Martin Luther than to Calvin. At the same time, Hooker's treatment of Baptism and the Eucharist shows a careful absorption of the received reformed orthodoxy of the English church and an explicit rejection of Lutheran and Roman Catholic positions as he understood them. Neelands argues that Hooker adopts an account resembling symbolic instrumentalism in the *Lawes*. In the *Dublin Fragments*, however, he adopts an account resembling the earlier symbolic parallelism. Substantially orthodox, Hooker developed an original account of the relationship of the believer and Christ in the sacraments through his important theological formulation of the Neoplatonic concept of 'participation'.

In his essay on the 'Orders of Ministry' Corneliu Simuț presents the essentials of Richard Hooker's pastoral theology as presented in closing chapters of Book V. Hooker offers a definition of ministry closely connected to the reformed idea of salvation as God's initiative. The clergy receive special power from God for ministry while the laity practically carry out this ministry by the exercise of spiritual gifts. For Hooker, the role of the Holy Spirit in ministry is thus of paramount importance because it is God himself through the Spirit who works in and by means of the clergy. The orders of ministry are fundamentally twofold: they are distinguished as presbyters (Hooker does not favour use of the term 'priest') and deacons, and both must be formally ordained for ministry. Some presbyters are elevated to the status of bishops, successors to the apostles and to whom the church has delegated the power of jurisdiction and order, including the power to ordain new members to the orders of presbyters and deacons. In defence of tithing Hooker claims that clergy and laity must actively support Christian ministry because the wealth of Christians is in fact God's own property. By offering tithes Christians give from what they own in order to demonstrate outwardly their constant love for God. The Christian believers' love for God, however, must also extend beyond parish churches into a ministry to the entire world. Simuț shows that this should be made possible because ordination is valid beyond the limits of parish churches—as, e.g., in the context of the universities—and God's ministers must always be well trained both in their spiritual calling and practical ministry as well as humbly preoccupied with the common public good.

In his 1593 Preface, Hooker promised four Books on 'particulars' to follow upon the 'generallities' treated in Books I through IV. Two of the former were to be Book VI on the church's laws concerning spiritual jurisdiction, and Book VII on its episcopal regiment. In his chapter on 'Jurisdiction and the Keys' Dean Kernan explores the groundwork for both in Book V (1597) in order to elucidate linked aspects of Hooker's treatment of jurisdiction in Books VI and VII. Heated controversy over the legality of the church's right to enforce conformity in the period 1584 to 1593 especially shapes the structure of Hooker's argument. According to Kernan, an unfinished version of Book VI (as published eventually in 1648) develops the theological justification for the church's claim to jurisdiction, and effectively underwrites the need for ecclesiastical courts, the canon law, and the church's power to exercise discipline over its members. A plausible outline can be constructed for a finished sixth book from Hooker's notes and elsewhere, which suggests how

Hooker may have applied these insights to the laws and courts of the Church of England, as well as how he might have argued against proposed presbyterian models of ecclesiastical discipline. A. S. McGrade takes up the thread with his exploration of Book VII where Hooker carefully extends his argument for the necessity of an episcopal hierarchy and for its legitimacy in holding governmental functions within both church and commonwealth, while arguing also that the institution of episcopacy is based upon the consent of the church.

In the succeeding chapter Daniel Eppley focuses on the arguments employed by Hooker in Book VIII of the *Lawes* to defend the institution of 'Royal Supremacy' over the English Church. Eppley discusses Hooker's famous treatment of the royal power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction Hooker's in light of his hermeneutics, ecclesiology, legal theory, Christology, *etc*., as presented in sermons and the preceding books of the *Lawes*. He analyses the manner in which Hooker used these philosophical and theological ideas in order to justify and broaden the powers claimed for the civil magistrate over the church. Eppley also addresses Hooker's conception of the relative powers of Crown and Parliament in the actual exercise of the royal ecclesiastical supremacy.

The extant sermons of Richard Hooker present a remarkably rich synthesis of his theology and ecclesiology. In his discussion of the 'Practical Divinity' of these writings, John Stafford seeks to illustrate the extent to which these sermons reveal Hooker to be a man of deep pastoral insight and vision, and how they bring into view a unique sense of convergence of the theoretical and practical elements of his thought. Stafford's essay centres specifically on an analysis of *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*—Hooker's exposition of Habakkuk 2:4. The sermon reveals Hooker displaying all of his skills as Biblical exegete, theologian, rational debater, and concerned pastor. Stafford concludes further that while Hooker's theology remained firmly located within the limits established by such key Reformation doctrinal parameters as justification by faith and *sola scriptura*, Hooker's view of reform was nonetheless considerably more generous than that proposed by his Puritan counterparts.

In the final essay of the Companion, Diarmaid MacCulloch offers an incisive summary of Hooker's 'Reputation and Reception'. MacCulloch argues that Hooker, particularly in the latter part of his career, established his own idiosyncratic theological stance. Before his death in 1600, debate over his aims and theological orientation was initiated in 1599 by the publication of an anonymous tract *A Christian Letter of*

certaine English Protestantes; very quickly Hooker's authority was claimed by rival parties in the English Church and he gained an authoritative status. MacCulloch's essay on the *rezeptionsgeschichte* explores varied attempts to appropriate him down to the nineteenth century: namely by such diverse parties as Laudian High-churchmen, their evangelical and latitudinarian opponents, Tories, Whigs, even dissenters and deists. MacCulloch shows how Tories stressed the 'high' features of his ecclesiology and were embarrassed by his justification of political consent and contract; how Whigs claimed him as a spiritual ancestor, although in the full sun of Enlightenment Bishop William Warburton came to view him as an opponent of some significance. Only with the determined annexation of his memory by the Oxford Tractarians in the wake of the 1836 edition of his works by John Keble did Hooker's memory become comparatively uncontested, at least until the development of modern scholarly controversy. It is hoped that some significant element of the latter will be revealed in succeeding pages of this Brill *Companion to Richard Hooker*.

This volume is dedicated to the memory of Speed Hill, general editor of *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, whose Herculean efforts brought this splendid new critical edition into the light of day.



Portrait of Richard Hooker engraved by E. Finden 'from a very rare print by Hollar.' *The Ecclesiastical Polity and Other Works of Richard Hooker.* Edited by Benjamin Hanbury. 3 vols. London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1830.

CHAPTER ONE

LIFE OF HOOKER

Lee W. Gibbs

Richard Hooker was an Elizabethan polemicist who is remembered today as the author of his *magnum opus, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie: Eyght Bookes* (published between 1593 and 1662). This monumental treatise was primarily written to defend the Elizabethan church against the attacks of the Elizabethan Presbyterians at the end of the 16th century. Careful secondary attention, however, was also given to the refutation of what he and his conformist contemporaries perceived to be the 'errors' of the Church of Rome. In his writings Hooker decisively shaped this *via media* between the Protestant Reformation and Roman Catholicism that has been so distinctive of what in later centuries became known as 'Anglicanism'. Hooker's philosophical and theological writings set forth in elegant English prose the ethical, political and religious presuppositions of his age. Theologians, past and present, correlate his practical principle—'all things in measure, number and weight'—with his dynamic balancing of the respective authority of Scripture, reason and tradition. The 'middle way' describes not only Hooker's distinctive way of thinking but also his character, including his life style and his approach to making moral and political decisions in the world. This middle way of thinking and being in the world probably 'cost him' in terms of his personal preferment in that Church of England which he was both defending and helping to bring into existence. Almost without fail, where radically divergent interpretations of his life and thought occur, the most proper approach is to follow the more Catholic principle of '*both… and*' rather than the more protestant principle of '*either… or*'. When the question has been raised by interpreters whether Hooker is a systematic, philosophical theologian or an engaged polemicist the answer is that he must be '*both… and*'.

Even 'The Fyrst Booke *Concerning Lawes, and their severall kinds in generall*,' although couched in non-controversial language, lays the foundation for all the anti-disciplinarian arguments of the later books. Book I is thus a general introduction to a work that is first a practical polemic written

to defend the constitution and practices of the Church of England as established by the Elizabethan settlement against the attack of critics who desired further reform and, secondly, a definitive expression of the balanced reformed-catholic theology that was being formulated in England during the sixteenth century by such figures and Thomas Cranmer and John Jewel. While Book I functions as the general introduction to a sustained polemic, it also lays the foundations for a coherent philosophical theology. The peculiar strength and appeal of Book I is the manner in which it resolves—or *appears* to resolve—the contradictions inherent in being an apologetic yet philosophical theologian. As Gibbs wrote in his 'Introduction to Book I' of the *Folger Library Edition of Hooker's Works*:

> The fundamental problem in the interpretation of book 1 is therefore that of setting an apparently serene essay in philosophical theology within the context of the practical crisis faced by the Elizabethan church during the closing decades of the sixteenth century, for it is the distinction of Book 1, both within the *Lawes* and as compared to the works of contemporary controversialists, that Hookers' role as detached philosophical theologian and engaged polemicist writing on behalf of an established church appear to have seamless coalesced.[1]

Hooker's statements support both a high-church and a Magisterial Reformation evangelical (Lutheran and Calvinist) point of view.[2] Hooker said many different things in different ways so that past and present biographers have been able to draw upon his authority to support widely divergent points of view.[3] Furthermore, since Hooker's previous biographers tended to pick out different aspects of his thought or character which fit with their own personal perspective and needs, it is impossible to write a contemporary account of Hooker's life and works which does not take some account of these earlier biographies.

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[1] See Lee W. Gibbs, 'Introduction to Book I,' *FLE* 6(1): 88–89; see William Haugaard's comments: 'Irenicism and polemics, constructive theology and [polemical] rhetoric: each pervades the *Lawes*'. See 'Introduction to the Preface,' *FLE* 1:80.

[2] For a history of diverse interpretations see C. F. Diarmaid MacCulloch, 'Richard Hooker's Reputation,' *English Historical Review* 117 (2002): 801–92; and chapter XX below.

[3] The question has been debated whether Hooker should best be viewed as a successor to the late medieval scholastics or as a Protestant, evangelical reformer. The most accurate response is that he was both. See Egil Grislis in 'Introduction to Commentary on Tractates and Sermons'. In these documents he most significantly identified Hooker's primary sources after Scripture as the works of John Calvin and Thomas Aquinas, *FLE* 5:619–55.

Previous Biographies

The first biography of Hooker,[4] written by John Gauden, the Restoration Bishop of Exeter, was published in 1662 as a Preface to Gauden's new edition of Hooker's *Works*. Although Books VI (against the Presbyterian office of lay elders) and VIII (on the Royal Supremacy) of Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* had appeared in 1648, the year when episcopacy and monarchy were falling, Gauden's edition was the first to contain Book VII which deals with the origin and nature of episcopacy. Gauden endorsed all three of these last three posthumously published books of the *Lawes* as 'legitimate progeny'—although, he continued, 'they have not that last polish that their author is so customarily recognized for.'

Although Bishop of Exeter, Gauden was a moderate who held a generally Low-Church position with regard to the institution of episcopacy, limited in the direction of functioning as a presbyterian synod. Gauden probably therefore welcomed Hooker's view of the episcopacy reflected in Book VII because of what he understood to be its moderate position on the question of the origin and authority of the office. Gauden not only presents Hooker as a bulwark against nonconformity. He also speaks of the conflict caused, despite Hooker's efforts, not only by nonconformists but also by high churchmen overzealous for church ceremonial.

Gauden's narrative left much to be desired, especially from the perspective of the leadership of the newly re-established Church in England after the Restoration of 1660. This initial biography was marred by many historical inaccuracies, and it often presented Hooker in a rather unfavourable light. Gauden's depiction of Hooker's mediocrity as a college student and in the years thereafter, for example, was far from flattering. For example he wrote,

> While Mr. Hooker continued in *Corpus Christi College*, few men of any note in either University, but promised more then he did, as to any great and publique undertaking: Not that he wanted a publique spirit, or excellent

[4] *Richard Hooker. . . . An Account of his Holy Life and Happy Death*, in *The Works of Richard Mr. Hooker . . . in Eight Books of Ecclesiastical Polity, Now compleated* (London: Printed by J. Best, for Andrew Crook, 1662), 3–37.

> abilities in Nature and Education; but he was so locked up and reserved by a natural modesty, and *self deficiency* or distrust.[5]

Gauden's portrait of Hooker in later life is no more flattering.

> The uneasiness of his small maintenance [at Oxford], and his willingness to go out to the wider World, invited him to accept the offer of a small Living called *Buscomb*, in the West; thence *Anno* 1584, he was removed to *Drayton Beauchamp* in *Lincolnshire*, no very great Benefice; *Anno* 1592. He had the Dignities of a Prebendary in Salisbury, and the Subdeanery bestowed on him; and by the Queen he was preferred to be *Master of the Temple*;…hence *Anno* 1594 he was removed to his last station, at *Bishopsbourn* in *Kent*, and was made also Prebend of *Canterbury*.[6]

Gauden's account was further distorted because he was not aware that Hooker had married, and this oversight led him to misread and misdate many of the important events in Hooker's life. Moreover, the Restoration Church needed in Hooker a champion who supported the by then widely accepted doctrines of the apostolic succession of bishops and the reign of monarchs *de jure divino*. Gauden's endorsement of the authenticity of the controversial last three Books (VI, VII, and VIII) of Hooker's *Lawes* tended to portray Hooker as an advocate of a reduced view of the episcopacy and of constitutional monarchy limited by law and grounded in the consent of the people. Gilbert Sheldon, former Bishop of London who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1663, commissioned Izaak Walton (1593–1683), a layperson, whose reputation as a strong royalist with a high view of the episcopacy and a lover of high church ceremonial, to repair the damage.[7]

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[5] Gauden, *Life*, 13, cited by David Novarr, *The Making of Walton's* 'Lives' (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), 224.

[6] Gauden, *Life*, 35, cited by Novarr, *Making of Walton's* 'Lives,' 249.

[7] *The life of Mr. Rich. Hooker, the author of those learned books of the laws of ecclesiastical polity*…(London: J. G[rismond] for Richard Marriott, 1665). David Novarr has demonstrated how Walton fulfilled his official commission to undermine the authenticity of the last three Books of the *Lawes* not only by tarnishing the reputation of Hooker's wife, Joan Churchman, but also by perpetrating the story that Hooker's widow cooperated with Puritan conspirators who stole, burned, or interpolated the manuscript copies of the last three books which, Walton claimed, had been completed or perfected (Novarr, *Walton's* 'Lives,' 197–298). Jessica Martin has criticized Novarr for judging Walton by the evolved standards of mid-twentieth-century historical scholarship concerning the genre of biography which had not yet come into existence in Walton's time—a criticism which, however, leaves all of Novarr's most important insights concerning Walton's sources and methods of reconstructing Hooker's life intact. See Jessica Martin, *Walton's Lives: Conformist Commemorations and the Rise of Biographies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 313–14.

The Life of Mr. Rich. Hooker by Izaak Walton, published separately when it originally appeared in 1665, has been more responsible than any other for what thereafter became the traditional conception of Hooker's life and character.[8] Walton's portrait of Hooker was that of a judicious, mild-mannered, brilliant person who yearned for the quietness of a country living and domestic tranquillity but who was vexed by the major controversies of his time and a shrew of a wife. Historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries generally continued to accept Walton's image of this 'dove-like,' 'hen-pecked' Hooker, along with what became the accepted Anglican view of an idealized, noble, irenical hero whose mind transcended the bitter and ephemeral party conflicts of his own time. Walton himself was renowned in his own time and later for his innocence, honesty, and modesty, a man whose piety was sweet and reasonable, and who thought that catastrophes like the recent Civil War could be avoided only by the submissive obedience of all private individuals to their divinely appointed superiors in both Church and Commonwealth. Walton also appreciated the numinous qualities of the liturgy and ceremonial of the Church of England. Walton's 1665 *Life* prefaced the 1666 edition and all subsequent editions of Hooker's *Works* throughout the nineteenth century.

Walton did correct many of the basic errors in Gauden's account, the most obvious being the recovery of Hooker's last will and testament, which confirmed that he had been married and had four daughters who survived him. Walton's portrait of Joan Churchman was, however, far from flattering. According to Walton, Joan Churchman was an ugly and ill-tempered woman who was forced upon the shy, short-sighted Hooker by her anxious, scheming mother. Walton also speaks about the misery of Hooker's marriage, wherein the long-suffering scholar was plagued by a sharp-tongued wife who imprisoned her husband in a routine of menial, domestic chores.[9]

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[8] There were three revised editions which appeared respectively in 1666, 1670, and 1675, but it was the 1665 edition that was published traditionally throughout later editions of Hooker's *Works*, including the definitive 7th edition of John Keble, *The Works of That Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. Richard Hooker: With an Account of His Life and Death by Isaac Walton*, rev. by R. W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), 1–117; this is the edition of Walton's *Life of Hooker* that is cited throughout this chapter.

[9] Walton, *Life*, 23–26. At the end of the seventeenth century, Anthony à Wood perpetrated Walton's dismal portrait of Hooker's wife, Joan, describing her as 'a clownish, silly woman,' 'a wife who by all was reputed to be an imperious whore' who purposely impeded his study and 'would not even allow him paper to write upon,' and who after

Walton also attempted to amend Gauden's unflattering picture of Hooker's mediocrity at college and in later life. Most importantly, however, he looked for and embellished any material that he could find that would undermine the authenticity of the three last books of the *Lawes*. Walton reserved his discussion of the validity of the last three Books for an Appendix, where he not only strove to undermine their authenticity but in so doing to make Hooker a champion of Royal Supremacy grounded immediately in God's divine appointment rather than upon consent of the people.

John Keble, Hooker's nineteenth-century editor, agreed with Walton's interpretation of Hooker, but harboured objections to Hooker's position on episcopacy. In his Preface to the *Lawes*, Keble tries at great length to prove that Hooker had supported the apostolic succession in the Church of England,[10] and attempts to show that Hooker's views reflect the thought of Hadrian Saravia, Richard Bancroft, and Thomas Bilson. According to Keble Hooker's final view on the question was that the order of bishops was derived from heaven by divine right. But Keble is forced to admit that other passages by Hooker have the effect of being 'so contradictory as to neutralize him in this controversy, and make him unfit to be quoted on either side'.[11]

C. J. Sisson's *Judicious Marriage* (1940) opened up and clarified many details of Hooker's biography. Sisson persuasively argued on the basis of fresh documentation that Joan Churchman was not forced upon Hooker at all. The marriage was of great advantage to Hooker, providing him with financial stability and an entrance into a prosperous and influential London family. Further, he had no need to be occupied with household chores. In the first three years of the marriage, he was busy researching and writing the early books of the *Lawes* while enjoying the benefits of a household replete with an efficient staff of servants, including Churchman's amanuensis Benjamin Pullen, who copied Hooker's manuscripts for the Preface and Books I–IV of the *Lawes* into fair copy for the printer.[12]

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her husband's death 'turned his children out of doores, soe that in a short time they either begged their bread or died in the streets with hunger.' *Athenae Oxonienses*, ed. Philip Bliss (London: 1813), 1.

[10] Keble 1:lxvii–lxxxv.

[11] Keble, 'Editor's Preface,' *Works* (1888), 1:lxxxiv–lxxxv.

[12] C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of* 'The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940).

An important group of twentieth-century scholars have emphasized the frankly polemical and apologetic nature of Hooker's work, discounting the irenical intent Hooker claims for his treatise as a rhetorical tactic designed to lay claim to the high ground within the controversy.[13] The primary thrust of Hooker scholarship in the later part of the twentieth century has therefore, been a break away from the stereotypical thinking of earlier centuries: Walton's traditional interpretation of Hooker as a gentle, irenical person who transcended the tedious and brutal religious polemics of his day. He is now presented as a deeply engaged controversialist who used every resource at his disposal to defend an existing power structure against the demand for more revolutionary changes. Contemporary scholars readily acknowledge that Hooker took sides, that he was often unfair to his opponents, and that he was not beyond using smear tactics to undermine their credibility. Even the elevated search in Book I for first principles and final causes is now regarded as having a controversial point to make: the hierarchical universe so exquisitely depicted herein is now seen to reflect that Elizabethan love for order that made it dangerous to risk any social disruption which might be caused by disobedience to superiors or nonconformity.

Philip B. Secor has recently published *Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism*,[14] the first broadly historical reconstruction of Hooker's life since Walton. Secor has openly admitted that this biography is not addressed primarily to academic professionals but rather to a wider, more popular

[13] The emphasis upon understanding Hooker's *Lawes* in terms of its polemic against the Elizabethan presbyterians is found in W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society,'' *SRH*, 3–76, rpt. *Studies in the Reformation*, ed. Dugmore (1980), 131–91; Brian Vickers, 'Introduction 2,' *Of the Laws of Ecclesiatical Polity: An Abridged Edition* (London: Sedgwick & Jackson, 1973), 41–59; Rudolf Almasy, 'The Purpose of Richard Hooker's Polemic,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 39 (1978): 251–70; Robert Eccleshall, in 'Richard Hooker and the Peculiarities of the English,' *History of Political Thought*, 2 (1981): 63–117, says Hooker only provides 'window dressing for the command structure of Elizabethan society'; and John N. Wall, 'Hooker's 'Faire Speech': Rhetorical Strategies in the *Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity*,' in Donald S. Armentrout, ed., *This Sacred History: Anglican Reflections, for John Booty* (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990), 125–43. William J. Bouwsma locates Hooker in relation to a perennial tension in western cultural history between tendencies which can usefully be identified with 'philosophy' and 'rhetoric'. Bouwsma's nomination of Hooker as an example of *theologia rhetorica* emphasizes that the controversial Anglican *via media* must be understood as a *via*, a 'way' among powerful and competing alternatives, a path on which 'strenuous exertion, adaptation, and improvisation' are constantly required, not as the one right place to be for all eternity. 'Hooker in the Context of European Cultural History,' in *RHC*, 41–145.

[14] (Tunbridge Wells: Burns and Oates, 1999; 2nd ed., 2000).

audience.[15] The result is the emergence of a fresh and lively portrait of Hooker. Secor argues that Hooker was a founding 'prophet' of what later becomes the well known 'middle way' of Anglicanism.[16] Like most contemporary Hooker scholars, Secor was eagerly awaiting Georges Edelen's more academic biography which was left unfinished at the time of his death.[17] Much of Edelen's deep learning and scholarship is displayed in his detailed chronology of Hooker's life prefixed to the commentary volumes of the Folger Library Edition.[18] In the following section of this chapter of Hooker's Life and Works Edelen's chronology has been followed closely.

Life and Works

Richard Hooker (1554–1600) was born in Heavitree, a suburb of Exeter in Devonshire, in April 1554. Although his extended family, originally named Vowell, was socially prominent in that locality, his own immediate family was of moderate financial means. Hooker's great-grandfather, John Hooker, had been mayor of Exeter in 1490, as had his grandfather, Robert Hooker, in 1629. Hooker's father, Roger,[19] was the younger brother of the well-known John Hooker, who had studied at Oxford and who in 1553 had been appointed the first chamberlain of Exeter.

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[15] Secor, 'In Search of Richard Hooker: Constructing a New Biography,' in *RHC*, 21–2, n. 2.

[16] Secor, *Richard Hooker*, xiii–iv, xviii.

[17] Many of the annotated books on Hooker from Edelen's personal library are presently in private hands in Rockland, Maine. Three boxes of notes taken for Hooker's unfinished biography are presently held in the Archives of the Folger Library in Washington D.C. Any future biographer should carefully peruse and inventory these annotations and notes.

[18] Georges Edelen was a contributing editor to the Folger edition and author of the helpful 'A Chronology of Richard Hooker's Life,' *FLE* 6(1):xviii–xxv.

[19] Secor observes that Roger was an 'absentee' parent with whom Hooker ever had any intimate relationship, and describes Roger as a reckless and energetic adventurer who ranged far from home to find employment as a courtier, steward, secretary, aide-de camp, soldier under arms, and church administrator (10–17). Finding no hard documentation that Hooker's father was ever married to Richard's mother Joan (*Richard Hooker: Prophet*, 6), Secor speculates that, although his parents were 'probably' married, Richard may have been born out of wedlock. Finally, unable to locate any official record of his mother's death or burial, Secor surmises that she must have died relatively early in Hooker's childhood, thereby undermining Walton's portrait of a loving and doting mother worried about and praying for her sick teenage boy far away in college at Oxford. *Richard Hooker: Prophet*, 7; see Walton, *Life*, 12.

Hooker was educated at the grammar school in Exeter. Walton speaks of the virtue and industry of Hooker's parents and of their inclination to educate their children despite their lack of wealth. Walton also presents a picture of Hooker as a youth, admitting that it is conjectural and based on Hooker as he was at forty. He presents him as a child of humble gravity, an early questioner of remarkable modesty, and a gifted scholar. When the schoolmaster there recommended that the promising young man be further educated at one of the universities, Hooker was introduced by his uncle John Hooker to John Jewel, the bishop of Salisbury who had published the first major defence of the Church of England against attacks made by supporters of the Church of Rome, *An Apology of the Church of England* (1562). Jewel was favourably impressed, and with Jewel's patronage and support, Hooker matriculated at Corpus Christi College, Oxford in the fall of 1569. William Cole, the President of the college, took an interest in Hooker and enabled his admission. Jewel died in 1571, and his place as Hooker's patron was taken by Edwin Sandys, then bishop of London and later Archbishop of York. He was made a scholar of his College on 16 September 1577 and a full fellow in 1579. In July of that year he was appointed deputy professor of Hebrew and delivered the annual Hebrew lecture, a task that he continued to fulfil until his departure from Oxford. On 14 August 1579 he was ordained deacon by John Aylmer, bishop of London.

On 9 October 1580 Hooker was briefly expelled from Oxford along with three other fellows and his former tutor and lifelong friend, John Rainolds, who was known for his strong Puritan sympathies. The expulsion occurred because he and his friends had opposed the replacement of the president of the College, William Cole, by John Barfoot, a rigorous advocate of conformity to the *Book of Common Prayer*. Hooker and all his colleagues were restored by the following 4 November after Rainolds had assumed the presidency. This incident may reflect not only Hooker's early friendship with Rainolds but perhaps also certain youthful tendencies toward Calvinist nonconformity.

During his tenure at Oxford, Hooker made two other very influential contacts that were to bear fruit in later friendship and joint cooperative efforts in the writing of the *Lawes*. He became the tutor of George Cranmer, who was a great nephew of Thomas Cranmer, the martyred archbishop of Canterbury, and also of Edwin Sandys, whose father became Archbishop of York; George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys became two of Hooker's closest friends.

Hooker was ordained to the priesthood in 1581. Two sermons on the epistle of Jude[20] survive from Hooker's Oxford years, and a Latin letter to Rainolds[21] may also come from this period. All three compositions express anguish and trepidation at Roman Catholic attacks on the English church, especially those made by Englishmen themselves.

Meanwhile, Hooker's father, who was captured by rebels while in the service of Sir Peter Carew in Ireland, had died by 1582. Around the time that Hooker left Oxford in the fall of 1584, he delivered a sermon at Paul's Cross, the prestigious preaching station outside of Saint Paul's Cathedral in London.[22] This sermon has not survived, but later testimony affirms that some of the Puritan Reformers who heard it were offended because it was inconsistent with certain features of the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.[23]

On 16 October 1584 Hooker was presented with the living of St. Mary's in Drayton Beauchamp in Buckinghamshire, but there is no evidence that he was ever in residence at this parish. In one of the most memorable of Walton's fanciful accounts, he relates how Hooker's former students, Sandys and Cranmer, once visited him at Drayton Beauchamp, where they found him reading the odes of Horace while tending sheep. In Walton's narrative, they watch in dismay as the shrewish Joan Hooker orders her husband away from their company to rock the baby's cradle.[24] This story cannot be true, however, for there is no evidence that Hooker ever took up residence at Drayton Beauchamp, and he was certainly not yet married at the time when he might have been there.

It is true, however, that during this interim, instead of taking up residence at Drayton Beauchamp after leaving Oxford, Hooker moved into the household of John Churchman, a distinguished London merchant who lived on Watling Street near St. Paul's Cathedral, and who would later be elected master of the Merchant Taylors' Company as

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[20] *FLE* 5:2–57.

[21] *FLE* 5:421–33. Millar MacLure, *The Paul's Cross Sermons 1534–1642* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1958).

[22] Edelen, 'Chronology,' *FLE* 6(1): xxii; Walton's suggested date of 1581 is probably erroneous.

[23] At the time of his death Hooker was still struggling with this issue in his 'Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination'. Manuscript found in Trinity College, Dublin, recently published in *FLE* 4: 83–113. See David Neelands's article on 'Predestination' in chapter VIII below.

[24] Walton, *Life*, 25, 26.

well as chamberlain of the City of London. On 17 March 1585 Queen Elizabeth appointed Hooker Master of the Temple, one of the principal centres of legal studies in England, whereupon he resigned his living at Drayton Beauchamp on 12 October 1585.

Hooker was not the first choice for the prestigious position at the Temple Church. The favoured candidate was Walter Travers, whose *Full and Plaine Declaration of Ecclesiastical Discipline* (1574) was the leading exposition of the Presbyterian system of church government over against the regime of bishops.[25] At the time of Hooker's appointment, Travers was Reader of the Temple and had the support of many lawyers and the Lord Treasurer of England, William Cecil, Lord Burleigh. The Archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, preferred Nicholas Bond, an elderly chaplain to the Queen, but was willing to accept Hooker as a compromise candidate.

Immediately after Hooker arrived at the Temple, a dispute broke out with Travers—a controversy that eventually prompted Hooker to conceive the writing of his major treatise concerning the laws of ecclesiastical polity. Travers initiated the argument by openly advocating his presbyterian principles: he encouraged Hooker to submit his royal appointment to congregational approval, he promoted liturgical changes supported by the nonconformists, and proposed the conversion of traditional churchwardens and overseers into ruling lay elders and deacons. Hooker firmly rejected all such efforts to subject the Temple Church to a presbyterian *disciplina*.

Travers countered by using the Temple pulpit as a public platform from which to challenge the orthodoxy of Hooker's teachings. He would respond critically on Sunday afternoons to sermons that Hooker had delivered earlier the same mornings. Fuller's well-known characterization of the dispute was that 'the Pulpit spake pure Canterbury in the Morning, and Geneva in the Afternoon'.[26] The major doctrinal issues at stake between the antagonists included what Travers perceived to be Hooker's too lenient attitude toward the weakness of faith in believers and to the possibility that God most probably has saved thousands of

[25] *A full and plaine declaration of ecclesiasticall discipline owt off the word off God, and off the declininge off the churche off England from the same.* [Heidelberg]: Imprinted [by Michael Schirat], 1574.

[26] Thomas Fuller, *History of the Worthies of England* (London: J. G. W. L. and W. G., 1662), 264. See Lee W. Gibbs, 'Theology, Logic, and Rhetoric in the Temple Controversy between Richard Hooker and Walter Travers,' *Anglican Theological Review*, 65.1 (1983): 177–88.

those in the Roman Catholic Church even though they lived in 'popish superstitions,' a faulty understanding of the relation of the nature of God's grace to the divine will, and interpretations of the related doctrines of predestination, justification,[27] and assurance[28] that Travers considered to be at odds with the teachings of the 'best' Church Fathers and Protestant Reformers.

The public controversy continued for almost a year until, in March 1586, Archbishop Whitgift silenced Travers. Travers appealed in a *Supplication* that he addressed to the Queen's Privy Council[29] and Hooker replied by writing in March or April of 1586 an *Answere to the Supplication*, which he addressed to Archbishop Whitgift.[30] Both of these treatises were not to be published until 1612. Although Travers's appeal fell on deaf ears, he stayed on for some time at the Temple, where his faction continued its harassment of Hooker.

Hooker did not publish any of the sermons that he delivered at the Temple. Yet several have survived, primarily because after his death some of his friends were committed to preserving and publishing as many as they could find of his lesser works. *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, delivered sometime in 1585–86, is the earliest of the surviving sermons that provoked controversy with Travers. Travers was put off by Hooker's teaching that 'that which we see by the light of grace, though it be indeed more certain, yet is it not to us so evidently certain, as that which sense of the light of nature will not suffer a man to doubt of'.[31]

The tractate printed under the title *A Learned Discourse on Justification, Workes, and how the Foundation of Faith is Overthrowne* (1612) actually comprises three sermons delivered at the Temple at different times during 1585–86.[32] These sermons adjudicate the differences between the doctrines of justification as taught by the churches of England and Rome, with the latter's emphasis upon good works being necessary for salvation. Hooker's middle-way position is exemplified by his stance on

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[27] See Lee W. Gibbs, 'Richard Hooker's *Via Media* Doctrine of Justification,' *Harvard Theological Review*, 74.2 (1981): 211–20.

[28] See Debora Shuger's treatment of 'Faith and Assurance' in chapter IX below.

[29] Walter Travers, 'A Supplication made to the Privy Counsel,' *FLE* 5:171–292.

[30] Richard Hooker, 'Master Hookers Answere to the Supplication that Master Travers made to the Counsell,' *FLE* 5:211–57.

[31] Hooker, 'A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect,' *FLE* 5:59–82.

[32] *FLE* 5:83–169.

the relation of the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone to the Roman Catholic doctrine concerning the necessity of good works, as well as on the salvation of numerous Roman Catholics, past and present, despite their being misled in their faith. In his *Supplication* Travers said that he scarcely knew how to react to such an absurdity. Such favourable words about the papists had not been heard in this realm, Travers charged, since the days of Queen Mary.[33] As far as we know, Hooker never publicly recanted his opinions on this dangerous subject, even when there was national hysteria over the threat of an invasion by the Armada from Catholic Spain. To support Hooker implied, for Travers, the support of Rome and Spain. Regardless of the probable harm that his remarks and Travers's response had done to his career, he did not change his mind on the subject of the salvation of many Catholics.[34] *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride* was delivered at the Temple, probably after the controversy with Travers.[35] In it Hooker urges that the divine origin of a law does not entail its immutability. The point is expanded in Book III of the *Lawes* to refute the necessity of a particular form of church government even if it might have been the polity of the early church.

Although Hooker's great treatise on the *Lawes* had its inception in the Temple controversy with Travers, his major opponent soon became Thomas Cartwright, former Lady Margaret professor of theology at Cambridge. According to Walton, Hooker left the Temple in 1591 with Archbishop Whitgift's blessing so that he might bring to a conclusion the case of the Church of England in a public debate that had broken out some years earlier between Cartwright and Whitgift.

The Cartwright-Whitgift dispute had its beginning in 1572 with the anonymous publication of *An Admonition to Parliament*, a Puritan manifesto that had not only attacked all existing ecclesiastical and university dignitaries but also demanded a Presbyterian constitution for the English church. Whitgift had replied with his *Answer to the Admonition* (1572), to which Cartwright responded in *A Reply to an Answer Made of Master Doctor Whitgift* (1574). Whitgift's final contribution to the debate was his mammoth *Defense of the Answer* (1574). Cartwright, however, had gone

[33] Walter Travers, *Supplication* 5:208.9.

[34] Secor, *Richard Hooker: Prophet*, 93–94. Secor is persuaded that Hooker paid dearly for these un-retracted statements in terms of his preferment in the hierarchy of the Elizabethan Church.

[35] *FLE* 5:299–361.

on to publish two further treatises: *Second Replie against Master Whitgift's Answer* (1575) and *The Rest of the Second Replie of Thomas Cartwright agaynst Maister Doctor Whitgift's Second Answer* (1577), both of which had remained unanswered.

According to Walton, in June 1591,[36] in order to expedite Hooker's literary efforts, Whitgift answered Hooker's request for a less public living by presenting him with the rural living as rector of St. Andrew's in Boscombe in Wiltshire, making him at the same time sub-dean of Salisbury Cathedral and prebendary of Netheravon.

Walton says that Hooker finished four of the eight books of the *Lawes* at Boscombe. There is, however, no evidence that Hooker or his family ever lived at Boscombe, but records indicate that as a Prebendary of the cathedral, he did spend a prescribed amount of time each year at Salisbury working at the cathedral library and conferring with the Dean, Dr John Bridges. Bridges had by this time already published his own massive diatribe against the Puritans, namely, the *Defense of the Government Established in the Church of Englande for Ecclesiastical Matters* (1587).

During the early years of drafting some or all of the *Lawes*, Hooker resided at the house of his future father-in-law, John Churchman, on Watling Street in London. On 13 February 1588 he married Joan, the daughter of John Churchman. His wife's handsome dowery of seven hundred pounds provided financial security for her husband and their growing family.[37] Joan is known to have had six children with him: four daughters who survived him and two boys who died in infancy. In this same period he consulted frequently with his two former students, Sandys and Cranmer. Sandys was by then a lawyer, a member of the Inns of Court, and a member of the House of Commons. Cranmer had become a secretary, first to William Davidson, secretary of state, and later to Sir Henry Killigrew, an ambassador to France. Both Sandys and Cranmer read early drafts of the *Lawes*, criticizing them

[36] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 45–49, makes the case for the view that the project had Whitgift's support and 'blessing'; he also cited Chancery Court records to suggest that Whitgift was one of a number of 'eminent persons' who saw Hooker as a 'deputed spokesman of the church' (4–6, 145). W. Speed Hill, *SRH*, 129–130, challenges this reading of Sisson and does not believe that Hooker was ever deputed by Whitgift as a designated spokesman for the establishment. No doubt, Secor is close to the mark when he says that 'Whitgift informally approved and encouraged the project,' *Richard Hooker: Prophet*, 246.

[37] John Spenser does not appear to have known that Hooker was ever married, and regarded him as a bachelor.

and urging Hooker to deal less with general principles of philosophy and theology and more with a point-by-point refutation of the specific Puritan demands for reform.[38] In response to their critique, Hooker revised and expanded his initial drafts to address the Puritans and their arguments more directly.

The Preface and first four books of the *Lawes* were published in 1593. Hooker had not been able to find a printer who was willing to undertake such a large and financially risky publishing venture. Sandys, who was participating actively in the Parliament of 1593, wanted the first instalment of the *Lawes* published as support for his legislative efforts to have Puritans and other Protestant nonconformists included under the recusancy laws that had previously applied only to Roman Catholics. Sandys therefore volunteered to subsidize the printing of the first books of the *Lawes*, but only after persuading Hooker to append in chapters 8 and 9 of the Preface several last-minute additions that associate reforms demanded by the Elizabethan Puritans with the excesses of Thomas Müntzer and certain other continental Anabaptists.[39]

In 1595 Hooker was presented by the Queen with the living at St. Mary's parish in Bishopsbourne, Kent, where he moved from London with his family. Here, following Walton's rather idealized perspective, Philip Secor depicts Hooker as 'the happy rural pastor' who had at last found his heart's desire.[40] However, during this 'idealized' time Hooker's ministry at St. Mary's in Bishopsbourne was marred by two perplexing events. First, there was an attempt to slander Hooker's character by a woman and her brother. There was also a burglary at his home shortly before his death.[41]

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[38] 'Notes on the Sixth Book by George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys,' *FLE* 3:107–40.

[39] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 64; William P. Haugaard, 'Introduction to the Preface,' *FLE* 6(1):27–43.

[40] Secor, *Richard Hooker: Prophet*, 278–326.

[41] Walton's account of Hooker at Bishopsbourne includes what was to prove an influential description of Hooker's character: his poor clothes, his mean stature, his body stooped with study and mortification, his face covered with heat pimples, his dim sight, and his modest, bashful disposition (*Life*, 127–31). It is also during these years at Bishopsbourne that Walton places his story about the attempted blackmailing of Hooker by a prostitute and her brother (*Life*, 82–83). [This is where McGrade, following Gauden, places the tale of the blackmailing of Hooker; Walton, however, places it differently, during the final years of his life while at Bishopsbourne]. It is most likely that it was in these years that an attack on his character was made. Henry King, bishop of Chicester, related in a letter to Izaak Walton that he had heard from his father, John, King, bishop of London from 1611, 'all the circumstances of the plot to defame him

While Hooker was at Bishopsbourne, Book V of the *Lawes* was completed and published in 1597, again with Sandys' financial sponsorship,[42] and with extensive revisions that nearly doubled the length of an earlier draft. Book V was the last book of the *Lawes* to be published in Hooker's lifetime. Book V of the *Lawes* is *both* a defence of the *Book of Common Prayer* against the objections of the disciplinarians who contended that it was full of superstitious practices 'culled out of that popish dunghill, the Masse Booke,' *and*, without divorcing the book from its polemical context, it provides a constructive exposition of those practices by showing that in the Prayer Book '*True Religion*' could indeed be the '*roote of all true virtues and the stay of all well ordered common-wealthes*,'[43] thereby confirming Hooker's reputation as its foremost interpreter as well as apologist.

Hooker's one known invitation to preach at court was during Lent 1598, a few months after the publication of Book V. In his few remaining years, Hooker was an active pastor at Bishopsbourne, while continuing to work on the *Lawes*.

Walton emphasizes at the end of his *Life* Hooker's friendship with Hadrian Saravia. Walton here, by suggestion, attributes to Hooker Saravia's favourable stand on the apostolic succession of bishops.[44] For despite his presbyterian ordination on the continent, Saravia had become a firm advocate of episcopacy and of the apostolic succession of bishops in the Church of England. 'Walton's emphasis upon the close friendship of Saravia and Hooker, including the description of Saravia's deathbed attendance on Hooker: Saravia's absolutist position of the divine right of the monarch, and on the similarly divine author-

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[Hooker]; and how Sir Edwin Sandys outwitted his accusers, and gained their confession' (Walton, 82–3, 102–3). Gauden devotes more than a page to the story, as he had it from 'some well advised men of former years' (*Works of Hooker*, ed. Gauden, 32). A prostitute and her accomplice arranged to accost Hooker on a walk in the fields near London and blackmailed him, until Sir Edwin Sandys, whose father had been similarly came to know of it, had Hooker's tormentors imprisoned, and secured a confession. Walton relates (*Life*, 84–85) that days before his death his house was robbed. When Hooker was notified that his house had been robbed, his question was, 'Are my books and written papers safe?' When answered in the affirmative, Walton has Hooker reply, 'Then it matters not; for no other loss can trouble me.'

[42] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 68.

[43] *Lawes* V.1.1; 2:16.1.

[44] Hadrian Saravia, *De diversis ministrorvm evangelii gradibus* (London: G. Bishop and G. Newberie, 1590).

ity conferred on the episcopate by apostolic succession rubbed off on Hooker by propinquity.'[45]

After a long and painful illness, he died at Bishopsbourne on 2 November 1600. He was buried in the church, under a slab that had formerly been the altar. A monument, with the most nearly contemporary likeness of him (it was the source of several engravings from the 1650's onwards), was set up by William Cowper in 1635. Hooker's estate was substantial, including his library. He made 'my well beloved wife' the sole executor of his will. The whole of the estate amounted to nearly £1100, including money for a new pulpit at Bishopsbourne, 100 pounds dowry for each of his four daughters, and a handsome residue for his wife, who soon made an unfortunate marriage to Edward Nethersole, formerly mayor of Canterbury.

At the time of his death, Hooker was preparing a rebuttal to *A Christian Letter of certaine English Protestantes* (1599), an anonymous Puritan treatise that had attacked him and all five books of the *Lawes* then in print.[46] Hooker's marginal notes in his copy of this tract belie the portrait of Walton's 'humble, modest, dove-like character'. His initial responses were visceral and sharp. At one place he says that the author's godparents 'have much to answere unto God for not seing you better Catechized'.[47] Again, when he was criticized for his ponderous writing style, Hooker wrote: 'How this asse runneth kicking up his heeles as if a summerfly had stung him.' He also advised the author to go 'read some good catechisms' and called him an 'Ignorant Asse'. At another place, he angrily wrote: 'You ly, sir.'[48]

Only fragments of Hooker's more formal response to *A Christian Letter* remain, including one so-called Dublin Fragment that constitutes his most substantial treatment of grace and predestination.[49] He was also still at work revising and expanding earlier drafts of the last three books of the *Lawes*. Books VI and VIII were not to be published until 1648 when monarchy and episcopacy were falling, and Book VII only in 1662, shortly after the Restoration of 1660.

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[45] Jessica Martin, *Walton's* 'Lives,' 253.
[46] *FLE* 4:1–79.
[47] *ACL* 6; 4:22.16.
[48] 'Hooker's Autograph Notes on *A Christian Letter*,' *FLE* 4:41.15, 4:22.10, 4:41.29.
[49] 'Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination,' *FLE* 4:83–167.

Controversy over Posthumous Books

There has always been a problem concerning the authenticity of the last three books of the *Lawes* which were published posthumously. There was a question whether Hooker finished his first drafts of the last three books of the *Lawes* by 1593. The 'Autograph Notes', discovered by P. G. Stanwood at Trinity College, Dublin, and published for the first time in the third volume of the Folger Edition[50] now make it clear that the surviving texts, though undoubtedly Hooker's work, are not in finished form. Nevertheless, Books VI through VIII are now widely accepted as representing Hooker's own mind on the subjects with which they deal. Hooker left Book VII, on episcopacy, in near-readiness for the press. Book VIII, on the royal supremacy, survives in pieces, each coherent in itself but unfinished. It is however, possible to put the pieces together and to reconstruct most of this last book. Today there is general scholarly consensus that readers now have most of Hooker's *Lawes* as he conceived it from the beginning.[51]

A portion of Book VI, the bulk of which is an attack upon the teaching of the Roman church that repentance is a private sacrament, is extant although an earlier and longer manuscript of it dealing more specifically with the delegated topic of the presbyterian lay eldership was lost before 1600. This lost part of Book VI has been largely reconstructed on the basis of extensive notes written about it by Cranmer and Sandys between 1593 and 1596 first discovered and published by Keble in 1836.[52]

Book VII is both a defence of the legitimacy of the authority of bishops and of the honour and privileges due to them as well as a critique of the current corruptions and abuses of the office. Book VII, as it survives in Gauden's edition of 1662, is the most finished of the posthumous books. For all its vigour, Hooker's defence of episcopacy in Book VII is qualified with regard both to the office and to its present incumbents.

None of the manuscript versions of Book VIII appears finished. Book VIII is also significantly qualified: a theory of society and the origin of

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[50] *FLE* 3:493–554.

[51] For further discussion of the problem of these three posthumous books, see W. Speed Hill's essay in chapter III below.

[52] 'Notes on the Sixth Book by George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys,' *FLE* 3:107–40.

government based upon *both* Aristotle (humans are by nature rational and political animals which implies a strong preference for an absolute monarchy) *and* the notion of an original contract based upon consensus of the people. The royal supremacy, as Hooker saw it, was a wholly legitimate institution. Besides depending on the law emanating from the community for its initial legitimacy, the crown's power of dominion was limited in its operations by laws made in and with a parliament in which all the monarch's subjects were present either in person or by proxy. Hooker was unique among his contemporaries in his emphasis on law—and not only divine and natural law but 'common law,' the law of the land—as a restraint on royal action. He distanced himself from the newly fashionable *jure divino* concept of sovereignty.

Hooker's treatment of sovereignty is not free of ambiguity, and if modern commentators seem to agree essentially on Hooker's position as a supporter of constitutional monarchy, the High Church party of the Restoration determinedly interpreted that position as one of royal absolutism.

The problem of the authenticity of the three last books has been bound up with fallacious rumours about Hooker's domestic life: rumours which have been in circulation since Izaak Walton's *Life*. All three posthumous books, however, came under Walton's censure, and crucial to that brief was Walton's highly circumstantial story of their being vandalized at the time of Hooker's death. In an Appendix to the *Life* that deals with these last three books of the *Lawes*,[53] Walton implies that Joan Hooker was largely responsible for the disappearance and supposed mutilation of Hooker's unpublished literary remains. He qualifies his statement that Hooker lived to finish the last three books by adding: 'whether we have the last three as finished by himself, is a just and material question.'

Then Walton tells a story that he claims was related to him some forty years previously. He says that about a month after Hooker's death, Archbishop Whitgift sent one of his chaplains to Mrs. Hooker to inquire concerning the unpublished books, and relates that she either would not or could not give any account of them. Three months later Whitgift summoned her to London, where the day before she was to have been examined by some of the Queen's Privy Council she told him at Lambeth that 'one Mr. Charke and another minister came to

[53] Walton, *Life*, 88–99.

her, and desired that they might go into her husband's study and look upon some of his writings; and that there they two burned and tore many of them, assuring her that they were not fit to be seen.' The next morning she was found dead in her lodging on King Street, Westminster. Walton, after observing that there appear to be both omissions and additions in the last three books, concludes his effort to call into question the authenticity of the last three books by stating that King Charles I, who was a devoted reader of Hooker, doubted that they were Hooker's.

William Charke was a Puritan who had been expelled from his fellowship at Peterhouse, Cambridge in 1572 for declaring in a sermon that the episcopal system of ecclesiastical government had been introduced by Satan. At the end of 1581, Charke was invited to be the first Reader in Divinity at Lincoln's Inn. He remained in this position until early in 1593, when he was suspended by Archbishop Whitgift on account of his puritanism. Sisson found that the supposed defacers of the Hooker manuscripts also included Roger Raven, Headmaster of the King's School, Canterbury. Raven and a certain Mr Aldridge are said to have gained possession of various written works of Hooker's and burned or caused to be burned all or most of them.[54]

Sisson was disturbed by imprecision and inconsistencies in the testimonies cited by Walton and he concluded that the tales of vandalism were baseless. He also concluded that the sworn testimonies of William Covell and John Spenser that Hooker had finished the *Lawes* should be rejected. According to Sisson, there had never been any perfect copies of the three last books. The manuscripts divided up at John Churchman's house in 1600 contained Hooker's written contents of the last books.

The editors of the Folger Library Edition heard Georges Edelen animatedly and with conviction state more than once that he was convinced that the evidence clearly indicated that Hooker had finished all eight books of the *Lawes* by 1593, at least in first draft and that Walton's account of the destruction of Hooker's manuscripts of the three last books of the *Lawes* was substantially accurate and that Walton's veracity concerning this matter ought to be restored. The surviving textual evidence is ambiguous: Hooker's notes could just as easily have been saved because they were all that was left once the vandals in Walton's

[54] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 138.

account had done their work, or they were saved because the project lay unfinished on Hooker's work table at his untimely death and they were in fact all that remained.[55]

Twentieth-century scholarship has tended to vindicate Hooker's widow from the charges of irresponsibility or collusion in the corruption of the texts or the delay in publication of the last three books. Perusal of parish records has established that Joan Hooker lived well beyond the time specified by Walton. These documents indicate that she was remarried to Edward Nethersole of Canterbury on 23 March 1601, some five months after Hooker's death, and that she was not buried at Saint Peter's in Canterbury until 18 February 1603.

The most important evidence to appear on Joan Hooker's behalf was published in 1940, when C. J. Sisson, in *The Judicious Marriage*, made public the results of his research into the archives of the Court of Chancery. He discovered there records concerning a series of legal suits brought against various defendants, and especially Edwin Sandys, by guardians of Hooker's surviving children. The two sons born to the Hookers, Richard and Edwin, had died in infancy, so the lawsuits were brought on behalf of his four daughters, Alice, Cecily, Jane, and Margaret. The substance of these charges concerned the deprivation of Hooker's daughters because of negligence on the part of his literary executors in publishing the last three books of the *Lawes*. The depositions taken for the trials which ran their course in Chancery between January 1610 and April 1624, undercut the veracity of many of the details and some of the most important overall impressions conveyed by Walton in his account of Hooker's life.

For instance, the trial testimony establishes what happened to Hooker's unpublished manuscripts.[56] In his will Hooker had nominated as overseers of his literary estate his father-in-law, John Churchman, and his friend and patron, Edwin Sandys. On 16 November 1600, a short time after Hooker's death, Churchman sent a servant to Bishopsbourne to collect all the manuscripts that could be found in the Hooker house. The servant put all the writings he could find into a 'cloak bag' and then returned with them to London. Churchman subsequently called together several of Hooker's former friends and colleagues to examine

[55] W. Speed Hill, 'Richard Hooker in the Folger Edition: An Editorial Perspective,' *RHC*, 6.

[56] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 92–3, 133, 151–52.

the manuscripts that had been recovered—namely, Sandys, Henry Parry (Bishop of Worcester), and John Spenser (President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford). Lancelot Andrewes (Bishop of Winchester) was later added to the group.

During the litigation hearings of 1613–14, Spenser described in sworn testimony what was found in the cloak bag. Books VI and VII were among the manuscripts, 'though not fully perfected'. There were 'diverse tracts and discourses scatterly written but no coherent body' of Book VIII. There were also some sermons and the partly written answer to *A Christian Letter*.

These literary remains were later divided. Spenser was allotted the last three books of the *Lawes*, Andrewes was given the sermons, and Parry received the rest of the fragments, with the understanding that each man was to make ready the material in his care for publication. Spenser testified under oath that he had 'taken some pains in the fitting and perfecting of these three last books and hath brought two of them, viz. The sixth and seventh, to some reasonable perfection though not yet thought fit for the press. These manuscripts that Spenser describes as having been made ready for the press immediately following Hooker's death are regarded by the editors of the Folger Library edition of Hooker's *Works* as essentially the surviving holographs that were used as copy texts.[57] Each of the three last books may now be accepted as authentic in its present form. Sisson also found depositions from the Chancery Court blaming the literary coadjutors of Hooker's will for the delay in publication of the last three books. Spenser intimates in his testimony that publication of these books had been abandoned because a difference of opinion arose between Sandys and Andrewes over 'the inserting of a tract of confession . . . into the said books'. Sisson identifies this disputed 'tract of confession' as comprising a large part of Book VI since Ussher's edition of 1648, and has been published as Book VI in all subsequent editions of the *Works*. Sandys, who had with George Cranmer seen an earlier and now lost draft of Book VI that dealt specifically with the designated topic of refuting the presbyterian office of ruling lay elders, was reluctant to see published as Book VI what appeared to be in large part a diatribe against the Roman church's teaching that private penance is a sacrament. The High Churchman

[57] See P. G. Stanwood, 'Textual Introduction The Three Last Books,' *FLE* 3: xiii–lxxv.

Andrewes, on the other hand, favoured Hooker's emphasis here on the pastoral and sacramental functions of the church. With the emergence of such doctrinal and ideological differences, the publication of the last three books foundered, and the literary executors of Hooker's estate eventually turned their attention to other concerns.[58]

Any differences that might have arisen between Sandys and Andrewes over Book VI were greatly extenuated by the content of Book VII, where Hooker argues for the authority of bishops on grounds of historical precedent and practical expediency rather than a divine-right theory of apostolic succession, and also of Book VIII, where he argues for royal supremacy over both church and commonwealth on grounds of consensus of the people rather than a divine-right theory of monarchy. Hooker's teaching in these last two books would not have been well received by seventeenth-century supporters of emerging divine-right theories concerning the apostolic succession (such as Richard Bancroft, William Laud, and the bishops of the Restoration) and the royal supremacy as expounded in the royal theology of Stuart ideology.

This interpretation of the undermining of the authenticity of the last three books by High Churchmen and royal absolutists of the Restoration was anticipated by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in the nineteenth century. While previously under Walton's influence, Samuel Taylor Coleridge had already anticipated early in the 19th century that the last three books of Hookers *Lawes* were more likely to have been condoned by high churchmen and royal absolutists than by the puritans.[59]

Conclusion

In the short run, Hooker must be judged to have failed in his primary undertaking. By placing the defence of the established regulations of the English church within a broader normative context, he had hoped to win over the disciplinarian reformers and their followers, not merely to refute them. Nonetheless, the relatively moderate Elizabethan Puritans,

[58] See Lee W. Gibbs, 'Introduction to Book VI,' *FLE* 6(1):249–308; and 'Book VI of Hooker's *Lawes* Revisited: The Calvin Connection,' in *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, ed. W. J. Torrance Kirby (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 243–57. Gibbs's interpretation is challenged by Rudolph P. Almasy in 'Book VI and the Tractate on Penance: do they belong together?' in *RHER*, 263–83.

[59] See Roberta Florence Brinkley, ed., *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1955), 126–27.

who were neither satisfied nor pacified, were only driven underground, soon to reappear and unite with even more radical nonconformists in a bloody revolution that would displace the *Book of Common Prayer* and see the executions of William Laud and Charles Stuart.

Hooker must also be judged to have failed in persuading his immediate colleagues and successors to accept his views concerning the necessity of consensus and constitutional limitations on governmental power through the rule of law: '*lex facit regem*'. When Richard Bancroft, William Laud, and their Restoration successors began to assert the apostolic succession of bishops, thus tending to place them altogether outside the realm of positive law, their teaching was antithetical to Hooker's basic position. Hooker was equally unsuccessful in persuading Queen Elizabeth and her Stuart successors about the need for curbing royal despotism by a legal constitutionalism reflected in the common law tradition of England.

Hooker attempted to defend the liturgy and the polity of the Church of England in a way that did not fully satisfy partisans of the left or right. He was a man little understood in his own time, whose successors used him to buttress theologies and political theories that were antithetical to his own. The record of this qualified acceptance and chequered response demonstrates how difficult it is to achieve and to hold the delicate balance and complexity of thought that characterizes Hooker's distinctive 'middle way' of thinking, acting, and living in the world.

Hooker, along with other defenders of the establishment, forged a Christian tradition that was to prove distinct from those of Roman Catholic, magisterial reformed (both Lutheran and Calvinist), and radical (Anabaptists, Family of Love) persuasions. Among these defenders, Richard Hooker was to be the most persuasive and, through succeeding years, the most influential.

Whereas Jewel located the English church along with Lutheran and Reformed between the extremes of Roman Catholic and Anabaptist, Hooker suggests an ecumenical perspective in which the Church of England lies between Rome and the churches of the magisterial continental Reformation. Hooker's complex and distinctive *via-media* manner of thinking and making responsible decisions in the world is not—and never should become—an exclusive prototype for being a Christian. It may well be argued, however, that his complex way of regarding and being in the world still has continuing relevance and has an important contemporary contribution to make, both to individuals

who find it necessary to accommodate ambiguity and relativity into their theology and in their lives, and also for the ongoing growth of the Christian churches toward the idea of becoming truly one, holy, apostolic, reformed, evangelical, and catholic.

The Elizabethan church which he both defended and helped bring into existence, was envisioned by Hooker as being a broad, tolerant, and inclusive community of English citizens of widely differing beliefs who could live and worship together without shedding each other's blood. This kind of broad ecumenical spirit is the primary reason why past and present Protestant evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics, as well as broad church latitudinarians can and do still find authority for their respective positions in the writings of Richard Hooker.


SVNT MELIORA MIHI.
RICHARDVS HOOKER Exoniensis scholaris
sociusq3 Collegij Corp: Christi Oxon: deinde Londi:
Templi interioris in Sacris magister Rectorq3
huius Ecclesiæ, scripsit octo libros Politiæ
Ecclesiasticæ Anglicanæ, quorum tres desi:
derantur: Obijt Ann: Dō: M.DC.III. Ætat:
suæ L.
Posuit hoc pijssimo viro monumentum An:
Dō: M.DC.XXX.V. Guli: Cowper Armiger,
in Christo Iesu quem genuit per Evangelium.
1 Corinth: 4. 15.
Guil: Faithorne sculp:

The engraved portrait by Faithorne, which first appeared as the frontispiece in the 1662 edition of the *Lawes*. According to W. Speed Hill (*Descriptive Bibliography*, 1970), it was 'obviously a conventionalized likeness . . . done after a monument put up 35 years after Hooker's death (the inscription is in error).'

CHAPTER TWO

WORKS AND EDITIONS I

P. G. Stanwood

So well known is *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* that many readers might believe its author wrote nothing else. But Richard Hooker was first a lecturer and homilist, and his treatises and sermons form a significant even though minor part of his published work. There are ten of these shorter discourses, none published during Hooker's lifetime, and probably all belong quite early in his career. Two sermons on the epistle of Jude are from his Oxford years (1580–84), and they appeared in a quarto edition in 1614, following the publication, also in quarto, in 1612 of four sermons, which all belong to Hooker's tenure as master of the Temple (1585–90): (1) *A learned and comfortable sermon of the certaintie and perpetuitie of faith in the Elect*; (2) *A learned discourse of justification, workes, and how the foundation of faith is overthrowne*; (3) *A learned sermon of the nature of Pride*; and (4) *A remedie against sorrow and feare.* Izaak Walton, Hooker's early biographer, published *A Sermon of Richard Hooker Found in the Study of the late Learned Bishop Andrews*, on Matthew 7.7, appending it to his *Life of Dr. Sanderson* (1678). Finally, three incomplete sermons, found among the manuscripts of Archbishop James Ussher and in his hand, must be attributed to Hooker; they appear in the Folger Library Edition of Hooker's *Works*, on Matthew 27.46; Hebrews 2.14,15; and Proverbs 3.9,10.[1]

The fate of these sermons—and there must have been many others now lost—was inextricably bound up with the complications

[1] See *The Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker*, gen. ed. W. Speed Hill, vols. 1–7 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; vols. 6–7, Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1977–1998). Vol. 1, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Preface Books I to IV*, ed. Georges Edelen (1977); vol. 2, *Book V,* ed. W. Speed Hill (1977); vol. 3, *Books VI, VII, VIII*, ed. P. G. Stanwood (1981); vol. 4, *Attack and Response*, ed. John E. Booty (1982); vol. 5, *Tractates and Sermons*, textual ed. Laetitia Yeandle and commentary ed. Egil Grislis (1990); vol. 6 (in two parts), Introductions and Commentary (1993); vol. 7, *Index of Names and Works*, ed. W. Speed Hill (1998). Subsequent references to this edition are indicated by '*FLE*' with volume and page number following.

surrounding the disposition of Hooker's books and papers at his death in early November 1600, in Bishopsbourne, Kent. A servant, acting for Hooker's father-in-law John Churchman, removed all of Hooker's remaining writings, with notes and various documents, from his house and brought them 'in a cloak-bag' to Churchman in London. There several of Hooker's close friends sorted the contents and divided them amongst themselves: Edwin Sandys (1561–1629), who had been a pupil of Hooker's at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and a student at the Middle Temple; John Spenser (1559–1614), sometime fellow of Corpus Christi College and president of the College in 1607; Henry Parry (1561–1616), also a sometime fellow of Corpus Christi College, and later bishop of Worcester in 1610; and Lancelot Andrewes (1555–1626), who became successively bishop of Chichester (1605), of Ely (1609), and of Winchester (1619). James Ussher (1581–1656), archbishop of Armagh, a remarkable scholar and bibliophile, was also to become implicated in the disposal of Hooker's manuscripts, probably acquiring some of them from his friend Andrewes, which included the autograph manuscript of the *Sermon of Pride* as well as notes for the last three books of the *Lawes*; Ussher left these works, along with his own numerous papers, to Trinity College, Dublin.

Hooker intended his sermons pastorally, or else in their more extended lecture form perhaps as contributions to his controversy with Walter Travers during his period at the Inns of Court. Hooker seems to have taken no care for these works, except as they might have formed part of his thinking toward his major study *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie.* In an extension of the Hooker-Travers controversy (wherein, it is said, '*The Forenoon Sermon spake* Canterbury, *and the Afternoon*, Geneva'), Hooker addressed to Archbishop Whitgift in early 1586 his *Answer* to Travers's supplication.[2] Increasingly, it was becoming clear that Hooker needed time and leisure to compose a full response to his puritan or non-conformist opponents, a labour that he had in these several pastoral

[2] For an excellent description of the controversy between Travers and Hooker, see W. Speed Hill, 'The Evolution of Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*' in *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works*, ed. Hill (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972), esp. 117–129. See also John Booty's Introduction to *Attack and Response* in *FLE* 4: xxv–xxviii. The remark is reported by Izaak Walton in his *Life of Mr. Richard Hooker*, ed. George Saintsbury in The World's Classics (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 200: 'as St. *Paul* withstood St. *Peter* to his face, so did they withstand each other in their Sermons'. The lectures of Travers and Hooker in the Temple do not survive.

works already begun. By the middle of 1591, he became subdean of Salisbury and prebendary of Netheravon, livings joined to that of Boscombe, Wiltshire, where Whitgift instituted him as rector. But he was likely spending more time in London, at work on the *Lawes*; for he was able to publish the long preface and the first four books, or one-half of the proposed project, in early 1593. The fifth book, longer than the previous four taken together, appeared in 1597.[3]

Hooker's plan was to set out 'generalities' and the principles of law in the first four books, with the 'particularities' reserved for the remaining books, a promise or intention that he advertised in the preface of 1593. Book V is a partial fulfilment of this grand design, for it certainly provides in elaborate detail a review and defence of the worship of the English church according to the Elizabethan Book of Common Prayer. But nothing more of the *Lawes* appeared in Hooker's own lifetime, and only the Preface and Books I–V appeared in the editions of 1604 and 1611. But what became of the last three books? Their fate leads to a troubled and complex story that still remains unfinished. Spenser, as already mentioned, was among the first to see Hooker's remaining papers, and in his preface to the 1604 edition he alleges that the last books had been 'perfected', but only dismembered drafts now remained. Spenser recounts the story that Hooker's manuscripts were somehow disturbed and spoiled immediately after his death, even before they reached London in the 'cloak-bag'. He writes that 'some evill disposed mindes, whether of malice, or covetousnesse, or wicked blinde Zeale, it is uncerteine, as if they had beene Egyptian Mid-wives, as soone as they were borne, and their father dead, smothered them, and by conveying away the perfect Copies, left unto us nothing but certaine olde unperfect and mangled draughts, dismembred into peeces, and scattered like *Medeas Absyrtus*, no favour, no grace, not the shadowes of themselves almost remaining in them'.[4] This remarkable account was to become a significant part of Izaak Walton's Restoration biography of Hooker in which, as we shall see, the authenticity of these books would be disputed.

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[3] Hooker's pupil and loyal friend Edwin Sandys subsidised the publication of these first editions. The complex details of their publishing history appear in *FLE* 1: xiii–xxvii, and 2: xxiii.

[4] See Spenser's preface 'To the Reader', which he wrote to introduce the 1604 edition, reprinted in *FLE* 1:346–48; the quotation appears on 348. Cf. *FLE* 3: xiii–xvi.

Yet Spenser says that the time will come when these works would appear. And some nine years later, in litigation proceedings in connection with Hooker's estate, Spenser testified that he had 'taken some pains in the fitting and perfecting of those three last books and hath brought two of them, viz. the 6th and the 7th, to some reasonable perfection though not yet thought fit for the press'.[5] This statement does not contradict Spenser's earlier statement, but it does complicate the mystery of the missing books. Perhaps Hooker had indeed finished them before he died, but there is no satisfactory explanation for their having been 'disturbed' or 'smothered'. I have argued elsewhere that the problem in publishing these last books might have been doctrinal, not textual. In the published books, Hooker's appeal was fundamentally based on the natural law and not on the concerns of the national church—even Book V reaches beyond the Book of Common Prayer to the larger concerns of appropriate worship. But perhaps the events of the earlier seventeenth century, notably the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 and the fears of Rome which it exacerbated were partly to blame for the loss or suppression of the last three books. Similarly, Hooker's views expressed especially in Books VII and VIII were not in accord with the prevailing political and ecclesiastical temper of the Stuart years; for Hooker questioned episcopal and royal authority, suggesting that both rested on consent and usefulness—views not only unpopular but even dangerous.

Yet the *Lawes*, Preface with Books I–V, continued to appear throughout these years, with the fourth edition (fifth of Book V) in 1617 (1618), which, for the first time, now also included the *Tractates and Sermons* (1612 and 1614); and in 1638–39, there was published the seventh edition of the Preface, Books I–IV, the sixth edition of Book V, and the fifth collected edition of the *Tractates*.[6] But in 1648 (again in 1651), Books VI and VIII appeared through Ussher's intervention in what appear

[5] C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr Hooker and the Birth of 'The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity'* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1940), 146, describes evidence (now in the Public Record Office, C.24/390/100 and C.24/394/73) in a suit brought against John Huntley, the guardian of Hooker's three surviving daughters. Sir Edwin Sandys, it was alleged, had not paid these daughters their share of the profits from the sale of the first five books of the *Lawes*, and had even interfered with the publication of the three last books.

[6] See W. Speed Hill, *Richard Hooker: A Descriptive Bibliography of the Early Editions: 1593–1724* (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970). For an enumerative bibliography, see the entry for 'Richard Hooker' (by P. G. Stanwood) in *The New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1974), vol. 1,

selections, or in decidedly truncated forms. The printer's long notice to the reader is helpful in partially revealing the mysterious delay over presenting these lost and troubled works:

> *Here is presented unto thee, Two of the Three so long expected and much desired Books of Learned Mr* Hookers *Ecclesiasticall Policy;* viz. *the Sixth and the Eighth, as they were preserved in the hands of those Mirrours of Learning, Dr* Andrewes *late Lord Bishop of* Winchester, *and the present Dr* Usher *Lord Archbishop of* Armagh, *with great hopes the Seventh would have been recovered, that they might have been published to the Worlds view at once: but endevours used to that purpose have hitherto proved fruitlesse. And now hearing that some erronious, if not counterfeit Copies are abroad, hath occasioned the Publishing of these, to prevent as much as may be any addition of abuses to the abused Author; and also that he which so much desired the Unity of the Church, might have the divided members of his Labours united.*[7]

The situation of these two books VI and VIII, here given in fragmentary form, remained the same until the Restoration when further excerpts of Book VIII appeared in a collection of 1661, *Clavi Trabales; or, Nailes Fastned by some Great Masters of Assemblyes.*[8] Its compiler was Nicholas Bernard, chaplain and librarian to Archbishop Ussher. This work, whose several contributions promoted royal power, printed 'new' portions of the eighth book, here titled 'Mr. Hookers Judgment of the Kings Power in Matters of Religion'. Bernard made use for the first time of a manuscript in Trinity College, Dublin, which he found amongst Ussher's papers; but no more is heard of this important manuscript until the modern editing of Hooker began.

Meanwhile, John Gauden, bishop of Exeter, published in 1662 all eight books of the *Lawes* with the *Tractates and Sermons.* Book VII appears now for the first time, its provenance a mystery; and Gauden prints Books VI and VIII from texts derived from (but not the same) as those of 1648. *Gauden thus has the distinction of being the first editor of Hooker's Works*, and also the author of the first full biography of Hooker, prefixed to his edition. But this curious and involved publishing history becomes even

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cols. 1949–50. Cf. Georges Edelen, who gives the publishing history of the first five books, in *FLE* 1: xiii–xxvii, cited in note 4, above.

[7] *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie; the Sixth and Eighth books…A work long expected, and now published according to the most authentique copies* (London: Richard Bishop, 1648), sig. A2r.

[8] *Clavi Trabales: or, Nailes Fastned by some Great masters of Assemblyes, Confirming the Kings Supremacy, the subjects duty, Church Government by Bishops* (London: N. Bernard, 1661).

more vexed with Gauden's 'Life of Hooker'. His portrait of Hooker is hardly complimentary, for it is filled with unflattering comments. In reviewing his early life, Gauden describes Hooker as industrious and diligent but 'his natural temper was slow and reserved'; at Cambridge, he was 'a good *plodding Student*, one that *lay heavy* on the plow'.[9] Later, when he was preaching at the Temple, Hooker was the inferior of Travers who spoke (it is implied) with lively efficacy, with 'the *broader sails*'. Hooker's eyes, however, remained '*stedfastly* fixed on the same place from the beginning to the end of his *Sermons*'.[10]

Gauden's hearsay account appeared only once, for it was promptly replaced by a very different life of Hooker by Izaak Walton (first published on its own in 1665), which would appear in all subsequent editions of the *Lawes*, beginning with the next edition of 1666, and continuing down to modern times. Walton's hugely successful lives of John Donne (1640, revised 1658) and Sir Henry Wotton (1651) had attracted the appreciative attention of such important ecclesiastical friends as Gilbert Sheldon, the Restoration archbishop of Canterbury. Walton wrote, as Gauden evidently did not, with a more sensitive view of Hooker's life and accomplishments, turning Hooker into an heroic figure of the English Reformation and a theological thinker of the first importance—especially to the Restoration church. Yet more significant beyond Walton's design to elevate Hooker's character is the doubt into which he throws the last three books of the *Ecclesiasticall Politie*. The complete seventh book which Gauden had somehow unearthed (and quite rightly treats as authentic) views the episcopacy as traditional but not essential to the real essence of the church. And the fragments of the eighth book define a kind of limited royal supremacy. These ideas, as suggested earlier, were generally not in accord with the ecclesiastical (or political) thought of the 1660s, nor was the brief and certainly unfinished discussion of the sixth book on lay elders useful for defining and celebrating the high position of the worthy and 'judicious' Hooker. Thus Walton, sensitive to the wishes of Sheldon and other well placed friends, casts doubt on these books by urging their unfinished and tentative state. He imagines, for example, a conversation between Hooker

[9] See *The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker… In Eight Books of Ecclesiastical Polity… With an account of his Holy Life, and Happy Death, Written by Dr. John Gauden* (London: J. Best for Andrew Crook, 1662), 10 [sig. Dv].

[10] *Works of Richard Hooker* (1662), 30 [sig. gv].

and his friend Hadrian Saravia, quite purposefully; for Saravia was one of the leading exponents of the episcopacy, seeing in it a divine institution. Walton writes that in Hooker's last year of life, 1600, he regularly saw Saravia, and told him *'That he did not beg a long life of God, for any other reason, but to live to finish his three remaining Books of POLITY'*. Walton adds in richly ambiguous words: 'And God heard his prayers, though he denied the Church the benefit of them, as compleated by himself; and 'tis thought he hastened his own death, by hastening to give life to his Books'.[11]

Walton's doubts about the three last books cast a shadow over their integrity which would long persist. Editions of the *Lawes* continued to appear in regular succession, always with Walton's biography attached, in folio in 1676, 1678, 1682, 1705, 1721, 1723, 1739, etc., with the first octavo edition issued by the Clarendon Press in 1793, and the London editions of W. S. Dobson in 1825, and Benjamin Hanbury in 1831. Only Dobson and Hanbury attempted to do more than reprint a previous edition, and their labour led to John Keble's great edition of 1836, a milestone of nineteenth-century scholarship. Keble acknowledges Dobson's work 'as the groundwork on which to introduce the readings from the MSS. or original editions', noting that Hanbury possessed 'considerable spirit and industry', but he edited Hooker 'in some parts with a degree of haste'. Keble's edition, which was reissued with corrections and additions, reached its seventh edition in 1888, and this would remain the definitive text of Hooker for almost a century.[12] Yet Keble, like all of his predecessors, reprinted Walton's *Life* in a prominent, prefatory position; and while not doubting Hooker's

[11] See Walton, *Life of Hooker*, 223. The context of this and of Walton's other biographies is outlined in my *Izaak Walton* (New York: Twayne, 1998). For an excellent and very full description of Walton's relationship to the Restoration Church, his personal connections, and his interpretative writings, see Jessica Martin, *Walton's Lives: Conformist Commemorations and the Rise of Biography* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), esp. chap. 5.

[12] *The Works of … Hooker*, ed. John Keble, rev. R. W. Church and F. Paget, 7th ed., 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), vol. 1, lix. A new edition of Book V, deriving from the first edition of 1597, but with Keble's notes (revised), was published in The English Theological Library, ed. Ronald Bayne (London: Macmillan, 1902). This text, now long out of print, was once in common use by theological students. In an effort to broaden the audience of Book V, Philip B. Secor has recently produced a thoughtfully modernised version based on the Folger Edition, published as *Richard Hooker on Anglican Faith and Worship: A Modern Edition of Book V 'Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity'* (London: SPCK, 2003). Cf. also Secor's *The Sermons of Richard Hooker: The Power of Faith, the Mystery of Grace* (London: SPCK, 2001), a carefully executed modern version of all ten of Hooker's extant sermons.

authorship of the last three books, he questions the appropriateness of Book VI which seems not only fragmentary but also a deviation from the plan and argument of the *Lawes*. Its announced intention was to be a discussion of lay elders, yet it moves into a series of comments on penance, with sections on confession, satisfaction, and absolution. Keble believes that what remains of the sixth book belongs in some other place, and that it fell by mistake into the *Lawes*. But Keble did print for the first time the autograph notes (in Corpus Christi College, Oxford) made by Hooker's friends George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys on yet a different and perhaps 'authentic' version of Book VI which Hooker had submitted to them for their advice and criticism, and Keble gives these notes as an appendix to the putative Book VI.[13]

Keble based his edition of Book VIII on the manuscript in Trinity College, Dublin, the same from which Bernard had excerpted when he compiled *Clavi Trabales*; and Keble was, furthermore, aware of other manuscripts of the eighth book which he collated with Gauden's edition. The Trinity manuscript remains the best—or at least the fullest—version we have of Book VIII, and it forms also the foundation of the two subsequent editions of this book. The first of these is R. A. Houk's edition (1931), which is essentially the same as Keble's but more faithful to the manuscript. Keble, indeed, had modernised the text, adapting it to the style of early nineteenth-century spelling and punctuation. But Houk did little more than check Keble's transcription while at the same time introducing new errors and alterations, though he attempted to clarify the relationship of the several manuscripts and printed sources with the Trinity manuscript.[14] The second modern edition of Book VIII that relies on the Trinity manuscript appears in The Folger Library Edition, but reconstructed in the light of new knowledge and more recent textual scholarship. Most notable is the discovery of Hooker's autograph notes amongst Archbishop Ussher's papers in Trinity College, Dublin (MS 364, ff. 69r–84v), covering twenty-seven closely written pages, which contain rough general sketches of Hooker's arguments in Books VI and VIII. The old and persistent suggestion, begun by Walton,

[13] See Keble, 3:108–139. There is a new and more accurate transcription of Corpus Christi College, Oxford MS 295, ff. 1r–18v in *FLE* 3: 105–140. George Cranmer (1563–1600), like Sandys, was a former student of Hooker. See note 3, above.

[14] See Raymond Aaron Houk, *Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity: Book VIII* (New York: Columbia UP, 1931). Houk's substantial introduction to his edition is still of considerable value (3–146).

that someone else wrote or substantially revised the posthumous books could now be laid to rest.[15]

These last three books of the *Ecclesiasticall Politie* are particularly important in fulfilling the aim of The Folger Library Edition of Hooker's *Works*, that is, to present 'a critical, old-spelling edition of all the extant writings of one of the most important authors of the English Renaissance' with texts 'based on fresh transcriptions of the earliest and most authoritative documents, in many instances manuscripts written or corrected by Hooker himself or contemporary transcripts of these'. The first volume of The Folger Edition, edited by George Edelen, includes the Preface and Books I–IV, which was originally issued as a small folio in sixes in 1593. Edelen carefully edited the presentation copies of this first folio, with conservative emendations, especially where compositorial blunders occurred. The second volume, edited by W. Speed Hill, of Book V, is transcribed from autograph for the press by Hooker's amanuensis, Benjamin Pullen, and corrected in Hooker's own hand.[16] But Books VI, VII, and VIII obviously offered very special problems to the editor because of their troubled history.

Book VII, which appeared only in Gauden's 1662 edition, presented few difficulties, but a number of copies of this edition were compared with interesting results. The whole of the *Works* (less Book VII) was set in type before Book VII came to light. Gauden faithfully printed the text he uncovered, a manuscript source of Book VII, and he even reproduced many of Hooker's characteristic spellings and occasionally what seem to be his own notes. Of Book VIII, special circumstances apply: That a number of Hooker's manuscripts had been preserved by Archbishop Ussher and eventually found their way into the library of Trinity College, Dublin was a well known fact to Houk, and long before him, to John Keble, or persons assisting Keble. They had made use of a number of these documents, particularly, as we have noted, in the editing of the eighth book. All of these manuscripts were correctly presumed to be seventeenth-century copies of late sixteenth-century originals; but in about 1972, Laetitia Yeandle, the Folger editor of the

[15] Hooker's autograph notes include, besides material relating to Books VI and VIII, two pages of notes for the so-called 'Fragments of an Answer to the Letter of certain English Protestants', the unfinished reply to *A Christian Letter* (1599), a contemporary attack on Hooker. See John Booty's introductory discussion in *FLE* 4: xxxiii–xxxiv.

[16] This manuscript, uniquely employed for The Folger Edition, is in the Bodleian Library, Oxford (MS Add. MS C.165) and consists of 225 folios.

Tractates and Sermons (vol. 5) recognised that one of them, the *Tractate of Pride*, was in fact in Hooker's autograph. By chance, another scholar was at work at the same time re-cataloguing the Latin medieval manuscripts in Trinity College; and he happened on one document that seemed to have been misbound in the general upheaval of the Library during the middle of the eighteenth century. Here were twenty-seven pages of notes, described in the old shelf catalogue as 'Imperfect unconnected reflections concerning Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction . . . in Latin and English'. The Keeper of the Manuscripts at the time saw that the hand was familiar, and he suspected it was Hooker's, a fact that Laetitia Yeandle and I confirmed. These were the circumstances of this remarkable discovery, a key event in the textual research for the Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker, and one of the most exciting, though perhaps inadequately celebrated manuscript revelations in recent Renaissance scholarship.[17]

This remarkable set of notes, all in Hooker's minute hand make clear Hooker's authorship of the three last books; at some stage of composition, probably after 1593, Hooker may be seen to analyse his materials and organise his ideas by arranging them under topics. With Book VIII, for example, he considers the large issues, then sets out, then reorders the book into nine chapters. It is very likely that Hooker was putting his thoughts and current reading into some kind of order, here making a beginning and not a revision of his material. Also, Hooker gives a very clear plan of how he thought the different parts of the eighth book should be arranged, giving headings for each one of the nine sections, a scheme that is followed in The Folger Library Edition. Thus this most recent edition of the posthumous Book VIII is based on ten manuscript versions, if we number among them the notes and drafts in Trinity College, Dublin, unknown to previous editors, and as well two additional manuscripts of the eighth book that came to light during this most recent editorial activity, one in Lambeth Palace, the other in the British Library.[18]

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[17] This 'discovery' was first announced in *Long Room* [Trinity College, Dublin], 11 (Spring-Summer 1975): 7–10.

[18] The relationship of all these manuscripts is elaborated in the Textual Introduction of *FLE* 3: li–lxix; see esp. the 'genealogy', lx. Hooker's autograph notes are transcribed on 463–538. Ussher began to copy them, and his version is given, also in *FLE* 3 (539–54). The texts of Books VI and VIII are products of 'stemmatic analysis', that is, they derive from a complex genealogical plot that shows ancestry, relationship, and descent. Since Book VIII, for example, survives in ten extant manuscripts and three

As the draft notes reveal, Hooker's method of composition was a continuous writing and perfecting of his argument. The notes for Book VIII suggest that Hooker embedded some passages in longer ones, or else deleted certain lines, then rewrote them, then deleted them again. Hooker obviously wrote with painstaking care and effort, anxiously attempting to refine and clarify his argument. Perhaps Spenser, Hooker's first editor, would have seen the manuscript of Book VIII—and likely also of books VI and VII—in a stage decidedly more refined than the notes that have survived. But one can imagine that Spenser's description of these books as 'rude and mangled' was a fair statement of the confusing state of the manuscripts. The anomalous situation of Book VI, and the incompleteness and fragmentation of Book VIII, necessarily reflects the state in which Hooker's editors found them in 1600. But at least we can be confident that Hooker left the last three books of the *Lawes* more-or-less finished, though unfortunately he did not live long enough to see them published.

Nevertheless, the vexing question of whether Hooker *perfectly* completed the *Lawes* before his death in 1600 is still unsettled. I think that Hooker wrote the books of the *Lawes seriatim*, but finally ran out of time. Yet he might have completed the entirety of the *Lawes* by 1597 and then returned to the last three books in order to revise them. Many of the manuscript notes in Dublin likely represent, therefore, a late and revisionary stage of composition; those notes for Book VI, indeed, are seemingly a response to Cranmer's and Sandys's critique of Hooker's earlier (or other) version, now lost. Much of Book VI in its present state does seem at odds with the general development of the *Lawes*, so much so that some commentators, beginning with John Keble, though acknowledging Hooker's authorship of the whole of the existing Book VI, have suggested that all but the first two chapters belong in some other work by Hooker; or that almost all of the Book should stand independently as an extended treatise 'Of Confession' (or 'Of Penitence'), and so appear elsewhere, perhaps ideally in the volume of *Tractates and*

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early printed editions (1648, 1661, 1662), one may assume the prior existence of six now non-extant manuscripts, or, alternatively, a missing manuscript that was copied and recopied six times before disappearing. In such a way can the 'best' or most likely text be shown. W. Speed Hill comments on this and other editorial procedures in his informative 'Recent Theoretical Approaches to Editing Renaissance Texts, with Particular Reference to the Folger Library Edition of Hooker's *Works*', in *New Ways of Looking at Old Texts, II*. Papers of the Renaissance English Text Society, 1992–1996 (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1998), 11–21.

Sermons.[19] The debate over whether or not Book VI, as it first appeared in 1648, is an authentic part of the *Lawes* is defined by those who, on the one hand, argue from a rhetorical standpoint ('the material looks and *sounds* out of place'—it is a self-contained compositional unit), and those who, on the other hand, argue from a more theoretical position ('Book VI shows Hooker leaning toward philosophical and theological first principles').[20] No such dispute occurs over Book VII, of course, which was complete (in somewhat rough, presumably unrevised form), although it had disappeared after Hooker's death, not to emerge again until its publication sixty years later. One might well ask: If Book VII was concluded in 1600, why should not also VI and VIII have been similarly finished?

Hooker's *Works*, which include not only the *Lawes* but also his *Tractates and Sermons*, have scarcely (if ever) been out-of-print in the 400 years since they first appeared. Keble's edition of 1836 was the best of its time, and one may hope that The Folger Edition will survive as long. With the desire not for surpassing Keble's knowledge but merely for adding to it, the late twentieth-century editors have tried to continue in a way worthy of this great author. Keble's commentary is learned, but substantially more limited than the introductions and notes provided in the extensive volume 6 (in two-parts) of The Folger Edition. The final index volume, compiled by W. Speed Hill, is a rich resource to the vast literature—biblical, classical, patristic, exegetical—with which Hooker was easily familiar. Selections from Hooker have frequently appeared, such as *An Abridged Edition* of the *Lawes*, edited by A. S. McGrade and

[19] This is the view of W. Speed Hill, which he first asserted in his 'Hooker's *Polity:* The Problem of the 'Three Last Books',' *Huntington Library Quarterly* 34 (1971): 317–36, esp. 330: 'Book VI is, in nine tenths of its present text, not properly a part of the *Polity* at all'. He reaffirms this belief in his more recent essay on 'Richard Hooker and the Rhetoric of History', *Churchman* 114 (2000): 7–21, particularly in note 8 (p. 8): 'I find myself unconvinced that the text we have for the bulk of Book VI (i.e. chaps. 3–6) belongs in the *Lawes*'. See Rudolph P. Almasy, 'Richard Hooker's Book VI: A Reconstruction,' *Huntington Library Quarterly* 42 (1979): 117–139.

[20] Rudolph P. Almasy persuasively presents the rhetorical case; Lee W. Gibbs writes with equal conviction for the theological side. See Almasy, 'Book VI and the Tractate of Penance: do they belong together'; and Gibbs, 'Book VI of Hooker's *Lawes* Revisited: The Calvin Connection', both in *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, ed. W. J. Torrance Kirby (London and Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 263–83 and 243–61. Gibbs provides much detailed analysis in support of the appropriateness of the traditionally received Book VI in his Commentary, *FLE* 6:249–308, to which must be added Arthur Stephen McGrade's prefatory 'The Three Last Books and Hooker's Autograph Notes', *FLE* 6:233–47.


Brian Vickers,[21] and McGrade's edition of the *Preface, Book I, Book VIII* for the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought;[22] and anthologies commonly used in North American undergraduate survey courses typically give very brief excerpts from the *Lawes*, as if to honour Hooker's canonical status as a literarily gifted philosopher.[23] This worthy attitude is very old, and perhaps no better expressed than by Hooker's outspoken contemporary, Ben Jonson: 'Sir Philip Sidney and Mr Hooker, in different matter, grew great masters of wit and language, and in whom all vigour of invention and strength of judgement met'.[24]

[21] (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1975).

[22] *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: preface, book I, book VIII* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989).

[23] For example, see *The Longman Anthology of British Literature* (1999), 718–20, in which a brief selection from Book I is set within a contextualising section called 'Perspectives', on Government and Self-Government. *The Norton Anthology of English Literature* in the first six of its editions, provided generous selections, with six excerpts chosen from the Preface and Book I of the *Lawes*; but the 7th edition (2000) reduced this offering to two brief selections from Book I (558–63) while the 8th edition (2006) offers substantial selections in a section called 'Faith in Conflict', with additional excerpts in 'Norton Literature Online'.

[24] See *Timber, or Discoveries*, ed. Ian Donaldson, The Oxford Authors (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985), 546.



THE
WORKS
OF
Mr. Richard Hooker,
(That *Learned, Godly, Judicious,* and *Eloquent Divine*)
Vindicating the
CHURCH of ENGLAND,
As truly *Christian,* and duly *Reformed:*
In Eight BOOKS of
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.
Now compleated,
As with the *Sixth* and *Eighth*, so with the SEVENTH,
(touching *Episcopacy*, as the Primitive, Catholick and Apostolick
Government of the Church) out of his own Manuscripts, never
before Published.
With an account of his *Holy Life,* and *Happy Death,*
Written by Dr. *John Gauden,* now Bishop of *Exeter.*
The entire *Edition* Dedicated to the Kings Most
Excellent Majestie,
CHARLS the II.
By whose ROYAL FATHER (near His Martyrdom) the former Five Books (then onely extant) were
commended to his dear Children, as an excellent means
to satisfie Private Scruples, and settle the Publique
Peace of this Church and Kingdom.

James 3. 17. *The wisdom from above, is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easie to be intreated, full of mercy and good works, without partiality and hypocrisie.*

Μακρὰ τ' ἀλήθεια ζήτεται, καὶ τ' ἄριστα ἁπτῶτα. Plat.
Multi tædio investigandæ veritatis ad proximos divertunt errores. Min. Fel.

London, Printed by *J. Best*, for *Andrew Crook*, at the *Green Dragon* in S. *Pauls* Church-yard. 1662.

Richard Hooker. *The Works.* Edited with a *Life* of the author by John Gauden. London: Printed by J. Best, for Andrew Crook, 1662. The first complete edition of the *Lawes*. The engraved title page and dedicatory letter to King Charles II are dated 1661.

CHAPTER THREE

WORKS AND EDITIONS II

W. Speed Hill

It is not often one has a chance to right a textual wrong, to reverse—on appeal—a textual injustice, to correct a textual record fixed in print now for twenty-five years, but, thanks to the opportunity of making a contribution to the *Companion*, I am able to do exactly that, at least with respect to how chapters 3 through 6 of Book VI of the *Lawes* were edited and how they appear in the third volume of the Folger Edition.

Book VI was to have discussed the issue of '*Ecclesisticall Jurisdiction*,' responding in particular to the Puritans' brief that '*certayne Lay-elders*' ought to be '*established for the exercise of that* power'.[1] The argument excluding lay-elders as agents within the Church's jurisdictional mandate was aimed at the writings of Thomas Cartwright and Walter Travers. A decade earlier, in 1585, Travers had sought to install a Puritan polity in the Temple where he was Deputy Reader and Hooker was Master (by the Queen's appointment, no less). On this topic Hooker had had first hand experience.

Book VI at one time existed as fair copy, readied for the press; we have extensive notes on it by George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys reprinted in the Folger Edition and in Keble's edition.[2] We know the identity of its scribe; he was Benjamin Pullen, a clerk employed by Hooker's father-in-law, John Churchman. He had earlier prepared a 225-folio MS of Book V for the press which is extant.[3] In their notes on the missing MS, Cranmer and Sandys call for treatment of additional topics, for a more explicitly polemical stance, and for fuller documentation from Cartwright's earlier debates with John Whitgift. John Keble abstracts its contents,[4] as does Rudolf Almasy.[5]

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[1] *Lawes* VI.title; *FLE* 3:1, cf. also VI.1.1; 3:2.

[2] See *Cranmer's Notes* and *Sandys's Notes*, *FLE* 3:107–140; Keble 3:108–139.

[3] Bodleian MS Add. C.165.

[4] Keble 1.xxxvi–xxxvii.

[5] 'Richard Hooker's Book VI: A Reconstruction,' *HLQ* 42.2 (Spring 1979): 117–139.

The latest date we can assign to *these* notes is spring/summer of 1596 when Cranmer and Sandys together set out on a diplomatic mission to the Continent.[6] As of 1599, Sandys places himself in Paris on 9 April.[7] Thereafter the two return to London: Sandys to deliver his report, *Europæ Speculum: A View or Survey of the State of Religion in these Westerne Parts of the World*, to Archbishop Whitgift; Cranmer to join the English campaign led by Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, to subdue the Irish. Hooker's sixth book was unlikely to have been much on their minds.

Cranmer died in a skirmish with Irish rebels in 1600, just days after Hooker's own death; Sandys was in London, but extremely busy, having been abroad for three years. There would have been a window of opportunity, from December 1597, when Book V was published, to 1599, when *A Christian Letter of Certain English Protestantes* appeared,[8] for Hooker to initiate revisions. But Hooker's final note to the reader of Book V—'*Have patience with me for a small time, and by the helpe of Almightie God I will pay the whole*'[9]—does not sound like a man cheerfully rolling up his sleeves and getting on with it, now that the goal was in sight.

After 1596 the Hooker family were no longer living at the Churchmans', and Hooker now had the daily responsibilities of a parish cure as well as a family to care for. Seeing through the press (in London, of course, miles from Bishopsbourne) a revised and augmented Book VI could not have been a priority for him. When he speaks in 1597 of needing only 'a small time . . . to pay the whole'—that is, Books VI, VII, and VIII—he is either grossly underestimating what remained to be done, or we have lost at least one entire layer of composition, if not more, from the archival record, one that would have advanced each of the three unpublished books one step closer to completion than the surviving documents support. Hypothetically, then, Book VI would have been revised, fair copied, and readied for the press (as was Pullen's MS of Book V);[10] Book VII would have been in a scribal copy ready for vetting (as was the MS of VI underlying Cranmer's and Sandys's notes); and Book VIII, in authorial draft, would have been ready for inscription

[6] Raymond Houk, ed., *Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity: Book VIII* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), 95.

[7] *Europæ Speculum: A View or Survey of the State of Religion in these Westerne Parts of the World* (London: for S. Waterson, 1605; rev. edn. The Hague: for Michael Sparke, 1629), sig. 2h4^{v}.

[8] See John Booty's Introduction to *ACL* 4:xiii.

[9] *FLE* 2:498.22.

[10] See my Textual Introduction to Book V, *FLE* 2:xiii–xxii.

in fair copy. These hypothetical states of composition have analogues in MSS that do survive. Bishop John Gauden, who published Book VII for the first time, claims that it was printed from autograph which 'by comparing the writing of it with other indisputable papers, or known MSS of Mr. Hooker's, is undoubtedly his own hand throughout',[11] as is the Dublin MS of the tractate *Of the Nature of Pride*,[12] and that he has seen a copy of Book VIII, 'written by another hand, as a copy, but interlined in many places with Mr. Hooker's own characters, as owned by him',[13] as is the MS of Book V.

These then are plausible and distinct states of composition, but nothing that survives—and a great deal does survive—suggests that only 'a small time' would have been needed to ready VI for the press and VII and VIII for vetting by two young diplomats abroad. Given their political content, it is inconceivable that Hooker would have published VII and VIII on his own, even assuming he had himself finished them to his own satisfaction. In addition, Sandys would have needed to work out the arrangements with John Windet, the printer, about which the lawsuit initiated by Hooker's daughters is silent.

Some time in 1599, then, Hooker turned to the anonymous and unauthorized tract, *A Christian Letter of certaine English Protestantes.*[14] For this project, the archival record is quite full.[15] His response to his attackers would not be beholden to Cranmer, Sandys, or anyone else.[16] To answer their charges, he need only read (and copiously annotate) a small quarto, a task personally more urgent than the mind-numbing expansion and polemical documentation of Book VI.

From here on, my narrative proceeds posthumously. *A Christian Letter* was answered by William Covell, not by Hooker.[17] Both John Spenser and William Covell state that Hooker lived until he finished all eight books: Spenser in his 1604 address 'To the Reader'[18] and Covell in his 1603 vindication of Hooker's Books I–V, *A Just and Temperate Defence*.[19]

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[11] Keble 1:xl.
[12] 5:309–361.
[13] Keble 1:xl.
[14] *FLE* 4:6–79.
[15] The relevant documents are transcribed and printed in *FLE* 4.
[16] Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 13, 16–17.
[17] William Covell, *A iust and temperate defence of the fiue books of ecclesiastical policie: written by M. Richard Hooker* (London: P. Short for Clement Knight, 1603).
[18] *FLE* 1:348.
[19] See page 149.

Neither witness distinguishes autograph draft from authorial revision, and neither offers first-hand evidence: i.e., neither ever saw 'the perfect Copies' of which Spenser speaks.[20] What we have is testimony under oath that Spenser had by 1613 assembled two piles of MSS (VI and VII), 'that he thinckethe with some reasonable travell & paines might have beene made fit for the presse.' The 1604 statement had announced only an intention of 'setting forth' the three unpublished books, but as of 1604 no work had been done on them. Note the uncertainty of motive Spenser offers for their 'conveying away':

> But some evill disposed mindes, whether of malice, or covetousnesse, or wicked blinde Zeale, it is uncerteine,…as soone as they were borne, and their father dead, smothered them, and by conveying away the perfect Copies, left unto us nothing but certeine old unperfect and mangled draughts, dismembred into peeces, and scattered like *Medeas Absyrtus*…[21]

Were these vandals motivated by malice, greed, or religious zealotry? No single motive is offered, and by inference no assignable agent is either. By 1613, however, Spenser has been able to reconstruct from these fragments two piles of MSS., corresponding to Books VI and VII respectively,[22] which could be readied for the press. Book VIII, however, still consisted of 'scattered papers,' not yet 'brought…to any reasonable perfection.' There is no mention of lost 'perfect Copies.' Instead, there is a pained allusion to a breakdown of intention. Books VI and VII *have* been brought 'to some reasonable perfection,' but are 'not yet thought fitt for the presse, for some causes which…doe not concerne the matter nowe in question' (the 'matter' being the financial arrangements regarding Sandys's role as the *Lawes' financial* backer).

The legal documents Sisson transcribes are remarkably informative. The interrogatory asks: was there 'a purpose that the said 3 latter bookes showld have bine sett forthe & and that there was staie made thereof onlye by reason of a difference betwene the said defendt [Sandys] & the nowe lo: Bishopp of Elye [Launcelot Andrewes] about the insertinge

[20] Sisson judges Spenser to be Covell's source.

[21] From Spenser's note '*To the Reader*' in the 1604 edn. of the *Lawes; FLE* 1:348. According to Ovid, Jason killed Medea's brother Absyrtus in order to secure his escape from Colchis. Medea dismembered Absyrtus and scattered the pieces behind the Argo in the way of their father, King Aeëtes, who gathered up all the pieces in order to give his son a proper burial. Ovid, *Tristia* III.9.1–34.

[22] Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr Hooker*, 152–153.

of a tract of confession written by theire said fathers [sic] into the said bookes.' Seldom do we have independent documentary explanation for such a major textual anomaly. Spenser's response does not deny the assertion, but does not answer it. A careful reading of the extant Book VI reveals the problem. Keble succinctly put the matter: 'As it stands at present [Book VI] is an entire deviation from its subject'.[23] We now know why. In preparing Book VI for the press, a fault line opened up between two of the executors of Hooker's literary remains. Sandys wanted the Book VI he and Cranmer had vetted, the book that Hooker had advertised in chapter 7 of the Preface: *'concerning the power of jurisdiction . . . whether laymen, such as your governing Elders are, ought in all congregations for ever be invested with that power.'* This is the Book VI represented by the first of the two piles of MSS Spenser had put in order. Andrewes wanted something quite different, viz. 'the inserting of a tract of confession written by . . .' Hooker. Spenser was in the middle. Andrewes, a bishop, prevailed, and so spiked the larger purpose of setting forth at least two of the three last books that Spenser had recovered from Hooker's literary remains.

Given Spenser's silence, one can only speculate what ensued. Andrewes insisted on the insertion. Sandys insisted on the Book VI as planned by Hooker and signed off on by him and Cranmer. Spenser was caught in the middle. Sandys refused to pay Hooker's heirs for a MS that so sharply deviated from the Book VI he and Cranmer had approved. Andrewes secured a 'staie' of the 'setting forth' of the last three books. Bishops trump college presidents.

The real puzzle is why Andrewes should have wished to or been willing to sabotage Spenser's editorial work. Both Andrewes and Sandys were men of some power. As Sandys had probably not recouped his subvention of the published folios of Books I–IV (1593) and Book V (1597), he had a continuing financial interest in the publication of VI—VIII, as did Hooker's daughters, to whom Sandys would remit the £20 due them as Hooker's heirs. That is what the whole lawsuit was about. But Sandys refused to pay for unpublishable copy. What ensued? I imagine Sandys simply demanding the two MS piles Spenser had sorted out and stalking out of the room. Spenser's only consolation was to stay (until 1648, as it happened) the Book VI we have, the offspring of unacknowledged textual miscegenation. 'This anomaly,'

[23] Keble 1:xxxiv.

wrote Keble, 'every reader must have observed, and which in any writer carried so far would be extraordinary, but in Hooker of all writers is quite unaccountable…'[24]

As for Andrewes, we are free to ask why he did what he did. What polemical context would explain their insertion? Did Andrewes think no one would notice that Esau's hair was not his own? And why did Archbishop Ussher, who presided over the publication of the 1648 quarto and did so much to preserve Hooker's legacy, not hoist a warning flag? It is in this context, then, that I regard chapters 3.3–6.18 of Book VI as textual neoplasm, an alien growth that ought to be removed from a critical text of Book VI.

None of the editors of the Folger Edition believed then that the interpolations were not by Hooker, but I (together with Almasy and Keble) believe that they do not belong in a text that honours the intentions of the author of the *Lawes*. In a Foreword to Torrance Kirby's recent collection, *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, Paul Stanwood says: 'my own view is that it is a rightful, though dislocated part of a lost or unfinished book'.[25] Stanwood's 1981 edition kept the tracts in his text of Book VI.[26] Twenty-five years later, while acknowledging the cogency of Almasy's analysis, Stanwood regards excision or incorporation as editorial alternatives of equal merit.

The editorial excision of chapters 3.3–6.18 would leave us with an embarrassing hiatus (90 pages in the Folger edition), and these chapters would be reduced from being a part of the *Lawes'* canonical text to the status of a Textual Supplement belonging in the Folger's fifth volume, which gathers together Hooker's early tracts, treatises, and sermons as a category of texts of a similar nature,[27] written in the 1580s by an academic theologian at Oxford. But it would have accorded better with Hooker's authorial intentions, however frustrated, if we had presented the amputated but authentic first two chapters of Book VI as the only portion of Book VI that has documentary authority and that honours authorial intention. This is the text we should have printed, not the patchwork job done after Hooker's death by Spenser in order to give the appearance that Hooker had completed Book VI before his death.

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[24] Keble 1:xxxv.
[25] *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, ed. Kirby, xv.
[26] VI.3.3–6.18; 3:9.4–103.19.
[27] Cf. *Of Justification, Of Pride, Of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Grace in the Elect*, etc.

Besides the disciplinary divide that separated Andrewes from Sandys, noted by Sisson, there remained Sandys's financial interest in Books VI–VIII. He owed Hooker's estate £20 for the MSS of VI–VIII, but only upon their completion. I suggest that Sandys laid claim to the last version of each. So it would seem, then, that it is at Sandys's door we should lay the loss of any later versions.[28] Their absence from the record, however, is not decisive. They could have been written and lost, or not written at all. On this issue, the surviving record is mute. Certainly Sandys would not have paid for the text that was constructed in 1613 by Spenser. The archive has no items that have a Sandys provenance, apart from the early *Two Sermons on S. Jude*.[29] So it may be that Hooker's student, patron, and collaborator was finally responsible for the loss of those obscure objects of editorial desire, the 'perfect Copies' of 1604.

The duty of an editor should by now be clear: remove the alien growth. Keble's last words on why, instead, he reprinted the traditional 1648 text appear in a footnote. Their logic escapes me.

> The present editor is convinced . . . that the sixth book completed by Hooker is now almost or altogether lost, still he has judged it best on consideration to leave the following pages in their usual place.
> [1.] because the early part of them[30] does appear to have formed part of some rough draft of the book on lay elders.
> [2.] because it seemed safer to await the judgment of literary men in general, before expunging so large a portion of the treatise.
> [3.] because he believes the whole to be Hooker's, though wrongly inserted into his great work.[31]

Nonetheless, I was unable to persuade my colleagues, the Folger commentators on Book VI (Lee Gibbs) and on Books VII and VIII (Steve McGrade), and Paul Stanwood, textual editor of Books VI–VIII, that the textual and documentary evidence, though not without gaps, was unambiguously clear: Book VI as we have it is 95% material having to do with penance as a sacrament and is not relevant to the issue of whether lay-elders ought to participate in the exercise of church discipline.

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[28] Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage*, 104–105.
[29] *FLE* 5:9–57. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage*, 108–11.
[30] I.e., VI.1.1–3.1; 3:1.1–6.18.
[31] Keble III:1.n.

How did this editorial error come about? Alas, the collaborative/consensual model of decision-making that I had fostered throughout two decades, was incapable of adjudicating internal conflicts such as that between Book VI's textual editor (Stanwood) and me, the textual editor of the edition, when disagreements arose, or similarly between Stanwood and the commentary editors (Gibbs, McGrade) when they disagreed. Provoked by an article on the issue by McGrade, Gibbs argued, and continues to argue, that the printed 'Treatise of Confession' and the MS underlying the notes of Cranmer are both part of a larger but missing whole and properly belong together in our text. McGrade concurred. Stanwood conceded that Book VI as it stood was 'problematic,' but left it in place in his 1981 Folger text of Book VI, as Ussher had done with his in 1648. Our copy-text for Book VI, the Trinity College, Dublin, MS, was the fruit of Spenser's editorial labours. As Stanwood shows, Ussher and his scribe very successfully papered over the join.[32]

It would have sabotaged our editorial collaboration to insist as *de facto* textual editor of the edition (but not the named editor of that text) that one interpretation of the textual problem was correct. My article of 1971 on 'The Problem of the Three Last Books' of the *Lawes* challenged the traditional inclusion of the material on penance in any subsequent edition.[33] No one has since refuted the arguments first set forth by Keble, and Almasy has materially supported them.[34] Were I to re-edit Book VI, I would remove the material in question.

Textual evidence, based on documentary evidence, is subject to a degree of certainty that interpretative reading(s) of a text are not. I had no quarrel with the inclusion of the *topic* of penance in any hypothetical reconstruction of any lost Book VI, but not as it is treated in this particular *document.* Keble's 'literary men in general' includes Hooker's twentieth-century *textual* editors, who by training and inclination have an ear for texts in English, for their audiences, their rhetoric, their diction, their encoded participation in a particular discourse, that historical editors, accustomed to thinking and writing at high levels

[32] 'Textual Introduction: The Three Last Books,' *FLE* 3:xliii–xliv.

[33] 'Hooker's *Polity*: The Problem of the "Three Last Books",' *HLQ* 34.4 (August 1971): 317–336.

[34] 'Book VI and the *Tractate on Penance*: do they belong together?' in *RHER*, 263–283; cf. Almasy, 'Language and Exclusion in the First Book of Hooker's *Politie*,' *RHER*, 337–342.

of abstraction, may lack. Gibbs's and McGrade's vision of a revised Book VI has an intellectual grandeur that the reconstruction in the Folger edition lacks.

Now, speaking *in propria persona*—the mantle of the General Editor now hangs on a hook deep in my clothes closet—I believe incorporation into the *Lawes* of the 'Treatise on Penitence' was mistaken. In doing so we as editors did not honour authorial intention, although ours was an author-centric edition, not a documentary edition (at least for our text of the *Lawes*).[35] Publication of this note in the *Brill Companion* enables me to correct the record. My textual pangs of conscience begin to abate.

[35] For what is at issue, see W. Speed Hill, 'English Renaissance: Nondramatic Literature,' in *Scholarly Editing: A Guide to Research*, ed. D. C. Greetham [MLA, 1995], 204–230.

CHAPTER FOUR

CLASSICAL, PATRISTIC, AND MEDIEVAL SOURCES

A. S. McGrade

This review[1] touches only obliquely on issues about Hooker currently or perennially in dispute. It does, however, provide context for discussing such issues, and it raises a question of its own. Why so much subtext? Regarding church ceremonies, Hooker devoted hundreds of references and associated pages in *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* to controversies that were in his view 'for the greatest part such silly things, that very easines doth make them hard to be disputed of in serious manner'.[2] Inelegantly put, this looks like self-confessed over-kill. And with respect to weightier issues of authority in the church, he recognized that by the late 1590s a degree of calm had descended[3]—and yet he devoted to these issues more hundreds of pages and abundant references. Hence,

[1] Limits of space and competence preclude considering all of Hooker's sources here. My review is restricted to 'explicit' sources, texts that Hooker cites by author or title or that he quotes or closely paraphrases without attribution but with evident awareness. The Folger editors note many passages that might be counted as implicit references to, for example, Calvin or Aquinas. For the most part I do not consider biblical citations, which are more numerous than all other types of reference combined and for Hooker more important. I do not attempt to cover Reformation or Counter-Reformation sources, British or continental. Hooker's complex relationships to these are discussed elsewhere in this volume and in much other research. Finally, this review is restricted to works that Hooker had completed or nearly completed for publication: his tractates, sermons, and sermon fragments, and *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*.

My own major source is the Folger Library edition of Hooker's works (*FLE*), under the general editorship of W. Speed Hill. I am especially grateful to Professor Hill for providing me with a computer file of the Index of Names and Works which completes the edition. For almost every reference considered in this study, I am further indebted to the associate editors of the Folger edition responsible for commenting on Hooker's texts, to Egil Grislis on the sermons, William P. Haugaard on the Preface and Books II–IV of the *Lawes*, Lee W. Gibbs on Books I and VI, John Booty on Book V, and my younger self on Books VII and VIII. For these scholars' own summary discussions of Hooker's sources, see *FLE* 5:630–634 and *FLE* 6:62–72, 91–96, 143–153, 204–223, 261–271, 323–326, and 349–355. My citations of Hooker will be to *FLE*: title and section of the work (simply book, chapter, and section for the *Lawes*) and volume, page, and line.

[2] *Lawes* V.Dedication.3; 2:2.19–22.

[3] *Lawes* VI.1.1; 3:2.1–11.

besides trying to understand Hooker's use of individual sources, this study must in the end also address a broader question. Why are there so many of them?

After a few general remarks on the range and accuracy of Hooker's references, I will move through his works chronologically, picking out references that typify his use of sources or illuminate major themes in his thought. Tables indicating the distribution of different types of references in the works surveyed will be found at the end of the chapter.

The Range and Accuracy of Hooker's References

The range of Hooker's sources is wide. Of his 204 classical references, 66 are to Aristotle (20 to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 18 to the *Politics*, 10 to the *Rhetoric*, and the rest to 6 other works), 19 to Cicero (among 12 works), and 10 to Plato. The rest are distributed among 57 works by 48 authors. Similarly, Hooker's 852 patristic references, while dominated by the figures of Augustine (95 references to 45 works), Tertullian (78 references to 21 works), Cyprian (57 references to 33 works), and Jerome (52 references to 27 works), extend to a further 225 works by 93 authors. There are 216 references to 86 medieval sources. Thomas Aquinas (27 references to 7 works) is the only author to be cited as many as 10 times, although there are also 27 references to various parts of the canon law.

Hooker was distinctive among English controversialists in his use of three classes of sources that cut across a division into classical, patristic, and medieval: the Greek fathers, historians, and scholars of the early church and their Byzantine successors; Jewish texts; and a variety of legal sources.[4] References to the Greek fathers are especially numerous in *Lawes* V, both regarding fundamental theological issues about the person of Christ and his presence in the Eucharist and supporting Hooker's case for a ceremonially rich liturgy. They also figure in the treatise on repentance which is all that remains to us of Book VI. Hooker laid groundwork in *Lawes* IV.11 for his later use of Jewish sources in replying to an objection against the Jewish derivation of some Church of

[4] Hooker's schooling and career provide background for his use of such material: the emphasis at his Oxford college on reading the Greek fathers, his tenure as deputy Professor of Hebrew at Oxford beginning in 1579, and, for legal sources, his years as master of the Temple, a major centre of legal studies, and his continued close acquaintance with his former student, the lawyer Edwin Sandys.

England ceremonies. He initiates an important discussion of religion and morality at the beginning of *Lawes* V.1.2 with a line from Philo Judaeus, and he cites Philo and Josephus a dozen times each. In discussing restitution as part of genuine repentance, he quotes Maimonides, whom he identifies as one of 'their great Interpretors and scribes'.[5] Hooker employed ancient, classical, and Byzantine Roman law; a wide range of early church councils; Carolingian capitularies; Saxon law; medieval canon law; and English statute and common law for various purposes: as authoritative for religious practices, as a source of general principles transferable to religious cases (such as the binding character of promises made by sponsors at baptism), and as statements of the nature and status of law itself.

In his own time Hooker was credited for fairness in citing texts and arguments against his own position. Relative to the scholarship of his day, he was with few exceptions equally fair and accurate in deploying resources to support it. Later scholarship has, however, revised his identification of some sources. Mercurius Trismegistus was not, as believed in the Renaissance, an ancient Egyptian sage but the name attached to documents written by Neoplatonist philosophers between the late 2nd and 3rd centuries CE which appeared as a collection in the 14th century. The texts traditionally ascribed to Paul's Athenian convert Dionysius the Areopagite were written by a Christian Neoplatonist of the late 5th century. About a third of Hooker's references to Ignatius, the martyred first-century bishop of Antioch, are to interpolations or spurious epistles. The *Quæstiones et responsiones ad orthodoxos* previously ascribed to Justin Martyr (2nd century) are now thought to have been written after the Council of Nicæa (325). Some fourteen of Hooker's references to Cyprian, the 3rd-century bishop of Carthage, are to texts by Arnold, abbot of Bonneval in the diocese of Chartres from 1144–1156. The *De pœnitentia* Hooker attributes to Ambrose of Milan (*c.* 339–397) was more likely written by Caesarius of Arles (470–542). Two works attributed by Hooker to the 5th-century theologian Prosper of Aquitaine are by other authors, the *De vita contemplativa* of Julianus Pomerius and the anonymous *De vocatione omnium gentium*. Hooker's references to Eusebius of Emesa in Syria (d. 359?) and to Salvian of Marseilles (*c.* 400–*c.* 480), apart from those to the latter's *De vero judicio et providentia Dei* and *Timothei ad ecclesiam libri iv*, are to texts in a

[5] *Lawes* VI.5.7; 3:62.15–63.2.

Gallican collection compiled between the 6th and 9th centuries known as Eusebius Gallicanus.

Sometimes with acknowledgment, sometimes without, Hooker made occasional use of intermediate sources. For example, Theodoret bishop of Cyrrhus's 'dialogues' or 'florilegia' provided texts from other Greek fathers quoted in the central chapters of *Lawes* V on Incarnation and sacraments. Some texts Hooker cited in discussing infant baptism are taken from Georg Cassander's *De baptismo infantium* (1565). Sibrand Lubbert's *De principiis Christianorum dogmatum* (1591) supplied most of his references for discussing public reading of the Apocrypha and other non-canonical works. In Gratian's *Decretum* Hooker found many of the texts he used in discussing the moral and disciplinary aspects of repentance in *Lawes* VI. Besides being the only source for a number of Neopythagorean political treatises from the Hellenistic period (regarded by Hooker as earlier), the 5th-century anthologist Stobæus appears to have been Hooker's source for some quotations from Plato.

In a few cases—especially, as we shall see, in *Lawes* VIII—Hooker appropriated earlier texts for uses that went beyond their authors' intentions. Outright errors in the use of a source are very rare. For example, six references to Justinian's *Codex* to support various episcopal honours do not provide appropriate backing,[6] and a few other references are defective in one way or another.

As indicated above,[7] I treat as explicit references a number of quotations or close paraphrases that Hooker himself does not attribute to their authors. Significant examples include a famous sentence from Arnobius Afer on the dire consequences for humanity 'if nature should intermit her course, and leave altogether, though it were but for a while, the observation of her own lawes',[8] the conclusion from Arnold of Bonneval of the moving speech on behalf of the ordinary faithful communicant with which Hooker concludes his discussion of the Eucharist in *Lawes* V.67, and the paraphrase of Aquinas's explanation of the need for government in *On Kingship to the King of Cyprus* in *Lawes* VIII.3.[9]

An incidental benefit of approaching Hooker through his sources is an appreciation of his grace and vivacity as translator. He translates nearly all of his quotations from Greek and many Latin texts,

[6] *Lawes* VII.20.1; 3:267.*y* and VII.21.1; 3:270.*d*.
[7] See note 1.
[8] *Lawes* I.3.2; 1:65.20–66.4.
[9] *Lawes* VIII.3.4 [2.18 in Keble's division]; 3:349.6–20.

as well as a passage from Machiavelli's Italian *History of Florence*. With respect to desiring and possessing the truth that is God, for example, he sensitively expands Augustine's '*Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis*' to '*The longing disposition of them that thirst is changed into the sweete affection of them that tast and are replenished*'.[10] Notable longer examples include the passages from Arnobius and Arnold of Bonneval mentioned earlier, a page of Cyprian on the dangers easy penances pose for those to whom they are granted,[11] Basil the Great in praise of music in liturgy,[12] and Theodoret's dramatic account of the supposed excommunication of Theodosius I by Ambrose of Milan.[13]

Tractates and Sermons

Non-biblical references are far less frequent in Hooker's tractates and sermons than in *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, but some are interesting in themselves and others provide insight into the development of his thought. In two sermons on *Jude*, apparently delivered in the early 1580s, a time of high anxiety about domestic and foreign Roman Catholic activities supported by the circulation of 'prophecies which are no scripture'[14] and by appeals to scholastic theology, Hooker argues vehemently for the unique authority of Scripture. He cites Hilary of Poitiers to show that we learn the mystery of the eternal generation of the son of God, not from 'the schooles of the *Grecians*' or 'the Scribes and Interpreters of the law,' but from 'a poore fisherman, unknowne, unlearned'.[15] Hilary is cited again for the assertion that, 'those things that are not written in the booke of the law, wee ought not so much as to be acquainted with them'.[16] In the *Lawes* Hooker takes a different attitude toward learning and the use of extra-biblical sources.

In *A Learned Discourse of Justification*, comprising several sermons delivered in his first year as Master of the Temple, Hooker argues vigorously against current Roman Catholic teaching on justification by works but contends that, nevertheless, past generations of Christians

[10] *Lawes* I.11.3; 1:113.15–17.*x*.
[11] *Lawes* VI.5.8; 3:66.8–67.3.
[12] *Lawes* V.38.3; 2:153.14–154.4.*s*.
[13] *Lawes* VIII.9.5; 3:441.24–442.31.
[14] *Jude* 1; 5:15.1.
[15] *Jude* 1; 5:19.25–20.11.
[16] *Jude* 1; 5:21.15–17.

who had more or less implicitly accepted that doctrine were not necessarily damned thereby. Most of the two dozen references in *A Learned Discourse* bear on the first purpose. He summarizes Roman doctrine in what he presents as a quotation from Aquinas but which is in fact his own skilful construction from a number of passages in Aquinas. Professor Grislis gives more than two pages of subsidiary references to Thomas and the Council of Trent keyed to this ostensible quotation.[17] Among Hooker's many references to struggles against heresy in the patristic period, is a lengthy passage from Cassian on the elements of faith being so related that denial of one logically entails denial of all the others.[18] Despite this network of implication, Hooker contends that an individual's denial of one part of the faith does not show that he or she in fact rejects the others. People are not always logical.

The sermon on *Pride*, also preached at the Temple, looks forward to the *Lawes* in its discussion of justice[19] and at two other points. In Part I of this sermon Hooker uses a phrase from Gregory of Nazianzus in answering the question of how, exactly, Christ is 'in' the faithful Christian. Not κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον but κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον according to Hooker. That is, Christ is not physically present, in the form in which he appeared on earth, but the believer has Christ 'in mind' as an object of admiration and, with the aid of the Holy Spirit, imitation. The powerful passage in which Hooker develops this idea concludes with a rhetorical question about the saints: 'did they not all live the life of god?'[20] The theme of beholding and imitating God or Christ will be central to the *Lawes*. In part II of *Pride*, in connection with the so-called Apostolic Constitutions, Hooker argues that 'All Canons apostolicall touching the forme of church government though receyved from god him selfe' are 'yeat positive lawes and therfore alterable',[21] a position fundamental to his later treatment of ecclesiastical and royal authority in *Lawes* VII and VIII.

In a sermon fragment on *Hebrews* (time and circumstances of delivery unknown), Hooker strikingly adapts a phrase from Cicero (attributing it to 'an ancient father') to make vivid the significance of Christ's death. 'It is the joy of them that have bene the deliverers of others, not only

[17] *Just.* 5; 5:110.*g*, Commentary, 5:713–716.
[18] *Just.* 32; 5:155.20–156.11.
[19] *Pride*; 5:332.26–361.3.
[20] *Pride*; 5:327.9–329.10.
[21] *Pride*; 5:335.25–27.

to make it knowne what enemyes they have overcome, but also what wounds they have taken in conflict: *ut hostilis sanguis asserat fortitudinem, proprius pietatem*; saith an ancient father. *To the end that hostile blood may serve to be an argument of courage and valour, their own a token of piety and love.* The principall thing therefore which our grand deliverer would have for ever remembred is *that by death he hath wrought our deliverance*. For this cause the sacrament of the holy Eucharist was in such form and maner instituted, that the breaking of flesh and shedding of blood, that is to say, the face of death might most lively appear in it'.[22] This interplay of psychological effect and theological substance is characteristic of many passages in the *Lawes*.

Lawes, Preface: To Reformists

The *Lawes* begins with a Preface addressed to '*them that seeke (as they tearme it) the reformation of Lawes, and orders Ecclesiasticall, in the Church of ENGLAND*'.[23] I will designate these critics of the establishment, Hooker's principal interlocutors throughout the *Lawes*, as 'reformists,' leaving unsettled their relation to Puritanism, the Magisterial Reformation, or international Calvinism, and bearing in mind that Hooker also sought to justify the laws and orders of the English church in face of Roman Catholic attacks. The chief reformist writings to which Hooker responded were by Thomas Cartwright and Walter Travers. One of Hooker's major aims in the Preface was to offset the presumption in favour of reformism based on its broad appeal both to 'the people' and to many among 'the learneder sort.' Three classical references are among the resources deployed. The first bears on a recurrent theme in the *Lawes*, the different degrees of obviousness in matters of religion and the need for intelligence and learning in dealing with those that are less obvious. For the most part, '*things absolutely unto all mens salvation necessarie, eyther to be held or denied, eyther to be done or avoyded*' are not only set down in Scripture but, as Augustine says, '*plainely set downe*.' Other things belonging to the duties of Christians are more obscure. With regard to these, Galen is quoted, proposing that 'even as the darke-sighted man is directed by the cleare about things visible, so likewise in matters of deeper discourse the wise in heart do shewe the simple

[22] *Hebrews* 2; 5:406.13–23.
[23] *Lawes* Pref. title; 1:1.2–5.

where his way lyeth'.[24] How, then, is it that things neither obvious nor true, such as the unambiguous biblical support claimed for the reformist cause, can be 'seen' as plain and obvious? On this, Hooker compares reformist proselytising, '*fashioning the very notions and conceipts of mens minds in such sort, that when they read the Scripture, they may thinke that every thing soundeth towards the advancement of that discipline*' to Pythagoras's '*bringing up his Scholers in the speculative knowledge of numbers*,' which '*made their conceipts therein so strong, that when they came to the contemplation of things naturall they imagined that in every particular thing they even beheld as it were with their eyes, howe the elementes of number gave essence and being to the workes of nature*.' Following Aristotle, his source for the reference, Hooker regards this as '*A thing in reason impossible; which notwithstanding through their misfashioned preconceipt, appeared unto them no lesse certaine, then if nature had written it in the verie foreheads of all the creatures of God*'.[25] A paraphrase of Galen helps explain how inaccurate opinions can become widely held, even among the relatively clear-sighted.[26]

Lawes I: Normative Foundations

Book I, on laws and their several kinds in general, differs from the Preface and the following seven books in attempting an un-contentious exposition of principles that Hooker hoped all parties to the current controversies could accept. In this effort to provide a normative context for discussing disputed issues, the central idea is a distinctive concept of law set out at I.2.1, in terms of which any rule effectively directing an operation to its appropriate end may be called a law. In the remainder of *Lawes* I this broad conception is applied to the operations of God, natural agents, angels, and human beings (as individuals and in society). With regard to sources, the most obvious feature of this 'nomological' cosmology is the preponderance of classical references. These are more numerous than patristic and medieval references combined, although considerably fewer than the nearly two hundred scriptural references listed for *Lawes* I at *FLE* 6:1103–1106. Less obvious but equally significant is the role of classical sources and ideas in the book's organization.

[24] *Lawes* Pref.3.2; 1:13.7–23.
[25] *Lawes* Pref.3.9; 1:16.9–19.
[26] *Lawes* Pref.4.8; 1:26.7–19.*j*.

Although Hooker cites the Bible throughout *Lawes* I, he does not present it *as* the Bible, that is, as uniquely authoritative divine revelation, until chapter 11, two-thirds of the way through. In terms of the stock distinction between natural 'reason' and supernatural 'revelation', one might thus describe the first ten chapters of the book as the construction of a rational worldview as infrastructure, with revelation eventually supervening to remedy such flaws as may occur in the natural and reasonable course of events. This description is accurate as far as it goes. The central chapters of the book are indeed concerned with '*the naturall way of finding out laws by reason to guide the will unto that which is good*' (c. 8), '*The benefit of keeping that law which reason teacheth*' (c. 9), and '*How reason doth leade men unto the making of humane lawes*…' (c. 10). It would be a serious mistake, however, to parse 'reason' in these chapters as a secular term, for the whole discussion of human reason's search for 'that which is good' is framed by a vision of our good as the imitation of God.

The first occurrence of this theme is in chapter 4, where Orpheus and Aristotle are enlisted to present the angels as moved by love of God to be 'most industrious,' 'carefull how all things are performed amongst men'.[27] The theme is immediately picked up in the following chapter, the first on human actions, which are described as directed to '*the imitation of God*.' Here Aristotle, Plato, and Mercurius Trismegistus are cited to show that all things 'covet more or lesse' to participate in God; that wisdom makes men 'though not Gods, yet as gods, high, admirable and divine'; and that righteous spirits '*studie to frame themselves according to* THE PATERNE *of the father of spirits*'.[28]

Reason's pursuit of 'that which is good' leads, in *Lawes* I, to awareness of a desire for an unlimited good, union with God, unattainable in this life. 'Nothing may be infinitly desired but that good which in deed is infinite.… Then are we happie therfore when fully we injoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our soules are satisfied even with everlasting delight: so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God.… Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subject we are unto sundry *w*imperfections, griefs of body, defectes of minde…'[29]

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[27] *Lawes* I.4.1; 1:70.16–22.

[28] *Lawes* I.5.title; 1:72.25–26. I.5.3; 1:73.8–10, 74.5–14.

[29] *Lawes* I.11.2–3; 1:112.7–113.1, with references to Aristotle and Mercurius Trismegistus.

Although the desire for such transcendent bliss is natural, its attainment is beyond our natural capacities. A further guiding law is needed, the law of faith. The ground is laid here for a strong connection between imitation of God as the aim of 'reasonable' human action[30] and imitation of Christ in us, as discussed in *Pride*. The connection is made in a celebrated sentence on the theological virtues, where Christ is the object of faith, hope, and charity, the way to satisfying the natural human desire to 'live as it were the life of God'.[31]

There is much more to be said about sources in Book I, for example, the use of Aquinas and Augustine to support the idea of a twofold eternal law[32] or the extended quotation of Duns Scotus, 'the wittiest of the Schoole divines,' to emphasize the freedom and abundance of God's requital of human endeavours;[33] but the space available here may be put to better use in considering less well known parts of the *Lawes*.

Lawes II: Scripture and Reason

Lawes II is concerned with the reformist 'position,' as formulated by Hooker, '*That Scripture is the onely rule of all things which in this life may be done by men*'.[34] A reference to Aristotle early in the book supports a stinging assertion of Hooker's own position regarding the competence of human reason *apart from* Scripture. The reformist version of *sola Scriptura* implies, he says, that the light of nature is either useless or 'if it stand us in any stead, yet ᵛas *Aristotle* speaketh of men whome nature hath framed for the state of servitude, saying, *They have reason so far forth as to conceive when others direct them*, but little or none in directing them selves by them selves, so likewise our naturall capacitie and judgement must serve us only for the right understanding of that which the sacred scripture teacheth'.[35]

The remainder of Book II is almost entirely occupied with Cartwright's appeals to patristic texts in support of the reformist thesis. Two general characteristics of Hooker's use of sources emerge here. The first is attention to context. Context in a literal, textual sense is the

[30] *Lawes* I.5.
[31] *Lawes* I.11.6; 1:118.31–119.15.
[32] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:64.*s.*
[33] *Lawes* I.11.5; 1:117.19–118.4.*g*
[34] *Lawes* II.title; 1:143.2–8.
[35] *Lawes* II.4.7; 1:157.3–9, with reference to *Politics*, book 1.

whole point in Hooker's response to the assertion, drawn from Tertullian, that '*The scripture… denieth what it noteth not.*' Tertullian's assertion is limited in its scope, Hooker argues, by what 'the scripture did propose to recken up' in the biblical passage discussed. '*Tertullians* speech is probable concerning such matter as he there speaketh of,' namely the exceptional character of Lamech's polygamy in the generations before Noah.[36] '*There was no second Lamech; the scripture denieth what it noteth not*. Were it consonant unto reason to divorce these two sentences, the former of which doth shew how the later is restrained, and not marking the former to conclude by the later of them, that simplie whatsoever any man at this day doth thinke true, is by the scripture denied, unlesse it be there affirmed to be true?'[37] In responding to another assertion drawn from Tertullian ('*that is forbidden… which is not permitted*'), Hooker invokes a variety of contextual factors, including Tertullian's 'exulceration of mind' as a Montanist at the time of writing, to restrict the interpretation of this assertion as a statement of principle. '*Tertullian* therefore undoubtedly doth not in this booke shew himselfe to be of the same minde with them by whome his name is pretended'.[38]

The second feature of Hooker's use of sources revealed in these counter-interpretations is a preference for detailed discussion of a few crucial texts rather than rapid-fire *seriatim* rebuttal of Cartwright's many brief citations. This marks a departure from the form of much contemporary controversial writing, a contrast especially with the anti-reformist works of Hooker's patron, Archbishop Whitgift.[39] Even when Hooker does respond to individual citations in a reformist barrage, he does so in coherent sequences of his own construction, not by interspersing disconnected replies between reformist phrases. In chapter 6 of Book II, however, he uses a concession and a classical anecdote as a basis for leaving point by point consideration of Cartwright's arguments entirely to the reader. First, he grants that the fathers 'do use verie generall and large tearmes' in making negative arguments from Scripture. The question is whether these expressions are really meant to be taken as proclamations of principle. He then refers to a king of Syracuse who,

[36] Genesis 4:19.
[37] *Lawes* II.5.5; 1:161.9–162.1.
[38] *Lawes* II.5.7; 1:163.10–166.26.
[39] See John Whitgift, *An answvere to a certen libel intituled, An admonition to the Parliament* (London: Bynneman, 1572) and *The Defense of the Aunswvere to the Admonition, against the Replie of T.C.* (London: Bynneman, 1574).

astonished by a feat of engineering by Archimedes, exclaimed, '*From hence forward whatsoever Archimedes speaketh, it must be believed*.' His meaning, according to Hooker, was not that Archimedes was infallible in all matters whatsoever but that he deserved to be believed in those that pertained to his science. 'In speaking thus largely it is presumed, that mens speeches will be taken according to the matter whereof they speake.' On this note, rather than replying one by one to Cartwright's citations of negative arguments from Scripture used by Bishop John Jewel, a revered early apologist for the Elizabethan church, Hooker simply invites 'any man . . . that caryeth indifferencie of judgement [to] peruse the Bishops speeches'.[40]

Lawes III: Scripture, Reason, and Church Polity

Book III is concerned with the reformist's 'second assertion,' again as formulated by Hooker, '*that in Scripture there must be of necessitie contained a forme of Church-politie the lawes whereof may in no wise be altered*'.[41] In much of the first chapter Hooker is concerned to develop a broad conception of 'the visible Church,' as identified by having one lord, one faith, and one baptism. His use of sources for each of these three marks is of interest. Devotion to one lord might perhaps be taken for granted in a society of Christians, even one at odds with itself about what that devotion required. Hooker uses an extraordinarily apt anti-Christian source to evoke the distinguishing force and cost of devotion to Christ, one of the earliest extant non-Christian references to 'Christians,' 'Which name unto them was precious and glorious, but in the estimation of the rest of the world even Christ Jesus himselfe was ſexecrable, for whose sake all men were so likewise, which did acknowledge him to be their Lord'.[42] The reference is to Tacitus's account of the emperor Nero's extraordinary torture of those who were called Christians to punish them for the fire of 64 CE which rumour had blamed on him. Tacitus stigmatises the new movement as a noxious superstition guilty of loathsome crimes and Christ, the source of the name, as having been executed by Pontius Pilate. To argue that Christians had 'one faith' from the beginning, Hooker cites brief confessions of belief by

[40] *Lawes* II.6.4; 1:173.30–174.20.
[41] *Lawes* III.title; 1:193.2–6.
[42] *Lawes* III.1.4; 1:196.17–20.

Tertullian and Irenaeus. According to Irenaeus, '*He which amongst the guides of the Church, is best able to speake uttereth no more then this, and lesse then this the most simple doth not utter*, when they make profession of their faith'.[43] Hooker's presentation of the faith at this point in the *Lawes*, as straightforward and as the same for the learned and 'the most simple,' contrasts with his presentation in Book V of the creedal controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries—an illustration, perhaps unintended, of the distinction between the plain and the less obvious which was made in the Preface and runs through much of the *Lawes*. Hooker's use of sources in discussing 'one baptism' provides the first example in the *Lawes* of narration of an extended dispute in church history as the basis for a significant theological conclusion. The point at issue was the validity of baptism by heretics, with the African church, led by Cyprian, taking the view that heretics were no longer Christians and so could not validly baptize. The opposite opinion eventually prevailed. Taken together, the points Hooker makes on the basis of these references yield a conception of the visible church in which heretics could not only validly baptise but could be martyrs if they died for professing Christianity, and particular churches could vary greatly in soundness while remaining part of the body of believers. Hooker shows the same breadth of spirit here as he had demonstrated in *A Learned Discourse of Justification*. Soundness of faith is of the utmost importance, but unsoundness does not put an individual or a group outside 'the visible Church of Christ.'

The rest of Book III continues the debate begun in Book II about the respective places of Scripture and human reason in matters of religion, now with regard to church polity. Hooker's continued use for his own position of assertions by Tertullian apparently favouring pure scripturalism is noteworthy. According to Tertullian, '*Those thinges that are not of God . . . can have no other then Gods adversarie for their author*'.[44] Hooker agrees but insists that not only 'those thinges . . . which God supernaturally revealed' but also 'those thinges which men finde out by helpe of that light, which God hath given them' are 'of God,' and the citation is from a passage in which Tertullian calls God the author of nature. Hooker concedes that in the fathers there are indeed 'sundrie sharpe invectives against Heretiques, even for their verie philosophicall reason-

[43] *Lawes* III.1.5; 1:197.8–23.
[44] *Lawes* III.2.1; 1:207.12–18.

ings,' but he quotes Tertullian at length for an explanation: 'The cause whereof *Tertullian* confesseth, not to have bene any dislike conceyved against the kinde of such reasonings, but the end. "*We may* (saith he) *even in matters of God be made wiser by reasons drawne from the publique perswasions, which are grafted in mens mindes, so they be used to further the truth, not to bolster error, so they make with, not against that which God hath determined. For there are some things even knowne by nature, as the immortalitie of the soule unto many, our God unto all. I will therefore my selfe also use the sentence of some such as Plato, pronouncing every soule immortall…*'[45]

Along with Tertullian's indignation at the misuse of reason by heretics, there is in Hooker a corresponding indignation at the contempt for learned human reasoning fostered by the reformist reliance on a self-interpreting Scripture. He concedes instances in Augustine where direct appeals to Scripture were indeed decisive, but emphatically declines to generalize from them. 'Hereby therefore it doth not as yet appeare, that an argument of authoritie of man affirmatively is in matters divine nothing woorth. Which opinion being once inserted into the minds of the vulgar sort, what it may growe unto God knoweth. Thus much we see, it hath alreadie made thousandes so headstrong even in grosse and palpable errors, that a man whose capacitie will scarce serve him to utter five wordes in sensible maner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of scripture to thinke his own bare *Yea*, as good as the *Nay* of all the wise, grave, and learned judgements that are in the whole world. Which insolency must be represt, or it will be the verie bane of Christian religion'.[46]

Lawes IV: A General Reformist Objection

Book IV of the *Lawes* is concerned with the reformists' general objection to the established order of worship: that it is '*corrupted with popish orders rites and ceremonies banished out of certaine reformed Churches whose example therein we ought to have followed*'.[47] Hooker's orientation concerning the nature and use of religious ceremonies is subtly marked by four references at the beginning of the book. First Augustine is quoted on the simplicity of what is essential in religious actions. 'The substance of

[45] *Lawes* III.8.8; 1:224.28–225.21.
[46] *Lawes* II.7.6; 1:183.9–19.
[47] *Lawes* IV.title; 1:271.4–7.

all Religious actions is delivered from God him self in a few wordes. For example sake in the sacraments. '*Unto the element let the word be added, and they both doe make a sacrament*, saith S. Augustine'.[48] The example of ancient Roman manumission ceremonies and a line from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite are then used to support Hooker's contention that 'the due and decent forme of administring those holy sacraments, doth require a great deale more'.[49] The manumission ceremony (for which Hooker's immediate source has not been located) illustrates the claim that 'We must not think but that there is some ground of reason even in nature, whereby it commeth to passe that no nation under heaven either doth or ever did suffer publique actions which are of waight . . . to passe without some visible solemnitie'.[50] Pseudo-Dionysius indicates the essential relationship—resemblance or imitation—between outward ceremony and the substance of those sacramental actions 'of waight' with which Hooker is concerned: '*The sensible things which Religion hath hallowed, are resemblances framed according to things spiritually understood, whereunto they serve as a hand to lead and a way to direct*'.[51] Hooker immediately goes on to counter the objection (stemming from Theodore Beza, Calvin's successor as chief pastor at Geneva) that 'to adde to religious duties such rites and ceremonies as are significant, is to institute newe sacraments.' He replies with a reference to Livy's account of a modification of priestly attire by the second king of Rome: 'sure I am, they will not say that *Numa Pompilius* did ordaine a sacrament, a significant ceremonie hee did ordaine in commaunding the priests *'to execute the work of their divine service with their handes so far as to the fingers covered, thereby signifiing that fidelitie must be defended and that mens right handes are the sacred seat therof* '.[52] A framework is here constructed for Hooker's entire treatment of ceremonies, both his response in Book IV to the general complaint against 'popish' rites in the English Prayer Book and his replies in Book V to myriad particular objections against officially prescribed ceremonies. The essentials are indeed simple, and no embellishment should obscure that. Yet it is fitting that the administration of these essentials be richly 'significant.'

[48] *Lawes* IV.1.2; 1:273.20–23.
[49] *Lawes* IV.1.2; 1:273.27–28.
[50] *Lawes* IV.1.3; 1:274.14–18.
[51] *Lawes* IV.1.3; 1:275.21–24.
[52] *Lawes* IV.1.4; 1:275.24–276.2.

The longest chapter in Book IV, chapter 11, deals with a reformist objection against ceremonies of the Roman church taken from those of the Jews. A third of the book's references (of the types with which this study is concerned) are here. The chapter begins and ends with the emperor Constantine's pronouncements against having anything in common with '*that spitefull nation of the Jewes*'.[53] Between these references, Hooker begins by conceding that the enmity of Jews toward Christians at that time made them 'least to be used as fit Church-paternes for imitation,' but his following discussion is distinctly favourable to Jewish ordinances not specifically abrogated by the coming of Christ. For this attitude, he cites to good effect Leo the Great and Tertullian.[54] In the end and in context, Constantine's invective appears as an intemperate use of prejudice against the Jews as convenient support for keeping the date of Easter according to western rather than eastern custom. Hooker's citation in this chapter of the *Seder olam rabbah*, a second-century Jewish chronicle of major events from the creation of the world to the Jewish revolt of 135 CE, shows a mastery of rabbinical as well as scriptural Hebrew (or reliance on an unidentified personal or textual resource).[55]

Hooker's discussion in the next chapter of the scandalous in church ceremonies broaches issues that will recur at many points in *Lawes* V. The Eunomian heretics 'in dishonor of the blessed Trinitie, brought in the laying on of water but once, to crosse the custome of the Church which in Baptisme did it thrise.' But some Spanish heretics who held the Trinity to be, not three distinct persons but three distinct natures, 'abused the Ceremonie of three times laying on water in Baptisme unto the strengthning of their heresie.' Addressing this situation, Gregory I observed that '*To dyve an infant either thrice or but once in Baptisme, can be no way a thing reproveable; seeing that both in three times washing, the Trinitie of persons; and in one the Unitie of Godhead may be signified*'.[56] Thus, the scandalous is to some extent a moving offense. Even within the same church some may be scandalized by what others find edifying. For such cases Hooker appeals to the Byzantine jurist Harmenopoulos for the

[53] Cited from Eusebius, with similar remarks by Cartwright, at *Lawes* IV.11.1; 1:309.9–11, recalled by Hooker, with context, at IV.11.12; 1:319.6–7.*j*.

[54] *Lawes* IV.11.8; 1:314.22–27.*z* and IV.11.9; 1:315.13–17.*a*.

[55] See commentary note to 1:313.2–9.*v* at *FLE* 6:629–631.

[56] *Lawes* IV.12.3; 1:321.18–29; to avoid schism he prescribed single immersion.

principle that laws should suit the whole, not the rare individual: 'we are not to looke that the Church should change her publique lawes and ordinances, made according to that which is judged ordinarily, and commonly fittest for the whole, although it chance that for some particular men the same be found inconvenient'.[57]

Lawes V: Worship and Ministry

The fifth and by far the longest book of the *Lawes* addresses the assertion, again imputed by Hooker to the reformists, '*That touchinge the severall publique duties of Christian religion, there is amongst us much superstition reteined in them; and concerning persons which for performance of those duties are indued with the power of Ecclesiasticall order, our lawes and proceedinges accordinge thereunto are many wayes herein also corrupt*'.[58] The range and number of criticisms taken up and answered in the book accord with the comprehensiveness of its title, as do the range and number of sources presented. Nearly three-fourths of more than five hundred references are to patristic sources, with the remainder about equally divided between classical and medieval. As might be expected, the use of sources from among these categories varies with the topics discussed.

The extra-biblical sources for Hooker's discussion of the Incarnation are almost exclusively patristic. Apart from two references to Arnold of Bonneval's *De coena Domini*, which he took to be by Cyprian, there are only six medieval and no classical references in these chapters (V.50–56). Hooker's emphasis on '*What Christ hath obteined accordinge to the flesh, by the union of his flesh with deitie*' in *Lawes* V.54 prepares the way for a eucharistic theology, also grounded in patristic sources, that is devotionally rich but conceptually spare. The latter aspect is foreshadowed in the discussion of Christ's personal presence everywhere, which, Hooker argues, does not extend to his physical nature. Christ is undoubtedly present everywhere as God, but 'wee hold it in regarde of the forealleaged proofes a most infallible truth that Christ as man is not everie where present'.[59]

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[57] *Lawes* IV.12.7; 1:325.9–13.
[58] *Lawes* V.title; 2:15.4–13.
[59] *Lawes* V.55.7; 2:231.18–20.

When Hooker comes to the Eucharist, then, he can assert, in what must be the most densely sourced sentence in the *Lawes*,[60] that Christ's 'personall and true presence' in the Eucharist adds to the natural substance of the consecrated elements 'supernaturall efficacie, which [a]addition to the nature of those consecrated elementes changeth them and maketh them that unto us which otherwise they could not be; that to us they are thereby made such instrumentes as [b]mysticallie yeat trulie, invisiblie yeat reallie worke our communion or fellowship with the person of Jesus Christ as well in that he is man as God, our participation also in the fruit grace and efficacie of his bodie and blood, whereupon there ensueth a kind of [c]transubstantiation in us, a true change both of soule and bodie, an alteration from death to life'.[61] But these effects occur even though 'a parte of Christ be *corporallie* absent',[62] for 'it appeareth not that of all the ancient fathers of the Church anie one did ever conceive or imagin other then onlie a mysticall participation of Christes both bodie and blood in the sacrament'.[63] Having previously canvassed fuller theories of Christ's real presence in the sacrament—consubstantiation and transubstantiation—Hooker uses what he takes to be the common and sufficient conception of mystical participation as the basis for a moving prosopopoeia on behalf of 'that minde which lovinge truth and seekinge comfort out of holie mysteries hath not perhapes the leasure, perhapes not the witt nor capacitie to tread out so endles mazes, as the intricate disputes of this cause have led men into'.[64] Beginning with two pages of his own composition, he concludes with twenty unattributed lines from Arnold of Bonneval's *De coena Domini*, ending with the question, 'why should any cogitation possesse the minde of a faithfull communicant but this, *O my God thou art true, O my soule thou art happie*?'[65] Patristic sources are also dominant when Hooker presents the history of a devotional practice as context for assessing its current value, for example, the chapters on liturgical

[60] *Lawes* V.67.11; 2:338.13–340.1.*y-c*. Hooker's notes to this sentence cite Theodoret, Arnold of Bonneval (understood to be Cyprian, seven times), Hilary of Poitiers, Leo the Great, Irenaeus, and Cyril of Alexandria.
[61] *Lawes* V.67.11; 2:338.17–340.1.
[62] *Lawes* V.67.11; 2:338.15.
[63] *Lawes* V.67.11; 2:340.1–4.
[64] *Lawes* V.67.12; 2:340.15–19.
[65] *Lawes* V.67.12; 2:343.24–26.

reading of Scripture, the litany, the Athanasian creed and *gloria Patri*, the sign of the cross in baptism, and public fasting.[66]

Classical and medieval sources prove useful for two related aims Hooker had in Book V. The first chapter of the book concerns the contribution of religion to civic life. According to Aristotle, the 'fitt instrumentes' for forwarding 'the coorse of politique affairs' are the virtues, and, following Philo Judaeus, Hooker proclaimed godliness 'the cheifest top and welspringe of all true virtues, even as God is of all good thinges'.[67] He proceeded to argue for this thesis with regard to justice, courage, and general devotion to the common good throughout society.[68] Much of the ensuing defence of ceremonies in *Lawes* V is based on their claimed effectiveness in nurturing the kind of religious character Hooker speaks of here. For this purpose, Aristotelian moral psychology and other classical and medieval sources proved helpful. These resources were also useful in making clear the 'significance' of the ceremonies Hooker defended, their success in focusing attention on the essential spiritual realities in the church's services, namely, the 'entercorse and comerce' between God and human beings in instruction and prayer and the 'mutuall inward hold' of Christ and the believer through the sacraments.[69]

Two examples from many may serve to illustrate Hooker's integrated use of a variety of sources in presenting the prescribed ceremonies of the Elizabethan church as fit for these purposes: his defence of the sign of the cross in baptism in chapter 65, and his discussion of festival days in chapters 70 and 71. Recollection of being signed with the cross at one's baptism may serve, he says, as the kind of reminder

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[66] *Lawes* V.19, 41, 42, 65, and 72.

[67] *Lawes* V.1.2; 2:17.6–11.*g, h.*

[68] In his introduction to *Lawes* V John Booty suggested that Hooker was here carrying forward 'a concerted movement to reform the commonwealth' that was active in mid-century at the time of the first Prayer Book (*FLE* 6:193–197). The second part of *Lawes* V begins with a chapter arguing that '*happines not eternall only but also temporall*' depends on the Christian ministry (V.76.title; 2:413.22–23). It quickly develops that the happiness Hooker has in mind is not material abundance but an understanding of the true value of material goods and contentment with a moderate sufficiency of them. It would seem that part of the ministry's contribution to temporal happiness in a society must lie in modifying by word and example the prevailing conception of what temporal happiness is. In any case, the ordained ministry is of great importance for edification in the church's public services, and, using legal, patristic, Jewish, and classical sources, Hooker vehemently defends traditional ways of providing for the clergy's maintenance (V.79).

[69] *Lawes* V.23.1; 2:110.14 and 56.1; 2:234.29.

Seneca recommended for times of temptation: 'To supplie the absence of such as that way might doe us good when they see us in daunger of slidinge, there are [q]judicious and wise men which thinke wee may greatlie relieve our selves by a bare imagined presence of some, whose authoritie wee feare and would be loath to offend, if in deed they were present with us'.[70] Three references to Aristotle's *De anima* in Hooker's following note attest to the pervasiveness and power of images in human thought. 'The minde while wee are in this present life [r]whether it contemplate, meditate, deliberate, or howsoever exercise it selfe, worketh nothinge without contineuall recourse unto imagination the onlie storehowse of witt and peculiar chaire of memorie'.[71] Pliny the Elder and Aristotle are cited on the peculiar connection of the forehead with 'the verie [s]thoughtes and cogitations of mans minde be they good or bad… In the forehead nothinge more plaine to be seene then the feare of contumelie and disgrace.' The fear of reproach 'doth use to showe it selfe [t]in that parte'.[72] Hooker finds it natural that the church fathers offer vigorous testimony to the effectiveness of this sign. According to Tertullian, the flesh is signed with the cross that the soul may be fortified. St. Cyprian, 'exhortinge to martyrdome in tymes of heathnish persecution and crueltie thought it not vaine to alleage unto them with other argumentes the verie ceremonie of that crosse whereof wee speake.… *arme your foreheads* unto all boldnes that *the signe of God* may be kept safe'.[73]

Hooker is enthusiastic in defending the joyful and generous celebration of festival days. 'The most naturall testimonies of our rejoycinge in God are first his praises sett forth with cheerefull alacritie of minde, secondlie our comforte and delight expressed by a [s]charitable largenes of somewhat more then common bountie, thirdlie sequestration from ordinarie labors, the toiles and cares whereof are not meete to be companions of such gladnes'.[74] Resting from ordinary labors while celebrat-

[70] *Lawes* V.65.6; 2:306.10–15.*q*.
[71] *Lawes* V.65.7; 2:306.32–307.4.
[72] *Lawes* V.65.7; 2:307.6–10, 16.
[73] *Lawes* V.65.7; 2:307.*v* and 65.8; 2:308.10–16.*w*; and see the passage from Cyprian Hooker quotes a little later in praise of those who stood fast in time of persecution—'*those foreheads which the signe of God had purified kept them selves to be crowned by him*'—the sign of the cross acting as 'a kind of barre or prevention to keepe them even from apostasie.' *Lawes* V.65.8; 2:308.21–309.2.
[74] *Lawes* V.70.2; 2:363.16–21, with reference to Philo Judæus's assertion that the lover of God and the lover of men are of the same nature.

ing the works of God 'representeth after a sorte that also whereunto wee tend, as festivall rest doth that coelestiall estate whereof the verie heathens them selves . . . did . . . imagin that it needes must consist in rest . . . in a life of the highest perfection and of that complete abundant sufficiencie within it selfe, which no possibilitie of want maime or defect can touch'.[75] Rest from labour and generosity to the poor are natural results of 'the glorious presence of that joy of minde which riseth from the manifold considerations of Gods unspeakeable mercie,' for 'in as much as the greatest felicitie that felicitie hath is to spread and enlarge it selfe, it commeth hereby to passe that the first effect of joyfullnes is to rest, because it seeketh no more; the next, because it aboundeth, to give.' Hooker's sense of the manifoldness of God's mercy is expressed in a massive sentence that begins with a review of Jewish festivals and continues by claiming ancient (albeit not apostolic) authority for the 'manie festivall times' of the Christian year.[76] This celebration of celebrations concludes with an imaginative application of Aristotle. 'That which the Head of all philosophers hath said of women, if they be good the halfe of the commonwealth is happie wherein they are, the same wee maie fitlie applie to times, well to celebrate these religious and sacred daies is to spende the flower of our time happilie'.[77]

Lawes VI: The Virtue and Discipline of Repentance

Hooker's conception of the Church of England as a society of Christians, primarily imperfect ones, is nowhere clearer than in his treatment of sin and repentance. A general confession of sin was an integral part of prayer book worship, and special emphasis was laid on the need for self-examination and repentance in preparation for receiving holy communion. These measures, supplemented by the excommunication of serious offenders, were exercises of 'spirituall jurisdiction,' the intended subject of *Lawes* VI. Hooker held that fostering repentance, not purification of the church, was the chief end of this disciplinary power. Consequently, in accordance with his conception of a law as a rule effectively directing an operation to its appropriate end, he proposed

[75] *Lawes* V.70.4; 2:365.10–19, with reference to Aristotle.

[76] *Lawes* V.71.10–11; 2:381.27–383.2, with references to the early church historian Socrates Scholasticus and to Augustine.

[77] *Lawes* V.71.11; 2:383.11–15.

to discuss the goal, repentance, before replying to the reformist proposal that the means, spiritual jurisdiction itself, be vested in lay elders in each congregation. Perhaps due to vandalism of Hooker's manuscripts at his death,[78] nothing remains of his critique of presbyterianism, but his preliminary treatise is of interest both in itself and for its sources.

These vary markedly, depending on the aspect of the topic at hand. In treating the inner side of repentance ('the vertue of repentance'), Hooker relies most on Greek fathers (but also on Tertullian, Cyprian, and a treatise *De poenitentia* ascribed at the time to St. Ambrose) to argue for the peril of impenitence and the availability of God's forgiveness in response to acknowledgement of one's sins. He cites Cassian and three Greek fathers from a 'large sea' of 'sweete sentences' on the power of repentance: '*There was never any man condemned of God, butt for neglect, nor justifyed, except he had care of repentance*'.[79] As to how one should repent, Hooker quotes Chrysostom approvingly and at length. 'In summe when the offense doth stand only betweene God and mans conscience, the counsell is good which St. *Chrysostome* giveth, [k]*I wish thee not to bewray thyselfe publickly, nor to accuse thyselfe before others, I wish thee to obey the Prophet whoe saieth, Disclose thy way unto the Lord. Confesse thy sinnes before him. . . . Lett God alone see thee att thy confession. . . .*'[80]

In considering the external side, the 'discipline,' of repentance, Hooker again uses the Greek fathers but now for historical purposes, to trace the variety of provisions made for penitents in the early church.[81] This variety, especially the period when there was no institutional arrangement for penance, was important for Hooker's forceful opposition to the Roman Catholic requirement of individual confession to and absolution by a priest as ordinarily essential to the remission of sin. In directly criticizing the elevation of auricular confession to the status of a

[78] For Georges Edelen's discovery of evidence lending support to Izaak Walton's story of vandalism of Hooker's manuscripts at his death, see Jessica Martin, *Walton's* Lives: *Conformist Commemorations and the Rise of Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 250–251.n. Direct contemporary testimony to Hooker's reports that he had finished the last three books of the *Lawes* should no longer be discounted, if indeed it ever should have been.

[79] *Lawes* VI.3.3; 3:10.24–11.6.*n*, quoting Marcus Eremita, a pupil of Chrysostom.

[80] *Lawes* VI.4.16; 3:51.14–52.9.*k*; and see VI.4.4; 3:19.16–27.*c*, a mostly unattributed quotation from Chrysostom on the importance of *detailed* confession to God, 'if not with tongue, att the least with heart': 'A generall perswasion that thou art a sinner, will neyther soe humble, or bridle thy soule: as if the catalogue of thy sinnes examined severally, bee continually kept in minde.'

[81] *Lawes* VI.4.5–13.

sacrament, Hooker primarily relies on scholastic theologians, as he does for his related critique of the view (which he regards as an 'invention' by Aquinas) that Christian sacraments are in themselves, in some way, *causes* of grace rather than indications of *God's* act of conferring grace. Against Aquinas's view he cites Scotus, Ockham, and Peter d'Ailly[82] and a little later cites six late medieval theologians to show that 'the Schoolemen both of those tymes [Aquinas's], and long after did for the most part maintaine it untrue, and some of them, unpossible, that sanctifying grace should efficiently proceed, butt from God alone, and that by immediate creation, as the substance of the soule doth'.[83] This is not denied by Aquinas, 'butt the phantasie which *Thomas* had, was 'that sensible things through Christs and the Preists Benediction, receive a certayne supernaturall transitorie force, which leaveth behinde it, a kinde of preparative qualitie, or beautie within the soule, whereupon immediately from God doth ensue the Grace that justifyeth'.[84] Hooker is happy to acknowledge Cardinal Bellarmine as his source for a list of seven theologians representing 'the old Schoolemens doctrine' concerning sacramental efficacy, that it 'derived from God himselfe, assisting by promisse… outward signes of elements and words'.[85]

Hooker's objection to the Roman church's handling of repentance was not that requiring confession to a priest made the practice too arduous. It was, rather, that the framework of purgatory, the treasury of merits, and papal indulgences made satisfaction too easy. He prepares for this charge by emphasizing the necessity for recompense and restitution to anyone injured by one's sin, first quoting Leviticus at length and then Maimonides. 'The whole order of proceeding herein is in sundry traditionall writings sett downe by their great Interpretors and scribes, which taught them that a trespasse betweene a man and his neighbour can never bee forgiven till the offendor have by restitution made recompense for wrongs done,' and he continues with half a page of quotation and paraphrase from the *Book of Mishnah Torah*.[86] A little later he devotes a page of text to a passage from Cyprian's *De lapsis* on the harm done when penances are lax. 'Such peace graunted contrary to the vigour of the Ghospell… doth butt under colour of mercifull

[82] *Lawes* VI.6.9; 3:84.*f*.
[83] *Lawes* VI.6.10; 3:86.6–9.
[84] *Lawes* VI.6.10; 3:86.9–14.*l*.
[85] *Lawes* VI.6.11; 3:90.6–9.
[86] *Lawes* VI.5.7; 3:62.15–63.2.

relaxation, deceyve sinners, and by soft handling destroy them, a grace dangerous for the giver, and to him which receiveth it, nothing att all available'.[87] He goes on to attack 'the inventors of Sacramentall satisfaction,' ending with papal indulgences and concluding, 'Such facilitie they have to convert a pretended Sacrament, into a true revenew'.[88] On this issue at least, Hooker is very much with the reformers on both sides of the Reformation divide.

This is not to say, however, that he favoured active use of ecclesiastical censure to ensure that the ordinary Christian's behaviour conformed to the highest moral standards. With regard to external discipline, his position is that of the German humanist Beatus Rhenanus, whom he quotes in favour of restricting excommunication to '*such as are eyther found culpable by their owne Confession, or have beene convicted in some publick, secular, or Ecclesiasticall court*'.[89] Between general confession and public discipline there is thus a large space for the individual to pursue the 'vertue' of repentance on his or her own. Two quotations in the concluding sections of Book VI, on difficulty of satisfying our own minds about the remission of our sins, bear on this situation. The first, the sole classical reference in the book, is from a letter of the emperor Tiberius to the Roman senate, reported by Tacitus. It expresses vividly the torments of an evil conscience: '*What to write, or how to write att this present, if I know* (saith *Tyberius*:), *Lett those Gods and Goddesses, whoe thus continually eate mee, only be worse to mee then they are*'.[90] For Tiberius there was no escape. The situation of the Christian sinner is more hopeful. Hooker closes with St. Augustine: '*Lord in thy booke and volume of lyfe all shall bee written, as well the least of thy Saints as the cheifest: Lett not therefore the unperfect feare, Lett them only proceede and goe forwarde*'.[91]

Lawes VII and VIII: Authorities and Authority in a Society of Christians

'For preservation of Christianitie there is not any thing more needfull, then that such as are of the visible Church have mutuall fellowship and

[87] *Lawes* VI.5.8; 3:66.4–67.3.
[88] *Lawes* VI.5.9; 3:69.11–12.
[89] *Lawes* VI.4.15; 3:49.17–50.6.*i*.
[90] *Lawes* VI.6.15; 3:97.28–98.5.
[91] *Lawes* VI.6.18; 3:103.16–19.

societie one with another'.[92] As we have seen, members of the visible church, as Hooker conceived it, are defined by devotion to one Lord, Jesus Christ, profession of one faith, and baptism in the name of the Trinity. They do not automatically make up a society. By a Christian society, as distinct from an assembly, Hooker meant 'a number of men belonging unto some [continuing] Christian fellowship, the place and limites whereof are certaine',[93] such as the Church of England. In the final two books of the *Lawes* Hooker defends the authority held in this particular Christian society by bishops (Book VII) and by the crown (Book VIII), while conspicuously considering the legitimacy of other structures of authority.

Patristic sources preponderate in Hooker's defence of church governance by bishops. They demonstrate the universality of episcopal polity by the third century,[94] and since the apostles were themselves bishops,[95] recognition of later bishops as the apostles' successors was natural. Accordingly, Hooker is happy to quote Ignatius (in what are now known to be spurious epistles and later interpolations as well as authentic texts) and other fathers in exaltation of the episcopal office. 'All Bishops are, saith *Jerome*, the Apostles successors'.[96] 'It was the general received perswasion of the ancient Christian world, [h]that *Ecclesia est in Episcopo*, the outward being of a Church consisteth in the having of a bishop'.[97] '*What is… the Bishop but one which hath all principality and power over all, so far forth as man may have it, being to his power, a follower even of Gods own Christ*'.[98] He conceded, however, that there was a period of presbyterian governance of local churches in the apostolic age and accepted Jerome's explanation of the reason for choosing one presbyter to rule over the rest: prevention of schism.[99] Who decided on this measure, on what basis, and with what enduring effect? Hooker considers alternative answers to the first two questions but denies the need to choose among them. Whether the apostles established episcopal governance by divine inspiration, on their own authority, or in consultation

[92] *Lawes* III.1.14; 1:205.20–23.
[93] *Lawes* III.1.14; 1:206.5–6.
[94] *Lawes* VII.5; 3:159–170.
[95] See Hooker's definition in *Lawes* VII.2.3; 3:152.19–25. See also VII.4.1; 3:155.17–18.
[96] *Lawes* VII.4.3; 3:158.8.
[97] *Lawes* VII.5.2; 3:160.29–31, quoting Cyprian.
[98] *Lawes* VII.6.8; 3:177.1–3, quoting an interpolation in Ignatius.
[99] *Lawes* VII.5.2; 3:160.31–161.8.

with the whole church, there is no doubt that, 'being established by them on whom the Holy Ghost was powred in so abundant measure for the ordering of Christs Church, it had either Divine appointment beforehand, or Divine approbation afterwards, and is in that respect to be acknowledged the Ordinance of God'.[100] But was the effect of such divine approbation to make episcopal governance of the church a matter of immutable divine right?

Hooker's answer to this further question is developed in response to a challenging text from Jerome. Bishops ought to know, according to Jerome, '*that custom, rather then the truth of any Ordinance of the Lords maketh them greater then the rest, and that with common advice they ought to govern the Church*'.[101] Other apologists for episcopacy ignored or dismissed this text. One thought that Jerome was dreaming or out of his mind (*allucinantis*) here. Hooker's acceptance of Jerome's assertion as a legitimate source is thus significant in itself. Beyond this, his exposition of Jerome brings into play his own principles regarding the locus and extent of church authority. He invokes here the principle of mutability, not this time for the church's power to change ceremonies but for its authority over its own governance. He interprets Jerome to mean that, although bishops may truly claim that their authority has descended from the apostles themselves, yet they must acknowledge 'that the Church hath power by universal consent upon urgent cause to take it away, if thereunto she be constrained through the proud, tyrannical, and unreformable dealings of her Bishops'.[102]

This utilitarian aspect of Hooker's defence of episcopacy is accentuated by a pair of classical references he uses responding to the reformist objection that contemporary bishops had more power than earlier ones over the lower clergy. He quotes Livy on the Roman tyrant Tarquin to cast the reformist charge under the concept of usurpation.[103] He then refers to another case of usurpation, Augustus's acquisition of imperial power (as described by Suetonius and Dio Cassius), which was commonly thought to have had good consequences.[104] Hooker's moral regarding the growth of episcopal power is that 'though it had

[100] *Lawes* VII.5.2; 3:161.8–15; and see VII.5.10; 3:169.29–170.20; and VII.11.8; 3:208.13–30.*h*.
[101] *Lawes* VII.5.8; 3:166.14–16.
[102] *Lawes* VII.5.8; 3:168.7–14 and see note to 3:166.16–168.35 at *FLE* 6:910–911.
[103] *Lawes* VII.14.1; 3:218.24–27.
[104] *Lawes* VII.14.2; 3:219.1–12.

an indirect entrance at the first, [it] must needs through continuance of so many ages as this hath stood be made now a thing more natural to the Church, then that it should be opprest with the mention of contrary orders worn so many ages since quite and clean out of ure'.[105] Hooker immediately goes on to assert that any accretions to episcopal authority over the centuries 'have been upon just occasions authorized by orderly means.' Thus, the comparison with Augustus, let alone Tarquin, is unfounded. Nevertheless, in suggesting such comparisons even hypothetically, Hooker leaves episcopal dignity somewhat unsettled. Accordingly, he does does not rest his case for bishops entirely on long continuance supposedly based on due process. The present benefit of episcopacy must also be addressed.

This question indeed is addressed at the beginning of the second main section of Book VII, Hooker's defence of episcopal 'honors.' A definition based on Aristotle is first proposed: 'Honor is no where due, saving onely unto such as have in them that whereby they are found, or at the least presumed voluntarily beneficial unto them of whom they are honored'.[106] Hooker then embarks on a substantial and original discussion of the public benefits of episcopacy, in effect an account of why the church should *continue* to be ruled by bishops.[107] He concludes that the benefits of episcopacy are sufficient to justify, not only a number of largely symbolic honours for bishops, but also ample endowment with lands and livings. Patristic sources predominate in the concluding chapters on these particulars.

In *Lawes* VIII, classical, medieval, and patristic sources all play essential roles in Hooker's defence of a legally grounded, legally limited royal supremacy in the English church. The chief classical contributions are made by Aristotle and a group of Neopythagorean political treatises preserved by the fifth-century anthologist Stobæus. Aristotle is used in two important ways. First, Hooker takes from him, and then transforms, the idea that a political society's aim '*is not simplie to live, nor the duetie so much to provide for life as for meanes of living well*, and that even as the soule is the worthier part of man, so humane societies are much more to care for that which tendeth properly unto the soules estate then for such temporall thinges as this life doth stand in need of'.[108] Hooker

[105] *Lawes* VII.14.2; 3:219.15–19.
[106] *Lawes* VII.17.2; 3:251.13–16.
[107] *Lawes* VII.18; 3:253.15–263.31.
[108] *Lawes* VIII.1.4; 3:321.7–13.*b*.

appropriates the preceding argument by taking it as sufficient proof that 'by all men '*the kingdome of God is first to be sought for*'.[109] The result is a conception of political society inherently more concerned with religion than was the case with Aristotle. Reformist and Roman Catholic insistence on a radical distinction between church and commonwealth is thus rejected as contrary to the very idea of political community.

Aristotle's second contribution to Hooker's account of the royal supremacy stems from his analysis of regimes in the city-states of his time, including forms of kingship differing widely from one another in the relationship between king and law. This analysis allows Hooker to reject the idea that 'universalitie of power even in regard of thinges and not of persons only did appertaine to the very being of a *King*'[110] and to argue, further, that the best type of royal power in religion is one that rules according to law. Here one of the Hellenistic political treatises in Stobæus provides an eloquent description of an ideal situation: '*The king ruling by Lawe the magistrate following, the subject free and the whole society happie*'.[111]

In the text just quoted, however, and in others from Stobæus, the idea of a king ruling by law can be taken to mean that the king himself may *be* the law, an animate law. In this way of looking at things, the law 'by' which the king ruled would be of the king's own making and not a limitation on royal power. This is not what Hooker wants.[112] He introduces the passage just quoted by stating his own version of the ideal: 'Happier that people, whose lawe is their *King* in the greatest thinges then that whose *King* is himself their lawe'.[113] Here Hooker's

[109] *Lawes* VIII.1.4; 3:321.10–15, with the reference not to Aristotle but to Matthew 6:33. At VIII.6.11; 3:404.18–405.2 Hooker cites another source for the inclusion of church affairs within the scope of politics, the Roman *Lex regia*, by which, the people having conceded 'their whole power for making of lawes' to the emperor, and emperors thus having 'competent authoritie and power to make lawes for religion,' 'so they were taught by Christianitie to use their power, being Christians unto the benefitt of the *Church* of *Christ*.'

[110] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [2.12 in Keble's division]; 3:341.1–2.

[111] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [2.12 in Keble's division]; 3:342.5–14.*d*, quoting a text ascribed to Archytas.

[112] At least this is not what he wants for England in his own day. Elsewhere, taking it as obvious that the church needs the rod of corporal punishment to keep her children in obedience, he cites as a good example 'such a law as *Macabeus* made amongst the *Scots*, that he which continued an excommunicate two years together and reconciled not himself to the *Church* should forfeite all his goodes and possessions.' *Lawes* VIII.3.5 [3.4 in Keble]; 3:354.24–29.

[113] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [2.12 in Keble]; 3:341.25–342.1.

pioneering appropriation of the treatise on English laws and customs traditionally ascribed to the thirteenth-century jurist Henry de Bracton is crucial. From Bracton Hooker draws such 'axiomes of our regall governement' as '*Attribuat Rex Legi quod Lex attribuit ei potestatem et Dominium*,' '*Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege*,'[114] and '*Lex facit Regem*. The *Kings* graunt of any favour made contrary to law is voyd. *Rex nihil potest, nisi quod iure potest.*'[115]

Medieval sources, reinforcing Roman civil law, also lie behind one of Hooker's few disagreements with Aristotle. This concerns the latter's view that there is 'a kind of naturall right in the noble, wise, and vertuous, to governe them which are of servile disposition'.[116] Both in *Lawes* I, where he registers his dissent from Aristotle, and in related discussions in Book VIII, Hooker hastens to distance himself from the seditious consequences that might be thought to follow from his insistence that 'without . . . consent, there were no reason, that one man should take upon him to be Lord or Judge over another'.[117] Nevertheless, the principle of consent plays an important, and not merely theoretical, role in his account of the royal supremacy. It underlies his commitment to Parliament as the source of law in England, it is expressly invoked against the right of the clergy to impose law concerning religion on the whole community without lay consent, and it is used to justify the English church's break with Rome. Hooker gives no source for his majestic statement that, 'The *Parlament of England* together with the *Convocation* annexed thereunto is that wherupon the very essence of all goverment within this kingdome doth depend. It is even the bodie of the whole Realme, it consisteth of the *King* and of all that within the *Land* are subject unto him for they all are there present either in person, or by such as they voluntarily have derived their very personall right unto',[118] but relevant sources are not far to seek. Hooker had stated the principle of consent a few pages earlier in general terms, with references to the civil law: 'For of this thing no man doubteth, namely that

[114] *Lawes* VIII.2.1 [2.3 in Keble]; 3:332.22–24. 'Let the king grant law what the law grants him, power and dominion' and 'The king ought not to be under man but under God and the law.'

[115] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [2.13 in Keble]; 3:342.19–21. 'Law makes the king,' and 'The king can do nothing except what he can do by law.'

[116] *Lawes* I.10.4; 1:99.10–12.*c*, citing *Politics*, Books 1 and 4.

[117] *Lawes* I.10.4; 1:99.8–9.

[118] *Lawes* VIII.6.11; 3:401.22–28. See note at *FLE* 6:1025 for a contemporary source.

in all societies companies and corporations what severally each shalbe bound unto it must be withall their assentes ratified'.[119] Regarding the need for royal assent to any ordinance by which the king was to constrain others, Hooker went on to assert, 'that vulgar axiome is of force. *'Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet*'.[120] By transferring this principle from the civil to the ecclesiastical sphere, Hooker justifies the English church's break with Rome. 'The naturall subject of power civill all men confesse to be the bodie of the Commonwealth.... [S]o we affirme that in like congruitie the true originall subject of power also to make church lawes is the whole intire body of that church for which they are made'.[121] Accordingly, 'The greatest agentes of the *Bishop* of *Romes* inordinate Soveraigntie strive against no one pointe with such earnestnes as against this that *Jurisdiction*... should be thought originally to be the right of the whole *Church*'.[122] The references here take us back to the late medieval debates about the relative authority of pope and council.

Hooker has both an exalted and a humanly grounded conception of kingship in *Lawes* VIII, as he had of episcopacy in Book VII. Apart from special divine appointment (occasionally recorded in the Old Testament) or the right of conquest in a just war, he considers it entirely a matter of human discretion whether Christian kings should hold supreme power in ecclesiastical affairs or, indeed, whether there should be kings at all. Nevertheless, on the principle that God approves of reasonable human decisions, he can describe kings by human choice as God's lieutenants, model their power on that of the kings of Israel, and agree with Bracton (though with his own idea of delegation) that the crown is a power delegated by God.[123]

Hooker's exaltation of duly acquired royal power in religion is moderated, however, not only by his reliance on medieval and civilian ideas of consent but also by the need to confront objections from both reformist and Roman Catholic authors on the basis of patristic texts. These include trenchant assertions of ecclesiastical independence from imperial control and accounts of open resistance to particular emperors.

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[119] *Lawes* VIII.6.7 [6.8 in Keble]; 3:393.8–21.

[120] 'What touches all ought to be discussed and approved by all,' *Lawes* VIII.6.7 [6.8 in Keble]; 3:393.17–21, citing canon law.

[121] *Lawes* VIII.6.1; 3:385.19–386.6.

[122] *Lawes* VIII.6.2; 3:386.18–22; references at note *x*.

[123] *Lawes* VIII.3.1 [2.5–6 in Keble]; 3:334.3–335.17.*s*.

'*Constantine* termeth *Church officers* overseers of thinges within the *Church*, himself of those without the *Church*' (reported by Eusebius). Only commonwealth matters pertain to imperial governors, not the judgement of ecclesiastical causes (Hilary of Poitiers). 'Palacies belong unto the Emperour, Churches to the minister' (Ambrose). '*God hath committed to the*[e] *Empire; with those thinges that belong to the Church he hath putt us in trust*' (Hosius of Cordova), One bishop challenged an emperor to his face: '*I wonder how thou which art called unto one thing takest upon the to deale in an other. For being placed in militarie and politique affayres in things that belong unto Bishops alone thou wilt bear rule*'.[124] Ambrose was thought to have denied communion to the emperor Theodosius I.[125]

Hooker makes two replies to such patristic testimony. In what is published in the Folger edition as an appendix to chapter 6, he brushes aside several texts with the remark that they prove only 'that in former ages of the world it hath been judged most convenient for *Church* officers to have the hearing of causes meerly Ecclesiasticall and not the Emperour himself in person to give sentence of them. No one man can be sufficient for all thinges'.[126] Later in Book VIII he offers a more substantial response, bringing the same texts into accord with his own principle that rulers should themselves be ruled by law. From the patristic strictures on imperial interference in church affairs Hooker thinks we may 'discerne how requisite it is that authoritie should alwayes follow received lawes in the manner of proceeding.' At first there was no certain law determining what force the principal civil magistrate's authority should have, and hence Christian emperors from time to time did what they thought reasonable. Constantine 'rather abstained from that which himself might lawfullie doe then was willing to claime a power not fitt or decent for him to exercise.' 'Againe on the contrarie part when governours infected with heresie were possessed of the highest power they thought they might use it as pleased them selves to further by all meanes therewith that opinion which they desired should prevaile.' The proper conclusion for Hooker's readers is that, 'In this respect therefore we must needes think the state of our own *Church* much better settled then theirs was because our lawes have with farr more certaintie prescribed

[124] *Lawes* VIII.8.8; 3:431.14–432.16.

[125] *Lawes* VIII.9.5; 3:441.15–442.3. In fact, Ambrose wrote the emperor that he had dreamed of doing this, and the emperor refrained from coming to church. See commentary note to this passage at *FLE* 6:1047.

[126] *Lawes* VIII.6.14 in Keble; 3:412.9–13.

boundes unto each kinde of power'.[127] More succinctly, Hooker can 'willingly embrace' Ambrose's dictum that a good emperor is within the church, not over it ('*Imperator bonus intra Ecclesiam, non supra Ecclesiam est.*') by rephrasing it: '*Kings* have dominion to exercise in *Ecclesiasticall* causes but according to the lawes of the *Church*'.[128]

Concession and Critique

The sources we have considered so far support Hooker's confident defence of the laws and orders of the English church of his day. A number of references reveal, however, a distinctly anxious side to Hooker, not only with respect to reformist-inspired nonconformity and Roman Catholic recusancy but also with regard to the very establishment he was defending. In the prologue to *Lawes* II[129] he sharply distinguished between 'the Ecclesiasticall law whereby we are governed' and 'the dealinges of men who administer government, and unto whom the execution of that law belongeth.' He undertook to defend the former but, emphatically, not the latter. 'We are no Patrones of those things therfore, the best defence whereof is speedie redresse and amendment.' The concession of personal defects in establishment figures recurs in the dedication to Book V. Hooker criticises excessive repression of reformism, comparing it with the anti-Manichaean zeal of Ithacius, an early bishop of Sossuba, for whom 'everie man carefull of vertuous conversation, studious of Scripture and given unto any abstinence in diet, was set downe in his Kalender of suspected Priscillianists'.[130] A little later he cites Gregory the Great's lament that when the priestly order is fallen inwardly, outwardly also it cannot long stand ('*Dolens dico, gemens denuncio, sacerdotium quod apud nos intus cecidit foris diu stare non poterit.*') to argue for vigilance against 'those evils whereby the harts of men are lost, which evils for the most part being personall do arme in such sort the adversaries of God and his Church against us'.[131] The fear is that such personal failings will outweigh the benefits of good laws.

Still more direct, almost to the point of naming names, is Hooker's indictment of the faults of Elizabethan bishops at *Lawes* VII.24.1–15,

[127] *Lawes* VIII.8.8–9; 3:432.16–434.17.
[128] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [2.17 in Keble]; 3:347.12–15.*l.*
[129] *Lawes* II.1.1; 1:144.1–12.
[130] *Lawes* V.Dedication.7; 2:5.7–14.*b.*
[131] *Lawes* V.Dedication.9; 2:7.4–12.*d.*

introduced with lines from Virgil that add an ominous tone to what follows. The quotation is from Latinus's speech to Turnus near the end of the *Aeneid*, advising him not to do battle with Aeneas, advice he ignores to his destruction: '*Sinite haec haud mollia fatu/Sublatis aperire dolis*'.[132] Hooker's sympathy with Jerome's strictures against the pride of insolent bishops, 'sometimes for [w]shewing disdain and contempt of the Clergy under them; somtime for not [x]suffering themselves to be told of their faults, and admonished of their duty by inferiors; sometime for not [y]admitting their Presbyters to teach, if so be them selves were in presence; sometimes for not vouchsafing to use any conference with them, or to take any counsel of them',[133] becomes evident when he refers to Jerome's complaints later, just before his own catalogue of episcopal faults.[134]

These passages should be read in relation to Hooker's occasional expressions of sympathy or respect for dissenters from authority. He sympathizes morally with the Anabaptists of Münster, citing Lactantius, 'O quam honesta voluntate miseri errant? With how good a meaning these poore soules doe evill'.[135] He quotes at length Epiphanius's sympathetic account of fourth-century anti-establishment zeal in the Audian schism.[136] Closer to home, he extols the personal excellence of some reformists, citing Aristotle's distinction between personal and social virtue to remark: 'I am perswaded, that of them with whom in this cause we strive, there are whose betters amongest men would bee hardly found, if they did not live amongst men, but in some wildernesse by themselves'[137]—a barbed compliment, to be sure, but compared with harsh words on personal failings in the establishment, a compliment nevertheless.

In view of these judgments, we must take Hooker's long quotation from Gregory of Naziansus at the end of the Preface to the *Lawes* at face value, as an expression of general anguish at the moral climate of the English church in the 1590s, not as an accusation directed only at reformists: '*Brought alreadie wee are even to that estate which Gregory Nazianzene mournefullie describeth, saying.* [a]My minde leadeth me . . . to flye

[132] 'Suffer [me] to utter this hard saying, stripped of all disguise.' *Lawes* VII.24.3; 3:292.7–8.*t*.
[133] *Lawes* VII.6.10; 3:179.19–25.*w–y*.
[134] *Lawes* VII.24.3; 3:291.7–9.
[135] *Lawes* Pref.8.9; 1:46.30–32.*f*.
[136] *Lawes* VII.24.3; 3:291.9–24.*s*.
[137] *Lawes* I.16.6; 1:140.3–9.

and to convey my selfe into some corner out of sight, where I may scape from this cloudie tempest of malitiousnes, whereby all parts are entred into a deadly warre amongst themselves, and that little remnant of love which was, is now consumed to nothing. The only godlines we glory in, is to finde out somewhat whereby we may judge others to be ungodly. . . .'[138]

Unfortunately from Hooker's standpoint, not all of the church's problems were 'personal.' As he confessed at one point, even the legal situation was not clear, for the 'rule for proceedinges in *Ecclesiasticall* affayres and causes by regall power hath not hitherto been agreed upon with so uniforme consent and certaintie as might bee wish't'.[139] Hooker was well aware of the civil lawyers' ambitions to take over the church's traditional legal jurisdictions and of the trend toward absolutism which was soon to flourish under the Stuarts, so he could hardly have been sanguine about prospects for imminent agreement with 'uniforme consent and certaintie' about rules governing royal power in either ecclesiastical or civil affairs.

Thus Hooker was to a considerable degree a critic as well as a defender of the Elizabethan church. He would have been even more critical of the regime which succeeded it. In his early sermons he called upon his hearers personally, in a perilous time, to '*Build your selves*' in faith.[140] The references just reviewed suggest that he also saw the English situation as perilous a few decades later, with dangers from within the establishment as well as without. Here, too, as in the sermons on Jude, Hooker's appeal is personal: an attempt to persuade committed Christians attracted to nonconformity or Roman Catholicism that they could live authentically within the fellowship and society of the established church, and a plea to holders of power in the establishment to take seriously the duties of godliness inherent in their positions.

Conclusion

Going through Hooker from one source-reference to another is like travelling through a large city by underground transport. One arrives in a different neighbourhood at each stop without seeing the inter-

[138] *Lawes* Pref.9.3; 1:52.18–53.5.
[139] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [Keble 2.16]; 3:346.16–19.
[140] *Jude* 2.11–20; 5:43.17–49.9.

vening terrain. This can provide a fresh look at places—contexts or topics—previously approached above ground, so to speak, on the road of Hooker's connecting argument. Another result is an appreciation of the variety of neighbourhoods with which Hooker was familiar, a far wider assortment than his mission as defender of Elizabethan church polity required him to visit (and not all of them pleasant). Hooker's subtexts provide highly visible foundations for his attempted resolution of the issues of his day and a scholarly context for understanding him in relation to the ideas and forces around him. But in their abundance, they do more. First, they represent Hooker's refusal to respond to the situation of the Elizabethan church simply in terms of the issues and positions most insistently thrust upon him. In the Dedication to *Lawes* V, he belittled current controversies about ceremonies as theologically 'silly,' but in the same passage he recognized the serious social consequences of impassioned disagreement about them, however formally unfounded. Hence he sought to present officially prescribed rites as not merely licit but appealing and broadly engaging. For this purpose, a rich grounding in sources was essential. There was an appearance of calm in England about civil and ecclesiastical authority at the end of Elizabeth's reign, but Hooker correctly estimated that no durable consensus had been reached. His treatment of these issues in *Lawes* VII and VIII with fresh as well as traditional sources, seemingly irrelevant when he wrote, would have been most timely in the next reign if these books had been publicly available.

Beyond their significance as responding to a broader than common view of the church's situation at the end of the sixteenth century, Hooker's abundant sources seem to me to have an additional value. The presentation of so much and so varied history and thought in the *Lawes* amounts to the construction of something like a church-in-text, a literary work mirroring the life and spirit of Christianity through the centuries. As a result, it is a work that can usefully be consulted in face of possibilities and challenges beyond those of Hooker's own place and time. It is also a work that, like a church, can be entered from time to time—or even regularly—for purposes other than problem-solving.

APPENDIX

The table presents a synopsis of the distribution of explicit classical, patristic and medieval references in the works of Hooker surveyed in this chapter. Patristic references include 27 references to Jewish texts from the patristic period (to *c*. 600). References to pagan writings of the patristic period are counted as classical. Greek references are to the fathers, historians, and scholars of the early Greek churches and to their Byzantine successors.

Tractates and Sermons

Text References/Pages	*Jude 1* 5/22	*Jude 2* 3/21	*Cert.* 1/13	*Just.* 28/64	*Answer* 6/26	*Pride* 12/48	*Remedie* 0/11	*Matt.* 3/9	*Fragments* 7/16	Total 64/221
% Classical refs	0	0	100	4	17	33	0	0	71	19
% Patristic refs	60	100	0	89	17	58	0	0	0	59
% Medieval refs	40	0	0	7	67	8	0	100	29	22
% Greek refs	0	0	0	14	17	8	0	0	0	9
% Jewish refs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	29	3
% Legal refs	40	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	6

Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie

Text References/Pages	Pref. 16/52	I 86/86	II 24/45	III 28/74	IV 42/71	V 560/490	VI 143/102	VII 206/166	VIII 102/129	Total 1207/1215
% Classical refs	25	60	21	32	14	13	0.7	11	22	16
% Patristic refs	69	26	71	54	76	73	66	79	49	67
% Medieval refs	6	14	8	14	10	14	34	11	29	17
% Greek refs	19	3	0	0	10	18	17	17	17	15
% Jewish refs	0	2	0	7	2	5	3	0.5	0	3
% Legal refs	0	7	0	14	14	15	8	29	25	16

CHAPTER FIVE

ELIZABETHAN THEOLOGICAL POLEMICS

W. B. Patterson

Queen Elizabeth I was widely hailed on her accession in 1558 as the Protestant Saviour of England, after several years of Roman Catholic rule under Queen Mary I and Philip of Spain. But the shape and direction of the English Church was a matter of intense discussion for several decades. Polemical theology was the order of the day, even though arguably what the English Church most needed was systematic, constructive theological writing that could serve as the framework for the Church's teaching, preaching, and conduct of public services. Theologians of all points of view wrote in a venomous way that suggested violent intentions towards their adversaries. Words did matter in a way that is now perhaps understandable in the wake of terrorist attacks in the name of religion. What a person said or wrote could lead to that person's banishment, imprisonment, or even execution. This is not surprising considering that much was at stake in the religious reforms and alignments under way after Elizabeth's accession. These included not only what the established Church taught and practiced but what side the country would take in wars conducted partly for religious reasons. The Elizabethan Settlement of religion helped to define the limits of religious change in the Queen's reign with the result that the Royal Supremacy, the Book of Common Prayer, and the Thirty-Nine Articles became the bedrocks of the established Church. But the result was far from the peace and stability the Queen and her advisers sought. Instead religious turmoil was pervasive for much of her reign.[1]

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[1] There are two important monographs on the settlement: Winthrop S. Hudson, *The Cambridge Connection and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1980) and Norman L. Jones, *Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion, 1559* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982). For the appointment of bishops in 1559–60, see Brett Ussher, *William Cecil and Episcopacy, 1559–1577* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 1–55, an account that supersedes Hudson's in many respects. Several books stress the challenges Elizabeth faced and the unsettled state of the church in her early years on the throne: Susan Brigden, *New Worlds, Lost Worlds: The Rule of the Tudors, 1485–1603* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 213–238; Felicity Heal, *Reformation in*

Polemical theology may be defined as theology that uses arguments and language aimed at overthrowing the theological views of another. Hostile is the meaning of the Greek adjective *polemikos*, which is derived from *polemos*, the Greek word for war. There was a decidedly hostile or war-like quality in much of the theology written during the Elizabethan period. Far from being the exclusive characteristic of writing by critics or opponents of the established Church, this quality pervaded the theological writing of leaders of the Church from the beginning of Elizabeth's reign. In 1559, for example, a key bill aimed at re-establishing the Royal Supremacy over the Church and authorizing a revised edition of the second Prayer Book of Edward VI was stalled in Parliament. The immensely difficult problem was that the Marian bishops in the House of Lords were unanimously opposed to the bill. As Norman L. Jones has shown, a disputation already scheduled on theological issues 'became Elizabeth's weapon against the opposition.'[2] Eight Catholics and eight Protestants were ordered to meet on March 31 to debate three propositions. They were: '(1) It is against the worde of God and the custome of the auncient churche, to use a tongue unknown to the people, in common prayer, and the administration of Sacraments. (2) Everie Church hath authoritie to appoynt, take awaye, and chaunge ceremonies and Ecclesiastical rytes, so the same bee to edification. (3) It cannot bee proved by the worde of God, that there is in the Masse offred up a sacrifice propitiatorie for the quick and the dead.'[3] Put at a disadvantage by the terms of the debate, the Catholics participated but were vociferous in raising objections and making what seemed to the sponsors of the debate to be obstructionist motions. The disputation was adjourned after two days and two of the Catholics, both bishops, were sent to the Tower of London, charged with 'disobedience to common authority.'[4] Six other Catholic disputants were ordered to make daily appearances before the Privy Council. The government's

Britain and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 353–412; Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529–1603* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 179–187; and Norman Jones, *The Birth of the Elizabethan Age: England in the 1560s* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 17–47. For the religious views of Matthew Parker, Elizabeth's first archbishop of Canterbury, see Louise Campbell, 'A Diagnosis of Religious Moderation: Matthew Parker and the 1559 Settlement,' in Luc Racaut and Alec Ryrie, eds., *Moderate Voices in the European Reformation* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 32–50.

[2] Jones, *Faith by Statute*, 123.

[3] Jones, *Faith by Statute*, 123.

[4] Jones, *Faith by Statute*, 127.

aggressive tactics worked. An Act of Supremacy and an Act of Uniformity were passed by Parliament, the latter by a scant three votes in the House of Lords.

John Jewel, an exile in Germany and Switzerland during Queen Mary's reign, was one of the Protestant disputants at Westminster. In the following summer he was named bishop of Salisbury, though he was not consecrated until January 1560. In the meantime, in November 1559, he energetically pursued the polemical tactics of the Westminster Disputation in a 'Challenge Sermon' at Paul's Cross, an outdoor arena next to St. Paul's Cathedral where sermons were regularly directed to a popular audience. He preached the sermon again at court in early March 1560 and then at Paul's Cross once more on March 31, 1560. In November 1559 he had ridiculed fifteen Roman Catholic beliefs and practices including the use of a language in worship not understood by the people, communion offered to the laity in one kind only (i.e., the consecrated bread), and the bishop of Rome's headship over the universal Church.[5] To these items he subsequently added twelve more, including the offering up of Christ to his Father in the mass. Jewel challenged his hearers and readers to bring 'any one sufficient sentence' in support of any of these beliefs and practices from the scriptures, the example of the primitive church, the writings of the ancient church fathers, or the canons of the ancient general councils.[6] Jewel was also the author of an officially sponsored defence of the recent religious changes in England intended for a European audience. His *Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicanae* of 1562 strikes a more positive note than the Challenge Sermon. The writing of this short treatise was a project supported by Sir William Cecil, the Queen's secretary, and Archbishop Matthew Parker, making it an official description of 'the True Religion Professed and Used' in the Church of England, as the title of the English translation of 1564 stated.[7] It sought to answer the charge that

[5] John Jewel, *The Copie of a Sermon Pronounced by the Byshop of Salisburie at Paules Crosse the Second Sondaye before Ester in the Yere of Our Lord, 1560* (London: John Day, 1560), Sig. F vi–vii. For discussions of the Challenge Sermon, see W. M. Southgate, *John Jewel and the Problem of Doctrinal Authority* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 49–55; John E. Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist of the Church of England* (London: SPCK, 1963), 15–35; and Gary W. Jenkins, *John Jewel and the English National Church: The Dilemmas of an Erastian Reformer* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 70–85, 251–252.

[6] Jewel, *The Copie of a Sermon*, Sig. F vii.

[7] John Jewel, *An Apology of the Church of England*, ed. J. E. Booty (Ithaca: Cornell University Press for the Folger Shakespeare Library, 1963), 1.

the English Church had left the fellowship of the universal Church by arguing that he and his co-religionists had 'ever judged the primitive church of Christ's time, of the apostles, and of the holy fathers, to be the catholic church.'[8] Of this Church, he asserted, the Church of England remained a part. He argued that the religious abuses of recent centuries, which still disfigured Roman Catholicism, had been swept away in England by legitimate constitutional means: 'the matter hath been treated in open parliament, with long consultation and before a notable synod and convocation.'[9]

The Thirty-Nine Articles, passed by the Convocations of Canterbury and York in 1563, and authorized by Parliament and the Queen in 1571, made this same assertion about the historic theological teachings of the Church of England, while aggressively opposing specific Roman Catholic beliefs.[10] Article I affirmed the classical Christian doctrine of God's unity in three persons as defined by the ancient councils of the undivided Church. Likewise, Articles II–IV affirmed the traditional doctrines of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ.[11] Article V affirmed the understanding of the ancient Western Church of the Holy Spirit as proceeding from the Father and the Son.[12] Moreover, Article VIII affirmed that the three historic creeds, the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian, 'ought thoroughly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.'[13] As this article showed, the Thirty-Nine Articles

[8] Jewel, *An Apology of the Church of England*, 65.

[9] Jewel, *An Apology of the Church of England*, 104.

[10] For the Convocation of 1563 and its importance, see William P. Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable Settlement of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) and David J. Crankshaw, 'Preparations for the Canterbury Provincial Convocation of 1562–63: A Question of Attribution,' in Susan Wabuda and Caroline Litzenberger, eds., *Belief and Practice in Reformation England: A Tribute to Patrick Collinson from His Students* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 60–93. The Latin and English text of the articles with historical and theological commentary is provided by E. J. Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*, third edition revised by H. J. Carpenter (London: Longmans, 1955). For a recent discussion, see Oliver O'Donovan, *On the Thirty Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity* (Exeter: Paternoster Press for Latimer House, 1986).

[11] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 22, 54, 94.

[12] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 119. As Bicknell shows, this wording reflects the Western Church's teaching, derived from St. Augustine, and contains an addition to the Constantinopolitan or Nicene Creed, which said, 'Who proceedeth from the Father.' The addition of 'and the Son' is the *filioque* that is still a source of contention between the Eastern and Western churches. See 123–124.

[13] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 147.

placed the English Church's teachings not only within the framework of the ancient Church but, with reference to a number of key doctrines then in dispute, within that of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Article VI was headed 'Of the Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation.'[14] Articles IX–XII treated the doctrines of original sin, free will, justification, and good works in a manner consistent with the Confession of Augsburg.[15] There was by contrast a recurring polemical theme when the Articles referred to what were represented as unscriptural or corrupt Roman Catholic tenets. According to Article XIV, 'Works of Supererogation,' or the doing of works beyond what is required by God, 'cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety.'[16] 'The Romish doctrine concerning purgatory, pardons, worshipping and adoration, as well of images, as of reliques, and also invocation of saints' were cited in Article XXII as 'a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the word of God.'[17] Likewise, the doctrine of 'Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of Bread and Wine) in the Supper of the Lord' was described in Article XXVIII as 'repugnant to the plain words of Scripture,' contrary to 'the nature of a Sacrament,' and the source of 'many superstitions.'[18] Even more striking was the view expressed in Article XXXI that 'the offering of Christ once made' upon the cross 'is the perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world.' 'Wherefore,' the article continued, 'the sacrifices of Masses, in the which it was commonly said that the Priests did offer

[14] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 125.

[15] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 171–172, 199, 207. See also Carl S. Meyer, *Elizabeth I and the Religious Settlement of 1559* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1960), 157–161. Article XVII, on predestination, is said by Meyer to be 'anti-Calvinistic' (p. 161). The article treats 'Predestination to Life' as a doctrine 'full of sweet, pleasant and unspeakable comfort to godly persons' (Bicknell, 218–219). It says nothing about reprobation and, for this reason, was felt by some English Calvinists to be incomplete. O'Donovan argues cogently that 'predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God,' as the article says, and that those chosen in Christ are 'to be carriers of the blessing which is for the rest of mankind.' See O'Donovan, *On the Thirty Nine Articles*, 85, 87. It would seem that the article represents an Augustinian tradition that is distinct from that found in the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), but is not thereby 'anti-Calvinistic.'

[16] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 209.

[17] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 276.

[18] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 382.

Christ for the quick and the dead, to have remission of pain or guilt, were blasphemous fables, and dangerous deceits.'[19]

Religious exiles from England were nothing new. There had been exiles both evangelical and traditionalist in Henry VIII's reign, Roman Catholic exiles in Edward VI's reign, and Protestant exiles in Mary I's reign. But the movement of Roman Catholics out of England in the early years of Elizabeth I's reign was distinctive, as were the activities of many of them once they settled abroad.[20] This exile community had a decidedly academic and intellectual character, the result of a substantial migration of scholars and students from Oxford and Cambridge—a remarkable phenomenon that has been strangely neglected by historians of Elizabeth's reign. The migration included Regius professors from the two universities, heads of colleges, and many fellows of colleges. At New College, Oxford, alone, over twenty fellows went into exile. Once on the continent, many of the exiles set about fashioning English academic communities, first at Louvain, then at Douai, both in the Spanish Netherlands, and then at Rheims in France, when the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain got under way. In 1579 the English College at Rome was founded by exiles as a place to train Catholic priests for missionary work in England. Colleges of a similar kind were started in Spain, in the cities of Seville and Valladolid. Scholars in these academic communities saw as one of their chief duties the writing and publishing of books in support of the Roman Catholic faith. These books, in English and Latin, were intended to support the exiles' co-religionists at home and to win back those of their countrymen who were tempted to fall away. They were also intended to keep alive in Roman Catholic countries in Europe the idea of an English Church allied with the papacy and part of the historic Western Church.

Jewel's Challenge Sermon and his *Apology of the Church of England* were answered by Thomas Harding, who had been educated at New College, Oxford, and appointed Regius Professor of Hebrew by King Henry VIII. During Edward VI's reign, when he served as chaplain to a nobleman, he was considered a Protestant, but in Mary I's reign he was chaplain and confessor to the staunchly anti-Protestant Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester. Harding matriculated at the University

[19] Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction*, 410.

[20] Peter Marshall, *Reformation England, 1480–1642* (London: Arnold, 2003), 168–178; Patrick McGrath, *Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I* (London: Blandford, 1967), 57–72.

of Louvain in 1563; he was later made a professor there. In 1564, in *An Answere to Maister Ivelles Chalenge*, published in Louvain, Harding responded to Jewel by accusing him of arrogance. Jewel, he said, could hardly claim to know all the writings, canons, and records in which he contended there was no statement to support twenty-seven Roman Catholic beliefs and practices. With reference to the first item on Jewel's list, Harding stated bluntly that there were no 'private masses' in the Catholic Church.[21] The term, he said, had been invented by followers of Luther to describe masses in which there were no communicants besides the priest. But the term was a misnomer. All masses were for the whole world and all were open to anyone 'with due examination hauing before made him self ready.'[22] This 'vnbloudy and daily Sacrifice of the Churche' had superseded the bloody sacrifices of the 'olde lawe' and had been commanded by Christ to be 'frequented and offered in remembrance of his passion and death.'[23] He accused Jewel of trying, by his attack on private masses, to abolish the mass itself, the service that Christ had left 'to the Apostles, the Apostles to the Churche, and the Churche hath continually kept and vsed through the whole world vntill this daye.'[24] Altogether Harding wrote six books against Jewel between 1563 and 1568, prompting Jewel to respond with two further books. The scholarly output of the English exiles in Louvain was impressive. Patrick McGrath estimates that the Louvain group 'produced over 40 books and pamphlets between 1564 and 1568 dealing with theology, history and the development of the Christian life.'[25]

Harding was supported by Thomas Stapleton in 1566, who sought to answer the charge of 'vntruthes' made in Jewel's *Replie* to Harding.[26] Stapleton, a fellow of New College, Oxford, had visited Louvain

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[21] Thomas Harding, *An Answer to Maister Ivelles Chalenge* (Louvain: Iohn Bogard, 1564), 9.

[22] Harding, *An Answer*, 9.

[23] Harding, *An Answer*, 10.

[24] Harding, *An Answer*, 10.

[25] McGrath, *Papists and Puritans*, 62. For the campaign by exiled Catholics to defend the faith, see Lucy E. C. Wooding, *Rethinking Catholicism in Reformation England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 181–222.

[26] Thomas Stapleton, *A Retvrne of Vntrvthes upon M. Iewelles Replie* (Antwerp: Iohn Latius, 1566). Jewel, in his *A Replie unto M. Hardinges Answeare* (London: Henry Wykes, 1565) had pointed to 'vntrvthes' in Harding's *An Answere to Maister Ivelles Chalenge.* Stapleton called them' Slaunders' (Sig. *3). Stapleton supported Harding in the latter's *A Breife Answer of Thomas Harding Doctor of Diuinitie Touching Certaine Vntruthes with Which Maister Iohn Iuell Charged Him* (Antwerp: Aegid. Diest., 1565).

in late 1559. After studying there and at Paris and visiting Rome, he returned briefly to Chichester, where he refused to sign the part of the Oath of Supremacy that dealt with the monarch's religious authority. In 1563 he moved permanently to Louvain, along with his father and the rest of his family. Two years later, he published a translation of the Venerable Bede's *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, the earliest history of England, which Bede had completed in the year 731. Stapleton dedicated his translation to Queen Elizabeth, assuring her that 'in this history it shall appeare in what faith your noble Realme was christened, and hath almost these thousand yeres continwed.'[27] Here the Queen would see how 'the misse informations of a fewe for displacing the auncient and right Christen faith, as also the way and meane of a spedy redresse that may be had for the same.'[28] The faith planted by Augustine of Canterbury in 597, as described by Bede, was, Stapleton asserted, the faith of the ancient church. He attached to the history a theological work called *A Fortresse of the Faith*, which sought to sum up the religion adhered to by the English from the sixth to the sixteenth centuries, emphasizing its continuity and consistency.[29] Some years later, in *Tres Thomae*, published in 1588, Stapleton traced the life and career of Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII's Lord Chancellor, giving a very different picture of the circumstances of the early English Reformation from that provided by Jewel and other Protestants.[30] Stapleton's life of More had considerable authority since, as Philip E. Hallett has pointed out, Stapleton could draw on the personal recollections and letters of members of More's household who were fellow exiles with him in the Netherlands.[31] Stapleton related that More, who had resigned as Lord Chancellor over the king's ecclesiastical policies, was called upon in 1534 to take a two-fold oath to recognize the succession to the crown through Henry's and Anne Boleyn's offspring and to abjure the pope's

[27] Thomas Stapleton, *The History of the Church of Englande, Compiled by Venerable Bede, Englishman* (Antwerp: Iohn Laet, 1565), Sig.*3.

[28] Stapleton, *History of the Church of Englande*, Sig.*2 verso.

[29] Thomas Stapleton, *A Fortresse of the Faith, First Planted amonge Vs Englishmen, and Continued Hitherto in the Vniuersall Church of Christ, the Faith of Which Time Protestants Call Papistry* (Antwerp: Iohn Laet, 1565).

[30] Thomas Stapleton, *Tres Thomae: seu, De S. Thomae apostoli rebus gestis; De S. Thoma archiepiscopo Cantuariensi & martyre; D. Thomae Mori Angliae quondam cancellarij vita* (Douai: Ioannis Bogardi, 1588).

[31] Thomas Stapleton, *The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir Thomas More, Formerly Lord Chancellor of England (Part III of 'Tres Thomae,' Printed at Douai, 1588)*, ed. and trans. Philip E. Hallett (London: Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1928), x.

authority in England. When he declined to take the oath and it was pointed out that all the members of the Privy Council had taken it, More said 'I am not then bounden to change my conscience and conform it to the Council of one realm against the general council of Christendom.'[32] When he was subsequently condemned to death for opposing the statute confirming the king's supremacy in the English Church, More claimed the support of 'all the councils that have been held in the whole Christian world for more than a thousand years.'[33]

Stapleton's interpretation of the English Reformation was consistent with that developed by Nicholas Sander, another leading member of the Louvain community. Sander, who witnessed the Westminster Disputation in 1559, had subsequently visited Rome. He had settled in Louvain by 1564. He wrote three books against Jewel, supported the rising of the Northern Earls in 1569 against the religious polices of Queen Elizabeth, and defended Pope Pius V's bull, *Regnans in excelsis* of 1570, which sought to depose the Queen and foment rebellion against her. His active career against the religious changes in England culminated in his participation in an attempted insurrection against English rule in Ireland, where he died in 1581. Sander's *De origine ac progressu schismatis Anglicani* was completed by Edward Rishton, a fellow Oxonian who was trained as a missionary priest at Douai, and published in Rome in 1586. It was the most detailed account of the English Reformation yet written.[34] In its explanation of the initial break with Rome during Henry VIII's reign, the book stressed the king's desire to obtain an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon in order to marry the young Anne Boleyn and the extraordinary steps he took to achieve this objective. These included having his matrimonial case settled in an English court and having himself acknowledged as head of the Church in England.[35] Published in Cologne in 1585 and subsequently in Rome, the book was translated into French, German, Italian, and Spanish. It soon became the standard work on the subject on the Continent. The historical writings of Stapleton and Sander provided a coherent and persuasive account of the course of ecclesiastical history in England.

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[32] Stapleton, *The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom*, 157.

[33] Stapleton, *The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom*, 196.

[34] Nicholas Sander and Edward Rishton, *De origine ac progressu schismatis Anglicani libri tres* (Rome: Bartholomew Bonfadinus, 1586).

[35] Nicolas [Nicholas] Sander, *Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism*, trans. and ed. David Lewis (London: Burns and Oates, 1877), 22–50, 92, 104–115.

They represented the separation of the English Church from Rome as an ill-conceived action robbing their countrymen of much of their religious and cultural heritage and as the tragic and perhaps final ending of the story of a once flourishing part of the Catholic Church.[36]

A radical attack on the established Church from the Protestant side was as virulent and outspoken as that from the Roman Catholic side, and its agents used even more opprobrious language. The term Puritan arose during the vestiarian controversy of the middle 1560s to connote those who wanted to rid the Church of England of relics of Roman Catholicism, including the use of distinctive garments or vestments for the clergy. Vestments for officiating clergy were prescribed in the 1559 Book of Common Prayer in the 'Ornaments Rubric' that said that ornaments should be those authorized by Parliament 'in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth.'[37] But interpretations of the rubric varied, and there was much opposition to the use of vestments among the members of the Church's Convocation of Canterbury in 1563.[38] Finally, in 1566, Archbishop Matthew Parker issued 'Advertisements' requiring that a white linen surplice be worn for services in parish churches.[39] In London there was widespread opposition to vestments, and some thirty-seven ministers refused to wear them. A spokesman for this group, Robert Crowley, an advocate for social justice in Edward VI's reign and an exile during Mary's reign, made the case against vestments in a pamphlet in 1566. He had previously preached against popish ceremonies in three sermons at Paul's Cross between 1559 and 1563. Crowley accepted the argument that vestments were matters of 'indifference,' in that there were no scriptural commands for or against

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[36] W. B. Patterson, 'The Recusant View of the English Past,' in Derek Baker, ed., *The Materials, Sources and Methods of Ecclesiastical History*, Studies in Church History, 11 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1975), 249–262; Marvin R. O'Connell, *Thomas Stapleton and the Counter Reformation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 53–69; Michael Richards, 'Thomas Stapleton,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 18.2 (October 1967): 187–199.

[37] *The Book of Common Prayer, 1559: The Elizabethan Prayer Book*, ed. John E. Booty (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Folger Shakespeare Library, 1976), 12–13.

[38] Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*, 196–200, 205–210, 224–232. See also Crankshaw, 'Preparations for the Canterbury Provincial Convocation of 1562–63: A Question of Attribution,' in Wabuda and Litzenberger, eds., *Belief and Practice in Reformation England*, 60–93.

[39] Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), 64–83.

them.[40] But he contended that 'simple Christians' were offended by the use of garments they associated with the practices of the Roman Catholic Church. At the same time, those of a Catholic persuasion found their religious point of view reinforced.[41] Crowley concluded that he and the other protesting ministers could not in conscience wear distinctive clothing that contributed nothing to building up the Church, and that they were ready to endure the penalties that the authorities might impose.[42] The pamphlet presented a carefully reasoned case. But it concluded with a disturbing prayer, showing the depth of the ministers' hostility to any continuation of the outward signs of the papacy. The 'godly prayer' contained a reference to Roman Catholic practices as among the country's faults: 'Are not the reliques of Romishe Idolatrie stoutly retayned?'[43] And it contained a vengeful petition concerning the Antichrist, a reference that those of the ministers' persuasion would have identified with the papacy. 'Look Lord and Judge most iuste on the proude bragge and boast of antichrist thyne enemy, cut his courage, confounde his counsel, disappoint his hope, breake his power, & giue him that utter ouerthrow, that there do not remayne so muche as a memorie or token of him, to be had in regarde, but that his memorye may be had in confusion.'[44]

Some Protestants wanted more than a further cleansing of the Church; they wanted a thorough and systematic rebuilding of it. This is clear in a sermon given by a young but immensely promising Cambridge scholar before the Queen in 1569. Edward Dering had already taken the side of John Jewel against Thomas Harding in 1568 in a book entitled *A Sparing Restraint of Many Lauish Vntruthes*.[45] Queen Elizabeth, perhaps seeing Dering as a potential supporter of her leadership in Church and state, invited him to preach at court. He began his sermon by expressing his own gratitude that God's people in England had been set free from spiritual bondage and provided with access to the truth. This alteration was the result of God's spirit at work in the life of the

[40] Robert Crowley, *A Briefe Discourse against the Outwarde Apparell and Ministring Garments of the Popishe Church* ([Emden: Egidius van der Erve], 1566), Sig. A iiii verso.
[41] Crowley, *A Briefe Discourse*, Sig. A iiii verso–A v.
[42] Crowley, *A Briefe Discourse*, Sig. B iii.
[43] Crowley, *A Briefe Discourse*, Sig. C vi verso.
[44] Crowley, *A Briefe Discourse*, Sig. C vii verso.
[45] Edward Dering, *A Sparing Restraint of Many Lauishe Vntruthes, Which M. Doctor Harding Doth Chalenge in the First Article of My Lorde of Sarisburies Replie* (London: Humfrey Toy, 1568).

Queen, who had herself once lived in great danger but now enjoyed safety.[46] Dering likened his nation's deliverance to the liberation of the people of Israel from their captivity in Egypt. It was now the duty of the Queen to feed God's people and of the magistrates 'to maintain Religion and to suppresse superstition.'[47] If she failed in her duty, she would be found lacking when the Lord came 'to take accompt of her stewardship.'[48] There were matters that urgently needed attention. Now that the word of God could be proclaimed widely and freely, greater numbers of well-trained ministers were needed as preachers of the word. Some clerical livings, which should support a preaching ministry, were being exploited for gain, sold, farmed out, or reserved for the sons of their patrons. Dering addressed the Queen directly: 'you at whose handes God will require it, you sit stil, and are careles, and let men do as they list. It toucheth not belike your commonwealth, and therefore you are wel contented to let all alone.'[49] Laws were needed to prevent ignorant men from becoming ministers and to make sure that bishops were not allowed 'at their pleasure [to] make Ministers in their closset.'[50] Dispensations, pluralities, nonresidence, and many other such 'horrible abuses' should be taken away.[51] Many years later, in 1597, when Dering dedicated his *Workes* to Queen Elizabeth, he commented that this sermon had so provoked her that he had been forbidden thereafter 'to preach any more openly within your Maiesties dominions.'[52] The sermon, meanwhile, had evidently continued to speak for him. It went through sixteen editions by 1603, the most frequently reprinted sermon published in the Queen's reign.

A greater uproar than that provoked by the vestiarian controversy occurred in the early 1570s as a result of agitation to win support in Parliament for further reforms in the Church. The call was for sweeping changes, including fundamental alterations in the Book of Common

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[46] Edward Dering, *A Sermon Preached before the Quenes Maiestie by Maister Edward Dering, the 25. Day of February Anno. 1569* (London: John Awdely, 1569), Sigs. B.i.–B.iii.

[47] Dering, *A Sermon Preached before the Quenes Maiestie*, Sig. C.iv. verso.

[48] Dering, *A Sermon Preached before the Quenes Maiestie*, Sig. C.iii. verso.

[49] Dering, *A Sermon Preached before the Quenes Maiestie*, Sig. E.iv. verso.

[50] Dering, *A Sermon Preached before the Quenes Maiestie*, Sig. F.i.

[51] Dering, *A Sermon Preached before the Quenes Maiestie*, Sig. F.i. verso.

[52] Edward Dering, *Workes, More at Large Then Euer Hath Heere-to-fore Been Printed in Any One Volume* (London: Paule Linley and Iohn Flasket, 1597), Sig. *1. Dering's prohibition from preaching did not prevent him from lecturing; he was also the author of spiritual letters and of prayers. See Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, passim.

Prayer and the abolition of church government by bishops.[53] The inspiration for the movement was the teaching and preaching of Thomas Cartwright, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who delivered a series of lectures at Cambridge in 1570 on the early chapters of the Book of Acts and on the organization of the primitive church.[54] Cartwright's treatment followed the exposition by John Calvin in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Book IV. Cartwright argued that the description of the ministry found in Acts should be regarded as normative and was the divinely instituted government of the Church for all time. Cartwright lost his position as Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge as a result of the lectures and resided for a time in Geneva, where he taught in the academy or university Calvin had founded.[55] But two followers of Cartwright, John Field and Thomas Wilcox, both parish clergy in London, set out to advance the cause of further reforms with *An Admonition to the Parliament* in 1572. The book contrasted in vivid terms the differences between the primitive church and the Church of England. 'In those daies no idolatrous sacrificers or heathnish priests were appointed to be preachers of the Gospel: but we allow, and like wel of popish masse mongers, men for all seasons, King Henries priests, King Edwards priests, Queen Maries priests, who of a truth (yf Gods worde were precisely folowed) should from the same be utterly removed.'[56] 'Then, as God gave utterance they preached the worde onely: now they read homilies, articles, injunctions, etc.'[57] 'Then ministers were not tyed to any forme of prayers invented by man, but as the spirit moved them… Now they are bound of necessities to a prescript order of service, and booke of common prayer in which a

[53] Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 101–121; Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 13–70.

[54] A. F. Scott Pearson, *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism, 1535–1603* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966, reprint of the Cambridge University Press edition, 1925), 23–38; H. C. Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 174–178. For Cartwright's theology see Peter Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), passim.

[55] Scott Pearson, *Thomas Cartwright*, 38–49.

[56] W. H. Frere and C. E. Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes: A Study of the Origin of the Puritan Revolt, with a Reprint of the Admonition to the Parliament and Kindred Documents, 1572* (London: SPCK, 1954), 9.

[57] Frere and Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes*, 11.

great number of things contrary to Gods word are contained.'[58] 'They ministred the Sacrament plainely. We pompously, with singing, pypyng, surplesse and cope wearyng.'[59] The remedy was not only to reform the ministry and revise the Prayer Book but also to institute a new order and discipline in every parish. This would require ministers or pastors who would preach, elders who would admonish and correct erring parishioners, and deacons who would distribute alms to the sick and indigent. Among the ministers there would be equality, precluding any need for archbishops or bishops.[60]

The *Admonition*—followed by a second one in the same year—did not generate the support the authors hoped for in Parliament, partly because of the Queen's opposition to it. But its stinging criticisms of the established Church plus the program of reform the authors spelled out were at the heart of a campaign pursued both publicly and covertly for several decades. Thomas Cartwright defended the *Admonition* is a series of exchanges with John Whitgift, master of Trinity College, Cambridge, who had been Cartwright's adversary at the university. Cartwright also translated a Latin work by his friend Walter Travers, a former fellow of Trinity College, who provided a detailed plan and rationale for a Genevan system of polity in the Church of England. In Cartwright's preface to *A Full and Plain Declaration of Ecclesiasticall Discipline*, his translation of Travers's work, Cartwright endorsed enthusiastically the model of polity described there. It was, he said, incredible to think that anyone should 'refuse, or not most desyrously embrace, so swete and holesome discipline off Christ, as both is propounded to us in his worde, and set forth in order in this present book.'[61] He also found it remarkable that the 'cruel boutchery off the Popish discipline whereby bothe body and soule, haue miserably been tormented' had for so long been quietly borne in England.[62] He was deeply concerned as a citizen and as one who had exercised a public ministry in England

[58] Frere and Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes*, 11. The features contrary to the word are listed as 'baptism by women, private Communions, Jewish purifyings, observing of holydayes, etc.' (11–12).

[59] Frere and Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes*, 14.

[60] Frere and Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes*, 15–16.

[61] Thomas Cartwright, *A Full and Plaine Declaration of Ecclesiasticall Discipline owt off the Word and off the Declininge off the Churche off England from the Same* ([Heidelberg]: [Michael Schirat], 1574), Sig. a 2. The bulk of the work is a translation of Walter Travers, *Ecclesiasticae disciplinae et Anglicanae ecclesiae ab illa aberrationis, plena e verbo Dei, & dilucida explicatio* (Heidelberg: Adam de Monte, 1574).

[62] Cartwright, *A Full and Plaine Declaration*, Sig. a 2 verso.

about 'the absence off th' Apostles Discipline' and 'the counterfait thereoff, which remaineth with us synce Popery.'[63] Other Protestants also supported the model described by Cartwright and Travers. In 1584, in *A Frvitfull Sermon*, Laurence Chaderton, master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, called upon all those 'which haue anye publique place in the Church of England' to show 'the proofe of their ministerie out of the worde, and the giftes which God hath giuen them, meete for the discharge of their callinges.'[64] Failure to recognize and to provide for the offices of pastor, doctor, elder, and deacon, as described in the scriptures, had been, he asserted, the cause of a multitude of disorders. Instead of the scriptural offices, the Church had been afflicted with a variety of other offices which he enumerated as 'Archby. Bysh. Deans, Archdeacons, Deacons, Chancellers, Commissaries, Officials;' all of these were 'members & parts of the whore and Strumpet of Rome.'[65] He contended that pastors and doctors were called to be the transmitters of sound doctrine and learning in every parish; elders were to admonish and correct members of the congregation, combating immoral behaviour, heresy, witchcraft, and political subversion; deacons were to help to care for orphans, the homeless, the poor, and the sick on behalf of their fellow parishioners.[66] Amidst the social, economic, and political problems of the late sixteenth century, Chaderton saw this form of local discipline as the key to establishing order, stability, and a systematic way to exercise Christian charity.[67]

Chaderton's sermon was serious, reasoned, and moderate in tone, despite the sweeping nature of the reforms he proposed. But the same could not be said of the tracts written pseudonymously by Martin Marprelate. He wrote to mock, malign, and thus to mar the bishops of the established Church, in order to promote the discipline set out by Cartwright and Travers. The authorship of the seven extant tracts is still uncertain, though Job Throckmorton or Throkmorton, a country gentleman and member of the House of Commons, seems the most likely candidate. He was probably assisted by John Penry, a preacher and writer who had previously written about the spiritual needs of his

[63] Cartwright, A Full and Plaine Declaration, Sig. a 3.

[64] Laurence Chaderton, attributed, *A Frvitfvll Sermon vpon the 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. and 8. Verses of the 12. Chapiter of the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes* (London: Robert Waldegraue, 1584), 5.

[65] Chaderton, *A Frvitfvll Sermon*, 42.

[66] Chaderton, *A Frvitfvll Sermon*, 39–40, 45–46, 74–82.

[67] Chaderton, *A Frvitfvll Sermon*, 82–92.

native Wales. The publication of the tracts was assisted by John Udall, a minister in the Thames Valley, who was well acquainted with the London printer Robert Waldegrave, from whose press—moved from place to place to escape detection—the first several tracts emerged.[68] The first two of the tracts were aimed at John Bridges, the Dean of Salisbury Cathedral, who had written a book of considerable length in defence of episcopal government.[69] The tract *Oh Read ouer D. John Bridges for It Is a Worthy Worke*, usually called *The Epistle*, began by addressing the 'Right poysond persecuting & terrible priests.'[70] This was an allusion to the campaign being pursued by the archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, and others to require conformity of all clergymen to the official formularies of the Church of England. They were required to subscribe to the Three Articles, affirming their acceptance of the Royal Supremacy, the Book of Common Prayer, and the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion.[71] Otherwise they faced expulsion from their parishes. The author said of Bridges's recent book that he could not deal with it 'commendablie according to order unless I should be sometimes tediously dunsicall and absurd.'[72] He had heard some people say that 'whosoeuer will read his booke shall as euidently see the goodnes of the cause of reformation and the poore poore poore nakedness of your gouernment as almost in reading all master Cartwrights works.'[73]

In a subsequent tract with a similar title, usually called *The Epitome*, the author declared that 'John Canterburie' and all the other bishops ought to be put out of *their* places. Every archbishop, he said, was 'a petty Pope,' and the whole 'pack of you' were 'eyther hirelings or wol-

[68] For the Marprelate controversy, see Donald J. McGinn, *John Penry and the Marprelate Controversy* (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1966) and Leland H. Carlson, *Martin Marprelate, Gentleman: Master Job Throkmorton Laid Open in His Colours* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1981). The extant tracts are reprinted in facsimile as *The Marprelate Tracts [1588–1589]* (Menton: Scolar Press, 1967).

[69] John Bridges, *A Defence of the Gouernment Established in the Church of Englande for Ecclesiasticall Matters, Contayning an Aunswere vnto a Treatise Called, The Learned Discourse of Eccl. Gouernment, Otherwise Intituled, A Briefe and Plain Declaration* (London: Thomas Chard, 1587).

[70] Martin Marprelate, pseud., *Oh Read ouer D. John Bridges for It Is a Worthy Worke* [*The Epistle*] (East Moslesey: R. Waldegrave, 1588), 1.

[71] For the text of the articles, see G. R. Elton, ed., *The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary*, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 455–456.

[72] Marprelate, *The Epistle*, 1.

[73] Marprelate, *The Epistle*, 1–2.

ues.'[74] Martin adopted the voice and character of a raconteur, spinning out tales of the foibles and scandalous deeds of leading bishops, whom he named: John of Canterbury, Thomas of Winchester, and John of London. Thomas Cooper, bishop of Winchester, was the object of an amusing though abusive account centering on his surname, which suggested a craftsman who made and installed hoops for barrels. *Hay Any Work for Cooper*, the fourth tract to appear, recalled a common street cry.[75] Cooper, the author of *An Admonition to the People of England*, an answer to the earlier tracts, was described as 'a deceitful workeman and if you commit the hooping of your bishopricks unto him they will so leake in a short space as they shalbe able to keepe never a Lord bishop in them.'[76] When agents of the earl of Derby found printers employed in producing a further tract in 1589, it was entitled *More Work for Cooper*. The tracts evidently reached an audience which had not been engaged in earlier theological exchanges, and this fact much concerned the Queen's government. A royal proclamation against the authors, printers, and distributors of what were described as seditious, schismatic, and libelous writings was issued in February 1589.[77] Two persons accused of producing the tracts paid a heavy price. Penry was executed in 1593 and Udall died in prison in the same year. Throckmorton, who was most likely the principal author, was tried in 1590 for his part in the affair but escaped punishment because of legal technicalities. Waldegrave fled the country in order to set up his printing business anew in Scotland.

If the Marprelate tracts were a daring attempt to turn public opinion against the episcopal establishment, the separatist movement was an equally daring attempt to lead an exodus from what its leaders saw as the half-reformed Church of England. In stating the case for separation, Robert Browne and Robert Harrison made trenchant criticisms

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[74] Martin Marprelate, pseud., *Oh Read ouer D. John Bridges for It Is a Worthy Worke* [*The Epitome*] (Fawsley: R. Waldegrave, 1588), Sig. 2.

[75] Martin Marprelate, pseud., *Hay Any Worke for Cooper: or, A Briefe Pistle Directed by Waye of an Hublication to the Reverend Byshoppes Counselling Them If They Will Needs Be Barrelled up for Feare of Smelling in the Nostrels of Her Maiestie & the State That They Would Use the Aduise of Reuerend Martin for the Prouiding of Their Cooper* (Coventry: R. Waldegrave, 1589).

[76] Marprelate, *Hay Any Worke for Cooper*, Sig. B 1 verso. Thomas Cooper, *An Admonition to the People of England: Wherein Are Answered Not Only the Slaunderous Untruethes Reprochfully Vttered by Martin the Libeller but also Many Other Crimes by Some of His Broode* (London: Christopher Barker, 1589).

[77] Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin, eds., *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964–69), vol. 3, 34–35.

of the national Church. Browne, a Cambridge graduate who had been influenced by the evangelical preacher Richard Greenham, Rector of Dry Drayton, near Cambridge, was convinced that English parishes did not reflect or practice important New Testament teachings about the life of the Christian community. He and his friend Harrison, another Cambridge-educated preacher, organized a covenanted congregation in Norwich outside the framework of the established Church. After being harassed by eccesiastical and civil officials, the flock and its two ministers emigrated in 1582 to Middelburg in the Netherlands.[78] Browne's message was expressed succinctly soon afterwards in his *Treatise of Reformation without Tarying for Anie*, published in Middelburg.[79] He argued that the Queen's authority was civil and extended to all her subjects, clerical as well as lay. But to wait for the crown, Parliament, or the magistrates to reform the Church was to put those agencies in the place of the persons whom St. Paul named as the officers of the Church under Christ: first apostles, second, prophets, third teachers, etc. [Ephesians. 4:11].[80] By their actions the clergy of the Church of England had given the spiritual keys of the kingdom over to the civil authorities and thus had 'no right to call themselues [members of] the Church of God, or lawful Pastors thereof.'[81] The scriptural solution was to leave such a corrupted body: 'For the worthie may not tarie for the unworthie, but rather forsake them, as it is written [Acts 2:40], Saue your selues from this frowarde generation.'[82] Browne mentioned specifically, among the vile practices of the established Church, the observance of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, and the admittance of those polluted by sin to the Lord's Supper.[83] What Christian communities everywhere urgently needed was a means by which they could reprove and admonish offenders, lest evils and disorders were tolerated to the extent that they could not be rooted out.

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[78] For their careers and teachings, see B. R. White, *The English Separatist Tradition: From the Marian Martyrs to the Pilgrim Fathers* (Oxford University Press, 1971), 44–66, and Stephen Brachlow, *The Communion of Saints: Radical Puritan and Separatist Ecclesiology, 1570–1625* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), passim (where Robert Harrison is frequently misnamed Richard).

[79] Robert Browne, *A Booke Which Sheweth the Life and Manners of All True Christians* (Middelburg: Printed by Richard Painter [Schilders], Sig. A 2–C 2 verso. The book contains three treatises; *A Treatise of Reformation* is the first.

[80] Browne, *A Booke Which Sheweth the Life and Manners*, Sig. A 3 verso.

[81] Browne, *A Booke Which Sheweth the Life and Manners*, Sig. A 3 verso.

[82] Browne, *A Booke Which Sheweth the Life and Manners*, Sig. A 4.

[83] Browne, *A Booke Which Sheweth the Life and Manners*, Sig. C 1 verso.

Robert Harrison, in his *Little Treatise uppon the Firste Verse of the 122. Psalm*, also published in Middelburg, used a striking metaphor to describe the Church of England as it had emerged early in Queen Elizabeth's reign. Its builders 'haue framed their timber, some too longe, and some too short, in such sort, that the building hangeth all on the one side, tottering and reeling with every wind.'[84] Being only half-built, much of it was crumbling away. Meanwhile, even though the builders confessed that 'many things are amisse,' they continued to counsel patience.[85] One of the building's chief defects, said Harrison, was that there was no place for the 'Scepter of Christe.'[86] He was explicit about what such a scepter or government required. It was the local congregation's responsibility to examine and approve a prospective minister before that person was received as its spiritual guide. The minister and congregation must then be free to worship God according to his word and not be bound to a 'stinted' form of service that had be read aloud. In addition, the minister and congregation had the responsibility of rebuking and admonishing those members who did not live up to their Christian commitment. If these measures did not lead to the needed reformation of the individual, the minister and congregation were to excommunicate such an offender.[87] Harrison challenged 'those Ministers in Englande, whiche thinke hardlie of our doinges' to set down from the scriptures those things that were intended to be part of true church government.[88] Then they should determine what they and their congregations were to do. Why, Harrison asked, should they sue the prince and Parliament 'for a lawe to compell them to doo that which the Lord haue commaunded them to doo'?[89]

When the Middelburg congregation experienced dissension, Browne returned to England by way of Scotland and eventually conformed to the established Church. But he remained a controversialist, writing against Thomas Cartwright and against the separatists John Greenwood and Henry Barrow. Harrison remained with the separatist congregation at Middelburg until his early death in 1585. John Greenwood, a

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[84] Robert Harrison, *A Little Treatise uppon the Firste Verse of the 122. Psalm, Stirring vp vnto Carefull Desiring a Dutifull Labouring for True Church Gouernement* (Middelburg: R. Schilders, 1583), Sig. A 8 verso.

[85] Harrison, *A Little Treatise*, Sig. B 1 verso.

[86] Harrison, *A Little Treatise*, Sig. B 1 verso.

[87] Harrison, *A Little Treatise*, Sigs. C 1 verso, D 1 verso, H 2, H 3.

[88] Harrison, *A Little Treatise*, Sig. H 4.

[89] Harrison, *A Little Treatise*, Sig. H 4 verso.

Cambridge-educated divine, was imprisoned in London for separatist activities there. Henry Barrow, a Cambridge graduate subsequently educated as a lawyer, was imprisoned as a separatist leader along with Greenwood.[90] Barrow wrote voluminously from prison and conducted conferences with clergy from his cell window. Both men were executed in 1593. They were convicted of writing seditious books under a law originally aimed at Catholic recusants. The authorities, both civil and religious, were also alarmed by a subterranean group called the Family of Love or Familists, whose members looked towards a new age of peace, interpreted the scriptures allegorically, and sought to become 'Godded with God' or spiritually transformed.[91] They were not easy to identify, since they did not circumvent the legal requirement of going to church. Originating with the Netherlander Henrik Niclaes and nurtured in England by the joiner and merchant Christopher Vittels, a resident of Southwark on the south bank of the Thames opposite London, the movement may have had a thousand men and women at its height in the 1570s. Urgent discussions were held in the Privy Council and in Parliament, and a royal proclamation was issued to ban the movement and authorize drastic action against its adherents. The Family of Love nevertheless maintained a shadowy existence for several decades, fascinating observers by the elusiveness of its organization and beliefs. The latter seem to have included rejecting the efficacy of infant baptism, which inevitably raised fears of radical Anabaptism.

Among the defenders of the established Church after John Jewel, Richard Bancroft, Treasurer of St. Paul's Cathedral and Canon of Westminster, was the most outspoken in his treatment of radical Protestants who wanted to alter the existing ecclesiastical government. Bancroft was deeply concerned about the movement championed by Field, Wilcox, and Cartwright. He was particularly alarmed by reports that they planned to set up the Genevan system covertly, creating a kind

[90] For Greenwood and Barrow, see White, *The English Separatist Tradition*, 67–90. See also Leland H. Carlson, ed., *The Writings of John Greenwood, 1587–1590, Together with the Joint Writings of Henry Barrow and John Greenwood, 1587–1590* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962); Henry Barrow, *Writings, 1590–1591*, ed. Leland H. Carlson (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966); and Leland H. Carlson, ed., *The Writings of John Greenwood and Henry Barrow, 1591–1593* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970).

[91] Alastair Hamilton, *The Family of Love* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1981); Jean Dietz Moss, *'Godded with God': Hendrik Niclaes and His Family of Love* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1981); Christopher W. Marsh, *The Family of Love in English Society, 1550–1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

of church within the church.[92] He also saw as extremely threatening the publication of tracts attributed to Martin Marprelate, who ridiculed and pilloried the bishops in 1588–89, while referring favourably to Cartwright. Furthermore, he saw as part of the same trend the emergence of congregationalism under the leadership of Robert Browne, Henry Barrow, and others. In the unwillingness of local gatherings to acknowledge the authority of any ecclesiastical officials beyond their own, they seemed to Bancroft to be like the radical Anabaptists who had caused social and political havoc on the continent or the Family of Love which had spread to England from the Netherlands. The direction of such movements in England, he believed, could only be towards lawlessness and social disruption. Preaching at Paul's Cross in 1588, Bancroft declared that just as St. Paul had prophesied in I Timothy 4, there were many false prophets about: 'Arrians, Donatists, Papists, Libertines, Anabaptists, the Family of love, and sundrie other.'[93] With the followers of Cartwright in mind, he also said that there were those who sought to establish a new form of ecclesiastical government patterned on that of the Jews. As the Jews had priests, the members of this faction advocated pastors; Levites, doctors; rulers of synagogues, elders; Levitical treasurers, deacons. 'Where this ecclesiastical synod is not erected, they say Gods ordinance is not performed.'[94] Yet even the members of this faction acknowledged that what they called the first government of the Church was much decayed long before the Council of Nicaea in the fourth century, 'and that since the said councell it was never heard of in christendome untill these their times.'[95]

Moving to the incendiary pamphleteer against bishops, he said that Martin Marprelate 'affirmeth that there are manie schismes in the Church of England at this day, bicause the Bishops will not suffer men to do as they list.'[96] Bancroft argued that on the contrary a major cause of schisms was the lack of respect for bishops. He cited St. Jerome's statement that 'the care of church government hath been committed' to bishops ever since the time of St. Mark.[97] Bishops, said Bancroft, had always been concerned especially to take away 'the seed of schismes'

[92] Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 385–431.

[93] Richard Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse the 9. of Februarie, Being the First Sunday in the Parleament, Anno. 1588* (London: Gregorie Seton, 1588), 3.

[94] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 9.

[95] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 10.

[96] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 14.

[97] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 14.

among Christians of a particular area.[98] Bancroft distinguished three groups of Christians. Roman Catholics accept whatever their Church teaches; restless spirits, who for Bancroft included the members of all the sects, question everything, wringing and wresting the scriptures as they will. But a third group, Bancroft asserted, occupies a much better position, namely a mean between the other two. Its members build a lively faith on the foundation of Jesus Christ, into whose mystical body they are incorporated by baptism and by whom they are nourished with the heavenly food of the Lord's Supper.[99] Bancroft advised his hearers to read the scriptures, 'but with sobrietie,' to accept the councils that have generally been honoured, and to accept also 'the decrees of our learned fathers in their lawfull assemblies.'[100] Returning to the proponents of a new discipline, Bancroft asserted that they, like their counterparts in France and Scotland, claimed all authority for their own assemblies, decrees, and laws, while ignoring what had been determined by provincial and national synods, or even by general councils.[101] In asserting that only their own officers had a lawful part in the government of the church, these agitators excluded the monarch and the civil magistrates. In urging that their proposals be adopted regardless of the sovereign's wishes, they threatened rebellion.[102] Moreover, those who sought to 'withdraw you from the church established' did not always agree among themselves, and were likely to lead astray those who listened to them.[103] Bancroft exhorted his hearers to remain steadfast in the faith, receiving thereby the grace of 'constancie in the truth.'[104]

Richard Hooker was unlike his contemporaries, both as a thinker and a writer. Hooker was a fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, who served as Master of the Temple Church in London from 1585 to 1591 before becoming rector, successively, of parishes in Wiltshire and Kent. He stands apart from theologians who were intent on ridiculing, belittling, or demonizing their opponents. His sentences, sometimes immensely long, suggest the viewpoint of a contemplative, even detached observer. Hooker conveyed eloquently his conviction that truth cannot be expressed adequately in stark, declarative form. He frequently

[98] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 15.
[99] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 33–41.
[100] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 42–43.
[101] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 72–83.
[102] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 95–96.
[103] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 103.
[104] Bancroft, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse*, 106.

appealed to common sense. Dogmatism was not a congenial mode of thought or expression for him. Yet there can be no doubt that Elizabethan theological polemics affected him deeply. His ministry at the Temple Church in London featured a running dispute between himself and Walter Travers, the other minister at the church, in 1585–86. With Hooker, 'the pulpit spake pure Canterbury in the Morning,' while, with Travers, it spake 'Geneva in the Afternoon,' according to Thomas Fuller, writing three-quarters of a century later.[105] Hooker's major work, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, the Preface and first four books of which were published in 1593, was written with the encouragement of those who wanted to discredit and defeat the advocates of the Genevan discipline in the Church of England. Hooker had the support of Archbishop John Whitgift, who had long been a theological opponent of Thomas Cartwright and his followers. Hooker's Preface to the *Lawes* took on the Puritan ecclesiological challenge directly and can be seen as part of Whitgift's campaign against nonconformity and to reflect Whitgift's writings against Cartwright and the authors of the *Admonition*.[106] The subject matter, approach, and language of other defenders of the established Church, including Jewel and Bancroft, are reflected in Hooker's major work. Thus the theological context in which Hooker wrote helps to illuminate his intentions and method and is important for an understanding of his own special kind of polemic.[107]

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[105] Thomas Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England* (London: Thomas Williams, 1662), 264.

[106] Patrick Collinson, 'Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment,' in Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed., *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* (Tempe: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1997), 151–181.

[107] For views of Hooker as a polemicist, see W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker,' in W. Speed Hill, ed. *Studies in Richard Hooker; Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works* (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972), 3–76; W. Speed Hill, 'The Evolution of Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*,' in Hill, ed., *Studies in Richard Hooker*, 117–158; Brian Vickers, 'Hooker's Prose Style,' in A. S. McGrade and Brian Vickers, eds., *Richard Hooker: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, an Abridged Edition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 41–59; Rudolph Almasy, 'The Purpose of Richard Hooker's Polemic,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 39:2 (Apr.–Jun. 1978), 251–270; Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans*, 145–252; John N. Wall, 'Hooker's 'Faire Speeche': Rhetorical Strategies in the *Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Polity*,' in Donald S. Armentrout, ed., *This Sacred History: Anglican Reflections for John Booty* (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990), 125–143; and P. G. Stanwood, 'Richard Hooker's Discourse and the Deception of Posterity,' in Neil Rhodes, ed., *English Renaissance Prose: History, Language and Politics* (Tempe: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1997), 75–90.

The Preface to the *Lawes* is addressed to 'them that seeke (as they tearme it) the reformation of Lawes, and orders Ecclesiasticall, in the Church of England.'[108] Its general hostility to them was consistent with the advice of George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys, two former students of Hooker's at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, as well as with the campaign against nonconformity being waged by Archbishop Whitgift. George Cranmer was the great-nephew of Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, one of the chief architects of the early English Reformation and the author and compiler of the Book of Common Prayer. Edwin Sandys was the son of Edwin Sandys, a Marian exile now Archbishop of York. Both men were active in political affairs in London. Cranmer advised Hooker on the contents of the book; Sandys helped to underwrite the costs of its publication.[109] Hooker's occasional stridency, however, was probably less than they would have wanted.

Hooker began by describing the circumstances of John Calvin's reorganizing the Church of Geneva. Accident played a large part. Not only was Calvin's visit there seemingly fortuitous, but it happened to coincide with the exodus shortly before of the bishop and clergy of the city-republic, who were frightened by 'the peoples suddaine attempt for abolishment of popish religion' there.[110] Calvin subsequently devised a church government in which the civic authorities played a large part. It would have been surprising, according to Hooker, if Calvin had not been able to find scriptural evidence 'that divine authoritie it selfe was the same way somewhat inclinable.'[111] Thus the new polity was less a matter of scriptural revelation than of Calvin's ability to adapt himself and his program of reform to historical circumstances. His followers, drawing on Calvin's own exposition of the New Testament, found the system of pastors, elders, doctors, and deacons 'the rule and canon of Church politie.'[112] It was, in their view, the one that should be erected everywhere in place of episcopal government. This conviction had spread widely in France, Scotland, and elsewhere, and was shared by many scholars. But, Hooker observed, the Genevan system of polity was not that of the Church's historic development. 'We require you to

[108] *Lawes* Pref.1.1; 1:1.2–5.
[109] Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'Richard Hooker and the Church of England,' in Trevor-Roper, *Renaissance Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 103–120.
[110] *Lawes* Pref.2.1; 1:3.23–24.
[111] *Lawes* Pref.2.7; 1:10.17.
[112] *Lawes* Pref.4.4; 1:23.17.

finde out but one Church upon the face of the whole earth, that hath bene ordered by your discipline, or hath not bene ordered by ours, that is to saie, by episcopall regiment, sithence the time that the blessed Apostles were heere conversant.'[113] The efforts being made to advance the Genevan discipline in opposition to the English ecclesiastical polity established by law threatened the rule of law itself. At the end of the Preface, in chapter 8, Hooker raised the same fears that Bancroft had raised, namely that political authority, social hierarchy, and even the 'orders and lawes' of the universities were all in peril should the innovators succeed.[114] But the polemic is only occasionally harsh or extreme. Mostly it is gentle and sometimes witty. Hooker described Calvin as 'incomparably the wisest man that ever the french Church did enjoy, since the houre it enjoyed him,' and he said of Calvin, 'Divine knowledge he gathered, not by hearing or reading so much, as by teaching others.'[115] Yet Calvin was a thinker whom Hooker evidently admired, and despite the playfulness with which he sometimes referred to Calvin and his followers, he took their theology seriously. And though he vigorously opposed any effort to further the Genevan polity in England, he clearly accepted the legitimacy of the Church of Geneva.

Taken as a whole, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* may be seen as a defence of the Church of England on Reformation principles against the narrow, potentially sectarian principles being set forth by the proponents of a new discipline. Book I is a kind of tutorial for his opponents on the subject of law, which Hooker saw as the organizing principle of the universe. The angels were subject to it, as were all natural agents. There was a divine law intended to regulate human affairs. Human communities had their laws and law-making institutions, which were intended to adapt the universal laws to specific circumstances. Hooker was intent on showing that the law of God was infinitely more complex than the proponents of a new discipline imagined. Books II and III are a discussion in which Hooker sought to answer his opponents' arguments concerning the authority of scripture and its relation to the ongoing life of the Church. He sought to show that the scriptures were to be understood in relation to the circumstances under which they were written and were to be applied in a way that utilized human reason

[113] *Lawes* Pref.4.1; 1:21.28 22.1.
[114] *Lawes* Pref.8.13; 1:51.14–22.
[115] *Lawes* Pref.2.1; 1:3.13–17.

and experience as well as the evidence of history. Book V, published in 1597, is a defence of the Book of Common Prayer from a theological, historical, and devotional point of view, showing how it drew on the past to provide the liturgical resources for regenerating human beings and advancing social harmony. It ought not to be purged of traditional materials simply because they had sometimes been misused in the past. Book VII, not published until 1662, argues that episcopacy, not the new discipline, was the apostolic system of government that Christ had instituted. But like all systems of government it was subject to error and abuse and sometimes needed to be reformed. In any case, government inevitably changed according to circumstances and was to be altered through lawful means.[116] Again and again Hooker reiterated the great themes of Reformation theology common to Lutherans and Calvinists alike, often reflecting the language of the Thirty-Nine Articles. Salvation, he insisted, is by the grace of God through faith in Jesus Christ. The scriptures contain everything necessary for salvation. It is essential that the scriptures be read, taught, preached, and pondered. The sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper were given by God to bring human beings into the body of Christ and to nourish them and prepare them for eternal life. One thing that is striking about the *Lawes* and contrasts sharply with much of the polemical theology of the period is that Hooker often sought to reason with his Puritan opponents in a way that recognized the common ground in theology that they and he shared.

The *Lawes*, therefore, was a response to the ideas and activities of the Elizabethan Puritan movement. It may also be seen as a defence of the Church of England. Hooker did not 'invent' a new piety for the established Church in order to supplant that of his Puritan opponents.[117] Rather, he reflected upon the strengths of the established Church and

[116] Compare Hooker's 'The matter conteyned in these eyght bookes' in *Lawes* Pref.7.1–7; 1:34.15–36.13. Treatments of Hooker that stress his commitment to a broadly conceived Reformed theology, despite his opposition to presbyterianism in the English Church, include Nigel Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason: Reformed Theologian of the Church of England?* (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997); Bryan D. Spinks, *Two Faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology: Sacraments and Salvation in the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1999); W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed., *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003); Corneliu C. Simut, *Richard Hooker and His Early Doctrine of Justification: A Study of His Discourse of Justification* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) and *The Doctrine of Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005).

[117] Compare Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans*, 227, 230.

presented them in a way that he hoped would be both compelling in its argumentation and disarming in its literary expression. The book's significance as an *apologia* is that Hooker represented the Church as truly reformed, but as distinctive in positive ways, particularly in its lack of scriptural literalism, its respect for theological and historical scholarship, its rich liturgical tradition, and its apostolic ministry. Is the book at all a response to Roman Catholic attacks in the same era? Yes, Hooker's *Lawes* was a response to Roman Catholics attacks to a limited extent. His argument advanced several key propositions with reference to Roman Catholic claims about the Elizabethan Church. One proposition was that the Church of England had retained a great deal that was valuable in ancient and medieval Christianity. A second was that the Church of England continued to recognize the Church of Rome as a true church, though one that was deeply flawed. A third was that the Church of England saw itself as a part of a worldwide communion of churches united not in organizational terms but in devotion to a common Lord. In Hooker's view the Church of England was not a heretical offshoot of Western Christendom but a renewed branch of the 'one catholic and apostolic Church,' in the phrase of the Nicene Creed as contained in the Elizabethan Prayer Book.[118] Hooker helped to inaugurate a much needed explanation of the faith and practice of the Church of England as defined by the ecclesiastical legislation and religious formularies of the reign of Elizabeth I. His teachings were not widely known in his own time or immediately afterwards, partly because of his complicated, discursive prose style and partly because of the delay of many years in the publication of the last three books of his major work.[119] But his ideas were eventually to be immensely influential in the English Church and among other churches closely related to it in faith and practice.

Hooker's *Lawes* did create enough of a stir to provoke a blistering attack in 1599. Entitled *A Christian Letter*, this response to the first five

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[118] *The Book of Common Prayer, 1559*, ed. Booty, 251 (Nicene Creed). For the relation between the Church of England and other churches, see Trevor-Roper, 'Richard Hooker and the Church of England,' and W. B. Patterson, 'Hooker on Ecumenical Relations: Conciliarism in the English Reformation,' in McGrade, ed., *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community*, 283–303.

[119] See Diarmaid MacCulloch, 'Richard Hooker's Reputation,' *English Historical Review*, 117, 473 (September 2002), 773–812, esp. 781–785; and Michael Brydon, *The Evolving Reputation of Richard Hooker: An Examination of Responses, 1600–1714* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1–20, 198–204.

books of the *Lawes* states on its title-page that it was from 'certaine English Protestants, vnfained fauourers of the present state of Religion, authorised and professed in England.'[120] By their own description of themselves, they clearly wished not to be confused with those whom Hooker represented as discontented radicals determined to undermine the established Church. Their objections to Hooker's theology were on the basis not of polity but of fundamental Christian doctrines. The book discussed Hooker's theology with specific reference to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, the Church's official statement of belief. By quoting directly from the articles, then juxtaposing quotations from Hooker's *Lawes*, they sought to show that 'Mr. Hoo.' as they called him, advanced erroneous and heretical views. These views were on doctrines ranging from Christology and the Trinity to free will, faith and works, predestination, and the nature of the sacraments.[121] In addition to citing and discussing the articles, the authors quoted from 'Reverend and learned Fathers of our church,' including Thomas Cranmer, Nicholas Ridley, John Jewel, and John Whitgift, in their effort to demonstrate Hooker's heterodoxy.[122] They accused Hooker of attempting to reintroduce into the English Church elements of Roman Catholic belief and practice, or, in other words, 'to scatter the prophane graines of poperie.'[123] Their challenge to him was to explain how his views were consistent with the theology of the church his book purported to defend. An indication of their own theological viewpoint was that they objected strenuously to his treatment of John Calvin's career and ideas, citing Jewel's description of Calvin as 'a worthie ornament of the church of God.'[124] 'What moved you,' they asked, 'to make choyse of that worthie pillar of the church aboue all other, to traduce him and to make him a spectacle before all christians'?[125]

The principal author of *A Christian Letter* was most likely Andrew Willet, a fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, and the author of a well

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[120] [Andrew Willet], *A Christian Letter of certaine English Protestantes, vnfayned fauourers of the present state of religion authorised and professed in England vnto that Reverend and Learned man, Maister R. Hoo. requiring resolution in certayne matters of doctrine (which seeme to ouerthrowe the foundation of Christian Religion and of the church among vs) expreslie contained in his fiue books of Ecclesiasticall Pollicie* (Middelburg: Printed by Richard Schilders, 1599).

[121] Willet, *A Christian Letter*, 6–7, 11–17, 26–35.

[122] Willet, *A Christian Letter*, 45; see 9, 17–18, 20–21, 24, 26–27, 29, 31, 33–34, 38.

[123] Willet, *A Christian Letter*, 15; see 17–20.

[124] Willet, *A Christian Letter*, 37.

[125] Willet, *A Christian Letter*, 37; see 37–42.

known work of controversy, *Synopsis papismi*, which set out what Willet considered the errors of Roman Catholicism.[126] Like his colleague at Christ's College, William Perkins, and his friend Laurence Chaderton, Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, he was a Calvinist in theology. Calvinism, or, more accurately, the Reformed tradition to which the continental scholars Heinrich Bullinger, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Theodore Beza, and others, as well as Calvin, had contributed, was by the late sixteenth century the prevailing theology at both English universities. In Cambridge, strict Calvinism had encountered a serious, though limited challenge from Peter Baro, a French Huguenot who was Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and William Barrett, a fellow of Gonville and Caius College.[127] Baro had, since the late 1570s, raised questions about the accepted ideas at Cambridge on grace, free will, and other subjects associated with the doctrine of predestination. When, in 1595, William Whitaker, the Regius Professor of Divinity, lectured against what he considered the erroneous interpretations being taught on predestination, Barrett preached a sermon at Great St. Mary's, the University Church, defending Baro's ideas. Baro and Barrett were eventually discredited by a disciplinary process against Barrett instituted by Whitaker that eventually came to involve William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the Queen's leading minister, and John Whitgift, the Archbishop of Canterbury. One result of the controversy was the formulation by the archbishop, in 1595, of a statement that attempted to resolve the contested issues, largely following suggestions by Whitaker. The statement came to be called, from the archbishop's London residence, the Lambeth Articles.[128] The nine articles of this statement elaborated in a distinctively Calvinist direction the treatment of predestination in the Church's Thirty-Nine Articles. But because Queen Elizabeth wanted to dampen down the controversy rather than risk exacerbating it, she

[126] On the authorship and historical context of *A Christian Letter*, see John E. Booty's introduction to Hooker, *Lawes: Attack and Response*, Vol. IV, xiii–xlviii, and Peter Lake, 'Business as Usual? The Immediate Reception of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 52, 3 (July 2001), 456–486.

[127] For the controversy involving Baro and Barrett, see Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge*, 314–390; Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* , 201–242; and Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590–1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990—paperback edition), 29–36 and passim. For the growth and development of the Reformed tradition at Oxford, see C. M. Dent, *Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), esp. 74–125, 152–180.

[128] The Lambeth Articles remained in manuscript until they appeared in print in 1651. See the text, translated from Latin, in Porter, *Reformation and Reaction*, 365–366.

exercised her royal supremacy over the English Church by declining to authorize a new statement of belief. The Lambeth Articles were thus not promulgated. One reason Willet may have joined in or led the attack on Hooker was that he saw Hooker as engaged in the same effort as Baro and Barrett to oppose the prevailing Reformed theology at the universities and thus lessen its influence in the established Church.

Hooker died in 1600 before he could complete a response to *A Christian Letter*. He did, however, write notes in the margins of the book and he wrote drafts of what might have become portions of his reply.[129] The Dublin Fragments by Hooker, so designated from their location at Trinity College, Dublin, dealt with grace and free will, the sacraments, and predestination, all topics treated in *A Christian Letter*. The published response to the *Letter*, as it happened, was by William Covell, who had so familiarized himself with Hooker's *Lawes* and literary style that Covell's *A Iust and Temperate Defence*, published in 1603, contained extensive passages made up of quotations and paraphrases of Hooker's work.[130] Covell was a fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge, who became the vicar of two parishes in Kent in 1603. He was evidently encouraged to write in defence of Hooker by Archbishop Whitgift, to whom the book is dedicated. Covell provided a kind of compendium of Hooker's thought on a range of topics, following the order of the Thirty-Nine Articles and *A Christian Letter*. He treated some subjects sketchily, including predestination, perhaps because he suspected that the reply Hooker had been engaged in writing at the time of his death might yet be published.[131] But he treated other subjects at length, including the ministry, preaching, and sacraments. Covell sought to counter the assertions of Hooker's critics that Hooker had neglected the role of the scriptures, especially the importance of preaching, in the life of the church. Covell asserted that the regular public reading of the scriptures, something that the Prayer Book provided for, conveyed

[129] See the texts of the notes and fragments in Hooker, *Lawes*, Vol. IV, ed. Booty, 1–167. For a discussion of the contents and significance of these manuscripts, see Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), passim.

[130] William Covell, *A Iust and Temperate Defence of the Five Books of Ecclesiastical Policie, Written by M. Richard Hooker* (London: Clement Knight, 1603).

[131] Covell, *A Iust and Temperate Defence*, 58–64. At the end of the preface 'To the Reader,' Covell wrote, 'if this had beene by himselfe performed (which I heare he hath done, and I desire thee to expect it) thy satisfaction (gentle Reader) would haue beene much more, yet vouchsafe in thy kindnesse, to accept this' (Sig. A 4 verso).

the revelation of God's word in a particularly direct way, free of the possible distortions of an interpreter.[132] Covell argued further that the word of God ought to be proclaimed in a variety of ways by ordinary Christians as well as by ministers. He cited conferences, exhortations, and teaching. Sermons should not be simply repetitious paraphrases of a scriptural text but should reflect 'humane learning' in order to bring out the meaning of the scriptures, thus reflecting what could be gained from 'those excellent fountaines of all learning, the Vniuersities.'[133] The sacraments of baptism and the eucharist, he argued, were not merely signs, seals, or tokens of God's grace, but effectual means of God's saving actions. For Christians called to God's service the sacraments were necessary, though God was certainly not limited to the use of such means in extending his saving grace.[134]

Hooker and Covell thus sought to direct English Protestants to the practical, immediate way to salvation provided in the parishes of the national Church. Theologically, the age of Elizabeth had been stormier and more vitriolic than any previous period in English history. By 1603, no consensus had been achieved, and in less than half a century revolutions were to break out across Britain and Ireland in which religion was to play a key role. What had been achieved was the staking out of theological positions that were to have a long life, particularly in the English-speaking world. The established Church was to prove to be remarkably resilient, durable, and adaptable to changing circumstances and a fundamental element in the nation's life and culture.

[132] Covell, *A Ivst and Temperate Defence*, 78–80.
[133] Covell, *A Ivst and Temperate Defence*, 80.
[134] Covell, *A Ivst and Temperate Defence*, 94–97, 110–111, 120.

CHAPTER SIX

RHETORIC AND APOLOGETICS

Rudolph P. Almasy

Rhetoric, in a sense, is the 'shewing' of one's self 'to the world.' The allusion to the 'selfe' in this phrase refers to Richard Hooker, and it is found in the opening paragraphs of *A Christian Letter*.[1] This 'letter' from 'certaine English Protestantes, unfayned favourers of the present state of religion' was printed in 1599 and serves as the first response to the publication of the opening books of Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*. The author of *A Christian Letter* sees Hooker's theological positions as dangerous to the church and contrary to the received theology of the English Reformation. To 'shew' Hooker in this negative light is a critical element of the rhetorical strategy of the letter, and that strategy begins with the understanding that Hooker himself, in 'shewing of him selfe to the world' through the *Lawes*, was practicing a rhetoric of display or performance that challenged the very foundation of reformist thought. As the letter remarks, Richard Hooker was merely one of those 'Poetts, Philosophers, *Rhetoricians*, Phisitians, Schoolemen, and whatsoever'[2] who depended on his own wit rather than on the grace of God to discover and share the truth. As those early protestant readers saw Hooker's work as rhetorically grounded (and thus problematic), so too should a focus on rhetoric help the contemporary reader enter into the world and the self Hooker constructs in his apology for the Elizabethan established church.

There are many ways Richard Hooker would have understood the task of rhetoric as he determined how to proceed with the project which became the *Lawes*. In this essay I wish to focus on three fundamental aspects of rhetoric. Hooker's rhetorical training would have encouraged him to think deliberately about the form or disposition of the material in his analysis of the presbyterian alternative to the established church in England. This deliberation would have been especially important

[1] *ACL* 4; 4:8.7.
[2] *ACL* 12; 4:35.4–5 (emphasis mine).

after he had made the decision to present himself a certain way and to design his treatise as a logically and rationally coherent argument from a seemingly logical and rational orator. Hooker would have known—and the *Lawes* everywhere gives evidence of this—that how one proceeded with one's rhetorical performance influenced—or at least was meant to influence or persuade or move—the reader. Thus, the fundamental rhetorical aspects to comment on are text, writer, and audience, but in the *Lawes* these are never straightforward, especially as Hooker constructs and reconstructs his presbyterian opponent.

As we examine the form of the *Lawes* and the organization of each book, Hooker gives the impression of having control over the massive project he undertook. In the Preface he writes that 'the most generall' questions will be dealt with first, and he will then 'descend unto particularities.'[3] The questions and particularities, of course, arise directly out of Hooker's understanding of the presbyterian agenda and suggest how, from the beginning, the rhetorical enterprise was reactive to what Thomas Cartwright and John Whitgift had written. We might even want to see Book I, in its consideration of law, order, and obedience, as rhetorically responsive to the situation created by the presbyterian challenge. Hooker begins quite deliberately with a discussion 'Concerning Lawes.' Here is his explanation from the first chapter of Book I for this decision: 'because the point about which wee strive is the qualitie of our lawes, our first entrance hereinto cannot better be made, then with consideration of the nature of lawe in generall, and of that lawe which giveth life unto all the rest… Proceeding from hence to the lawe first of nature, then of scripture, we shall have the easier accesse unto those things which come after to be debated….'[4] Hooker understands the need to identify, define, and discuss the key concepts of the debate, those concepts which will hold the discourse together. John H. Mackin identifies this procedure as the Socratic promise of rhetoric's unity: 'If the object of the discussion is correctly defined, then all the arguments will be deduced from that definition and will necessarily have a certain logical structure.'[5] It is not difficult to see Hooker proceeding in this Socratic manner.

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[3] *Lawes* Pref.5.3; 1:28.21–22.

[4] *Lawes* I.1.3; 1:58.11–18.

[5] John H. Mackin, *Classical Rhetoric for Modern Discourse* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 40.

Once the key term of law is discussed, the seven essays after Book I deal with seven challenges that can be traced to Cartwright's *Replye* and his *Second Replie*, even back to the *Admonitions*. To illustrate, note the title of Book II: 'Concerning their first position who urge reformation in the Church of England: Namely, That Scripture is the onely rule of all things which in this life may be done by men.' Furthermore, the table of contents for that book makes plain how Hooker was responding to Cartwright in constructing the whole of the *Lawes*. That table lists Hooker's work as answering 'their first proofe,' their second, third, and fourth, 'their proofes out of fathers,' and 'their proofe by the scriptures custome of disputing.' This polemical texture of the work conflicts or interferes, some would say, with the more irenic and philosophical thrust so many prefer to see in the *Lawes*. And we might want to say at the outset that there appears to be a conflict within Hooker's intentions, perhaps within Hooker himself, as he sought an intellectual means to defend the established church and invite the presbyterians into the church community at the same time that he was compelled to condemn his opponents and expose intellectual bankruptcy and political dangers. But this contestation, seen so well as we concentrate on rhetorical issues, also reflects the social and political anxieties of the 1580s as Elizabethan England marched into its third decade of a religious settlement that seemed to be working for some but not for all, especially not for a well organized presbyterian movement which sought further reformation. What I would argue is that this tension and these anxieties are played out in the rhetorical arena of the *Lawes.* That rich and suggestive arena is worthy of continued exploration. Through a careful examination of the rhetoric of the *Lawes*, one sees Hooker pulled in different directions, no doubt because of multiple agendas. When Debora Shugar writes that English Renaissance thought was fissured and internally divided, that judgment is confirmed in the polyvalence of Hooker's rhetorical proceedings and purposes.[6]

Samuel A. Yoder reminds us that Hooker began, as a good debater, with one thesis as a summary of the controversy. In the first chapter of the Preface, Hooker is direct: 'Surely the present forme of Church government which the lawes of this land have established, is such, as no lawe of God, nor reason of man hath hitherto bene alleaged of

[6] Debora Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 19.

force sufficient to prove they do ill… Contrariwise, The other which in stead of it we are required to accept, is only by error and misconceipt named the ordinance of Jesus Christ, no one proofe as yet brought forth whereby it may cleerely appeare to be so in very deede.'[7] The thesis is reiterated near the end of the Preface: 'that for the ecclesiasticall lawes of this land, we are led by great reason to observe them, and yee by no necessitie bound to impugne them.'[8] But as he hoped to persuade others of this thesis, Hooker is also speaking as someone who has tried all things and now, as the final authority in matters controversial, speaks ultimately as the judge, silencing both sides. One Hookerian voice debates; another Hookerian voice declares—which should alert scholars to the need to carefully observe Hooker's multiple voices. Because Hooker begins with a specific thesis, there is a wonderful coherence in the *Lawes* which Yoder believes is the result of Hooker's rhetorical training. One articulated the fundamental issue, and then one attended to *dispositio* in order to arrange the material so that everything contributed to explaining and persuading on that one issue. 'Every item of the whole discourse was to be so placed as to bring every ounce of its force to bear upon the cutting edge of the main thesis.'[9] This is why, according to Yoder and others, it is not difficult to describe how various books fit together so well in the *Lawes* as initially imagined. I, for one, see Books I through III as a unit on authority; then Books IV and V on worship, and the last three books as a unit on specific issues of ecclesiastical polity.

Dispositio also led to the coherence and organization of the arguments in each of the separate books. As Hooker shows, the controversy, now 20 years old, can be reduced to a handful of propositions. Book II again illustrates well this coherence and the rhetorical strategy Hooker pursued. After some general introductory words about his purpose to maintain only what 'truth and reason shall approove,'[10] Hooker moves from *exordium* to propositions and exposition as he covers familiar points over the use of Scripture in matters of ecclesiology. This material is

[7] *Lawes* Pref.1.2; 1:2.17–24.

[8] *Lawes* Pref.7.1; 1:34.16–16.

[9] Samuel A. Yoder, '*Dispositio* in Richard Hooker's "Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,"' *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 27 (1941), 93. On the exceptional organization of the *Lawes*, see also P.G. Stanwood, 'Richard Hooker's Discourse and the Deception of Posterity,' in *English Renaissance Prose*: *History, Language, and Politics*, ed. Neil Rhodes (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1997), 75–90.

[10] *Lawes* II.1.1; 1:144.4.

easily traced to Cartwright's two replies. Generally Whitgift responded to this material in either his *Answer against the Admonition* or his *Defence of the Answer*. Hooker is quite obvious about this procedure: follow 'that judiciall method which serveth best for invention of truth;' find 'the head theoreme of all their discourses;' and weigh the proofs, all for the benefit of the one who judges and determines victory.[11] The book's opening discussions prepare for what is always a major and often new response to an unanswered presbyterian argument, in the case of Book II the effectiveness of human authority in discovering truth. This seminal discussion is often Hooker's true contribution to the longstanding controversy. The book then concludes with chapter 8 and a summary statement or *peroratio*: 'A declaration what the truth is in this matter.' Such is the pattern in all books, even those not perfected for publication.

In examining the disposition of the material in the *Lawes* it is easy to see that Hooker paid attention to *logos*, that is, to the nature of the speech, or in this case the essay. *Logos* points to how Hooker went about to prove his case and to demonstrate how, in an Aristotelian sense, he was seeking truth. He performs as one who has examined objectively the issues and who then speaks truth, the inevitable result of such an examination. Hooker has carefully examined the 'sundrie declarations' of the opponents, he has tried 'all things,' and now, holding fast to the 'good,' sets down his 'finall resolute persuasion.'[12] It is in this area of rhetoric that Hooker has many admirers, for many observe that he wrote a rational treatise with care to construct arguments and produce discussions which were above all else logical. Whether as combatant or judge, Hooker hopes to teach rationally, *docere* being one the functions of rhetoric. Regardless of the specific topic of debate, Hooker's purpose is to write 'for mens more cleare and plaine understanding.'[13] This is a discourse—a *logos*—which would not only share knowledge but improve the thinking of the reader, even of the presbyterian. As Trevor McNeely observes, reason and rhetoric go together for Richard Hooker.[14] Hooker's rhetorical goal seems to be intellectual persuasion and the final settling truth which would bring peace and quietness, the

[11] *Lawes* II.1.3; 1:146.22–24.
[12] *Lawes* Pref.1.2; 1:2.7–16.
[13] *Lawes* III.1.1; 1:194.25.
[14] Trevor McNeely, *Proteus Unmasked: Sixteenth-Century Rhetoric and the Art of Shakespeare* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2004), 47.

unity of believers so eloquently desired in Book I. Rhetoric promised that 'all may with one hart and one mouth glorifie God.'[15] Although unity of mind, heart, and purpose may have appeared to be the goal of the rhetoric Hooker practiced, his *Lawes* demonstrates that the rhetorical nature of the arena of disputation seldom unites but instead divides.

Brian Vickers has written extensively on Hooker's rhetoric, and in his essay in *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* observes that Hooker linked comprehension and teaching, elevating logic as the means to demonstrate the truth which was being revealed. Yet, in the context of the debate, the truth is never separated from the orator and from the auditor. For just as truth is important for Hooker so too is 'mens more cleare and plaine understanding.' Thus, according to Vickers, of the three types of rhetorical display or oratory discussed by Aristotle—judicial, deliberative, and epideictic—Hooker wrote the *Lawes* as a judicial oration, the purpose of which was to defend the 1559 settlement and lay to rest any more debate over ecclesiology. And surely this is one way of approaching Hooker's rhetorical performance.

It is also useful to see the *Lawes* as deliberative oratory, arguing for a course of action and persuading the audiences (and they are multiple in this work) to embrace a certain position concerning religious practice and belief. When we think of judicial oratory, we focus on the work itself. When we consider the possibility of deliberative oratory, we move closer to *pathos* or the mind and heart of the audience. I should say here, though, that many scholars do not believe that Hooker appeals to *pathos*, that is to the emotions of the reader. But I believe that this is a rhetorical area ripe for investigation as we see how Hooker manipulates his audiences, frightens and warns them about political and social dangers, and asks them to surrender to the truth of his *Lawes*. Hooker saw the importance of challenging Cartwright's position that 'whatsoever is not done by the word of God is sinne.'[16] And he wanted to make his response 'so manifest, that if it were possible, no doubt or scruple concerning the same might remayne in any mans cogitation.'[17] To encourage such reflection, Hooker hoped to move his presbyterian readers (and others) toward assurance, easing the conscience, settling the heart over what was not sinful. It might be fruitful, then, in studying

[15] *Lawes* III.1.10; 1:202.22.
[16] *Lawes* II.4.1; 1:151.22–24.
[17] *Lawes* II.4.6; 1:156.3–4.

Hooker's discourse to see how his goal of intellectual assent includes an emotional embrace or surrender to a scheme of assurance.

What I want to suggest is that it might be important to examine Hooker's work from a perspective other than as a rhetorician pursuing only a rationalist agenda. He could be considered as someone more emotionally involved in the project that we normally think and as a rhetor seeking to move his readers in ways other than rational. Whether he is the passionate Christian orator as described by Debora Shuger in *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* is something to consider since it is obvious that Hooker is emotionally involved in his material, that there is a passionate seriousness (the phrase is Shugar's) in the *Lawes* (especially Books I, V, and the Preface), and that Hooker's argumentative prose is capable of moving readers not only intellectually but emotionally.

From the first sentence of Book I to the last chapter of that book, we can see that persuasion was on Hooker's mind. He acknowledges the problem of the 'passions of men' in persuasion, especially for something as important as civil, ecclesiastical, and spiritual laws. The rhetor has to understand that 'with such kind of matter the passions of men are…stirred one way or other.' So 'matter'—the intellectual material of the debate—is central also to Hooker's worry. How does one present the matter? Who presents it? And in what voice? The goal, in terms of auditor, is that 'knowledge…[be] set forwarde unto the tryall of that whereof there is doubt made.'[18] Thus, in terms of auditor response, what needs to happen, if a rhetor like Hooker is successful, is for the auditor to make trial of the issue at hand, is to arouse or move the reader enough so that internal debate occurs. And the material of the debate in the *Lawes* is less the opponents' exact words, as one usually finds in 16th century religious polemic, and more what Hooker himself supplies. Thus, Hooker's way of proceeding: 'I have…turned aside from that beaten path and chosen though a lesse easie, yet a more profitable way in regard of the end we propose.'[19] Hooker must mean by the 'beaten path' the procedure Cartwright and Whitgift (and others) followed in attacking each other's sentences and paragraphs, a procedure the author of *A Christian Letter* purports to admire. Hooker's disposition of material is, then, somewhat new for Tudor religious polemics. As

[18] *Lawes* I.16.1; 1:135.5–7.
[19] *Lawes* I.16.1; 1:135.7–9.

Vickers remarks, Hooker may be the earliest successful writer of a style that could sustain simultaneously argument and philosophical thought.[20] Such sustained argument promised, in Hooker's mind, to resolve doubt and prompt assurance. In his schoolmasterly *ethos*, Hooker describes his procedure: 'to teach men a reason why just and reasonable lawes are of so great force, of so great use in the world; and to enforme their mindes with some methode of reducing the lawes wherof there is present controversie unto their first originall causes, that so it may be in every particular ordinance thereby the better discerned, whether the same be reasonable just and righteous or no.'[21] The result of Hooker's procedure—and it is important to emphasize this for the type of world of disputation Hooker inhabited—is judgment, whether the judgment of the indifferent reader, the presbyterian, a church council, aristocrat, clergy, whomever. He is preparing people to soundly judge, so he says; thus the emphasis on *logos*.

But who, indeed, can or will serve as judge? This simple question about audience needs to be asked throughout the *Lawes*, for the issue of audience is a tricky one. As Hooker concludes Book I, he continues to categorize his auditors: 'Easier a great deale it is for men by law to be taught what they ought to doe, then instructed how to judge as they should do of law; the one being a thing which belongeth generally unto all, the other such as none but the wiser and more judicious sort can performe.'[22] If one cannot escape questions of audience, indeed of judgment, in rhetoric, one has to be alert to the ramifications of these (and other) Hookerian sentences. This one suggests two purposes—and they are not the same: to teach for obedience and to instruct for judgment. If Hooker's rhetoric moves toward instruction for judgment, then, according to Hooker, it is meant only for 'the wiser and more judicious sort.' Someone like Hooker, we should add. It is fascinating to observe Hooker's rhetorical positioning as we ask simple questions which are always worth asking repeatedly in a conflicted discourse like the *Lawes*: what is his goal? Who is his audience? What is his persona?

Although judgment is important, in terms of audience response one could say that Hooker is also interested in surrender. The less politi-

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[20] Brian Vickers, 'Introduction 2: Hooker's Prose Style' in *Richard Hooker Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: An Abridged Edition*, eds. A. S. McGrade and Brian Vickers (New York: St. Martins Press, 1975), 41–59.

[21] *Lawes* I.16.1; 1:135.5–6.

[22] *Lawes* I.16.2; 1:135.30–136.1.

cally minded would say 'in persuasion.' But who should be persuaded? Who should surrender? It seems to me that there are three different audiences Hooker speaks to—or tries to speak to. Of greatest interest, in my opinion, are his opponents, the presbyterians. I say this because in analyzing how Hooker constructs his opponents (and such construction is always going on in rhetoric) we continue to see the contestation inevitable in Hooker's rhetorical arena. Rhetoric must always posit an audience before whom the oration transpires. Judicial oratory, a defence of a position, takes place before a judge who could render a final verdict of the oration's success. In many rhetorical situations, the rhetor pits himself against an opponent who may be defending something else or proposing a different course of action than the rhetor, or who may deserve blame rather than praise for his actions. Judge and opponent are hardly ever the same—except, often enough, for Hooker.

When one observes how the presbyterian opponents serve as the audience, Hooker often wants to persuade them to embrace the polity and worship—and the grounds for the polity and the worship—not only so that they could understand the intellectual and historical basis of the settlement and embrace this 'truth' intellectually but, more importantly, so that they could worship in the established church with good conscience. 'Neither wish wee,' writes Hooker in the Preface, 'that men should do any thing which in their hearts they are perswaded they ought not to doe, but this perswasion ought (we say) to be fully setled in their hearts.'[23] Although his emphasis with the presbyterian audience is less emotional, for he certainly doesn't want passions to reign, he is nevertheless interested in '*movere*'—in stirring the readers to think, believe, and embrace. With sincerity, Hooker declares: 'my whole endevor is to resolve the conscience, and to shewe as neere as I can what in this controversie the hart is to thinke, if it will follow the light of sound and sincere judgement. . . .'[24] It is in this regard that Hooker does something else unusual for Tudor polemics. While such polemics always transpired before the 'indifferent reader' or judge with the rhetor poised to belittle the opponent, Hooker often presents his opponents as potentially capable judges, as individuals who could be led through the logic of the argument and the force of the thought to embrace and conform—both intellectually and emotionally. Hooker

[23] *Lawes* Pref.6.3; 1:31.22–24.
[24] *Lawes* Pref.7.1; 1:34.20–22.

asks those presbyterians to 'spend the time in reexamining more dulie your cause, and in more throughly considering of that which ye labour to overthrow.'[25] Try your cause 'even point by point,' he urges at the end of the Preface; 'sift unpartiallie your owne hearts' and 'search the truth,'[26] and this counsel assumes the presbyterians were capable of such rigour and objectivity. Earlier, Hooker had announced that he had 'sifted therin your objections . . . [and] layd before you the briefe of these my travailes, and presented under your view the limmes of that cause litigious betweene us.'[27]

But the 'briefe' is also presented for readers other than the presbyterians. In its search for an audience, the *Lawes* is seldom straightforward: Hooker speaks in two ways (at least): on the one hand, in opposition to his adversaries in disputation and, on the other, in paternal relationship with his readers who are not yet presbyterian. When we consider the extent of *movere* in the *Lawes*, we should note that part of Hooker's rhetorical strategy is to make the mind and the behaviour of the opponent a large part of the debate, and in this he is no different from traditional disputation. One influenced the audience by ridiculing the opponent. John N. Wall, in discussing rhetorical strategies in the *Lawes*, emphasizes that Hooker pursued all the goals of rhetoric: teaching, delighting, and moving. As Wall's remarks, Hooker shaped and planned this work 'with designs on its readers.'[28] And clearly Hooker wants to move those non-presbyterian readers to join him in fearing and condemning the politically and socially dangerous presbyterians. Hooker's political language is meant to move people to worry about the social order. Exposing the nature of the presbyterian mind was Hooker's goal in his *Answer to the Supplication* which he presented to Archbishop Whitgift. Although the exchange between Walter Travers and Hooker in the Temple revolved around theological doctrines of some importance, Hooker spends most of this discourse condemning Travers' behaviour, his mental confusions, and his treatment of Hooker.

Thus, in addition to being portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, the presbyterians are also seen as political dangerous, perverse and wicked,

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[25] *Lawes* Pref.6.6; 1:33.6–8.
[26] *Lawes* Pref.9.1; 1:51.28–30.
[27] *Lawes* Pref.7.7; 1:36.8–11.
[28] John N. Wall, 'Hooker's "Faire Speeche" Rhetorical Strategies in the *Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity* in *This Sacred History: Anglican Reflections for John Booty*,' ed. Donald S. Armentrout (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990), 128.

challenging lawful authority, threatening chaos, and promising a world turned upside down. And Hooker is particularly artful in constructing his opponents through the force of his language and his sarcasm. Full of gall and bitterness, they withstand the received order of the established church—and 'withstand' is a powerful word in Hooker's vocabulary. There is something other than truth and good judgment which 'doth guide their speech.'[29] Of course, such condemnation of the opponent is typical, but it should not be ignored or underrating in Hooker's treatise, especially since this kind of condemnation, rearing its head throughout the *Lawes*, is meant to move or persuade the people on the sidelines of the debate to also condemn these presbyterians, to be sure not to even think about joining them, to fear them, to understand the need to silence them, even jail them and their alleged followers. In threatening disorder, they strike at the heart of Elizabethan society, and Hooker very much wants his readers to feel this danger from the beginning of Book I. There is more going on in Hooker's treatise than intellection.

The final audience I would identify for the *Lawes* is what Hooker calls in the first sentence of his work 'posteritie.' There are other words to imagine this third audience: a universal church council or 'higher judgment' or 'universall authoritie' mentioned in chapter 6 of the Preface. And what of this chapter's title? 'No end of contention without submission of both parts unto some definitive sentence.' One could suggest that Hooker serves as the spokesman for the established church before a universal authority which has the power, imagined or otherwise, to deliver the definitive sentence and so overrule the partial judgments (Hooker's included) of those involved in partisan controversy. Importantly, Hooker does mention Beza's wish for 'some common lawfull assembly of Churches' which would settle all strife.[30] That is, private opinion is silenced before 'the sentence of judiciall and finall decision.'[31] The private is overwhelmed by the public; the local by the global. Hooker's third audience has this global characteristic.

It may be that Hooker plays rhetorically at presenting his brief for the established church before a higher judgment or universal authority, and that he constructs an *ethos*—or character—which would serve him

[29] *Lawes* III.3.3; 1:210.20.
[30] *Lawes* Pref.6.4; 1:32.28.
[31] *Lawes* Pref.6.3; 1:31.26–27.

and his cause best. The issue of how Hooker constructs an authorial self in the *Lawes* is an area which needs to be further explored since so little study of this aspect has been done, mainly because for so long Hooker has been perceived as without a 'self,' that is without an overly combative (and constructed) personality. Many prefer to see Hooker as principally a scholar, a 'disinterested seeker of truth' (the phrase is Speed Hill's).[32] The grave and judicious Hooker, so the argument goes, rose above controversy to present objectively the case for the established church. And it is with this *ethos* that Hooker is so easily identified not as a personality but as a voice, a voice of reason, offering 'the lawes whereby we live unto the generall triall and judgement of the whole world.'[33] It is, moreover, a morally superior voice, repeatedly questioning the integrity and motives of his opponents and demanding that the accusers examine their own consciences.

Nonetheless, for the author of *A Christian Letter*, Hooker was perceived not as an impersonal representative of the church but as a manipulating rhetor who played a rhetorical game of being seemingly judicious. In section 19 of the letter—and this is the letter's longest section—the writer condemns Hooker's portrayal of John Calvin—a 'despitefull' fiction it is labelled—in the Preface's second chapter. 'In penning this storie . . . of Calvin,' Hooker deliberately sought to deceive the reader 'by an artificiall entwining of some part of the trueth with the hollow and glittering threed of your owne wittie conjectures and peremptorie censures.'[34] Hooker's goal was not truth; it was power. And to what end? To influence the reader, say the anonymous author of *A Christian Letter*. Hooker's explanation of what happened with Calvin in Geneva was meant to 'drop into your readers heart . . . unheeded impressions, as may make him highly admire R.H. [Richard Hooker's] great gravitie and judicious wisedome and J. Calvins carnall pollicie, fine hipocrisie and peremptorie follie.'[35] The author of the letter reads the Preface as a rhetorical attempt to manipulate *ethos* and *pathos*. The letter sees Hooker's 'great gravitie and judicious wisdom' (and note those words) as a fiction of the rhetorical stage. They knew what Hooker was about—as Hooker himself knew because he knew his rhetoric. Hooker's response

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[32] W. Speed Hill, 'Hooker's Polity: The Problem of the "Three Last Books,"' *Huntington Library Quarterly* 34 (August 1971), 334.

[33] *Lawes* I.1.3; 1:58.5–6.

[34] *ACL* 19; 4:59.20–22.

[35] *ACL* 19; 4:60.17–19.

to the letter's criticism is this: 'A great deale of passionate Rhetorique bestowed to little purpose.'[36]

As the beginning of Book I indicates, Hooker knows quite well the dangers of arousing an audience emotionally (which he would have said *A Christian Letter* was doing), and he spends a great deal of effort at trying to do something—or appearing to do something—other than stir up passions. In this respect, there are two ways of viewing Hooker's *ethos*—the 'I' (a word so seldom used in the *Lawes*) or the authorial self. The first is to be reminded of the disputation of the academy, which is one model Hooker knew well and which captured some of his rhetorical imagination. In such an exercise, he is in some sense equal to the opponent. Each knows the words and arguments of the other; each uses those words in one's own text; and each attacks those words in an argument or presentation which condemns the other and lifts up the one who has the truth. The academic exercise is performed before a judge or an indifferent reader who is given the ability to judge the debate. Any one who has reviewed the work of Cartwright and Whitgift can see instantly how their debate proceeds in this textual and rhetorical form. There is enough in Hooker's procedures to indicate that he knew this technique of disputation well, and it would bear fruit to examine Hooker's various chapters and sections with this polemical procedure in mind.

We also know that Hooker's *ethos* is more than or even something other than the debater, this a matter of multiple voices and polyvalent language. It appears to me that Hooker is so often a teacher or a schoolmaster—concerned, humane, and paternal, yet exacting and authoritarian. Whether it is the presbyterians, the universal church council, English parliamentarians, or just common folk wondering about their national church, Hooker is often teaching. This effort represents the '*docere*' of the work. But if we stress the notion that one of the purposes of the *Lawes* is instruction, then we have to give some consideration to how Hooker constructs the learners, the pupils under his charge. Rhetorically, we are constantly drawn to the audience—or audiences—what they are capable of, how they should respond to the truth which they are being led to embrace, what are the alternatives in the instructional arena. *A Christian Letter* does see Hooker constructing

[36] *ACL* 19; 4:63.14–15.

himself as a teacher. As the *Letter* remarks of Hooker, it 'is verie arrogant and presumptuous to make him self the onelie Rabbi.'[37]

In Book I, there is a variety of people to whom Hooker addresses his arguments and that variety is characterized by different levels of intellectual potential. Some readers may be capable of understanding and judging as Hooker would have them. Others may just have enough brain power to confront the issues and decide to conform. Still others may have to be quiet and submit. Regardless, there is a sense throughout the opening books of the *Lawes* that the presbyterians—and those who have been tempted or are being seduced to follow the presbyterians—have the ability to examine their positions, examine also the political dangers inherent in the presbyterian polity, be warned to surrender to the established church. The Socratic promise that logic and rhetoric could improve thinking and lead people to the truth prompts Hooker's optimism in the last chapter of the Preface:

> The best and safest waie for you therefore my deere brethren is, to call your deedes past to a newe reckoning, to reexamine the cause yee have taken in hand, and to trie it even point by point, argument by argument… to lay aside the gall of that bitternes wherein your mindes have hitherto overabounded, and with meeknees to search the truth.… sift unpartiallie your owne hearts, whether it be force of reason, or vehemencie of affection, which hath bread, and still doth feede these opinions in you. If truth doe anie where manifest it selfe, seeke not to smoother it with glosing delusions, acknowledge the greatnes thereof, and thinke it your best victorie when the same doth prevaile over you.[38]

If the presbyterians can 'sift unpartialie' their hearts, they are Hooker's readers. But if they are intellectually bankrupt as Hooker so often says, Hooker has other readers in mind. One of the best ways of observing Hooker's multiple audiences and his multiple views of his ecclesiastical opponents is to think of the individual rhetorical tasks Hooker engages, the positions he adopts upon the rhetorical stage. One ought not to assume that there is consistency in the presentation of *ethos* and *pathos*. Observe how the text—we should rightly say 'texts'—are working. And accept that Hooker may have been chiefly interested not in assent but in surrender, surrender to the paternal schoolmaster.

But Hooker is more than schoolmaster. As he imagined the ethical self he wished to portray in the *Lawes*, Hooker finally plays judge over

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[37] *ACL* 11; 4:30.16–17.
[38] *Lawes* Pref.9.1; 1:51.24–52.1.

it all. Hooker stands above or beyond the disputants; he has heard both sides, has considered all arguments and evidence and now objectively presents the final definitive sentence from which there is no appeal. Performing authority we might say. We might also say performing power, for many believe that rhetoric is fundamentally about power, taking it to oneself discursively and using it skilfully, for Hooker does leave his readers with a sense of his own power as a philosopher and a judge—the one with the power to render judgment which in Elizabethan England was not given to many. And in understanding Hooker as the voice of power, it is valuable to think of *ethos* in terms of discursive positioning. The voice of power speaks always before someone or some body; it can move horizontally among equals; it can move vertically as authority. Hooker does shift his positions (and I mean that in terms of the rhetorical arena), but his positions are also determined by the shifting rhetorical goals and the various audiences he has in mind. Regardless of the position Hooker assumes, or from which position he speaks, the force of his judgment would bring, in the classical and renaissance rhetorical worlds, peace and harmony, obedience and stability, virtues Hooker sought—and for that matter everyone else said they sought. In exploring Hooker's overall rhetorical strategy and the strategies designed for the individual books, one needs to understand how important it was for Hooker to believe that his effort would end the controversy of 20 years. As rhetoric seeks truth, it promises peace and harmony. Or at least the clever rhetor, as he presents himself, assures his auditor that he is merely in quest of peace and harmony.

It might be in relationship to this peace-loving, 'judicious' Hooker that people have grounded their observations concerning Hooker's style, a scholarly subject less popular than it once was. Georges Edelen, for example, observes a style that reflects Hooker's interest in demonstrating truth and in leading his readers to that truth by means of a style which enables examination, logic, and conclusion. Edelen's describes this as 'a style of rational thrust,'[39] a phrase which reveals as much about Edelen's view of Hooker as of his style. For Edelen, then, Hooker may be the schoolmaster, but very definitely is the judge. Clearly if this is Hooker's style, then it is a style utilized because of the *ethos* Hooker wanted to

[39] Georges Edelen, 'Hooker's Style,' in *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of his Works*, ed. W. Speed Hill (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972), 247.

portray. Brian Vickers' observations on Hooker's style are not dissimilar, but his sense of Hooker's *ethos* is different. Rather than seeing Hooker as principally reasonable and unmoved, Vickers takes seriously the arena of controversy in which Hooker debates (he calls it a 'violent' genre)[40] to argue that Hooker's style is not Ciceronian ornamentalism, as it is often described, but a flexible and vigorous weapon to help the reader understand how the established church is on the right track and how the opponents mislead. Vickers uses the rhetorical notion of deliberative oratory to argue that Hooker often proceeds with *laus* and *vituperatio* (praise and blame), and so is always, as I think we need to emphasize newly, manipulating his readers.

As Vickers draws attention to the binaries *laus* and *vituperatio*, we see that often Hooker is portrayed as playing with opposites and finally arriving at judicious balance. In commenting on Hooker's style, Speed Hill, for example, sees a style of harmonized antithesis 'which suggests a world of oppositions and contrarieties, light and dark, honey and gall.'[41] Hill's observation should lead us to Hooker's diction—or to the need to pay attention to the language or languages Hooker as a practicing rhetor used deliberately to construct the polemical landscape of the *Lawes.* We need only to look at the table of contents in Book I. There one finds ideologically charged words: understand, keep, obey, direct, guide, lead. As I have written elsewhere, 'humanity divides into two groups: one is fundamentally passive—they understand, keep, and obey; the other, those with wisdom and authority, direct, guide, and lead.'[42] As an embodiment of the power and authority of the established church, Hooker uses rhetoric to portray himself as the one who directs and guides and leads. He takes the power to himself to categorize and proceeds thence to establish hierarchy. Such language forces us to look anew at audience and speaker. And it should encourage us to move through the various books with an eye to the language or diction Hooker was a master at using as he drew his reader into his enterprise.

Various languages and authorial voices appear, it seems to me, in the Preface, a discursive site which reveals the authorial contestations in

[40] Vickers, 'Hooker's Prose Style,' 43.

[41] W. Speed Hill, 'The Authority of Hooker's Style,' *Studies in Philology* 67 (1970), 332.

[42] Rudolph P. Almasy, 'Language and Exclusion in the First Book of Hooker's *Politie*, in *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*', ed. W. J. Torrance Kirby (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 231.

the *Lawes*. There is no better place to start than to see how chapters 2 through 4 of the Preface relate to Hooker's *ethos*. Although chapter one of the Preface is addressed to the opponents—as is much of the Preface—it serves to reveal Hooker's display of himself as modest, loving, and reconciling, intellectually able to the task before him, presenting at last the conclusion he has reached after much study. As Wall has it, this is a constructed voice 'from which to present the arguments of the *Lawes* which will make them appear less threatening, less oppositional, more considered, more thought out, the positions of one truly open to persuasion that have been reached only after considering both sides rather than of an already convinced controversialist.'[43] The goal, we know, is peace and quietness. This hope for peace and quietness is taken up again in chapter 5 'Their calling for tryall by disputation,' and results from a voice like Hooker's which reflects the corporate voice of power and authority—that 'whole' which deliberates what laws each part shall observe.

One direction in which the Preface moves mimics the form of academic school disputation. Two private or limited voices not only perform but are ready to submit before the expansive voice of authority. As chapter 5 indicates, a 'part' of the 'whole' cannot (or ought not) refuse that 'which the whole hath orderly agreed upon.'[44] Peace and quietness come after surrender to the Hookerian representative of the 'whole.' As the title of chapter 6 reads, there can be 'No end of contention without submission of both parts unto some definitive sentence.'[45] And here we begin to see Hooker's polyvalence. He plays at being a debater along side an equal colleague (we can recall Travers' *Supplication* and the *Answer*), but then so much of the effort of the Preface is directed toward condemning the behaviour of the opponent. The presbyterian is, indeed, so dangerous that the voice of disputation has no choice but to become the voice of responsible authority, and thus to represent the whole church, even the whole nation. That voice of authority seems always to use the arena of disputation to categorize the enemy. As Hooker indicates throughout the Preface, good disputation—perhaps we should say rationalist, ethical rhetoric—leads to authorial truth or the definitive sentence. Weak disputation—and here

[43] Wall, 131.
[44] *Lawes* Pref.5.2; 1:28.6–7.
[45] *Lawes* Pref.6; 1:29.21.

Hooker so often means manipulative rhetoric that plays on the auditor's passions—reflects socially dangerous controversialists and leads to intellectual and political confusion. On the one hand, Hooker can seek in this way surrender to his rhetorical voice and obedience to the political voice (both represented by Hooker and reflective of public order). On the other hand, Hooker knows that surrender is hardly possible because the goal of the opposition is confusion and overthrow. It is quite easy to see, then, that rhetoric's strategy is, in part, to expose the wickedness of the opponent who has little desire to move from private fancy to public responsibility and obedience. Out of what might appear as Hooker's private vision emerges Hooker's public judgment which brings peace precisely because that judgment results from surrender to or conformity with the divine structures of Book I. If the Preface originally ended with chapter 7, that ending is an orderly and lucid one; that is, 'the matter conteyned in these eyght bookes.' And part of that orderly way of proceeding presents the *ethos* Hooker hopes would help him be successful in defending the established church before the world: rational, objective, patient, charitable. His is 'the light of sound and sincere judgement;' no 'clowd of prejudice, or mist of passionate affection' here![46]

In chapter 7, Hooker's implied hope is that the presbyterian opponents just might be able, if they follow Hooker's arguments, to exercise judgment, come to self-understanding, and have their consciences resolved. Yet this hopeful possibility conflicts with the emphasis of chapters 2 through 4, and even of chapter 6. The rhetorical strategy in these chapters displays the opponents as singular individuals with no self-understanding. They are perverse, wilful, self-centred creatures who 'offend against God by troubling his Church without any just or necessary cause.'[47] And such sentiments are not uncommon throughout the *Lawes*. It should be noted, for example, how the argument of Book III ends. As the presbyterians insist they know what God intended for his church, Hooker wonders at their exceeding boldness, calls them molesters of the church, fears they exceed their bounds, and seeks to condemn their pride. Here is neither Christian meekness nor gracious humility (often Hooker's *ethos*), but only pharisaic arrogance.

[46] *Lawes* Pref.7.1; 1:34.22–23.
[47] *Lawes* Pref.6.6; 1:33.15–16.

As we look at chapters 2 through 4 of the Preface, two observations present themselves, and each has something to do with how we traditionally understand rhetoric. The first is that rhetorical performances are often directed to a multitude easily swayed by what sounds good. This is, of course, politically dangerous. One of the goals of the Preface is to expose how 'much sway in the hearts' of the simple the presbyterians have achieved merely by stirring up 'dislike and discontentment of things present.'[48] It should be recalled that this is Hooker's very first worry as he commences Book I of the *Lawes*: 'He that goeth about to perswade a multitude, that they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favourable hearers; because . . . they have not ordinarily the judgement to consider.'[49] The second observation is to see that, because of lack of 'judgement to consider,' people can be manipulated by rhetoric, and the manipulation Hooker exposes in these early chapters of the Preface is the worst of rhetoric's dangers. The opponents not only exercise the worst of rhetoric but additionally their poor performance reflects weak minds and dangerous motives. To illustrate, Hooker almost immediately takes on John Calvin, exposing his motives and manipulation in chapter 2, '*The first establishment of new discipline by M. Calvins industry in the Church of Geneva.*' In terms of *ethos*, Hooker's strategy is to contrast Calvin's manipulation and the manipulation of the English presbyterians with his own rhetorical integrity. Unlike Hooker, presbyterians are simply not good debaters (not an uncommon accusation of the opponent). Their authority is another man's word—in this case John Calvin's—and their evidence 'verie neer the dregs.'[50] In withstanding the received orders of the church, they have 'wonderful zeale and fervour'[51] without wonderful intellect. Their logic is never clear; they are rash in their misunderstanding and just plain lazy. Their ploy? 'Generall inducements . . . used to make saleable [the] cause in gross.'[52] What they propose has been 'collected onlie by poore and marvelous slight conjectures.'[53]

Hooker, of course, never draws attention to his own manipulations, careful to adopt an objective persona in the Preface, almost like a

[48] *Lawes* Pref.3.8; 1:16.6.
[49] *Lawes* I.1.1; 1:56.7–12.
[50] *Lawes* Pref.4.6; 1:25.9.
[51] *Lawes* Pref.1.2; 1:2.1.
[52] *Lawes* Pref.3.5; 1:15.10.
[53] *Lawes* Pref.4.1; 1:21.20–21.

reporter recounting Calvin's rise to power in Geneva and the presbyterians' manipulation of the 'simple and ignorant.' Throughout these chapters, Hooker insists on the need for authority and power in the face of childish and rash individuals. Disorder and disruption—in the arena of controversy, in the church, in the nation— are always possible and just below the surface. Indeed, disputation mirrors a contentious society; and since all societies are potentially contentious, there must be a hierarchical power to perform 'some kinde of triall . . . to finde out which part is in error.'[54] And that power—the power of coherence—is reflected in the rhetorical *ethos* Hooker takes to himself, especially as he contrasts his way of conducting disputation with his opponents' way. Hooker plays at a rationalist rhetoric while displaying his opponents as practicing the worst kind of *movere*, that stirring up of 'poore beguiled soules.'[55] We are led to believe that rationalist rhetoric holds together a contentious society about to explode.

Scholars are now persuaded that chapter 8 is an addition to Hooker's original Preface which may have ended with chapter 7 or with some version of what is now chapter 9. For Hooker to have moved originally from chapter 7 to chapter 9 makes sense as chapter 9, a peroration addressed to the opponents, continues the typical Hookerian *ethos* and the traditional promise of rhetoric. Hooker gives the impression that the presbyterians can be indifferent readers; they can leave behind the 'vehemencie of affection;' they can embrace the truth.[56] Hooker will even magnanimously forgive them for the trouble they have been causing: 'That yee have bene earnest in speaking or writing againe and againe the contrarie waie, shall be no blemish or discredit at all unto you.'[57] And he invites them to return to the community and labour together 'under the same yoke, as men that looke for the same eternall reward of their labours, to be joyned with you in bands of indissoluble love and amitie, to live as if our persons being manie our soules were but one.'[58] Rhetoric, we have noted before, promises unity and 'unfainedlie reconciled love.' As the rhetor takes on the meekness of Jesus Christ, which Hooker invokes in chapter 1, religious language,

[54] *Lawes* Pref.2.10; 1:12.20–21.
[55] *Lawes* Pref.3.12; 1:18.31.
[56] *Lawes* Pref.9.1; 1:51.30.
[57] *Lawes* Pref.9.2; 1:52.1–3.
[58] *Lawes* Pref.9.3; 1:52.12–15.

especially scriptural language, enables him to rise out of or above the arena of controversy as the charitable voice of authority.

But then we confront the long chapter 8, '*How just cause there is to feare the manifold dangerous events likely to ensue upon this intended reformation, if it did take place*.' With Speed Hill leading the way, many now agree that chapter 8 is an addition to the preface Hooker had written as he found himself with an opportunity in 1593 to publish Books I through IV. The opportunity to see these books, along with a preface, into publication was occasioned by Hooker's political friends (and former pupils) George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys who believed there was political value in Hooker's work as the 1593 Parliament anticipated debate on what to do with recusants, protestant as well as catholic. For *The Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker*, William P. Haugaard has provided a lucid and complete discussion of chapter 8 concerning compositional questions, publishing history, the politics of 1593, and the importance of a letter from George Cranmer to Hooker on the political and civil dangers of presbyterianism that may very well have influenced Hooker to add chapter 8. As Haugaard argues, chapter 8 is 'a polemic of a different character' with more emphasis than elsewhere in the Preface on 'the dangerous character of the militants' program.'[59]

That having been said, chapter 8 has rhetorical features that are shared with other chapters of the Preface and with other books of the *Lawes*. For example, Hooker continues an objective persona as if reporting what had happened with the Anabaptists and the Barrowists and how the discipline will overthrow all learning at the universities and in the courts and will entail a challenge to both royal supremacy and episcopacy. These are not, however, new topics; for discussion of lay eldership, episcopacy, and royal supremacy was part of Hooker's project from the beginning. Stressing the political link between presbyterian and separatist, as Hooker does in this chapter, may be new for the *Lawes*, but having this link reflected in the arena of disputation is not new. Presbyterians and separatists are intellectually alike: they are zealous, extreme, intellectually unsound, and deceitful. Rhetorically, it would not have been difficult, as Hooker added chapter 8 to the Preface, to demonstrate that the separatists were heirs to the presbyterians. Whether it is the presbyterian or the Anabaptist, Hooker is consistent in

[59] Haugaard, *FLE* 6 (1):49.

exposing the mind of the opponent as it stubbornly challenges existing political and ecclesiastical structures:

> In such kinds of error the minde once imagining it selfe to seeke the execution of Gods will, laboureth foorthwith to remoove both things and persons which any way hinder it from taking place; and in such cases if any strange or new thing seeme requisite to be done, a strange and new opinion concerning the lawfulnes therof, is withall received and broched under countenance of divine authoritie.[60]

Rhetoric always constructs the opponent, and is eager to expand the area which the opponents influence and infect. As chapters 3 and 4 have argued, the presbyterians were masterful manipulators of the multitude, the common yet good people (like William Hackett) who are easily seduced. As Hooker writes in chapter 3 of 'poore beguiled souls,' once they are persuaded that they are specially chosen they answer any authority with

> We are of God, he that knoweth God, heareth us, as for the rest, ye are of the world, for this worlds pomp and vanitie it is that ye speake, and the world whose ye are heareth you. Which cloake sitteth no lesse fit on the backe of their causes, then of the Anabaptists, when the dignitie, authorite and honor of Gods Magistrate is upheld against them. Shew these egerlie affected men their inhabilitie to judge of such matters; their answere is, God hath chosen the simple.[61]

The presbyterians were already linked in Hooker's mind to the Anabaptists, and chapter 8 provided a good opportunity to expand on this link.

Nevertheless, even though it is easy to point out Hooker's condemnation of the presbyterians in chapter 8 and elsewhere in the Preface, chapter 8 continues the ambiguous attitude Hooker seems to have felt toward his opponent. With that sense of inviting in the presbyterians as brethren who could be persuaded of the truth of the established church's position, we can see in chapter 8 that Hooker has taken some care not to alienate and condemn completely. Indeed, he admits that the presbyterians do not endorse what the separatists have done: 'These mens hastines the warier sort of you doth not commend, yee wish they had held themselves longer in, and not so daungerously flowne abroad before the fethers of the cause had been growne, their errour with

[60] *Lawes* Pref.8.6; 1:42.9–15.
[61] *Lawes* Pref.3.14; 1:19.25–31.

mercifull termes ye reproove naming them in great commiseration of mind, your poore brethren.'[62] In fact, Hooker states that the separatists and the presbyterians are professed adversaries. Whether we feel this in chapter 8 and elsewhere is another issue.

When Hooker warns in this chapter that the world will be 'cleane turned upside downe' by accepting the presbyterian discipline as 'the absolute commaundement of almighty God,'[63] he is not immersed in a polemic of 'a different character.' He is merely strengthening the warnings he has given throughout the first books of the *Lawes*. And we should not forget to read the Preface in light of the *Lawes*' opening books as a conclusion to Books I through IV since it was surely written after those books were readied for publication. Too many, perhaps, have believed Richard Hooker when he wrote to Archbishop Whitgift in the *Answere to the Supplication*, 'I take no joye in stryvinge,'[64] and thus want to see chapter 8 of the Preface as a wholly different kind of writing. Throughout the *Lawes*, Hooker may not have enjoyed 'stryvinge' but nevertheless he did it, and did it well with enthusiasm because one could not escape 'stryvinge' in a society so dominated by the rhetoric of language and power and order.

That sense of 'stryvinge' is evident in the 1599 response 'of certaine English Protestantes' to Hooker's Preface and first four books, *A Christian Letter*, a text which reads Hooker principally as practicing rhetoric and which condemns Hooker's writing often on the basis of the rhetoric. Of course, all this criticism is done as the letter uses rhetoric for its own purposes. Although many feel that Hooker made an attempt to separate his personality from his composition and thus not display himself, *A Christian Letter* approaches the *Lawes* as if it does, indeed, 'shew' a self which is Richard Hooker. The letter makes a systematic attempt to be sure Hooker is not invisible within his discourse. One strategy which helps expose Hooker and Hooker's theological dangers is the repeated structure of each section. First we find what the established church's Articles of Religion says about a specific doctrine, such as the sacraments. Then the letter prints sentences from Hooker which seem to contradict established doctrine; and finally Hooker is asked to explain himself: 'Heere wee desire to bee resolved how these your

[62] *Lawes* Pref.8.1; 1:36.26–30.
[63] *Lawes* Pref.8.5; 1:42.2–4.
[64] *Answere* 26; 5:256.19.

assertions can stande with the doctrine and beleef of the church of England.'[65] This strategy identifies the theological differences between Hooker and his protestant challengers who 'have made choyce . . . of a few principal things, which trouble manie godlie minded christians, who advisedlie read over' Hooker's books.[66] The 'principal thinges' are typically reformist topics: scripture, free will, predestination, works, preaching. As can be anticipated, the letter's goal is to demonstrate how Hooker gives succour to the papists, overthrowing the foundation of the Christian religion. With this condemnation, the letter hopes to have the last word.

Rhetorically, however, there is more going on than exposing theological differences. First, there is the demonizing of the other which is often one of the ploys of the rhetor. If the person being attacked—and Hooker is aggressively attacked and ridiculed in this brief text—is a wicked, dangerous fellow, there should be no reason to follow him or side with him in the arena of disputation. This should sound familiar. Hooker challenges the articles of the established church; he opposes the wisdom of the established church fathers—and often it is John Jewel who is used as the model of orthodoxy, a brilliant rhetorical move since Hooker's first patron was John Jewel. And finally, Hooker is nothing less than a papist. He cannot judge rightly, he cannot lead rightly (themes right out of the *Lawes*). As the letter repeatedly asks for Hooker to 'shew us we pray' the truth, the letter sees the *Lawes* as failed discourse. Little has been proved, much confusion has been produced, and there is no sentence definitive to embrace. The work of *A Christian Letter*, in some sense, imitates the work of the *Lawes*, namely through good deliberative oratory: to marginalize the other and to show how the other is wilfully removing himself from the community. Hooker is repeatedly portrayed as outside what is 'authorized and professed in England,' as the title of the letter states.

Furthermore, Hooker is the worst kind of rhetor: through rhetoric he deceives, he hoodwinks, he 'beguile[s] and bewitch[es] the verie Church of God' by 'excellencie of wordes, and intising speeches of mans wisedome.'[67] The best example is Hooker's lies about John Calvin and about how the discipline in Geneva had been established. Hooker's

[65] *ACL* 6; 4:21.7–9.
[66] *ACL* 4; 4:9.3–4.
[67] *ACL* 4:6.21–22.

purpose in chapter 2 of the Preface is 'to deceave [the] reader by an artificiall entwining of some part of the trueth with the hollow and glittering threed of your owne wittie conjectures and peremptorie censures.'[68] It is precisely what the author of the letter sees as Hooker's sophist rhetoric—his 'skill and force' and style used to manipulate, deceive, persuade. And note how these 'certaine English Protestantes' are eager, at every opportunity, to show how they conform to the established church and how they support the ecclesiastical community. They repeatedly demand: 'Shew us . . . howe your positions agree with **our** church.'[69]

In exiling Hooker from the community, the author of *A Christian Letter* is intent on demonstrating that Hooker is not interested in truth and honest meaning, and this accusation is, fundamentally, an attack on Hooker's character. Such an accusation seems inevitable from the rhetorical culture that dominated controversialist prose of the 16th century. Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian linked the good man and the good orator. Hooker practiced an *ethos* that constructed himself as rational and good, as interested only in truth, as creating the peaceful community that was rhetoric's promise. And I think it is true that Hooker works hard, through his language and tone, to project a moral character, and many a scholar have read him that way. For example, L. C. Knights describes Hooker as reasonable, courteous, tolerant, and open. He remarks that Hooker was 'a great exponent of reason—which means that he believed in certain universal standards and laws.'[70] One of the purposes of *A Christian Letter* is precisely to persuade the reader that Hooker had no universal standard of truth; that his rationalist pose was disingenuous; that he was in fact not Quintilian's good man. What he wrote, after all, was 'but bitter skornes and despitefull fictions.' Richard Hooker was a liar!

And he was the very worst kind of rhetorician. The 'heat of disputation' affects his emotions; his arguments are full of 'unadvised slippes,' and his mind reflects 'rash judgement.' His is the 'bending . . . [of] selfe in heate of disputation against the one side' so that his eyes are 'dazelled' and his hand drawn 'unawares to farre and too favourable to the other side.' And the weak rhetorician does it through 'so harde

[68] *ACL* 19; 4:59.20–21.
[69] *ACL* 5; 4:19.1 (emphasis mine).
[70] L. C. Knights, *Public Voices: Literature and Politics with Special Reference to the Seventeenth Century* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 53.

and so harsh [a] stile (beating as it were . . . against the verie heart of all true christian doctrine . . .).'[71] Discourse which is supposed to display the good man reveals, instead, a poor writer whose poor writing reflects weak thinking and a plethora of contradictions. Perhaps to expose the bad man in the bad writing the letter hits harshly at Hooker's style. Indeed all of section 21 of the *Letter* is devoted to criticizing Hooker's 'stile and maner of writing.' Hooker's Ciceronian 'eloquence' is contrasted with 'the simplicitie of holie Scripture.' His 'stile [is] not usuall;' his books too long and tedious. His intent in a discourse 'mingled with all kinde of matters and sutes of learning and doctrine' is merely to show off, to display—'to shewe your selfe to bee some rare Demosthenes, or extraordinarie Rabbi.'[72] It's all 'swelling wordes of vanities, and cunningly framed sentences to blinde and intangle the simple.' We are not brought to truth, as Hooker hoped, but led 'into a maze' as Hooker 'shews' himself another Aristotle.[73] And what of the *Letter*'s comment on the *Lawes*? 'Wee walke as in a labyrinth, and are suddenlie overwhelmed as in the deepe sea.'[74] As Hooker accused his opponents of pride in Book I, the author of *A Christian Letter* does the same as the letter concludes with a proverb: 'Only by pride doth man make contention.'[75] But I want to stress that the accusation of pride is linked in this section on 'stile and maner of writing' to the rhetorical performance which is the *Lawes*. Thus, the letter's advice to Hooker to improve his writing is to assume humility and lowliness! Be plain and sensible. Follow the usual language and style of learned men. Omit unnecessarily long discourses. Use plain terms and words of sincerity. No 'hugie embossements or stuffed bumbasing.'[76]

The best way, so says the letter, to expose Hooker's 'excellencie of wordes' is to focus on specific sentences and discrete passages that are duplicated and criticized, precisely the standard disputational procedure that most controversialists of the Tudor years followed. If we are to believe the letter, it is a procedure these protestants elevate as the best means to discover truth—not the lengthy, complicated treatises which comprise the *Lawes*. In surely another personal insult, the letter confesses

[71] *ACL* 4:8.4–10, 29–30.
[72] *ACL* 21; 4:71.10–17.
[73] *ACL* 21; 4:72.12–14.
[74] *ACL* 21; 4:73.18–19.
[75] *ACL* 21; 4:77.14.
[76] *ACL* 21; 4:76.21–22.

to approving John Whitgift's disputational procedures over Hooker's. Whitgift's polemical sections reflect a specific question 'judicially sett downe,' a sensible answer to the matter in question, a display of 'reasons eyther from holy scripture, from Fathers or new writers, without all circumferences and crooked windings.'[77] The 'crooked windings' is Hooker's way of proceeding. It is words and sentences (page numbers always provided to help) which need to be exposed; the truth is in the words, less in the thinking. Or perhaps they felt that the words were the best way of exposing weak thinking and commenting on character. *A Christian Letter* was having the last word, which is something far more important in disputation than we perhaps imagine. The *Admonition* had to be answered, and so Whitgift writes; Whitgift is answered by Thomas Cartwright who in turn is answered by Whitgift. Cartwright writes the *Second replie* as a 'final' response. But then Hooker writes the *Lawes* as the last word, only to be outdone by *A Christian Letter* which Hooker's autograph notes indicate would have been answered. And always at the centre of each response is the text, the language, the rhetor.

Finally, the kind of *ethos* which Hooker displayed in his work was fundamentally condemned by the Reformation, this 'shewing' of a self who is controlled by human wit. This business of setting up 'mans testimonie'[78] is linked by the authors of the *Letter* to pagan rhetoric. Not the pure word of God but the 'finenesse of witt, or helpe of arte' displayed by 'Poetts, Philosophers, Rhetoricians, Phisitians, Schoolemen.' When the *Letter* speaks of the value of preaching in section 12, there is a subtle condemnation of Hooker's whole work—with its 'Logicall and Dialecticall frame'[79] (so much admired today!), 'framed of the mere witt of man,' not uttered by 'a gift supernaturall of the spirit.'[80] The author of the letter knows his Augustinian rhetoric. Be warned of the subtle speech that might appear 'fine and smooth.' It is fundamentally a display to 'winne praise' for oneself, to show 'of him selfe to the worlde.' False words are what 'the Tempter' used with Jesus in the desert.[81] And like the Tempter, Hooker is nothing more than 'a privie and subtill enemie to the whole state of the Englishe Church.'[82]

[77] *ACL* 21; 4:73.7–11.
[78] *ACL* 4; 4:17.9.
[79] *ACL* 12; 4:33.29.
[80] *ACL* 12; 4:34.4, 19.
[81] *ACL* 12; 4:35.18.
[82] *ACL* 20; 4:67.22–23.

Hooker's work is compared to 'polished armour'[83]—looks good from the outside but it covers something deceitful, weak, and vulnerable.

We find ourselves back among indifferent readers watching two sides debate and being called to take sides. Do not follow the wicked tempter Richard Hooker, *A Christian Letter* is saying to these indifferent readers. Follow us instead, they propose, and they have cleverly turned the rhetorical tables on Hooker, that seeming defender of the Elizabethan Church and policeman of order and harmony. His thought will merely 'bring in a confusion of all thinges.'[84] Did not Hooker make the same accusation of the presbyterians? If one desires ecclesiastical, social, and civil peace, join with these 'certaine English Protestantes' who affirm and promise 'the longe experience of Gods protection, in these golden dayes of quiet concorde' under 'our deare soveraigne Ladie and Queene Elizabeth.'[85] And Hooker's answer to all this? A repetition of the attack he himself made in categorizing his opponents as intellectually bankrupt and politically dangerous. Their 'delight in conflicts'[86] corresponds to how they are 'sclenderly instructed.'[87] Their words of 'coler and rage'[88] cloud their self-understanding. They stir themselves up as they would stir up others, a worry Hooker has in Book I. These 'Protestantes' are nothing more than 'shallow witted men,'[89] Hooker deferring to the kind of categorizing of human intellect which characterized Book I of the *Lawes*.

In Book I, Hooker's discourse, both as he plays polemicist and judge, becomes a public strategy to address—and combat—the most fundamental fears of Elizabethan culture, namely disorder and chaos. The confined and confining space of the academic disputation, favoured by *A Christian Letter* and practiced by Cartwright and Whitgift, enabled only limited discussion on argumentative details that occupied the debaters as they often only delved into points of scholarship. Such a focus did not open matters for public debate. Travers's *Supplication* and Hooker's *Answere* illustrate the point I am making that in the *Lawes* Hooker is able to move to a wider stage. I see the *Supplication* as a private arena of exchange complemented by the *Answere* narrowly addressed to the

[83] *ACL* 19; 4:64.15.
[84] *ACL* 20; 4:68.17.
[85] *ACL* 20; 4:68.25–27.
[86] *ACL* 4; 4:14.17.
[87] *ACL* 4; 4:16.13.
[88] *ACL* 20; 4:70.6.
[89] *ACL* 21; 4:76.8.

Archbishop. Confined to the Temple, each petitioner speaks specifically about himself, about his situation, about how he has been mistreated, throughout exposing the insulting and troubling actions of the other. Even though there were fundamental issues of doctrine at stake, the debate never rises above the personal and the private.

In the *Lawes*, Hooker was able to move away from the private and personal of typical polemics. Rather than duplicating individual sentences and then responding to them, the standard procedure of Elizabethan controvery, Hooker summarizes his opponent's position, and in this way better controls the arena of disputation than someone like Whitgift did. He is still, of course, reactive as polemics always are. Take Book II, for example. Hooker first responds to specific 'proofs' out of Thomas Cartwright. Then he responds to the important and well-known topic of the value and necessity of human authority. But then Hooker in this book, and elsewhere, steps back, we might say, to generalize about the 'truth' of the controversial topic. As the title of chapter 8 has it: 'A declaration what the truth is in this matter' that scripture is the rule for all things in this life. But this declaration reflects a strategy—and I think it is rhetorical—that Hooker employs in Book I and, we might say, Book V, and elsewhere in speaking to all audiences in a less controversialist tone and procedure, delivering the judicial sentence in a public declaration that moves the discussion far beyond the confining site of the typical polemical arena.

Hooker's rhetoric thus pushes the reader away from the private to the public—or at least that was Hooker's intention. We recall an overarching theme of Book I is that public power must always overrule private judgment. What is so often our sense of the *Lawes* is Hooker's rendering a public judgment. And he also speaks more globally, for example again from Book II, about matters like assurance and conscience, something Whitgift could not do in his limited discourse. Whitgift's narrower approach, which may very well have rested on shared, unarticulated assumptions among combatants, did not allow him to address the presbyterian conscience as he pursued what was fundamentally an academic exercise. Somehow Hooker created a different discursive space which nevertheless separated the sides so that such space could accommodate serious talk on matters like assurance and conscience. The discursive distance may have forced Hooker to concern himself genuinely with the need for both intellectual and emotional assurance as he constructed what he thought was a coherent world of order and harmony into which even prideful enemies could be invited. Only 'in

public' could conflict be resolved into peace. Only in public is there truly community.

In chapter 8 of Book VIII, Hooker explores the power of royal authority 'in commanding and in the judging of cases *Ecclesiastical*'[90] and refers to Constantine's power to make judgments and his subsequent refraining from doing so. As Hooker cites St. Augustine's Epistle 68, he draws a sharp distinction between the 'sentence of private perswasion and . . . [the sentence] of solemne jurisidiction.'[91] We might say that Hooker's discourse moves out of the 'private perswasion' of the arena of disputation where equals 'to and fro' debate and into the sphere of 'solemne jurisdiction' where the judge, in order to silence all, speaks publicly by presenting that broad Hookerian philosophical foundation so many admire. Through a quite deliberate rhetoric, which nevertheless tends in conflicting directions, Hooker sought, in John Spenser's words, 'by force of demonstration, so farre as the nature of the present matter could beare, to make knowne to the world'[92] what the real truth was. For those who agreed, Hooker does make truth known to the world; for those who did not, Hooker was merely 'shewing of him self to the world.'

[90] *Lawes* VIII.8.1; 3:421.24–25.
[91] *Lawes* VIII.8.8; 3:433.16–17.
[92] In Spenser's preface 'To the Reader' in the 1604 edition of the *Lawes*, *FLE* 1:347.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SIN AND GRACE

Ranall Ingalls

The question of how to interpret Richard Hooker's thought about sin, grace and salvation has only recently begun to receive the attention merited by its importance in the body of his writings and its place in the structure of the argument of the *Lawes*. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the scholarly discussion about these matters that did take place was commonly shaped by questionable assumptions about the Reformation and about Hooker's relationship to the magisterial reformers. Many of these are now under close critical scrutiny. So, for example, Hooker has often been read as representing a doctrinal middle way peculiar to the Church of England based on principles shared neither with the reformers nor sixteenth-century Roman Catholicism. The various ways in which Hooker insists that grace does not destroy but perfects nature were taken as evidence of a departure from the reformers' Augustinian account of the fall and original sin, of human nature, reason and freedom, and of the priority of grace.[1] Furthermore, this principle was understood to be more or less inconsistent with the doctrine of justification peculiar to the magisterial Reformation, with its strong distinction between justification and sanctification and its insistence that the grace of justification is received by faith alone, leaving the Christian at once a sinner and just. This made it very difficult to interpret Hooker's oft-repeated restatements of this doctrine.

An examination of what Hooker says about sin, grace and salvation will make clear that he believes it is precisely these sorts of questions that are at issue between himself and his adversaries. His argument is that Augustine's argument for the priority of grace in human salvation *and* the reformed doctrine of sin and grace *and* the principle that grace

[1] See for example Peter Munz, *The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952; reprinted New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1970), 25–27, 47–8, 51–59.

does not replace but perfects nature *all* follow as consequences from the doctrine of Christ.

I. Sin and Grace in Hooker Scholarship: Keble to the Present

During his lifetime, Richard Hooker's critics recognized that his teaching about sin and grace was crucial to their other disagreements with him and attacked it as inconsistent with the norms of Reformation orthodoxy. In his *Supplication to the Privy Counsel*, Walter Travers complained of the sermons Hooker preached as the new Master of the Temple in London in the mid-1580s that the like had not 'ben heard in publick places, with in this land, synce Quene Maries daies'.[2] Similarly, the anonymous author of *A Christian Letter*, the only critique of the five Books of the *Lawes* published in Hooker's lifetime, objected especially to what he understood Hooker to teach there about sin, grace, and salvation, as inconsistent with the formularies of the reformed Church of England, especially the Thirty-Nine Articles.[3] However, these questions were soon overshadowed. Hooker's reputation was forged and sustained for the first two centuries following his death in controversies about polity.[4] In the last two centuries, such questions have arisen, but usually as part of a search for a uniquely 'Anglican' middle way between Roman Catholicism and the magisterial Reformation. This has begun to change, with a challenge to conventional wisdom from scholars like Torrance Kirby, Nigel Atkinson and, to some extent, Egil Grislis, who have argued that Hooker embraces the principles of the sixteenth-century magisterial Reformation, the peculiarities of his synthesis notwithstanding.

Kirby and Atkinson have both argued that these recent divergent readings of Hooker on sin and grace have roots in the nineteenth-century Oxford Movement, and particularly in John Keble's edition of Hooker's works and Newman's *Lectures on Justification*. Lee Gibbs has

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[2] *A Supplication made to the Privy Counsel, FLE* 5:208.9–10.

[3] The two appealed to different standards of reformed orthodoxy. Travers, standing with the authors of the *Admonitions to Parliament* of 1572, appealed to the writings and the example of continental reformers and especially to John Calvin *against* the Articles of the Church of England and its polity as well as against Hooker. The author of *ACL* appealed especially *to* the authority of the Articles. In answer to both, Hooker protested his orthodoxy, and argued that his adversaries had misunderstood the very principles they claimed to defend.

[4] Diarmaid MacCulloch, 'Richard Hooker's Reputation', *English Historical Review* 117 (2002): 773–812. See chapter 20 below, 563 ff.

objected on the grounds that the conception of the Church of England as following a kind of middle way between Roman Catholicism and the continental Reformation has early sixteenth-century roots.[5] In fact, however, as Peter Nockles has demonstrated, the Tractarians do represent a profound transformation of the way in which Hooker was read and understood, and this is the essential point. The Tractarian movement began as a reaction against the relationship between Church and State that Hooker had laboured to defend just as that relationship was undergoing a profound transformation. The Tractarians regarded the Reformation and the formularies of the Church of England quite differently than their High Church predecessors and contemporaries.[6] Their appeal to antiquity was in part an appeal against these. 'For old High Churchmen, the appeal to antiquity could not supersede that which the Reformers and seventeenth-century divines had already made and which had been enshrined in the Church's authorised formularies.'[7] The Tractarians were particularly hostile to the reformed doctrine of justification, regarding it as the root of their other disagreements with popular Protestantism of their time.[8]

Keble feared a degeneration of the relationship between Church and State into an unbridled and unprincipled Erastianism. His friend E. B. Pusey had witnessed in Germany the effects of an alliance between the power of the state in the Churches of the Reformation and the new 'critical' historical methods. Both Pusey and Keble believed that the Church of England was becoming subject to secular powers indifferent to theological principle who would soon seize the tools of 'criticism' as weapons against the doctrinal principles which might limit their use of the Church for political ends. They did not therefore seek a simple return to the *status quo ante*. They sought a more radical solution, which would make the abuses they feared impossible, by loosing the bonds which held Church and State together. Keble therefore sought in Hooker an authoritative interpreter of the doctrines and institutions of the reformed Church of England who could define the limits of the

[5] Lee W. Gibbs, 'Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism or English Magisterial Reformer?' *Anglican Theological Review* 84.4 (2002): 952–954.

[6] Peter B. Nockles, *The Oxford Movement in Context: Anglican High Churchmanship, 1760–1857* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 44–103. See also John Gascoigne, 'The Unity of Church and State Challenged: Responses to Hooker from the Restoration to the Nineteenth-Century Age of Reform', *The Journal of Religious History* 21:1 (1997): 60–79.

[7] Nockles, *The Oxford Movement*, 114.

[8] Nockles, *The Oxford Movement*, 256–259.

power of the state in ecclesiastical affairs and assert its own autonomous authority. It was, after all, the same John Keble credited with launching the Oxford Movement with his famous Assize Sermon of 1833 who edited what became the standard edition of Hooker's *Works* for nearly two centuries.

In this polemical context, there was a powerful motive to emphasize the distinctiveness of the English Reformation. The Tractarians sought to protect the Church of England from the fate of other reformed churches. They searched her post-Reformation heritage for defensive weapons. Accordingly, Keble argued that Hooker had distanced himself and the Church of England from the continental reformers in important ways, maintaining that Hooker was more at home in the fourth century than in the sixteenth.[9]

This motive had been absent from the earlier controversies in which Hooker's reputation as an authoritative voice for the reformed Church of England was forged. Hooker's admirers before Keble were certainly not all of the same political stripe or churchmanship. Izaak Walton and John Locke had both found much to admire in him! However, it would not have occurred to either of them to look for a basis for the authority of the Church of England apart from Crown and Parliament. Yet this is precisely what Keble discovers in Hooker, in the principle that the early church fathers are the authoritative interpreters of the Scriptures. This motive also helps to explain why he apologizes at considerable length for Hooker because he does not entirely share the Tractarian view of apostolic succession.

In the years before his conversion to Roman Catholicism, John Henry Newman extended Keble's line of argument. He maintained that Hooker represented a doctrinal *via media* peculiar to the Church of England with respect not only to questions of authority, but also questions of saving doctrine.[10] Specifically, in his *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification* (1838), he argued that Hooker represented this peculiarly Anglican middle way with respect to the teaching of the magisterial

[9] 'Introduction', Keble 1:ci–cii.

[10] *The* Via Media *of the Anglican Church*, ed. H. D. Weidner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). Weidner's volume follows the third edition, which was published with this title in 1877, long after Newman had entered the Church of Rome. Newman published two editions of this work in 1836 and 1837 while still an adherent of the Church of England, under the title *The Prophetical Office of the Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism* (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1837; London: Rivington, 1838).

Reformation about sin, grace, faith, and the distinction between justification and sanctification.[11]

Since Newman the idea that Hooker represents a doctrinal *via media* between Roman Catholicism and magisterial Protestantism distinctive to Anglicanism has played a central role in the interpretation of his thought. Francis Paget gave this thesis its best-known form, arguing that Hooker represents a peculiarly Anglican theology built on Scripture, tradition, and reason together.[12] This 'tripod' replaces the reformed principle that the source and measure of the saving knowledge of God is Scripture alone (*sola scriptura*). Several years later, Lionel Thornton took it upon himself to apologize for what he took to be certain confusions in Hooker's thought including his account of justification. He attributed these to the fact that Hooker belonged to 'a generation of transition between revolution and reconstruction' and excused them on the grounds that 'he was shedding his Protestantism as he went along'.[13] More recent examples of this interpretative approach are far too numerous to mention.

The attempt to understand Hooker's teaching about sin and grace in terms of a peculiarly Anglican middle way was challenged indirectly in the mid-twentieth century by scholars who argued that it was incoherent. Robert Kavanagh argued that Hooker shared the soteriological principles of the magisterial Reformers, but attempted to graft these on an essentially alien scholastic metaphysics.[14] His synthesis therefore lacked the coherence of Aquinas' teaching. Not long after, Gunnar Hillerdal also interpreted Hooker's soteriology as an unstable mixture of medieval scholasticism and Protestantism. However, Hillerdal attributed Hooker's incoherence to a failure really to understand the Reformation

[11] Alister McGrath examines the argument of these lectures, assesses their importance for the history of the argument that there is a distinctively English tradition with respect to the doctrine of justification which seeks a middle way between Roman Catholicism and magisterial Protestantism, and addresses these arguments in *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (Cambridge, UK: CUP, 1998 [2nd ed.]), 308–321. Given his analysis, it is odd that he accepts without discussion Lee Gibbs' conclusion that Hooker sought to construct such a middle way. *Iustitia Dei*, 291.

[12] F. Paget, *An Introduction to the Fifth Book of Hooker's Treasise of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907 [2nd edn.]), 284. The image of the 'tripod' is not Paget's, but is commonly used to describe his view.

[13] L. S. Thornton, *Richard Hooker: A Study of His Theology* (London: SPCK, and New York, NY: Macmillan, 1924), 77.

[14] R. V. Kavanagh, *Reason and Nature in Hooker's Polity* (PhD Thesis, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1944), 96–7, 101–2.

principles he claimed to hold. On this reading, what Hooker's theology lacked was the coherence of Luther's argument about sin and grace.[15] In answer to both, Egil Grislis defended the coherence of Hooker's thought about sin and grace and upheld its Reformation pedigree, though he continued to think of Hooker as representing a distinctively 'Anglican' theological method.[16]

The debate about the coherence of Hooker's teaching about sin and grace and its character brought attention to the early sermons and the late fragments and notes in which Hooker addressed these questions directly. Pointing especially to the evidence of *Justification*, C. FitzSimons Allison stressed the importance of the question of the formal cause of justification for reformed soteriology and argued that Hooker's answer to this question was precisely that of the magisterial reformers.[17] In his 1976 thesis on Hooker's controversy with Travers in the mid-1580s, Joseph Devine examined the argument of Hooker's early works, giving a particularly close analysis of *Justification*. Like Kavanagh, he concluded that Hooker's account of grace is incoherent insofar as it juxtaposes the reformers' forensic account of justification with a scholastic or Aristotelian account of nature and causation.[18] More sympathetic to Hooker was Olivier Loyer in his thesis *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker*, though his sympathy arose from the conviction that Hooker was consistently eirenical toward the teaching of the Council of Trent (1545–63) and that he eventually abandoned even the appearance of adherence to the principles of Reformation soteriology.[19] Loyer goes so far as to suggest that even in his early works Hooker uses the language of the reformers in a way that takes away its true meaning, and that in response to the redoubled assaults of the 'Calvinist party' he develops in the *Lawes* and

[15] G. Hillerdal, *Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker* (Universitets Årsskrift, Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1962), 22–25, 91, 129, 144–5.

[16] E. Grislis, 'Richard Hooker's Method of Theological Inquiry', *Anglican Theological Review* 45 (1963): 190–203.

[17] C. F. Allison, *The Rise of Moralism* (New York, NY: Seabury Press, 1966), 1–5. See also P. E. Hughes 'Introduction' to *Faith and Works: Cranmer and Hooker on Justification* (Wilton, CT: Morehouse-Barlow, 1982), 40–47.

[18] J. G. Devine, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of Justification in the Debate with Walter Travers, 1585–1586* (PhD Dissertation, The Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1976), 247.

[19] O. Loyer, *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker* (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1979), 1:421–430.

the late notes and fragments 'a theology of grace infinitely closer to that which he still appeared to denounce in his sermons'.[20]

In answer to Devine, Lee W. Gibbs argued for the coherence of Hooker's account of grace in his 1981 article on Hooker's doctrine of justification.[21] Like Loyer, Gibbs ascribed to Hooker a true middle way between sixteenth-century Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Unlike Loyer, he maintained that Hooker's synthesis preserved the truth in both. He accomplished this by a fundamental modification of the reformers' views, as a result of which the kinds of objections raised by Kavanagh miss their mark when applied to Hooker. Gibbs argues on the basis of a passage from *Justification* that Hooker makes the formal cause of justification not the external and alien righteousness of Christ imputed to the believer and received by faith, but 'the inherent righteousness of sanctification worked by the Holy Spirit, especially faith, which brings in its train hope and love and all together form the fountain of repentance and all other virtues'.[22]

Contemporary discussions generally have assumed with Paul Avis that Hooker's teaching on faith and salvation is 'pure evangelical theology'.[23] Nigel Voak, who is certainly sympathetic to the idea that Hooker represents a doctrinal *via media*, nevertheless rejects this reading of *A Learned Discourse of Justification*, arguing that Hooker consistently believed that the formal cause of justification is 'the externall justice of Christe Jesus which is ymputed'.[24] Voak argues that in other respects, however, what Hooker says in *Justification* and the other early works is quite different from his mature theology as found in the *Lawes* and the notes and fragments from the last months of his life. Scholarly opinion is divided with respect to whether or not Hooker's understanding of

[20] In Loyer's original French, 'une théologie de la grâce, infiniment proche de celle qui'il semble dénoncer encore dans ses sermons'. *L'Anglicanisme*, 1:430.

[21] Lee W. Gibbs, 'Richard Hooker's *Via Media* Doctrine of Justification', *Harvard Theological Review* 74.2 (1981): 211–20.

[22] Gibbs, '*Via Media* Doctrine of Justification', 219.

[23] P. D. L. Avis, 'The Shaking of the Seven Hills', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 32 (1979): 439. Cf. Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 169–70, 174–78. Strangely, on page 441 Avis goes on to ascribe to Hooker a *via media* with respect to justification. Similarly odd is the fact that A. E. McGrath does the same in *Iustitia Dei*, citing Gibbs without comment to support the claim that 'it is clear that Hooker attempts to construct a mediating doctrine of justification between Catholicism and Protestantism'. *Iustitia Dei*, 291.

[24] N. Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology* (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 177, quoting *Justification* 21, 5:129.25–8.

justification changed significantly between his early and his later works[25] and, if so, in what respect and how far.[26]

In his 1988 thesis *The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker*, David Neelands addressed the question of Hooker's understanding of justification in the wider context of the history of Protestant understanding of grace and salvation on the continent and in England.[27] He also discussed at length the broader questions of Hooker's understanding of human nature, of the effects of original and actual sin, and of the relationship between nature and grace. Nigel Voak has taken up all these questions in his recent study of Hooker on reason, will, and grace, emphasizing especially the role of what Calvin dubbed 'common grace' in his thought as explaining how Hooker's readers can disagree so widely about his meaning.[28] On the one hand, Hooker says things about human nature which may strike some readers as evidence of a Renaissance optimism about human reason and will.[29] On the other hand, Hooker says things which seem quite to deny all such optimism, consistent with the reformers' doctrine of total depravity.[30] Voak argues that Hooker is, indeed, optimistic about the human powers of reason and will, to the point of disagreement with the Thirty-Nine Articles. However, Hooker's optimism is unlike that of the great Christian thinkers of the high middle ages and the Renaissance and closer to Augustine insofar as he insists that all human capacities to know, will and accomplish what is good depend on 'common grace'. None can be attributed to unaided nature.[31]

Torrance Kirby accounts for this apparent contradiction in a quite different way. On his reading, Hooker shares with the early reformers admiration for the natural powers of human nature even in their state

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[25] On the 'nay' side are scholars like Torrance Kirby and Nigel Atkinson, and, with respect to justification, Egil Grislis and David Neelands.

[26] Keble first suggested that Hooker's mature theology represents a departure from his early sermons. 'Introduction', in Keble I:xlviii, cited by Avis, 'Shaking of the Seven Hills', 440, n. 2.

[27] *Theology of Grace*, 30–63, especially 46–47, n. 32.

[28] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 95–166.

[29] P. Lake, *Anglican and Puritans? Presbyterian and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 150. Cf. P. Munz as cited earlier.

[30] Kavanagh, *Reason and Nature*, 86–106; N. Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason*: *Reformed Theologian of the Church of England?* (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 1997), 27–31; E. Grislis, 'The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker', *Anglican Theological Review* 84:4 (2002): 881–884. For Torrance Kirby, see note 32.

[31] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 165–66.

of corruption after the fall insofar as they serve noble ends. However, like them, he is entirely pessimistic about the powers of human reason and will apart from the grace of Christ with respect to that eternal union with God in knowledge and love that is salvation.[32] The 'external forum' of life together in the family, the church and the state must be distinguished from the *forum conscientiae*, which has to do with salvation.[33] The Christian, living in both, may be righteous in the former, but not in the latter. This dialectical understanding of human nature, reason and freedom, characteristic of the reformers, allows Hooker to agree wholeheartedly with Article XIII of the Thirty-Nine Articles, according to which 'Workes done before the grace of Christe, and the inspiration of his spirite, are not pleasaunt to God, forasmuche as they spring not of fayth in Jesu Christ…'[34] At the same time, he acknowledges the admirable operations of human nature, reason, and freedom in human life, and is careful to insist that grace perfects and completes human nature without merely replacing it.

The question of the relationship between Hooker and the teaching of the magisterial Reformation is crucial to an understanding of his thought about sin and grace. Answers to this question are shaped by assumptions about the character of reformed thought. Many such assumptions are challenged in recent scholarship, which has brought attention to the way in which the reformers' ideas often developed and changed over the course of their lifetime, to differences in emphasis and sometimes of substance even among reformers who were in general agreement, to the great variety of related but sometimes opposing strands of reformed theology in the sixteenth century, and to ways in which reformed theology was not merely a reaction against late-medieval theology, but shared with it important assumptions and questions. This complexity need not lead to despair. It is possible to make a sound beginning in the search for an answer to this question by looking at what

[32] W. J. Torrance Kirby, 'The Context of Reformation Thought: The Influence of the Magisterial Reformers on Richard Hooker's Discourse on Natural Law' in *The Theology of Richard Hooker in the Context of the Magisterial Reformation* (*Studies in Reformed Theology and History*, NS 5, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2000), 11, n. 35 and *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 46.

[33] On this 'Chalcedonian' dialectical approach to the distinction between 'two realms' in Luther, Calvin, and Hooker see Kirby, *Royal Supremacy*, 41–51.

[34] Edward Cardwell, *Synodalia: A Collection of Articles of Religion, Canons, and Proceedings of Convocations in the Province of Canterbury from the year 1547 to the year 1717* (Oxford: OUP, 1842), 95.

Hooker himself says about what the reformers intended to deny and to affirm by what they said about sin and grace, and how he represents himself as faithfully maintaining their intentions.

II. Hooker, St Augustine, and the Magisterial Reformers

In *Justification* Hooker addressed a common objection to the faith of the reformed Church of England. Roman Catholic apologists often argued that if salvation by works was a damnable heresy, Protestants condemned countless numbers of their own forefathers.[35] Hooker addressed the question squarely, arguing that it followed from a proper understanding of the reformed doctrine of justification that such faith might receive saving grace. In his immediate context, it was an original polemical move that brought upon him the suspicion of Roman Catholic sympathies. Walter Travers pressed home this suspicion publicly from Hooker's own pulpit in the controversy that led to his removal from the Temple by Archbishop John Whitgift in March of 1586. In his *Answere to the Supplication that Master Travers made to the Counsell*, Hooker defended himself against Travers' suspicions, explaining that he had dwelt on what Protestants and Roman Catholics have in common with respect to grace and justification in order not to give Roman Catholic apologists 'occasion to saie (as commonly they do) that when we cannot refute theire opinions we propose to our selves suche insted of theires as we can refute', taking instead 'the beste and most perspicuous waie of teachinge' by addressing what they had actually said and their best arguments for it.[36] If the argument of *Justification* as a whole is considered in relation to his extant early sermons, this appears plausible. A recurring theme of these sermons is the weakness and deficiency of saving faith, and the strength and sufficiency of the grace of God received by it.[37] From the point of view of this characteristically reformed concern, the argument of *Justification* represents the application of general principle to a particular case.

Hooker explicitly claims to represent the reformers' teaching about sin and grace in *Justification*. A passage toward the end of the treatise

[35] *Just.* 37, 5:166.1–10.
[36] *Answere* 12; 5:238.5–9.
[37] *Jude* 1.11; 5:25.21–33, *Jude* 2.16; 5:45.16–21, and 2.28, 5:52.9–17; *Cert.* 5:76.23–31.

in which he addresses the question 'what is the faulte of the churche of Rome?' is particularly instructive. His answer summarizes the work's particular argument and at the same time makes clear what he understands to be the intent of reformation teaching with respect to salvation generally.

> Christe is the matter whereof the doctrine of the gospell treateth and it treateth of Christe as of a saviour. Salvation therefore by Christe is the foundation of christianitye. As for workes they are a thing subordynate, no otherwise necessary than becawse our sanctification cannot be accomplished without them. The doctrine concerning them is builded upon the foundacion, therfore the doctrine which addeth unto them power of satisfying or of merrittinge addeth unto a thing subordinated, builded upon the foundacion, not the very foundacion it self, yett is the foundacion consequently by this addition overthrowne forasmuch as out of this addition it maie negatyvely be concluded he which maketh any worke good and acceptable in the sighte of god to proceed from the natural freedome of our will, he which gyveth unto any good work of ours the force of satisfying the wrath of god for synne, the power of meritting either erthly or heavenly rewardes, he which holdeth workes going before our vocation in congruity to meritt our vocation, workes following our firste to merytt our second justification and by condignity our laste reward in the kingdome of heaven, pulleth up the doctryne of faith by the rootes, for out of every of theis the playne directe denyall thereof maie be necessarily concluded.[38]

Hooker represents himself as affirming what the reformers affirmed, and denying what they denied. With both Augustine and the reformers, his concern is to affirm that Christ alone saves (*solus Christus*). He aligns himself with Augustine and the reformers against the Pelagians, denying that fallen human reason, will and freedom are ever able to move toward union with God apart from the mediation of Christ. At the same time he aligns himself with the reformers against late-medieval doctrines of merit they rejected as Pelagian, and specifically a doctrine of successive 'justifications' merited *de congruo* and *de condigno*. A survey of Hooker's works beginning with *Justification* and the other early works and proceeding to the latest will show that he consistently maintains what he describes in this passage as the intent of Reformation doctrine with respect to sin and grace.

[38] *Just.* 32; 5:154.7–26.

Continuity with St Augustine: 'The Heresie of Freewill'

Augustine argued against Pelagius that human beings have rendered themselves incapable of that use of their natural freedom which could receive salvation as the reward of human merit.[39] Hooker makes clear in the passage quoted above that this is what he is rejecting when he speaks of the 'heresie' or 'errour' of freewill.[40] With Augustine he rejects as an 'errour' the belief that 'any worke good and acceptable in the sighte of god to proceed from the natural freedome of our will'. He emphasizes this point and the consequent need of grace repeatedly both in his early works, in the *Lawes*, and in the *Dublin Fragments*.

In *Certaintie*, Hooker contrasts the 'natural man' with the one who has discovered the means of salvation outside the resources of fallen human nature in Christ.[41] *Justification* opens with an argument that 'there never is, nor never was, any mere naturall man absolutly righteous in himself, that is to saye voide of all unrightuousnes, of all synne', introducing the larger question how human beings are saved by the grace of Christ.[42] In his *Answere* to Travers's *Supplication*, Hooker protests his orthodoxy with respect to the incapacity of human nature.[43] He restates this position with respect to fallen human nature unaided by saving grace in *Pride*.

> But boast not. For what have ye or are ye of your selves? To this mark all those humble confessions are referd which have bene alwaies frequent in the moouths of Saincts trulie wading in the traill of them selves: as that of the prophet, Wee are nothing but soarnes and festered corruption; our verie light is darkness and our righteousness is selfe unrighteous…[44]

In both *Pride* and the first Book of the *Lawes*, Hooker distinguishes two ways to salvation, making clear the necessity of grace.[45] Arguing first that we are 'undoubtedly not capable of that blessednes which wee naturallie seek but subject unto that which wee most abhor anguish

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[39] For Hooker's own account of Pelagius' teaching and the controversy that followed, see *Dublin* 36–38; 4:147.32–151.34.

[40] *Just.* 26; 5:143.16, 18.

[41] *Cert.* 5:69.16–18. See also *Jude* 1:5; 5:18.13.

[42] *Just.* 2; 5:105.3–106.1.

[43] *Answere* 22; 5:253.22–24.

[44] *Pride* I; 5:321.15–20.

[45] See also *Dublin* 7; 4:106.15–17, where he says, 'To finde our supernaturall lawes, there is noe natural way, because they have not their foundation or ground in the course of nature.'

tribulation death woe endlesse miserie', he argues the necessity of 'a nue waie unto salvation so that they which were in the other perverse maie in this be found straight and righteous'.[46]

> That the waie of nature, this the waie of grace. The end of that way salvation merited presupposing the righteousnes of mens wourkes, their righteousnes a naturall hability to do them, that hability the goodnes of god which created them in such perfection. But the end of this waie salvation bestowed upon men as a guift presupposing not theire righteousnes but the forgivenes of their unrighteousnes, justification; their justification not their natural hability to doe good but their hartie sorrow for not doing and unfained beliefe in him for whose sake not doers are accepted, which is their vocation; their vocation thelection of god taking them out from the number of lost children; their election a mediatour in whom to be elect; this mediation inexplicable mercy, his mercy their mistrie for whome he voutchafed to make him selfe a mediatour.[47]

This argument informs the structure of the first Book of the *Lawes*. The discussion of the various kinds of law and their relation to the creative will of God in the first ten chapters is essentially about 'the waie of nature'. In the eleventh chapter, he introduces 'the waie of grace', in which the Christian and the Church are guided by the 'divine law' discovered in the Scriptures. The distinction here is part of his argument that from the unique status claimed for the Scriptures by the reformers it does not follow that the laws which belong to the way of nature are simply replaced, nor that all the laws found in the Scripture have the same force, nor that they are all perpetually binding.[48] This argument is not our concern here.[49] However, the fact that this distinction is repeated in the *Lawes* and lends its structure to this crucial argument of the opening Book is important as testimony to the constancy of Hooker's assent to Augustine's rejection of 'free will' in the sense described earlier. As in *Pride*, he insists that 'all flesh is guiltie of that for which God hath threatned eternallie to punish', and draws out the implication that there is either no way to salvation, 'or, if any, then surely a way which is supernaturall, a way which could never

[46] *Pride* I; 5:312.26–28, 313.5–6.

[47] *Pride* I; 5:313.6–19.

[48] Cf. R. Ingalls, *Richard Hooker on the Scriptures: Saint Augustine's Trinitarianism and the Interpretation of* Sola Scriptura (PhD Thesis, Lampeter, UK: The University of Wales at Lampeter, 2004), 178–182.

[49] See the discussion of Hooker's account of the generic division of Law in chapter X below.

have entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God him selfe had not revealed it extraordinarilie.'[50] He goes on in the next section,

> The light of nature is never able to finde out any way of obtayning the reward of blisse, but by performing exactly the duties and workes of righteousnes. From salvation therefore and life all flesh being excluded this way, behold how the wisedome of God hath revealed a way mysticall and supernaturall, a way directing unto the same ende of life by a course which groundeth it selfe upon the guiltiness of sinne, and through sinne desert of condemnation and death.[51]

The way of grace begins with knowledge of God 'above nature,' with respect to both its origin and its content and with respect to the way in which it is grasped by fallen human beings. With respect to its origin and content, it is made possible only by God's assumption of human nature in the Incarnation. As he says in Book V, 'The guift whereby God hath made Christ a fountaine of life is that conjunction of the nature of God with the nature of man in the person of Christ…'[52] With respect to the way in which the grace of Christ is received, the human mind and heart requires the assistance of the Spirit to clarify and strengthen human reason to elevate it to an end of which it is not capable apart from such supernatural assistance. Specifically, the Spirit assists the eyes of human understanding to recognize the good that has been revealed in this way,[53] and to practice the virtues of faith, hope and charity in a life of penitent adoration through which grace will make use of everything that belongs to the lives of fallen human beings as means of sanctification.[54] In both senses, then, this way is 'supernatural', and distinct from all that belongs to nature and 'the waie of nature'.

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[50] *Lawes* I.11.5; 1:116.2–8.

[51] *Lawes* I.11.6; 1:118.11–18.

[52] *Lawes* V.54.3; 2:222.14–16.

[53] On reason as an instrument of spiritual or intellectual vision able to perceive goodness to which the senses are blind, see *Lawes* I.7.2; 1:78.3–4, and I.8, *passim*, 1:81.6–93.16. On grace as a revelation of goodness addressed to human reason and will, see *Dublin* 2; 4:103.21–24. On the necessity of the Spirit for saving knowledge of God, see *Dublin* 6; 4:106.3–4 and 12; 4:111.28–32.

[54] The fact that this assent follows on the basis not of demonstrative arguments but the testimony of witnesses follows from the fact that knowledge of the Incarnation begins with knowledge of historical events. This preserves the character of faith for this assent.

In the *Dublin Fragments*, Hooker is no less clear on this point. He is happy to agree with the author of *A Christian Letter* and the Articles of Religion (1571) 'that without Gods preventing and helping grace, wee are nothing att all able to doe the workes of pietie which are acceptable in his sight', i.e., which will obtain salvation.[55] As a result of original sin we require 'God's special grace' to 'aid our imbecilitie' or 'whatsoever wee do or imagine would be only and continuallie evill', i.e., tending not to eternal union with God, but to separation.[56] Without grace the powers and faculties with which God has endowed human beings in creation no longer bring forth 'noe nott the blossoms or least buds *that tende to the fruit of eternall life*'.[57] Hooker insists that he has understood grace 'as all the ancient Fathers did in their writings against Pelagius',[58] and aligns himself with Augustine and his successors in the Pelagian controversy.[59] At the conclusion of his argument in the *Fragments* that human reason and freedom are neither entirely removed by that corruption which is a result of the fall, nor replaced by the grace which restores human nature, Hooker once again makes clear the precise sense in which he rejects 'free will':

> In summe the grace of God hath aboundantlie sufficient for all. Wee are by it that wee are, and att the length by it wee shall bee that wee would. What wee have, and what wee shall have, is the fruite of his goodnes, and not a thing which wee can claime by right or title of our owne worth. All that wee can doe to him commeth farre behind the summe of that wee owe, all wee have from him is meere bounty. And seing all that wee of ourselves can doe, is not only nothing, butt naught, lett him alone have the glorie by whose only grace, wee have our whole abilitie and power of well doing.[60]

With Augustine, Hooker insists that the grace of Christ is necessary to initiate, sustain and bring to fruition the aspirations of restless human hearts to happiness in union with infinite truth and goodness.[61]

In a note on *Pride* in the Folger edition, Egil Grislis claims that the 'essentially Augustinian contrast' between nature and grace was replaced by Thomas Aquinas's conception of 'the complementarity

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[55] *Dublin* 1; 4:101.4–6, cf. *Dublin* 9; 4:108.30–109.4.
[56] *Dublin* 1; 4:101.16–18, cf. *Dublin* 2; 4:103.9–12.
[57] *Dublin* 2; 4:103.16–17.
[58] *Dublin* 10; 4:109.6–7.
[59] *Dublin* 11 & 12; 4:110.5–111.33.
[60] *Dublin* 13; 4:113.17–26.
[61] *Lawes* I.11.4; 1:115.13–25. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* I.i.1; XIII.ix.10.

of nature and grace'.[62] To oppose Augustine to Aquinas in this way obscures matters essential to our understanding of Hooker, however. Though the principle *gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit* is associated with the name of Aquinas,[63] Augustine states the same principle in *The Spirit and the Letter*,[64] an anti-Pelagian treatise that was crucially important to the development of Luther and Calvin's thought about sin and grace. It is therefore not clear that this principle, which unites the two ways, merely replaces the principle according to which the two are distinct. Hooker himself recognizes this implicitly, in that shortly after restating the distinction between the two ways in Book I of the *Lawes* he states the principle according to which they are complementary. Speaking of St Paul's argument 'that nature hath need of grace', he expresses the hope that 'we are not opposite by holding that grace hath use of nature'.[65]

With respect to the 'heresie' of free will, Hooker's argument from the early sermons through the *Dublin Fragments* presents itself as consistent and clear when read as part of an attempt to understand the relationship between nature and grace in accordance with this Christological paradigm. Hooker maintained in the *Lawes* that sin had not taken away human reason and freedom, but maimed them. He therefore insisted that even after the fall there is 'in the will of man naturally that freedome, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it'.[66] *A Christian Letter* complained of this as inconsistent with the Articles of Religion.[67] In the fragment 'Grace and Free Will', Hooker first protests his adherence to the teaching of the reformed Church of England 'that without Gods preventing and helping grace, wee are nothing att all able to doe the workes of pietie which are acceptable in his sight', and then asks the rhetorical question, 'Butt must the will cease to be itselfe because the grace of God

[62] 'Commentary', *FLE* 5:805.

[63] The words are not precisely Aquinas's. Cf. *ST* 1a q.1, and esp. q.8 ad 2.

[64] Robert Crouse quotes the Latin, '*non quod per naturam negata sit gratia, sed potius per gratiam reparata natura*' and translates, 'Not that grace is negated by nature, but nature is restored by grace.' *De spir. et litt.*, 27, 47; see NPNF 1, 5:103. 'Sin and Grace: The Development of the Doctrine of Sin and Grace from Augustine to Anselm' in S. Harris, ed., *The Journey Home: Sin and Grace* (Charlottetown, PEI: St Peter Publications, 2002), 42.

[65] *Lawes* III.8.6; 1:223.26–29.

[66] *Lawes* I.7.6; 1:79.27–29.

[67] *Notes* 4:17.16–20, 18.1.

helpeth it?'[68] The pages that follow give the reasons for his answer, 'No'. Hooker borrows Augustine's distinction between 'ableness' and 'aptness' in order to make his point.[69] As a result of the fall those who are 'apt' are no longer 'able' so to perform 'the duties and workes of righteousnes' as to obtain 'the reward of blisse'.[70] To draw from this the conclusion that grace must replace human freedom and reason or restore it where it was utterly lacking rests on a misunderstanding. 'You peradventure thinck aptnes and ableness all one, whereas the trueth is, that had wee kept our first ablenes grace should not neede, and had aptnes beene alsoe lost, it is not grace that could work in us more then it doeth in brute creatures.'[71]

Hooker's argument is, then, that what some have called 'cooperation' with grace does not distance his position from Augustine or the reformers in principle. By arguing in this way, however, he merely draws out the consequences of the principle that grace does not destroy but perfects nature, already implicit in his early works. In *Certaintie* he had argued that God does not act as 'a naturall agent' like the fire to inflame or the sun to lighten. Instead 'the incomprehensible wisdome of god doth limit the effectes of his powre to such a measure as seemeth best unto him selfe'.[72] In *Justification* it is clear that this measure includes the nature of the objects upon which grace operates. In the case of human beings, this means their reason and freedom. For this reason Hooker argues at the end of *Justification* that it is not the necessity of works that is taken away by the reformed doctrine of justification, but their power 'of satisfying god for syn and a virtue to merite both grace here and in heaven glorye'.[73] Hooker lists the distinct moments in the order of salvation: election, calling, justification, sanctification, and glorification, and makes the anti-Pelagian point that 'Christe in every of theis hath somewhat which he worketh alone.'[74] He immediately goes on to insist on the side of nature however that the gratuitous and unmerited grace of Christ does not replace the material of human nature upon which it works. Salvation is 'not so by him alone as if in us to our vocation the hereing of the gospell, to our justification faith, to our sanctification

[68] *Dublin* 1; 4:101.4–7.
[69] *Dublin* 1; 4:101.10–18.
[70] *Lawes* I.11.6; 1:118.12–13.
[71] *Dublin* 1; 4:101.28–31.
[72] *Cert.* 5:72.27–29.
[73] *Just.* 31; 5:153.18–19.
[74] *Just.* 31; 5:152.22–23.

the fruites of the spirite, to our entraunce into reste perseveraunce in hope in faith in holynes weare not necessarye.'[75] The participation of human nature in grace preserves what remains after the fall of its rationality and freedom, and works to strengthen and restore human nature, making it possible effectively to will union with God, though only through the mediation of Christ.

Hooker, then, consistently understands Augustine's anti-Pelagian argument to mean that no use of the resources of fallen human nature avails to initiate, effect, or sustain union with God apart from Christ. His argument for the existence of free will in fallen human beings and the preservation of human nature as it receives supernatural grace do not qualify this agreement. Instead, they address his adversaries' misunderstanding. By insisting on the reality of human freedom even apart from the grace of Christ, Hooker merely follows the example of Augustine in *The City of God*.[76] By arguing that this freedom remains as distorted and maimed human reason and freedom becomes the subject of grace, he follows Augustine's example not only as it is found in the early anti-Manichean treatises, but in later works like *The City of God, On the Trinity*, and *On the Spirit and the Letter*.[77] Augustine's argument about nature, sin and grace is understood as an explication of the doctrine of Christ. It remains to show how the reformed doctrine of justification is understood by Hooker in the same way.

Continuity with the Magisterial Reformers: 'Ymputed Rightuousnes'

Hooker repeatedly appeals to doctrine of justification shared by Protestants and condemned by the Council of Trent as the crucial *locus* of sixteenth-century Protestant criticism of the teaching of the late-medieval church about sin and grace. In *Justification*, he takes it for granted that this is the characteristic mark of reformed Christian faith and the measure against which the faith of those who died in the Church of England before the Reformation must be tried. In his early sermons he

[75] *Just.* 31; 5:153.11–14.

[76] In *The City of God*, a work of Augustine's maturity, he argued against Cicero that piety must not pit the good providence of God and human responsibility and freedom, as if they were mutually exclusive, but choose both. *City of God* V.9. Cf. R. Crouse, 'Sin and Grace' in Harris, ed., *The Journey Home*, 40.

[77] *De spir. et litt.*, 30, 52, quoted in Crouse, 'Sin and Grace', 42.

makes a constant use of it to address the confusions and disorders he believes cripple the faith, hope and charity of his hearers. The *Lawes* is chiefly concerned with questions that belong to the realm of sanctification, but the clear distinction between justification and sanctification is presupposed, and its reasons clearly stated in the Christological preface to the treatise on the Sacraments in Book V, as mentioned earlier. In the notes and fragments Hooker addresses objections to his teaching raised by *A Christian Letter*.

Hooker takes up the reformers' elaboration of Augustine's anti-Pelagian argument and makes it his own. He adopts the terms, distinctions and arguments that belong to the reformed consensus with respect to justification. In *Justification* he therefore opens up 'that graund question, which hangeth yet in controversie betwene us and the churche of *Rome*, aboute the matter of justefying righteousnes' by restating it succinctly.

> There is a glorifyinge righteousnes of men in the Worlde to comme, and there is a justefying and a sanctefyinge righteousnes here. *The righteousnes wherewith we shalbe clothed* in the world to comme, is both perfecte and inherente: that whereby here we are justefied is perfecte but not inherente, that whereby we are sanctified, inherent, but not perfect.[78]

The Christian aspires to a final union with God 'in the Worlde to comme' by a twofold participation in Christ in the present. These two kinds of righteousness each have their own logic. On the one hand, the believer participates in the perfect and complete righteousness of Christ immediately by faith. However, this righteousness remains external and 'alien'. Because it is perfect and complete, it cannot be received as a 'devyne spirituall qualitie', which increases or decreases according to the capacity of the one who receives it.[79] It is therefore received not by faith in its character as a virtue or excellence of human nature, but in its function as recognizing the unmerited mercy and promise of God in Christ. On the other hand, the believer receives the Spirit of adoption, which works an inner transformation of human understanding and will and brings forth fruit in words and deeds expressive of this transformation. The virtue of faith, like any virtue, can be cultivated or neglected, increase or decrease. Through all such changes, the function

[78] *Just.* 3; 5:109.6–14.
[79] *Just.* 5; 5:110.13 and 111.2–10.

of faith (uniting the believer to Christ) and the content of faith (salvation by Christ) remains the same.[80]

This account is presented in contradistinction to the teaching of the Council of Trent. Trent taught that the grace of justification is the justice of God received as a quality or characteristic inhering in the believer according to his or her capacities.[81] This characteristic can increase or decrease.[82] The Council described it as the 'single formal cause' of justification, using the language by which Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causes and explanations. According to Aristotle, the 'formal' cause of a thing is that which makes a thing to be essentially what it is.[83] It is that which gives matter its 'form', making it a thing of this or that kind. By speaking in this way, the Tridentine fathers meant to point out that the grace of justification is what makes a Christian a Christian. Given the Aristotelian ontological assumption, this cannot be something wholly external and alien as required by the forensic account of justification. Joseph Devine states the argument succinctly: 'Now a formal cause is, by definition, an internal cause. But if justification is entirely by extrinsic attribution, there cannot be a formal cause of justification. On the other hand, if there is not change in the form of the thing, nothing has happened, that is, no cause has taken effect.'[84]

Hooker understands the basic disagreement between Protestants and the Church of Rome to be about the formal cause of justification. In the 1580s, in his *Answere* to Travers's supplication, Hooker protested, 'As for the counsell of Trent concerninge inherent righteousness, what doth it here? No man doubteth but they make another formall cawse of justificacion then we do, in respecte whereof I have shewed alredye that we disagree aboute the verye essence of that which cureth our

[80] *Dublin* 16; 4:117.16–17, 24–26. Cf. the argument of Jude 2, in which Hooker urges his hearers to 'edifie themselves' in the faith, clearly thinking of faith as a virtue capable of increase and decrease. Just as clearly he argues in *Certaintie* that it is not the strength or weakness of faith which justifies, but its objective content: Christ.

[81] Session 6, ch. 7, reads, in part, 'and not only are we reputed but we are truly called and are just, receiving justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to everyone as He wills, and according to each one's disposition and cooperation'. *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, ed. H. J. Schroeder (St Louis, MO, and London: B. Herder, 1941), 33 (cited hereafter as *CT*).

[82] *CT* 6.10, ed. Schroeder, 36. Cf. *Justification* 5:110.25–111.2.

[83] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.2 (1013a), cited by J. Booty in a note in his Commentary on *ACL* 6 'Of fayth and workes'; 4:21.33 at *FLE* 4:196.

[84] Devine, *Debate*, 247.

spirituall disseas.'[85] Near the end of his life, in his notes on his copy of *A Christian Letter*, Hooker answers the accusation that he had added hope and charity to faith as the formal cause of justification in the *Lawes* by protesting, 'Is faith <alone> then the formall cause of justification? And faith alone a cause in this kind. Who hath taught you this doctrine? Have you bene tampering so long with Pastors Doctors Elders Deacons that the first principles of your religion are now to learn?'[86] Hooker makes explicit what is implicit in each passage in which he rejects justification based on any inherent quality: he regards it as a matter of 'first principles'—about which Protestants who disagree on matters of polity are not divided—that the formal cause of justification is the perfect, external and alien righteousness of Christ. By insisting with the reformers that the formal cause of justification must be something alien and external received by faith and 'ymputed' to the believer, and that therefore justification must be clearly distinguished from sanctification,[87] Hooker at the same time aligns himself with their argument that the categories of Aristotelian ontology are inadequate to describe the relationship between the believer and Christ.

> But the rightuousnes wherein we muste be found if we wilbe justified, is not our owne, therefore we cannott be justefied by any inherente qualitie. Christe hath merited rightuousnes for asmany as are *found in hym*. In him god findeth us if we be faithfull for by faith we are incorporated into hym. Then although in ourselves we be altogether synfull and unrightuous, yett even the man which in him self is ympious, full of inequity, full of synne, him beinge found in Christe through faith, and having his synne in hatred through repentance, hym god beholdeth with a gratious eye, putteth awaie his syn by not ymputing it, taken quite awaie the ponishemente due therunto by pardoninge it, and accepteth him in Jesus Christ as perfectly rightuous as if he had fulfilled all that is comaunded hym in the lawe, shall I saie more perfectly rightuous then if him self had fulfilled the whole lawe?[88]

Regarded in relation to Christ and considered in the light of the doctrinal content of Christian faith the Christian lacks nothing. He is complete, perfect, *iustus*. Regarded in himself, he remains imperfect, a pilgrim *in via*, at once sinner and saint (*simul peccator et iustus*).[89] This

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[85] *Answere* 14; 5:242.25–245.1, cf. *Just.* 5–7.
[86] *Notes* 4:21.33–22.2.
[87] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 169–170.
[88] *Just.* 5; 5:112.22–113.4.
[89] Cf. *Cert.* 5:72.29–31 and the note in the Commentary, *FLE* 5:701.

cannot be said if the categories which express relationship are merely accidental to a human being, and therefore not part of what makes a person what they are.[90] Together with the reformers Hooker defends the Augustinian view that the relation of absolute dependence upon the perfect and complete mediation of Christ constitutes the Christian as a Christian. Such dependence does so without taking away those natural qualities and characteristics which constitute a human being as human—e.g. the 'aptnes' of the will. Even errors, failures and sins retain their intrinsic character as evil. They are not merely erased but *redeemed*, i.e., made to serve the purpose of union with God while retaining their intrinsic character, like the events of Christ's Passion.

Behind the precise and apparently arid and abstract language in which the reformed doctrine of justification is expressed lies a profoundly pastoral concern, then. It is intended to help make clear how sin and failure are redeemed by grace without taking away their character as sin and failure. This concern underlies a second. If that which constitutes a Christian were any kind of proper characteristic or accomplishment, honesty would leave Christians in a perpetual state of uncertainty with respect to God's will concerning themselves. Hooker recalls this argument as he sketches the piety to which the reformers objected and describes it in *Justification* as a 'maze'.[91] The reformed doctrine makes the ground of the Christian's confidence the content or object of faith: Christ and God as known in Christ in the form of doctrine.[92] This doctrine is the unique saving content of the Scriptures, and the basis of the reformers' claim that salvation is *sola scriptura*, 'by the Scriptures alone'.[93] Faith, then, receiving the saving doctrine of Christ which is unique to the Scriptures, turns the human being in search of

[90] Augustine had already discovered that this could not be true of God. In his trinitarian theology, eloquently and succinctly summarized long after his death in the *Quicunque Vult*, the relations in which the three Persons stand to one another belong to the very essence of the divine life. For Hooker's statement of this, see *Lawes* V.56.2; 2:235.3ff.

[91] 'This mase the churche of Rome doth cawse her followers to tread, when they aske here the waie of justification.' *Justification* 5; 5:112.6–8.

[92] Hence Hooker's description of salvation by Christ as 'the foundation of faith': *Just.*16 & 23 *passim*, 32; 5:154.7–9. Cf. *Lawes* V.56.6, 7; 2:237–238. 'Christ alone <could earn> was able to remove and has removed the hindrance to our salvation; he alone was able to earn salvation and has earned it for the whole world…Salvation never comes to any man without Christ.' *Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination*, *FLE* 4:95.7–11, 11–16.

[93] *Lawes* V.21.3; 2:84.23–85.14.

grounds for confidence in God's favour away from the resources of the self toward God through Christ as this faith is understood.[94] 'That which linketh Christ to us is his meere mercy and love towards us. That which tieth us to him our faith in the promised salvation revealed in the word of truth.'[95] However, it is not by reason of its strength or its quality as a human virtue or excellence that faith 'ties us to Christ'. If it was, the Christian's attention would be turned within once more to examine the quality of faith to be found there, searching for grounds for confidence before God. In *Certaintie*, this turning away from simple trust in the goodness of God is identified as the root and ground of sin.[96] Only a perfect faith could prevent this. Original sin has made us incapable of such faith. Afflicted with 'the foggie damp of originall corruption, it cannot be that any mans hart living should be ether so enlightned in the knowledg or so established in the love of that wherein his salvation standeth as to be perfect, nether doubting nor shrinking at all.'[97] Furthermore, such faith would have no need of saving grace. Since faith is 'the root and mother' of all the other parts of perfect righteousness, 'fayth being perfect (as it is if it be not at all mingled with distrust and feare) what is there to exclud other christian vertues from the like perfection? And then what need wee the righteousnes of Christ? his garment is superfluous, wee may be honorably clothed with our own robes if it be thus.'[98] Therefore it cannot be 'the worthinesse of our beleeving… by which we stand sure as houses that are builded upon a rocke' but 'the vertue of him in whom we beleeve'.[99] It is not the quality of faith but its object which renders it capable of receiving saving grace.[100] Saving faith turns the human mind and heart away from confidence in itself to place confidence instead in Christ.[101] 'The simplicitie of faithe which is in Christe taketh the naked promyse of god his bare word and on that it resteth.'[102] The strength of the faith

[94] Cf. Hooker's descriptions of how Christ dwells in the believer and the believer in Christ at *Pride* 5:327.9–26; and *Just.* 26; 5:137.24–138.5. It is helpful to read Hooker's interpretation of *sola scriptura* in the concluding chapters of the first Book of the *Lawes* in this light.

[95] *Jude* 1; 11, 5:25.21–23.

[96] *Cert.* 5:77.9–80.24.

[97] *Cert.* 5:71.16–20, cf. *Lawes*, Pref.9.1; III.8.9, 11.9; IV.9.2.

[98] *Cert.* 5:71.24–30.

[99] *Jude* 2; 16, 5:45.16–18, cf. *Dublin* 16; 4:117.26–30.

[100] *Just.* 26; 5:137.20–138.5.

[101] *Cert.* 5:76.23–31.

[102] *Cert.* 5:77.15–16.

that 'ties us to Christ' is in the means by which Christ has linked himself to us, that is, the Incarnation and the Passion. Hence Calvin's striking answer to the question how he could have confidence before God, 'Christ is worth a thousand evidences to me'.[103]

Theological concerns also lie behind Hooker's assent to Augustine's anti-Pelagian argument and the reformers' doctrine of grace. In the course of a discussion of Chalcedonian Christology in his preface to the treatise on the Sacraments in Book V of the *Lawes* he writes,

> Lett us… sett it down for a rule or principle so necessarie as nothinge more to the plaine descidinge of all doubtes and questions about the union of natures in Christ, that of both natures there is a cooperation often, an association alwayes, but never any mutual participation whereby the properties of the one are infused into the other.[104]

Since our union with God is by means of God's union of himself with human nature in Christ,[105] the paradigm for the union of the two natures in Christ becomes also the paradigm for understanding the union between Christ, the Church, and its members.

> Christ is whole with the whole Church, and whole with everie parte of the Church, as touchinge his person which can no waie devide it selfe or be possest by degrees and portions. But the participation of Christ importeth, besides the presence of Christes person, and besides the mysticall copulation thereof with the partes and members of his whole Church, a true actuall influence of grace whereby the life which wee live accordinge to godlines is his, and from him wee receave those perfections wherein our eternall happines consisteth. Thus wee participate Christ partelie by imputation, as when those thinges which he did and suffered for us are imputed unto us for righteousnes; partlie by habituall and reall infusion, as when grace is inwardlie bestowed while wee are on earth and afterwardes more fullie both our soules and bodies made like unto his in glorie.[106]

Hooker understands the purpose of both Augustine's argument against Pelagius and the reformed doctrine of justification in Christological terms. Pelagius' account of the powers of human nature was inconsistent with the essential Christological point that 'there is no union of God

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[103] J. Calvin, *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God*, trans. J. K. S. Reid (London: James Clarke & Co., 1961), 130. Cf. *Cert.* 5:81.8–10, *Remedie* 5:376.12–14, 377.3–8.
[104] *Lawes* V.53.3; 2:218.28–219.3.
[105] *Lawes* V.50.3; 2:208.20–209.2.
[106] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:242.26–243.9.

with man without that meane betwene both which is both', i.e., the Person of Christ.[107] Hooker understands the reformers' doctrine of sin and grace, built on this Augustinian foundation, to further Augustine's argument and, at the same time, to work out more fully the implications of Chalcedonian Christology. By understanding our participation in Christ in terms of the two distinct but inseparable graces of justification and sanctification, each with its own logic, the need for a grace that exceeds the resources of human nature is restated with even greater emphasis.[108] At the same time, grace is understood to make use not only of nature, but of the destructive distortions of human nature, redeeming them without changing their essential character as evil.

Hooker argues that the reformers' doctrine of grace has been disastrously misunderstood by his adversaries who think of themselves as defending it. Properly understood, the doctrine does not exclude works and the practice of virtue.

> We our selves do not teache Christe alone excluding our owne faith unto justeficacion, Christ alone excluding our owne workes unto sanctification, Christe alone excluding the one or the other as unnecessary unto salvation. It is a childish cavill wherewith in the matter of justificacion our adversaryes do so greatly please them selves exclayming that we tread all christian virtues under feete and require nothing in Christians but faith because we teache that faith alone justefieth, whereas we by this speech never mente to exclude either hope and charitye from beinge alwaies joyned as inseparable mates with faith in the man that is justefied, or workes from being added as necessarye duties required att the handes of every justefied man; but to shew that faith is the onely hand which putteth on Christ unto Justeficacion and Christ the onely garmente which being so putt on covereth the shame of our defiled natures, hideth the imperfections of our workes, preserveth us blameles in the sighte of god before whome otherwise the very weaknes of our faith were cawse sufficiente to make us culpable, yea to shutt us out from the kingdom of heaven where nothing that is not absolute can enter.[109]

On his own account, then, his intention is not to distance himself from the doctrine of the reformers, but rather to understand and to defend it.

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[107] *Lawes* V.50.3; 2:208.22–23. Augustine died in 430 AD, years before Chalcedon. However, the principles stated by Chalcedon are already clearly grasped by Augustine.

[108] E.g., *Dublin* 39; 4:152.24–26, cited in White, *Predestination, policy, and polemic*, 135, n. 71.

[109] *Just.* 31; 5:151.13–152.3.

Both Hooker and the reformers knew Augustine well enough to be well aware of the grain of truth in the charge that their doctrine of justification was new. Augustine did not distinguish justification and sanctification in this way. However, in the context of the late medieval church, the reformers insisted that this doctrine more accurately represented Augustine's anti-Pelagian argument. Hooker agrees. A doctrine of justification founded on an inherent quality and the piety it fostered was essentially 'Pelagian' in that both left the Christian to judge of his relationship to God based on works and introspection.[110] It also left Christians prone to the two great spiritual dangers posed by Pelagianism: an illusory self-righteousness as the ground of a false confidence before God, or despair as this ground is taken away.[111] In answer, the reformed doctrine was intended to locate the ground of the Christian's confidence where Augustine had found it, in Christ as the object of faith, known and loved as he is received by the human mind and heart in the form of doctrine understood and loved.

III. Some Contemporary Questions

Hooker clearly wanted his readers to believe that his argument with respect to sin and grace was consistent with Augustine's critique of Pelagianism and the reformers' critique of late-medieval piety and theology. It may still be true that he was not sincere, or that he moved away from it over time, and that in the end what he says is inconsistent with one or both of these. These kinds of arguments have been made at length in recent literature. Peter Lake has argued that Travers and the author of *A Christian Letter* were right to be suspicious of his claims to Protestant orthodoxy. It is further suggested that Hooker was able to mount an attack on the most basic principles of Reformation doctrine that would not have been tolerated even by those English Protestants who willingly conformed to the polity of the Church of England had he not veiled it behind an argument about polity, which was itself accept-

[110] Like Hooker in *Justification*, they objected especially to the works of piety recommended to the faithful on the authority of the late medieval church as means to increase the inherent quality and so to merit further increases of grace as a kind of impenetrable maze. They also sought to avoid thinking of the Sacraments as such means. Cf. *Dublin* 17; 4:118.22–32.

[111] *Remedie* 5:376.14–23, 377.3–10.

able to them.[112] Recently, Nigel Voak has taken up Lake's argument and expanded it, concluding that in his mature view of justification, Hooker allows that justification is congruously merited (*de congruo*) and that the grace of justification makes possible a cooperation with grace in sanctification according to which the reward of salvation is merited by condignity (*de condigno*).[113]

Lake draws attention to the fact that Hooker thinks of original sin as a kind of sloth on the part of human reason and will as a result of which human beings fail consistently to pursue truth until they find it.[114] On this basis he argues that 'Hooker did not have a particularly dramatic or cataclysmic view of the effects of the fall.' In fact, compared with other Protestants, 'Hooker's vision of sin as a species of ignorance, a sort of intellectual laziness, seemed almost benign.'[115] The powers of human nature are left nearly intact in a way that appears to be inconsistent with the idea that human beings are totally depraved as a result of original sin and the fall.

Substantially, Voak agrees. After examining closely Hooker's account of the way in which this kind of sloth in the mind leads to sins of malice, sloth and passion, he concludes that according to Hooker fallen human beings retain the power to resist any particular sin considered 'distributively', but not the power to resist all sins 'collectively'.[116] Hooker's argument for free will in the sense of the freedom to choose between the goods with which human reason is presented is therefore not Pelagian, in the sense that he recognizes the need of grace to assist human nature in its weakness.[117] Voak differs from Lake, however, in

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[112] 'Hooker's whole project had represented a sort of sleight of hand whereby what amounted to a full-scale attack on Calvinist piety was passed off as a simple exercise in anti-presbyterianism.' Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 239. Cf. 'The 'Anglican Moment'? Richard Hooker and the Ideological Watershed of the 1590s' in S. Platten, ed., *Anglicanism and the Western Tradition* (Norwich, UK: Canterbury Press, 2003), 108.

[113] Nigel Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 192. Voak defines condign merit as 'merit in an unqualified sense, pertaining to an act that in itself deserves a reward', and congruous merit as 'merit in a qualified sense, pertaining to an act that, although imperfect and not strictly deserving of a reward, is still accepted to a degree by God and is rewarded'. Voak, 184.

[114] Lake cites *Lawes* I.7.7; I.8.11; III.3.3. Voak also draws attention to *Lawes* Pref.3.9; III.10.1 and *Cert.* 5:78.5–10 and 5:80.21. Cf. *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 79–80 and *Cert.* 5:71.16–20.

[115] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans*, 150.

[116] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 89.

[117] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 104–5.

allowing that Hooker does hold a doctrine of total depravity, thus taking into account those passages where Hooker describes sin and its consequences as devastating and tragic.[118] Apart from grace, the consequences of the fall are disastrous. Nonetheless, Voak argues that those who have read Hooker as an orthodox Protestant have erred by ascribing to him the view that 'the specifically Christian grace of renewal' is needed 'if the reason and the will are to function aright and are not to be totally depraved'.[119] Voak argues that this is a misreading. What is missing from it is a recognition of Hooker's espousal of what Calvin called 'common grace', by means of which people who lack this grace of renewal may yet know and obey God's will to some degree.[120] Hooker and Calvin both accept a doctrine of total depravity, and both have a doctrine of common grace. Yet, at least in the *Lawes* and the later notes and fragments, Hooker is much more optimistic than Calvin about 'the common behaviour and nature' of those who have received only this grace, 'and hence of the general effects of original sin',[121] no longer speaking of the 'heresie of freewill'.[122] In his mature view of the consequences of the fall, there is nothing with which St Thomas Aquinas might not agree.[123] There is therefore no reason to identify it as peculiarly 'Calvinist' or reformed.[124] Indeed, Hooker's mature account clearly rejects the reformed understanding of fallen human nature as 'generally hostile…to the concept of human freedom'.[125]

From this development of Lake's comments on sin in Hooker's thought, Voak goes on to argue that in his mature theology Hooker embraced the idea that human beings can cooperate with saving grace in such a way as to merit their own justification.[126] In the language of

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[118] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 100–109.
[119] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 112–113.
[120] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 109, 114.
[121] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 140. Cf. 157.
[122] *Just.* 26; 1:143.16. Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 145.
[123] No doubt this is true. However, the force of his argument presupposes an assumption stated clearly though without nuance by Nigel Atkinson. 'As Thomas is regarded as Rome's chief theologian any similarities noted between the two theologians serve, indirectly, to pull Hooker away from an explicit dependence upon Reformed Thought.' See Atkinson, *Hooker and the Authority of Scripture*, xvii–xviii. For a quite different assessment from a reformed point of view, see Arvin Vos, *Aquinas, Calvin, & Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant View of the Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: Christian University Press, 1985).
[124] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 144–145.
[125] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 148.
[126] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 149.

late-medieval theology, Voak maintains that Hooker came to believe what he had explicitly rejected in *Justification*, namely, that the grace of justification can be merited *de congruo*. After considering Hooker's account of sanctification, Voak similarly concludes that in his mature theology he also came to believe that those who have received saving grace may go on 'in some sense' to merit 'not only their salvation, but their specific eternal reward' *de condigno*.[127] Since humans have 'liberty of indifference', i.e., freedom to choose or to reject the good with which they are presented, and grace is resistible, in the sense that it is possible to reject the grace of salvation, avoidance of sin is 'congruously meritorious'.[128]

A number of considerations need to borne in mind when weighing these arguments. With respect first to Lake's argument, he himself has acknowledged the importance of the fact that the measure of Protestant orthodoxy he has applied is that of Hooker's immediate late-sixteenth century English context.[129] In this context, Hooker's work is clearly remarkable. Our argument here is simply that it is not remarkable by reason of an intention to depart from the doctrine of the reformers. With respect to Lake's comment about original sin, Voak rightly points out the need to take seriously those passages in which Hooker emphasizes the severity of the consequences of original sin. It is also helpful to recall that Hooker's description of the nature of original sin as a kind of sloth with respect to reason is substantially Augustinian. For Augustine as for Hooker, the purpose of human reason is to discern the good with the 'eye' of the understanding.[130] Its 'weakness' results in the choice of the lesser good over the greater, especially as the will attaches itself to the merely apparent good to the neglect or even repudiation of the real.[131] His argument concerning original sin is developed within this general account of sin. To think of sin as a kind of sloth did not lessen Augustine's sense of the gravity of sin and its consequences, or lead him to suppose that these might be easily

[127] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 210.
[128] Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 209–210.
[129] P. Lake, 'Business as Usual? The Immediate Reception of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 52 (2001): 469, 484–5.
[130] *Lawes* I.7.2.
[131] *Lawes* I.7.7.

overcome by a right use of the resources of fallen human nature.[132] The same may be said of Hooker.

With respect to Voak's argument that Hooker allows that actions of 'mere natural persons' may be pleasing to God, it must first be granted that Hooker certainly does believe that they may obey certain of the laws of nature in such a way as to be 'righteous' before fellow human beings in the 'external forum' to which civic life belongs. This civic virtue is profoundly ambiguous, however. As Augustine argues *The City of God*, human community after the fall is a community in sin because those who are joined in it will finite and temporal goods in such a way as to frustrate the truly human good, in which both human personality and the life of the city can flourish. This good is eternal union with God in knowledge and love. Civic virtue is properly recognized and honoured in civil life, but to the extent that it leaves human nature distorted and frustrated and human love disordered, it is altogether insufficient for the attainment of happiness.

It may be helpful to remember that for both Augustine and Hooker, evil is the privation of good.[133] For a human being to fall short of this end is therefore evil. To will the lesser good to the exclusion of the greater is the very definition of evil. It is in this sense that all human knowing and willing is sinful apart from Christ after the fall. Unable wholeheartedly to will this end, it cannot consistently will the means. In Hooker's terms, 'the way of nature' is closed to fallen humanity. Ignorant of 'the way of grace', honesty must finally despair of this end. When Hooker's remarks about the capacities of human reason, will and freedom are understood against this Augustinian background, it is not clear that what he says distances him substantially from the magisterial reformers, whatever may be said about differences of emphasis or exposition.

Voak is no doubt correct that it is not accidental that Hooker does not speak of the 'heresie of free will' after *Justification*. In his later works he is concerned to make clear that the anti-Pelagian argument of Augustine and the reformers neither makes God the author of evil nor

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[132] See Paul Rigby, 'Original Sin' in Allan D. Fitzgerald, ed., *Augustine Through the Ages* (Grand Rapids, MI, and Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1999), 607–614. Cf. *Lawes* I.7.7; 1:80.24–29, 81.8–10.

[133] *Confessions* VII.v.7 and xiii.19. He connects this doctrine with that of creation out of nothing at XII.vii.7, xxviii.38. Calvin disagreed. On this, see David J. Marshall, 'Calvin, John' in Fitzgerald, ed., *Augustine Through the Ages*, 119.

takes away human freedom and responsibility. The phrase is too easily misunderstood apart from its context in these arguments. However, as we have seen, even in *Justification* he meant by these words only to exclude the idea that the will can effect union with God after the fall *apart from* the mediation of Christ. The essential question is whether or not the reformed understanding of fallen human nature is, indeed, 'hostile to the concept of human freedom'. Hooker does not think so.

Finally, with respect to merit *de congruo*, Voak appears to be convinced by the argument of the Council of Trent that if grace can be resisted, man is not utterly passive with respect even to his first receipt of saving grace, 'since he can also reject it'.[134] Since Hooker allows in his later works that it is possible actively to resist grace, it follows that he is active in the same way to receive it. If one might justly receive blame for rejecting grace, justice requires that some kind of merit be recognized in those who do not reject grace. This does not follow, however, since the activity by which it is rejected and that by which it is received are not symmetrical.

In order to see why this is the case, it is important to remember that Hooker's understanding of nature is teleological.[135] For Hooker as for Aristotle, the highest and most important causes are final causes—the purposes for which things are done and for which creatures exist. Reason is above all the power of discovering such causes. The act of choosing what the understanding has recognized as true, good and possible therefore is in important ways unlike the activity in which it is rejected. This is especially clear in the case of love. The action of turning away from love proffered and the response by which it is received are not symmetrical. In the first case, the good known is actively rejected. In the latter, the whole reason of the action is found by the lover extrinsically in the beloved. In that sense, in turning toward the beloved, the lover is wholly passive. This does not mean, however, that the lover stands in relation to the beloved as an inanimate object to an external force. It means rather that the lover discovers the principle and source of his own thought, will, and activity outside himself, in the beloved.[136]

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[134] *CT* 6.5, ed. Schroeder, 32, '*quippe qui illam et abjicere potest*', 310.

[135] Barry Rasmussen recognized the significance of this in 'The Priority of God's Gracious Action in Richard Hooker's Hermeneutic' in W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed., *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 10–11.

[136] Augustine draws attention to this asymmetry in *On the Trinity* XIV.15 (21), trans. Stephen McKenna, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Cambridge, UK: CUP, 2002), 159.

As we have seen in his early sermons, Hooker understood the precise theological terminology of reformed soteriology in this way—that is to say, 'mystically'—as Egil Grislis has recently argued.[137] The Christian way begins, continues and ends in immediate mystical union with Christ. At the same time it proceeds from a less to a more perfect union with Christ in knowledge and love. Hooker is no less emphatic about this in the *Lawes*; for as sin has rendered nature futile as a means to union with God, 'the wisedom of God has revealed a waye mysticall and supernaturall' to that same end.[138] Human beings are lifted to participation in the life of the Trinity through Christ[139] by virtue of a 'mysticall conjunction' so that the Christian and the Church is 'of him and in him even as though our verie flesh and bones should be made continuate with his.' It is no quality or characteristic of the beloved which establishes this relationship, however. 'Wee are in Christ because he knoweth and loveth us even as partes of himself.'[140]

> The Church is in Christ as Eve was in Adam. Yea by grace we are everie of us in Christ and in his Church, as by nature wee are in those our first parentes. And his Church he frameth out of the verie flesh, the verie wounded and bleedinge side of the Sonne of man. His bodie crucified and his blood shed for the life of the world, are the true elementes of that heavenlie being, which maketh us such as him selfe is of whome wee com…Adam is in us as an originall cause of our nature and of that corruption of nature which causeth death, Christ as the cause originall of restauration to life; the person of Adam is not in us but his nature and the corruption of his nature derived into all men by propagation, Christ havinge Adams nature as wee have, but incorrupt, deriveth not nature but incorruption and that immediatlie from his owne person into all that belonge unto him.[141]

Reformed soteriology makes possible a distinction between grace and nature more clear even than Augustine's, yet also recognizes the possibility of an inseparable unity between sinful human beings and God through Christ without either denying the intrinsic character of sin or finding in it a reason to despair. Regarded from this perspective, the

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[137] Egil Grislis, 'Hooker Among the Giants: The Continuity and Creativity of Richard Hooker's Doctrine of Justification', *Cithara* 43:2 (2004): 12.

[138] *Lawes* I.11.6; 1:118.14–15.

[139] *Lawes* V.56.1–13.

[140] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:239.3–6.

[141] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:239.19–26, 240.3–9. The language of 'propagation' is Augustine's, who contrasted it with Pelagius' talk of 'imitation'.

suggestion that Hooker returned to the doctrine of merit *de congruo* and *de condigno* in his later works, after having rejected it as wholly inadequate to describe the union of Christ, the Church and the Christian soul in his early works, does not appear plausible.

IV. Conclusion

Hooker regards the reformed consensus with respect to sin and grace as a clarification of the Chalcedonian tradition of thought, then, not as its rejection. Regarded from this perspective, the reformers' teaching has the merit of showing clearly how fallen human beings and their ecclesiastical and civil institutions can be united with God without losing the character they have by nature, and without requiring that what is disordered and broken be merely replaced. Just as individuals are 'just' by virtue of the relationship with God in which they participate by faith, while their virtues remain imperfect and their wills impure, so their institutions are now able to serve the primary purpose for which they were created as 'instruments of union' with God, without in any way denying the many ways they are perverse, unjust and in error in themselves. On this account, to bring order and to mend what is broken is the fruit of grace, not the condition which must be met in order for grace to begin its work. The reformers' principle that the Christian is at once just and sinful (*simul iustus, simul peccator*) is thus understood as an explication of the principle that grace does not take away but perfects nature (*gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit*), and both are understood as implications of the orthodox Christology. It would have been unthinkable to Hooker that reformed faith should represent a departure from Christological orthodoxy, as indeed it would have been to earlier magisterial reformers. It is therefore a mistake to approach Hooker with the assumption that the reformed doctrine of justification excludes the principle that grace does not destroy but perfects nature. For Hooker, this is precisely the question at issue between himself and his adversaries, and he believes he has shown them to be in error.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PREDESTINATION

W. David Neelands

Hooker and Predestination

Richard Hooker did not publish any treatise on predestination, and his only surviving manuscript was published first by John Keble in 1836. Hooker had, nonetheless, considerable interest in this important and controversial topic, and referred to it throughout his public career. Although some have found that he changed his position considerably during the period, it has also been argued that there is no reason to suppose that this is so.[1] Differences of position about the topic flamed up as the basis for the controversy surrounding his first public appearance, a sermon at Paul's Cross in 1584, whose text apparently does not survive, and hints about his position declared in passing in *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, 1593 and 1597, led to anonymous public criticism in *A Christian Letter*, published in the second last year of his life.

Although he explicitly commented on only two errors, Hooker apparently identified six of the twenty-one supposed errors listed by the anonymous authors as related to predestination and to positions relating to the doctrine of grace which underlay his views on predestination. These six articles may be summarized, with their original titles, as follows:

5. *Of free will.* (Hooker holds that the human will is free to take or refuse, and that reason by diligence finds the good.)
6. *Of fayth and workes.* (Hooker teaches that God rewards works.)
7. *The virtue of workes.* (Hooker makes acts done by the light of nature virtuous.)
8. *Workes of supererogation.* (Hooker teaches works of supererogation.)

[1] W. David Neelands, 'Richard Hooker and the Debates about Predestination 1580–1600,' in *RHER* 43–61. The article includes detailed descriptions of the relevant passages in the Paul's Cross Sermon, the *Lawes* and the Sermons, which need not be repeated here.

9. *None free from all sinne.* (Hooker teaches that it is possible to avoid all great and grievous sins.)
10. *Predestination.* (Hooker teaches, against predestination, that God has a mutable and occasioned will.)[2]

The Dublin Fragments

Although his manuscript for a considered response is undoubtedly incomplete, it has, since its re-discovery in the nineteenth century, been recognized as cogent and comprehensive as far at it goes, and is now published in a critical edition that retains the section numbers added by Keble.[3] Hooker begins with an extended treatment of 'Grace and Free Will' and eventually mentions specifically the fifth article of *A Christian Letter.*[4] A summary of the Dublin manuscript, omitting only the middle section comprising about ten percent of the manuscript, and dealing with grace and the sacraments, follows:

Grace and Free Will[5]

1. To do that which is acceptable to God, we must have God's preventing and helping grace, yet we have not lost the *aptness* of our wills, or else grace would be of no avail, though because of sin our wills have lost their *ableness* for good.
2. Neither foreknowledge, nor predestination, nor grace, impose necessity on human freedom; God's grace, both external and internal, draws us amiably not by force; grace perfects nature, it does not destroy it.
3. God makes free *external* offers of grace, but also *inwardly* illumines us through grace; there is no free desire for heavenly things without the grace of God working in us.
4. Although the state of glory will take away any possibility of sinning, in our present state grace does not take away the possibility of sinning nor compel our wills to good actions.
5. Yet we have sufficient knowledge from God to discern goodness; ignorance of the good derives from our laziness.
6. Human reason may know natural laws without God's assistance; sanctifying grace is required to learn saving knowledge. Calvin himself distinguishes natural and supernatural laws.

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[2] *ACL* 5–10; 4:17–28.
[3] *FLE* 4:99–167.
[4] *Dublin* 13; 4:112–113.
[5] *Dublin* 1–13; 4:101–113.

7. There is no natural way to discover supernatural laws, such as God's prohibition to Adam or God's mysteries of salvation through Christ; because of sin we also require grace to know and observe natural laws.
8. We acknowledge, with St. Paul, that sin deceives us, and our laziness breeds carelessness, so that we choose evil. Yet precedent grace brings life to our reason and gives good desires, and subsequent grace allows us to see clearly and allows our wills to incline to good.
9. Human will is moved by desire of the real or apparent goodness of what is desired; if right reason does not correct the 'judgement of sense', we slip into evil sensuality, opposed to the natural law, which reason can know, as well as to supernatural law, which requires God's revelation.
10. There are different senses of 'grace': (1) God's undeserved love and favour; (2) offered means of *outward* instruction; and (3) that grace that works *inwardly*. Pelagius restricted grace to outward grace.
11. Although Pelagius' view of a natural sufficiency without grace was generally rejected, some held that human beings retained the *ability* to assent to grace externally offered, and on account of this to receive the inward grace required.
12. These 'Demipelagians' were condemned by the [second] Council of Orange [A.D. 529]; human beings cannot accept grace offered without inward and preventing grace. Demipelagians accepted the necessity of inward grace, unlike Pelagius himself, but limited the work to perfecting what good human desires without grace had begun.

Fifth Article

13. Although we must always affirm the need for inward sanctifying grace, we must not ignore the outward grace of exhortation and the necessity of our labour so that God's grace becomes unprofitable. As Dionysius held, God does not lead us to virtue against our wills, but through our wills. In summary, God's grace is absolutely sufficient for all, and all our good works depend on him alone.

It will be obvious from this summary that Hooker has returned to some of his principal positions in the *Lawes*, such as the authority of reason and of the church in spiritual and doctrinal matters.[6]

[6] Reflected sequentially in his autograph notes interspersed in the text of *A Christian Letter* related to article three and four respectively (*FLE* 4:14.11–18). As these notes make clear, the critics' own resort to human authority, the potential controversies a Christian might have with infidels, the challenge of early Christians to Roman authorities and the rewards and punishments awarded for virtues and vices illustrate the forum of human reason and of human ecclesiastical authority in doctrinal matters (4:13.1–6; 4:13.14–20; 4:13.27–14.2; 4:14.21–23). For an extended treatment of Hooker's position on the authority of human reason and the voice of the Church in relation to Scripture, see W. David Neelands, 'Hooker on Scripture, Reason and

For the first time, we have an extended analysis of the grace of God, to provide a framework for Hooker to defend himself on the various charges. It is important, he holds, to note that there are at least three important and different senses of grace: (1) God's undeserved love and favour; (2) offered means of *outward* instruction and doctrine; and (3) that grace that works *inwardly* in human hearts. Pelagius had mistakenly restricted grace to outward grace.[7]

The first sense gives, one may presume, the basis of all theologies of grace: grace is a quality or aspect of God, such that all of God's activities flow from grace. The second sense, 'offered means of outward instruction' might easily be overlooked by theologians in the Augustinian tradition, and is explicitly identified by Hooker as the sense given by Pelagius; it is, nevertheless, of critical importance for Hooker, in the current argument. The third sense, 'that grace that works inwardly', is the principal sense understood by the critics, and shared by Hooker himself. This distinction grew out of the Pelagian controversy, which Hooker traces in §§10–12[8] and again in the third fragment which addresses '*The Tenth Article touching predestination*' (§§36–39).[9] Hooker here illustrates the (human) authority of the church in action, in arbitrating matters of doctrinal dispute, as described in Article 20 of the *Thirty-nine Articles*.[10] It was not enough for the (Western) church to reach a consensus against Pelagius: a group of 'Demipelagians' within the French Church accepted Augustine's insistence that *inward* grace is given, but treated this gift as a reward for obedience to the outward grace of instruction. Their position was rejected, Hooker believed, at the local Latin Council of Orange in 529, which reaffirmed Augustine's position: inward grace is not a reward but a requirement for obedient and virtuous human action.

Hooker concludes this section with his summary response to the fifth article of *A Christian Letter*: the church has indeed decided, with

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"Tradition",' in *RHC*, 75–94. In the face of criticism, Hooker does not in any way give up his spirited defence of the use of reason in the *Lawes*, incidentally referring, in the *Dublin Fragments* to the 'voice of reason' as 'the voice of God,' at least in one specific context. *Dublin* 9; 4:108.6–7.

[7] *Dublin* 10; 4:109.4–110.5. For an extended and careful account of Hooker's treatment of grace in the *Dublin Fragments*, see Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 266–317.

[8] *FLE* 4:109–111.

[9] *FLE* 4:147.32–153.6.

[10] Neelands, 'Scripture, Reason and "Tradition",' in *RHC*, 89–94.

Augustine, and confirmed by the [second] Council of Orange, that inward grace—which he calls a 'sanctifying grace'—is required, and it is described in glowing terms.[11] Yet, as Hilary makes clear, this wonderful gift does not make the second sort of grace—the instrument of God's favour to our good—obsolete, since *labour* is still required:

> For lett the Spiritt bee never soe prompt, if labour and exercise slacken, wee faile. The fruits of the Spiritt doe not follow men as the shadowe doth the bodie of their owne accord. If the grace of sanctification did soe worke, what should the grace of exhortation neede? It were even as superfluous and vaine to stirre men up unto good, as to request them when they walke abroad not to loose their shadowes. Grace is not given us to abandon labour, butt labour required least our sluggishnes should make the grace of God unprofitable. Shall wee betake ourselves to our ease, and in that sorte referre salvation to Gods grace, as if wee had nothing to doe with it, because without it wee can doe nothing? *Pelagius* urged labour, for the attainement of æternall life without necessitie of Gods grace, if wee teach grace without necessitie of mans labour, wee use one error as a nayle to drive out another. . . . In summe the grace of God hath aboundantlie sufficient for all.[12]

Thus Hooker establishes a pattern that will be decisive for his treatment of predestination, and provides a basis for his conviction that grace is universally offered and sufficient for all: the *outward instruction* or exhortation to good works is both gracious and given to all. We will return to this principle in the third section. For now, it should be noted that outward instruction relates to the genuine authority of human reason. We have sufficient knowledge from God to discern goodness, but have constitutional ignorance, derived from our laziness, and usually need exhortation, that is, external grace, to bring our reason back again with its accompanying good desires.[13]

There are, as well, other principles that Hooker has laid down here. He quotes here four passages of Scripture, then a passage from *On the Divine Names* of Pseudo-Dionysius, a supposed apostolic author, emphasizing another key principle, that God does not lead us to virtue by force, but through our wills.[14] Grace, like foreknowledge, includes the grace

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[11] *Dublin* 13; 4:112.2–18.
[12] *Dublin* 13; 4:112.22–113.18.
[13] *Dublin* 5–8; 4:105.10–108.1.
[14] Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.33. See *Dublin* 13; 4:113.10–17. See John Booty's Commentary, *FLE* 4:246.

of predestination, and imposes no necessity on human freedom.[15] As the scholastic authors of the middle ages summed it up, 'grace perfects nature, it does not destroy it'.[16]

This key point, already addressed (§2), is the basis for Hooker's controversial view that a freedom of the will remains in the human being, an 'aptness' if not an 'ableness' (§1), and thus some vestige of original created gifts, though helpless.[17] With these, he was in a position to respond to article five of *A Christian Letter*, but did not draw out the conclusion. With respect to article five, he has made clear that, although we are unable to do good without grace, we retain our aptness, or free will. He would return later to the matter of articles six to nine.

After an interlude addressing the relationship of grace and the sacraments, relating the gifts of grace in the *instruments* of the sacraments to virtuous life, and thus to the same sanctifying grace that the *instruments* of outward grace give for virtuous life,[18] Hooker turns to the major part of the treatise, on Grace and Predestination, comprising nearly seventy percent of the text.

Hooker divided this portion into seven unequal sections:

The Tenth Article touching Predestination

19. In order to respond to article 10 of *A Christian Letter*, some fundamental discussion is required.

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[15] This was an important principle to emphasize, given that the fashionable definition of predestination, deriving from John Calvin, was entirely 'necessitarian' in tone. For Calvin, human beings have no choice either when or whether they move to respond to God's call to them. 'The elect are gathered into Christ's flock by a call not immediately at birth, and not all at the same time, but according as it pleases God to dispose his grace to them.' *Inst.* III.24.10 (1539); LCC 2: 976.

[16] *Dublin* 2; 4:102.34–103.6. Compare *ST* Ia q1. a8; see also *ST* IIa IIæ q26. a13, where the stronger principle that 'nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory, no less than grace, the beginning of glory in us.' See Neelands, 'Scripture, Reason and "Tradition",' in *RHC*, 76–82.

[17] For an extended treatment of Hooker's likely view of the later Calvinist doctrine of total depravity and of the use of 'aptness' by Hooker, see W. David Neelands, *The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker* (ThD dissertation, Trinity College and University of Toronto, 1988), 160–185.

[18] *Dublin* 14, 18; 4:115, 119–121. Although it is not described as such here, Hooker elsewhere describes baptism, an act of the visible church, as part of God's external vocation, offered to all, even to those who may not be elect. *Lawes* V.60.3; 2:256.10–26. See Neelands, 'Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and Invisible Church,' in *RHER* 104.

I. *The difference between things contingent and necessary*

20. In contingent effects, the causes may or may not produce the effects in question.
21. Examples of necessary and contingent effects; to be learned or virtuous is contingent, since not all human beings have these qualities.
22. Between the absolutely necessary and the utterly contingent lie a group of contingent effects that nevertheless resemble the necessary, since they are dependable. Such include considered virtuous habits, which produce predicable results, and the providence of God, that aids human industry in bringing about such dependable contingencies.

In order to provide for the discussion of fundamentals he believes required, Hooker turns first to a description of the traditional philosophical distinction between things necessary and things contingent. Those things are contingent for which their causes may or may not produce them as results; those things are necessary for which their causes must produce them as results. For example, the motion of the Sun must be treated as necessary, involuntary and natural. The power of sensation and the faculty of reason are always found in human beings. By contrast, Socrates' walking is contingent; Socrates might walk or not walk. Developed reason, or learning, and virtue are not always found in human beings. There are, in addition, whole classes of things 'casual', that is things that cannot be affirmed or predicted before they come to pass, which after they have come to pass cannot be doubted as actual, such as most of the particulars that are observed and known.

Thus necessary things are always dependable, but there are various dependable things that are not therefore necessary. In this important classification, Hooker places both the providence of God and developed human virtues. Neither is necessary: God is not compelled to act according to his particular providence, nor are human beings automatically virtuous. Yet the providence of God is dependable and virtuous human beings act virtuously. Both human virtue and God's providence are important elements in Hooker's account of predestination, as will emerge later in the text. Hooker rejects notions of absolute Destiny and sheer Chance as compatible with Christian truth; 'in between', as it were, is the doctrine of divine providence, which is the starting point for a discussion of predestination.[19] Providence provides the analogy, at

[19] See Egil Grislis, 'Providence, Predestination, and Free Will in Richard Hooker's Theology,' in *RHER* 89–95. In setting predestination within the topic of providence, Hooker returned to a venerable tradition, including Peter Martyr and others, and

the divine level, of 'matters indifferent', the area of human decision, at the human level. God's providence is neither pure Determinism, like *Destiny*, nor purely arbitrary, like *Chance*. Yet it is, like virtue in a virtuous human being, dependable.

II. *That God's eternal and infallible foresight of all things maketh not all things to be of necessity*

23. God's foreknowledge does not make all things necessary.

The brief second section of his argument deals with only one point: God's foresight, though from eternity and without error, does not make all things necessary. As Hooker had already noted (§2), foreknowledge shares with both grace and predestination this character. While the philosophical conundrum about the non-necessity of future contingent facts had already been dealt with by Aristotle and by Augustine, and it is unlikely that many in Hooker's time drew erroneous conclusions about predestination from a mistake about God's foresight, Hooker appears to have felt it important to set the stage for predestination, by clearly pointing out the non-necessitarian character of God's foresight, which precedes predestination in the *ordo salutis* of *Romans* 8:28 ff. When God foretells future events in Scripture, such events must come to pass unless averted by God—they are 'necessities of reason'—but not by that fact real necessities: neither prescience nor foreknowledge has any causal efficacy.[20]

III. *Of God's will touching all things that are; of his will to create and govern the world not considered as being evil, and of the first beginning of evil in the world*

24. God's foreknowledge includes possibilities not actualized. God foreknows sin, but does not foreordain sin.

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turned away from Calvin, who came to distance predestination and providence. *Locus on Predestination*, 10, in Peter Martyr Vermigli, *Predestination and Justification: two theological loci*, ed. Frank A. James (Kirksville, Missouri, 2003), 17–18.

[20] Compare *Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination* (*FLE* 4:84.6–86.5) for Hooker's preliminary notes on §23. The preceding passage (4:83.1–84.5) addressed to a point raised in *ACL* 10, relating to the prayer that all be saved (4:27.12–20), but Hooker does not seem to have taken up this particular criticism in the portions of his treatise that survive.

> 25. The natural inclination of God's will is only to good effects; there is wisdom in all God's determinations, though we may not always understand that wisdom.
> 26. God's determinate will is either positive, in which he works himself, or permissive in what God's creatures do, or privative, as when he withholds grace from some. All God's determinations are for good.

Hooker's third section has a title, but is not numbered in the manuscript. It proceeds to develop the philosophical point about God's foreknowledge, in order to deal with the problem of the reality of evil in creation: God must have foreknown that there would be evil, but would this not compromise his goodness? Hooker takes a traditional theological line on this matter. God's foreknowledge depends, in part, on his perfect knowledge of secondary causes; and God also foresees the possibilities that are never actualised. But God's foreknowledge does not come from any foreappointment or predetermination of all things, as others have held. That means that God foreknows sin, since sin is a possibility, but does not foreordain it: God is not the author of sin, as he would be if it were foreordained. On the contrary, God's will delights only in good things: we cannot always penetrate God's will, but know that God does not will anything unjust or evil; God's commandments cannot be inconsistent with his own wisdom.[21]

Referring to Augustine's *De Trinitate*, Hooker distinguishes between God's determinate (that is, as Hooker has established, non-necessitated) will as it is *positive*, in 'whatsoever himselfe worketh', and *permissive*, in that 'he willeth by permission, that which his creatures doe.' Hooker then goes on to add, unsupported by the quotation from Augustine, a third form of determinate will, a 'negative or privative will alsoe wherby he withholdeth his graces from some.' In this sense, Scripture describes God in terms of casting some asleep, hardening some hearts, and taking things away from some, which descriptions are to be understood in terms of God's withholding what he could give, for instance vigilance, a softening of the heart, and a gift or grace. This interpretive structure will become important later in diffusing alleged cases from Scripture where God appears actively to make the reprobate obdurate. Hooker, finally, reaffirms the fundamental conviction that all God's determinations are for good, again a preliminary to his conclusions about predestination.

[21] *Dublin* 25; 4:131.14 seq.

IV. *The creation and [governance] of the world not yet considered as being evil. And touching the first beginning of evil in the world*

> 27. God's providence is over all, and the root of both creation, in which God's will is gracious, beneficial and bountiful, and governance, in which God's will is merciful by his own accord, and wrathful by occasion offered.
> 28. God willed that angels and men would find the happiness of eternal life as a reward, and therefore gave them liberty; sin came to be through a voluntary choice of free will, which God permitted.
> 29. But God is not the author of sin. Angels and human beings must take responsibility for their sin.

Based on these preliminaries, Hooker then moves, in a separate new fourth section, which is not numbered in the manuscript, to discuss the origin of evil. God's providence, which he has established as being contingent, not necessitated, yet dependable and predictable, is universal, and always good, since good is, for Hooker, 'before evill both in dignitie and in Nature (for wee cannot without good define and conceive what evill is)'. The point is important; good and evil are not simply two alternatives, to be chosen indifferently. Evil is, in logic and in reality, parasitic on the sense of good; for example, as Hooker points out elsewhere,[22] no one can choose evil except as an apparent good.

Thus in both creation and the governance of the creation, God's actions are directed by good:

> Butt his providence . . . is over all. All things have their beginning from him, by him their continuance, and in him their end. In power he ordereth them, butt yett with gentlenes;[23] mightily, butt yett in amiable manner. Soe that under him they feele noe unpleasant constraint, framed they are to his inclination without violence to their owne, such is the course of his heavenly Regiment, such his wisdome to over rule foreceably without force. This providence of God is both generall over the kindes of things, and such alsoe as extendeth unto all particulars in each kind.[24]

Thus, as Hooker will come to suggest, predestination, which must be seen under the umbrella of God's providence, is not compelling, just as neither foreknowledge nor grace are compelling. Nevertheless, God's

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[22] *Lawes* I.7.6; 1:80.1–6.

[23] An allusion to *Wisdom* 8.1. See below for the place of this 'sweet and amiable ordering' in the theology of Hooker.

[24] *Dublin* 27; 4:134.21–30. Compare *Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination* (*FLE* 4:86.11–89.35) for Hooker's preliminary notes on creation and governance in preparation for §27.

governance must include his just anger at evil; this anger is, nevertheless, always based on the *occasion* that gives rise to it.[25]

Hooker then turns to the question of the relation of salvation to rewards and punishments. On the surface, this must have sounded like a risky premise, since it would invite a superficial comparison to the rejected views of Pelagius, and especially to the Reformation dismissal of the possibility of any merit in human works. As Hooker recognized, discussion of God's rewards for virtue and punishment for vice did echo a dominant Scriptural drift that appears to support Pelagius' case, and Hooker had already built a discussion of rewards and punishments into the argument of the first book of the *Lawes* on the basic assumptions of human society and order.[26] This was related to articles six, seven, and eight of *A Christian Letter*, but Hooker does not spell out the connection. The very gift of liberty, to both angels and human beings, he argues, comes from God's providential ordering that eternal life should involve the happiness of the creature, and the joy of receiving that happiness as a result of labour, or in other words, as a reward—that is, to use the previous philosophical framework Hooker had developed, through the developed and dependable, though contingent and not necessary, virtues of the rational creature.

The emergence of sin, in both angels and human beings is therefore a contingent consequence of God's providence: it was not necessitated, but it came through a voluntary choice, in the exercise of the gift of liberty, which God's permissive will allowed. Echoing Augustinian tradition, Hooker pointed out that angels and human beings were created with grace sufficient not to sin; in the developed and dependable state

[25] Here is a reference to Hooker's disputed view that there is in God's will both a universal general will to the good of all, and an occasioned will to punishment. This was the matter of article 10 of *ACL*, in a narrow sense, but it occupied the whole extended treatise on predestination. Hooker had been publicly criticized for this view for at least fifteen years. See Neelands, 'Predestination,' in *RHER* 45–48.

[26] *Lawes* I.9; 1:93–95: 'the benefit of keeping that law which reason teacheth'. The relationship of that chapter with the *Dublin Fragments* is considerable; in that chapter, the following theses are advanced: (a) the observation of the law of rational human nature is righteousness and makes rewards meaningful; (b) not observing rational human nature is sin, and makes punishment meaningful; (c) reward and punishment presuppose actions are willingly done, not under compulsion; (d) rewards and punishments come from those above us; (e) human superiors reward or punish external actions but God alone rewards or punishes inward affections.

of glory, the virtue of human beings will be so developed as they can not sin.[27]

Then follows Hooker's most significant conclusion, a premonition of his treatment of reprobation: God is not the author of sin, and this should be the consensus of the whole Christian world, considering the church's previous arbitration of error on this score.[28] That is, according to the 'voice of the Church'—Calvin included—God is not the author of sin (though he providentially permits it, and providentially provides punishments for it).

V. *What the will of God is touching man, the sin of the world being presupposed*

> 30. On account of sin, God's provident governance includes divine wrath, which we feel in our mortality.
> 31. God's justice proportions punishment to the degrees of sin, infinite because sin is against an infinite good, variable according to degrees of wickedness. But God's mercy is also operative, offering undeserved eternal life and reward for virtues performed under his grace.
> 32. God foresees sin and appoints punishment because of it; yet God's general will remains that all be saved, as shown in God's promises *and* threats.
> 33. God's general providence ordained that Christ should be a sufficient remedy for the sin of all.

The fifth section, also unnumbered, but given a full title, develops this point at considerable length, apparently since this is crucial to the account of predestination Hooker was preparing in response to his critics in *A Christian Letter.*

God's general providence, concerned in creation with the happiness in virtue of the rational creature, now displays a new aspect, which had not been manifest apart from sin and sin's punishment, both of which had all along been possibilities.

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[27] Hooker provides a considerable discussion of the fall of angels, including speculation that they fell, as Gregory of Nyssa and others had suggested, because of their jealousy for the favour shown to human beings. This special attention to angelic destiny is parallel to Hooker's treatment of angelic law in *Lawes* I.4; 1:69–72, which had intruded into Thomas's ordering of law, which Hooker seems otherwise to have followed. Compare *Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination* for Hooker's preliminary notes on §29, on the origin of sin in the world. See *FLE* 4:90.1–94.5.

[28] *Dublin* 29; 4:138.7–32. It is perhaps worth pointing out that Calvin's church is part of this consensus, and Calvin a hero in developing it.

> The lawes of his providence wee terme such generall rules, as it pleaseth God to follow in governing the severall kinds of things, and especially in conducting reasonable creatures unto the end for which they were made. And because in the subject of his providence over reasonable creatures, there is now an addition of sinne which was not before considered, the Lawes of his generall providence in regard of this addition, are somewhat different from such, as we have allreadie noted. For as Nature draweth love from God, soe corruption of nature procureth hatred, it being as naturall to him to abhorre that which defaceth his handie worke, as to delight in the absolute perfection which himselfe hath given. Soe that Sinne hath opened now in God everie way of wrath which before was shutt. Sinne hath awakened justice, which otherwise might have slept.[29]

God, as it were, had a pre-lapsarian direction of his will: the happiness of all. With a view of the actuality, and universality of sin, mortality is now the punishment for all.[30] In other words, this is not a change of the will of God, but an actual manifestation of the possibility of punishment, which was built into God's providential provision of happiness in the rational creature, along with reward. Yet it remains a matter of judgement, not 'furie'. God has not changed, even though what Hooker earlier called his positive will now entails judgement, which had been merely a possibility before.

Hooker distinguishes proportions in human punishment. By the measure of the object of the sin, God, the sin is infinite, and there is one eternal punishment appropriate for all sinners; yet by measure of the subject, 'that creature in whome sinne is', punishments admit of varieties, as Scripture makes clear: 'degrees in wickenes have answerable degrees in the waight of their endles punishment.' Further, God has condescended to 'favorable conditions'

> except it be where incurable malice, on the part of the sinfull themselves, will not suffer mercie with such conditions to take place, leadeth still to eternall life by an amiable course, framed even according to the verie state wherein wee now are. Hee is not wanting to the world in any necessarie thing for the attainement of eternall life, though many things be necessarie now, which according to our first condition wee needed not.[31]

In other words, duties remain, but additional assistance is available. God's mercy and love are not to be frustrated. The rules have not

[29] *Dublin* 30; 4:139.11–23.
[30] *Dublin* 30; 4:140.1–4.
[31] *Dublin* 31; 4:140.29–141.3.

changed; only God's condescension to the sinner. Hooker lays great stress on the importance of God's grace, presumably including the outward instruction referred to earlier, and on our *labour* as a result of it.[32] Salvation is still offered, and still possible, though because of sin extra graces are necessary. Eternal life is now bestowed as God's 'owne free and undeserved guift', but there continue to be 'great varieties of rewards proportioned to the verie degrees of those labours, which to performe' he himself by his grace inableth.' Thus we receive graces Adam did not, since our *ability* to stand is now lost. And punishments in this world are no indication of eternal punishment, but rather to be looked upon as gracious chastisements.

Hooker then explicitly links various of the themes he has developed: the contingent; the positive will of God; the non-necessity of predestination; the significance of occasion for God's positive will; the promises of rewards and the threats of punishment; and the relation of predestination to the purposes of providence:

> If therefore wee looke upon the ranck or chaine of things vuluntarilie derived from the positive will of God, wee behold the riches of his glorie proposed as the end of all, wee behold the beatitude of men and Angells ordained as a meane unto that end, graces and blessings in all aboundance referred as meanes unto that happiness, God be blessed for evermore, the Voluntarie author of all those graces. Butt concerning the heapes of evills which doe soe overwhelme the world, compare them with God, and from the greatest to the least of them, he disclaimeth them all. He refuseth utterly to be intituled eyther *Alpha*, or, *Omega*, the beginning or the ende of any evill. The evill of Sinne is within the compasse of Gods prescience, butt nott of his Predestination, or foreordaining will. The evill of punishment is within the compasse of Gods foreappointed and determining will, butt by occasion of precedent Sinne.[33]

Thus, although Gods consequent will actualises the possibility of punishment for sin, infinite eternal punishment and temporal punishments, yet the fashionable conclusion that God ordained both our sins and their punishment 'for his glory' makes no sense:

> Sinne is noe plant of Gods setting. He seeth and findeth it a thing irregular, exorbitant and altogether out of course. It is unto him an occasion of sundrie acts of mercie, both an occasion and a cause of punishment: by which mercie and justice, although God be many wayes greatly glo-

[32] *Dublin* 10, 13.
[33] *Dublin* 32; 4:141.32–142.13.

> rifyed, yet is not this glorie of God, anie other in respect of sinne, then only an accidentall event. Wee cannot saye therefore truely, that… he did ordaine to his glorie our punishment, and for matter of punishment our sinnes. For punishment is to the will of God noe desired end, butt a consequent of ensuing sinne; and in regard of sinn, his glorie an event thereof, butt no proper effect.[34]

Thus God is not the cause of sin; Gods punishment is a consequent; and God's glory is not the result of sin, or his righteous anger, but the condition of the display of mercy.

God's general will remains that all be saved, as shown in his promises and in his continuing threats, for threats would make no difference unless there were benefit in responding to them:

> For sinne altereth not his nature, though it change ours. His generall will, and the principall desire whereunto of his owne naturall bent he inclineth still, is, that all men may enjoy the full perfection of that happines, which is their ende. Signes of the generall inclination of God, are all promises which he maketh in holy Scripture, all the Precepts which he giveth of godlines and vertue, all Prohibitons of sinn and threatnings against offenders, all cousells, exortations, admonitions, tolerations, protestations, and complaints. Yea all the workes of his mercifull providence in upholding the good estate of the World, are signes of that desire, which the Schoolemen therefore terme *his signifyed will, Damascen* the *principall* will of God. And according to this will, he desireth not the death, noe not of the wicked, butt rather that they might be converted and live. He longeth for nothing more then that all men might be saved.[35]

This bold statement of the continuation of the universal salvific will of God sets the stage for the work of Christ: 'Hee that willeth the ende, must needes will alsoe the meanes wherby wee are brought unto it.' In other words, the person and work of Christ are all part and parcel of God's original and universal saving will. Hooker thus speaks in advance against any notion of an atonement in Christ limited in principle, offering a catena of New Testament texts stressing the universality of Christ's saving work. Christ is 'a medecine sufficient for all', the gospel of Christ 'a most sufficient remedy for the sinne of mankind.'[36]

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[34] *Dublin* 32; 4:142.20–32.

[35] See *Dublin* 32; 4:143.5–18. It need hardly be noted that Hooker again returns to his confuted distinction between the general and signified will of God, present in his theology from the time of his first public statements. See above.

[36] *Dublin* 33; 4:144.3–28.

Yet, although the work of Christ is, by the providence of God and Christ's will, sufficient for all, it is not efficacious for all; this passage is immediately followed by the following clause, which is a transition to the sixth and longest section of the text:

> …although to ordaine in whome particularly it shall be forceable *and effectuall be an act* of special or personall providence.[37]

VI. *The cause of God's [reprobation of the wicked]*

34. Therefore the cause of the damnation of some human beings must be in them, not God.
35. Yet although all would deserve to die, God's 'good pleasure' has determined mercy and love before the world was formed to Christ and to those human beings to be spared in Christ.
36. Although Augustine initially accounted for election because of foreseen faith, he later came to see that it was entirely favour, liberality and grace that determined the act of the will of God to elect some and justice that determined the act of the will of God to condemn those not chosen.
37. Alarm at Augustine's later view raised questions about previous authors, about free will and about the role of exhortation to godliness and virtue in relation to immutable predestination. Eventually, Augustine's later view prevailed at the [second] Council of Orange [AD 529].
38. After Prosper of Aquitaine died, confusion arose, and one Lucidus pressed Augustine's conclusions too far; his views were rejected at a Synod at Arles [c. AD 472].
39. Summary. The cause of election is in God and God's Christ; the cause of damnation is in the damned.
40. God's appointed means of bringing Christ's work to effect in the elect begins with outward vocation into the fellowship of God's people, as in Israel, which includes temporary response in some.
41. Yet the fact that the outward grace of vocation is temporary in some does not mean that the election of Israel is broken, but that a greater salvation may come.
42. It is *inward* grace that is God's means to bring to life. The obdurate remain so because of malice and previous sin.
43. Mercy may justly do good where it will; justice may justly withhold good.
44. Although the obdurate blame God, mercy is the only cause of the good we receive and sin is the only cause of the evil we receive.
45. God may eventually give inward grace to the obdurate; the visible election of the people of God endures; God also *inwardly* chooses some in Christ.

[37] *Dublin* 33; 4:144.28–30.

> 46. The elect may resist God obstinately, but God's election in them, totally undeserved, will inevitably bring them and only them to glory.[38]

Hooker may have removed the blame from God and Christ for the damnation of any individual person, but how can he account for the damnation of any, if it is the will of God that all be saved, and Christ's work and Gods grace is sufficient for all?

The sixth section of the treatise is by far the longest, comprising more than a quarter of the whole. It moves in several steps. The first step (§§34–35) develops the conclusion that human beings are responsible for their damnation and God for the salvation of those who nevertheless do not deserve salvation. It is only because of 'personal impediment' that God's will does not succeed in some particular human beings, and this resistance gives rise to a 'secondary kind of will' in God, contrary to God's general inclination towards the human race. But God's 'nature is to hate nothing which he hath made'.[39] The 'decree of condemnation', however, is an act of hatred;

> the cause of this affection towards man, must needes be in man some qualitie whereof God is himselfe noe author. . . . Divells were not ordeyned of God for Hell fyer, butt Hell-fyer for them, and for men soe farre forth as it was foreseene, that men would be like them.[40]

It is important, especially since certain passages of Scripture that seem to suggest that God deliberately created human beings for destruction, and led them there, to distinguish between the results of God's decisions and his purposes; God's decision concerning reprobates is, therefore, a consequence of what they have made themselves, not part of his antecedent will.[41]

The second step (§§36–39), returns to the history of the Church developing a consensus on a disputed question, in the rejection of Pelagianism and the aftermath. The early church authors commonly agreed that 'reprobation presupposeth foreseene sinne.'[42] Augustine's

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[38] §46 includes a partial appropriation of the *Lambeth Articles* of 1595.

[39] Hooker provides the biblical text *Ezekiel* 18:21, 23. This phrase, however, more closely follows various liturgical texts in the *Book of Common Prayer*—the Absolution in Morning Prayer, the Collect for Ash Wednesday, and the third Collect for Good Friday—and is derived from a medieval source, the Solemn Prayers for Good Friday in the Sarum rite, but linked to another passage from *Ezekiel* 33:11.

[40] *Dublin* 34; 4:145.19–146.4.

[41] *Dublin* 34; 4:146.14–18.

[42] *Dublin* 35; 4:147.4.

initial position against Pelagius, denying Pelagius' position that made human merit the cause of grace, attributed the 'wellspring' of graces to 'Gods eternall Predestination', but made the foresight of faith the basis for election and the foresight of lack of faith the basis for rejection.[43]

Yet mercy, an act of God's favour, termed '*the good pleasure of Allmightie God*'[44] by the Apostle Paul, takes precedence over justice. Augustine came to review his initial judgement, which had made both election and rejection matters of justice, and to confer on mercy its proper precedence over justice. Thus, while he did not change his views substantially about who were judged on account of their unbelief and impiety, he came to see that election (based on mercy) must precede grace, which itself precedes faith. The *good pleasure* of God's will must alone be the source of the salvation of any, and the act of electing some meant leaving the rest to their just deserts in eternal condemnation. His 'latter judgement' is summarized as follows:

> the whole body of mankind in the view of Gods eternall knowledge, lay universally polluted with sinne, worthy of condemnation and death, that over the masse of corruption, there passed twoe Acts of the will of God. An act of favor, liberalitie and grace, choosing part to be made partakers of everlastinge glorie; and an Act of Justice, forsaking the rest and adjudging them to endlesse perdition, these vessels of wrath, those of mercie, which mercie is in Gods elect, soe peculiar, that to them and to none else (for their number is definitly knowne, and can neyther be increast nor diminished) to them it allotteth immortalitie and all things thereunto appartaining, them it predestinateth, it calleth, justifieth, gloryifyeth them, it powreth voluntarily that spiritt into their hearts, which spiritt soe given is the roote of their verie first desiers and motions, tending to immortalitie; as for others on whome such grace is not bestowed there is justly assigned, and immutablie to everie of them, the lott of eternall condemnation.[45]

Although Hooker appears to speak of a *double* act, the language of predestination applies strictly only to those elect, as in St. Paul; the others are 'forsaken' to what they deserve, the model of predestination known in the Middle Ages as *preterition*; mercy takes precedence over justice.

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[43] *Dublin* 36; 4:148.11–19.

[44] *Dublin* 35; 4:147.21. The phrase 'will of the good pleasure of God' (compare *Ephesians* 1:5) had been used by Whitgift in *correcting* Whitaker's phrase 'absolute and simple will of God' in the draft article that became the second of the Lambeth Articles of 1595.

[45] *Dublin* 36; 4:148.23–149.4.

If this account by Augustine was more effective in combating Pelagius' errors, it raised consternation broadly in the Western Church, for it appeared not to do justice to much Christian teaching that had gone before, and resistance to Augustine's account, both of prevenient grace and of predestination, surfaced. Augustine's account of predestination, in particular, seemed to contradict respected earlier voices who had spoken about predestination more like the early Augustine. Some also concluded that Augustine's account made irrelevant exhortations to godliness and virtue, always a part of Christian teaching, and Pelagius' strongest argument, especially since Augustine had not made clear whether predestination took away free will or not. Augustine died before these questions had been completely solved, leaving Prosper of Aquitaine to continue the defence of his position. Ultimately, a summary of Augustine's teaching on grace and free will similar to Prosper's was adopted by the [second] Council of Orange in 529 AD. Before that time, after Prosper's death, considerable confusion arose, and Augustine's conclusions were pushed in an extreme direction by one Lucidus, who defended an absolute predestination, whereby God unconditionally predestined some to life and others to death, so that the elect had nothing to do to receive their salvation, and the damned were outside the compass of Christ's saving work; Christ did not die for them. Bearing in mind that the views attributed to Lucidus were actually current in Hooker's time, Hooker's remark that these debates about Augustine were generally not well-informed is particularly dismissive of his contemporaries. Lucidus recanted his position at a local Synod in Arles [ca. AD 473].[46] Hooker summarized the conclusions of the Synod as follows:

> 1. Predestination as St Augustin himselfe taught it, doeth noe way diminish the great necessitie of labour required att our hands, nor 2. import that originall sinne, is the only cause of destruction or exprobation; nor 3. that Gods foreknowledge is the cause why any man doeth perish,

[46] Hooker clearly valued the case of Lucidus, an obscure Gallic priest, whose views were echoed among Hooker's own contemporaries, as showing that the church had already decided against such distorted views, based on Augustine. Hooker wrongly asserts that the opinions of (St.) Faustus of Riez [Rhegium], Ludicus' opponent, were also rejected at Arles in ca. 473. Faustus' semi-Pelagian views were not rejected at the time, but were rejected in the decisions of the [second] Council of Orange in 529. Hooker appears to recognize that Faustus was a Semi-pelagian, 4:103.*b*. See article 'Predestinarianism' in *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1911), 12.377b and article 'St. Faustus of Riez' in *ODCC* 601b.

> nor 4. that the grace of God is withheld from any man, butt justly and deservedly; nor 5. that any man in whome, desier, and endeavour to be saved, can be a vessell of contumelie and wrath, nor 6. that Christ did ever purpos and determine to exclude any from the benefitt of his death, butt whome their owne incurable wickenes doeth worthily exclude.[47]

Hooker concludes this step with a summary, arguing that, from the various premises developed, the cause of election is in God and God's Christ: God freely bestows election, and those who are condemned justly deserve their fate. We can perhaps refuse God's good pleasure, but we cannot deserve it.

The third step (§§40–41) deals with outward vocation, the point in traditional Christian teaching that has seemed to support Pelagius' view and that seemed to be undermined by Augustine's account of predestination and grace. 'Christ is a meane unto God for us' declares Hooker, which raises the question of God's appointed means of bringing Christ's work to effect in human beings. For Hooker, there are three sorts of such means: means God has appointed towards us, means to be in us, and means that are to proceed from us. First he deals with the means God hath appointed towards us: 'The meane toward us, is that grace, wherby wee are outwardly called, and chosen unto the fellowship of Gods people.'[48]

This observation links outward vocation, one of the steps in the *ordo salutis*, and the visible church. The beginning of the visible church, however, is to be seen in the election of the Jewish people, who so held to their own election that even Christian Jews were shocked to be told that God had called those who were not Jews. God gave special gifts to the Jews that he withheld from other nations, including both divine law and temporary ordinances. Yet the grace of vocation is temporary in some, and does not include their eternal good. But that does not mean that the election of Israel is abrogated. The eternal good implied in salvation now includes those once outside the vocation of Israel; but the Jews are not cast off forever. Hooker takes for granted that those Jews who did not accept Jesus became 'unbelievers', but this does not mean for him that they are forever rejected.

In dwelling on *outward grace* and the election of one nation by God, Hooker confirms the previous emphasis on outward grace and external

[47] *Dublin* 38; 4:151.25–34.
[48] *Dublin* 40; 4:153.16–18.

vocation, which he had already emphasized in his first summary of the Church's dealing with the Pelagian controversy (§§10–12), in his reminder that eternal life is of the nature of a reward for responding to God's call and exhortation (§28), and in God's gracious offering of undeserved eternal life as a reward for virtues performed under his grace (§31). Hooker is, of course, no sort of Pelagian, for he insisted on the necessity of inward grace; but neither does he neglect the original and continuing significance of external vocation in the *ordo salutis*, nor the importance of exhortation and threat within the visible church,[49] the assembly of those who respond to such vocation, as exemplified first in the ancient people of Israel.

The fourth step brings in Augustine's revolution of the absolute need for inward grace for salvation (§§42–44):

> The inward meane whereby his will is to bring men to eternall life, is that grace of his holy Spiritt, which hath beene spoaken of allreadie att large, in the article that concerneth free will.[50]

Only obduration, coming from the hardness of the sinner's own heart, a stubborn refusal on the part of sinful people, repels God's mercy and grace, and so it is only because of malice and previous sin that the obdurate remain so. It would be a mistake to interpret Scripture as proposing that God causes such obduration: for instance, God does not give Pharaoh an obstinate will, God merely foresees that will in Pharaoh. Pharaoh remains accountable for his stubbornness and opposition to God. Pharaoh becomes the type of thousands throughout the ages.[51]

Once again, Hooker emphasizes that it is not the 'natural' will of God that any human beings be damned: God offers inward grace to all. But there are those who persist, either temporarily or forever, in resisting God's inward grace, and those justly condemned for their own obduration as well as for their other sins and crimes. God is thus

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[49] Compare the emphasis on both the outward means, the threats and promises found in Christian preaching, and the inward means, in the effects of Holy Communion, found in Lancelot Andrewes, a generation later. Sermon prepared for Easter-Day 1624, in *Ninety-six Sermons*, LACT (Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1841–43), 97.

[50] *Dublin* 42; 4:157.17–19. Hooker here refers to §§10–13 and shows the internal link between the first section of the *Dublin Fragments* and the major treatise on Grace and Predestination that comprises most of the remainder of the text (§§19–46). Compare *Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination* (*FLE* 4:94.6–97.8) for what may be Hooker's preliminary notes on §42, on justice. There is, for instance, one common reference to Fulgentius.

[51] *Dublin* 42; 4:159.6–20.

merciful to those who accept his grace and respond, although they be sinful, while he is just to those who are not. His withholding of effectual grace from those not elected cannot be considered unjust:

> And therefore as wee can yeeld noe reason, why of all the other wicked Tyrants in *Egypt, Pharaoh* alone and the people under him should be made such a tragicall spectacle: soe neyther are wee able to shew any cause, why mercie may not doe good where it will, and wheresoever it will justice withhold good.[52]

The obdurate will naturally blame God, but it is justice they receive. The good we receive is not based on justice, but on God's mercy; the evil we receive is not based on God's reprobation, but on God's justice.[53]

Just as obduration has been the case that Hooker has exhibited to deal with the resistibility of God's outward and inward grace, so it is obduration that paradoxically moves him in the final step to account for the indefectibility of the elect, for even the obdurate may not remain so forever (§§45–46). Obduration is not equivalent to reprobation, for even the most obdurate may accept the inward grace God offers, and that grace become effective. God's grace is wider than the circle of the elect,

> And yet that in [the reprobate] God did not allwayes see cause to withhold his holy spiritt, appeareth in as much as the same men were once enlighted and had beene partakers of the heavenly guift of the holy Ghost, and had tasted of the good word of God, and the power of the world to come.[54]

Thus, among those who experience God's grace, not all are of the elect:

> …*perpetuitie of inward grace*, belongeth unto none butt eternallie foreseene elect, whose difference from castawayes in this life, doeth not herein consist, that the one have grace allwayes, the other, never: butt in this that the one have *grace that abideth*, the other, eyther not grace att all, or else grace which abideth not.[55]

All those whose election is visible and external, such as the Jewish people of old, and now all nations, include those who are invisibly

[52] *Dublin* 43; 4:161.24–28.
[53] *Dublin* 44; 4:162.29–163.14.
[54] *Dublin* 45; 4:163.24–28.
[55] *Dublin* 45; 4:163.29–165.1.

and eternally chosen, but are not necessarily themselves elect in this crucial sense.[56]

Yet no one deserves such invisible and eternal election: the elect are as unworthy as those cast away, the reprobate. The elect can resist God's grace temporarily, but not finally; as they have been foreknown, and predestined to the likeness of Christ, in whom they are said to be elect; they are adopted through actual vocation into the invisible church; they are 'effectuallie' justified through Christ's righteousness, and they are glorified.[57] That is, the elect will, with the aid of God, persevere to the end.[58] And yet, until the very end, there are those who show various appearances of being of the elect, yet are not; their final defection shows that they were not elect: 'such as utterly depart from them, were never of them.'[59]

At this stage, Hooker appropriates eight of the nine of the Lambeth Articles of 1595,[60] making significant emendations in some of them, in the light of the development of his argument in this treatise. In the first point, related to the first Lambeth Article, Hooker clearly restricts predestination to election to life, and does not include reprobation as a part of predestination.[61] This is entirely in keeping with his argument in this treatise. He will use the vocabulary of 'reprobation', but restrict its meaning to the 'passing over' of those not elect that is implied in the act of election.[62] For Hooker, Scripture and the church speak only of predestination to life. The other seven points are taken over from

[56] *Dublin* 45; 4:165.3–7.
[57] *Dublin* 46; 4:166.7–16.
[58] *Dublin* 46; 4:166.25–31.
[59] *Dublin* 46; 4:166.31–167.1. This shows, as does the argument of most of the treatise, that Hooker, like Perkins and others of his contemporaries, did not espouse a strict version of the 'Golden Chain,' a view that held that only the elect received vocation, grace and justification. Until the end, no one can be sure, by any evidence that they are of the elect; some of those not elect experience inward grace and (temporary) justification.
[60] Hooker conspicuously omits any reference to the emerging and fashionable doctrine of assurance in the elect. It would have been incompatible with his view that one's election is not sure until the end and it deals with a topic that he dealt with, in a very different way, in his *A Learned Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect* (*FLE* 5:69–82).
[61] Compare Art 19 of the *Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion*, and Peter Martyr, who spoke only of election as predestination, and not reprobation (although he also recognized reprobation), on the grounds that 'the Scriptures speak this way for the most part'. Peter Martyr Vermigli, *Locus on Predestination*, 9, in Frank A. James, ed., *Predestination and justification: two theological loci* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press) 16.
[62] *Dublin* 35; 44.

the *Lambeth Articles*, but the language is made less technical and more in keeping with the language of the treatise. Thus his version of the fourth article emphasizes that it is only human sin (and not God) that can account for damnation; his version of the fifth article relates to God's grace and not faith in the elect as the original had; his version of the seventh and eighth (his sixth and seventh) stress that it is *inward* grace that is not given to all, since he has argued that outward grace has been, and that this withholding of inward grace from some is a matter of desert; and his version of the ninth adds to the original statement of human incapacity, the more important point of the need of grace.

What follows next would have provided an important corrective to the Lambeth Articles and to the developing sense that predestination told the whole story of human salvation: labour on the part of the elect is an inevitable part of the picture; although the elect do not deserve salvation, they must assert themselves to attain it.

VII. *Of the necessity of labour to concur on our part with the will of God in justifying and sanctifying his elect, that in the end they may be glorified*

> Yet we must labour.

Hooker did not complete the treatise, but it is easy to see where the next section would have gone. His preliminary work on the validity and universality of external vocation, of rewards and punishments, of exhortation, and of the laborious development of virtues under grace gave the direction. Despite the undoubted truth of the Christian conviction about the absolute dependence on grace, developed by Augustine in his controversy with Pelagius and supported by the consensus of the Western Church, there is no more room for lack of vigilance or for lazy security than there is for despair:

> God is noe favorer of sloath and therefore there can be noe such absolute decree touching mans salvation as on our part includeth noe necessitie of care and travaile, butt shall certainly take effect, whether wee ourselves doe wake or sleepe.[63]

[63] *Dublin* 46; 4:167.16–19.

Hooker's Theological Foundations: the Sweet and Amiable Ordering, *Wisdom* 8.1

One of Thomas Aquinas's favourite biblical verses is found in the deutero-canonical writings: 'Wisdom reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly [Gr. χρηστως] doth she order all things.'[64] It is of significance that this is one of Hooker's favourite verses as well as a token of the theological consonance between Thomas and Hooker. Hooker can easily use this verse to explain at the same time the limits of God's power and the measure of creation:

> If therfore it be demanded, why God having power and habilitie infinite, th'effects notwithstanding of that power are all so limited as we see they are: the reason hereof is the end which he hath proposed, and the lawe whereby his wisedome hath stinted th'effects of his power in such sort, that it doth not worke infinitely but correspondingly unto that end for which it worketh, even al things χρηστως, in most decent and comely sort, *all things in measure, number and waight.*[65]

This 'decent and comely' operation has two significant aspects for Hooker: God's will is never more apparent than his reason: in particular, the voluntaristic suggestions of the description of creation by God in Genesis 1, where there are a series of 'God said…and it was done' are to be interpreted away; the Bible speaks of God as creating through speech, according to Hooker, as a means to exhibit the laws of nature,[66] which are not arbitrary. The second aspect of this treatment of God's operations becomes apparent when Hooker describes the way in which God influences the human being in history: Hooker speaks of God's causality as a 'sweet compulsion' of human action.[67]

The '*amiable*' comes again to the surface of Hooker's writing in the *Dublin Fragments*:

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[64] *Wisdom* 8:1. The passage is frequently quoted in Thomas' writings. A survey of some of the passages in *ST* shows how many different topics the text could illumine. Thomas uses it in discussions of divine government (I, q103, a8), grace (Ia IIæ q110. a2), charity (IIa IIæ q23. a2), the temptation of Adam and Eve (IIa IIæ q165. a1), Christ's miracles (IIIa q44. a4), the passion of Christ (IIIa q46. a9), and the manifestation of the Resurrection (IIIa q55. a6).

[65] *Lawes* I.2.3; 1:60.27–61.6. Hooker is also here using *Wisdom* 11:17, as his footnote indicates.

[66] *Lawes* I.3.2; 1:65.4–20.

[67] *Lawes* V.68.10; 2:356.1–8.

> The axiome of the providence of God in generall, whereby he is said to governe all things amiablie according to the severall condition and qualitie of their natures, must needes especiallie take place, in ordering the principall actions whereunto the hand of his grace directeth the soules of men.[68]

Once again, the themes and the biblical verse are to stress the manner of God's operations: to have his way, inevitably and finally, but not in such a manner as to remove human initiative:

> God hath ordeyned grace . . . that thereby wee which cannot moove ourselves, may be drawne, butt amiablie drawne. If the grace of God did not enforce men to goodnes, nothing would bee more unpleasant unto man then vertue'. Whereas contrariwise, there is nothing soe full of joye and consolation, as the conscience of well doing. It delighteth us, that God hath been soe mercifull unto us as to drawe us to himselfe.[69]

The vocabulary of being drawn by God is that of the Lambeth Articles, taken from the *Gospel of John*; the thought behind this passage is far removed from the deterministic assumptions of the framers of those Articles. Not to understand this as God's manner is to misconstrue the whole life of grace: 'in power he ordereth [all things], butt yett with gentlenes; mightily, butt yett in amiable manner.'[70] Not to understand this as God's manner also makes a puzzle of relating God's occasioned will to the general will of God: '[Even after sin, God] leadeth still to eternall life by an amiable course, framed even according to the verie state wherein wee now are.'[71]

The Resistibility of Grace

Since human beings are, for the hard line followers of St Augustine, 'spiritual corpses,' incapable of doing anything for their own salvation, except turning the wrong way, and especially incapable of unselfish love of God and neighbour without God's aid, it seemed to them that salvation would be impossible if human beings could effectively resist the grace of God that was necessary for even the beginning of salva-

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[68] *Dublin* 2; 4:102.9–13. The editors of the Keble edition provided a corresponding passage from Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, 56.
[69] *Dublin* 2; 4:103.21–28.
[70] *Dublin* 27; 4:134.23–24.
[71] *Dublin* 31; 4:140.31–141.1.

tion, for then no one would be saved, since the only exercise of human free will that was possible apart from grace was to turn from God. To assume, further, that the human being could refuse to accept God's grace seemed to most Calvinists of the last half of the sixteenth century to reverse totally the true picture: to make God revolve around the human being, and not the human being around God's sovereign grace. But Hooker did not go so far, in part because of his view of the manner of God's operations, wherein grace did not destroy but perfects nature, in part because of his view that human beings are real participants in the *process* of justification, in spite of their natural depravity.

This balance between an insistence on the absolute need for God's grace, and a place for human initiative and will in the process was apparent in the *Lawes* when Hooker described the grace that is *offered* in the sacraments: for Hooker, the sacraments are *moral* instruments, or 'means conditional,' precisely because human beings can refuse to accept God's grace therein. Hooker speaks more frequently of grace offered—apparently inevitably offered—in the sacraments, than he speaks of grace *conveyed*, although he uses this vocabulary as well.[72]

That is, God *offers* the same grace to all in the sacraments; but clearly some do not receive the grace offered because they *refuse* it. Development of this thesis had to wait for the response to *A Christian Letter*. In the *Dublin Fragments*, Hooker clearly spells out his view that the human being may resist God's grace: to deny this view would change the account of how God works, and suppose that grace imposed a necessity on those offered grace. It would also deny human autonomy, without which the human being would not be human.

> Prescience, predestination and grace impose not that necessitie by force, whereof man in doing good hath all freedome of choice taken from him. If prescience did impose any such necessitie, since prescience is not only of good butt of evill, then must wee grant that… *Adam* sinned not voluntarily, because that which *Adam* did ill, was foreseene. If predestination did impose such necessitie, then was there nothing voluntarie in *Adams* well doing neyther, because what *Adam* did well was predestinated; Or if Grace did impose such necessitie, how was it possible that *Adam* should have done otherwise then well, being soe furnished as he was with grace?[73]

[72] *Lawes* V.58.2; 2:249.15–19; V.62.4; 2:270.23–25.
[73] *Dublin* 2; 4:102.13–23.

Hooker's point is related to the underlying theological premise that grace (of any kind) does not destroy, but perfects, the nature that needs and receives it. God draws the human being by grace, and God's drawing is amiable. This view is distinguished from the Pelagian view that God issues an invitation to which the human being is free to respond; Hooker follows Augustine in insisting on the inward character of God's grace, but this does not mean that God imposes the result without the creature's free consent.

> Yett what man should ever approach unto God, if his Grace did noe otherwise draw our mindes, then *Pelagians* and *Semipelagians* imagined? They knew noe grace butt externall onlie, which grace inviteth, butt draweth not; Neyther are wee by inward grace carried up into heaven, the force of reason and will being cast into a dead sleepe. Our experience teacheth us, that wee never doe any thing well, but with deliberate advice and choice, such as painefully setteth the powers of our mindes on worke, which thing I note in regard of *Libertines* and *Enthusiasts*, whoe erre as much on the one hand, by making man little more then a block, as *Pelagians* on the other, by making him almost a God in the worke of his owne salvation.[74]

It is the capacity of the human being to resist God's grace that accounts for the fact that not all achieve salvation, despite the universal salvific will of God and the unlimited atonement wrought by Christ, on both of which Hooker insists:

> Butt if God would have all men saved, and if Christ through such his Grace have died for all men, wherefore are they not all saved? Gods principall desire touching mans happines is not allwayes satisfyed. It is on all sides confest, that his will in this kind oftentymes succeedeth not, the cause whereof is a personall impediment making particular men uncapable of that good, which the will of his generall providence did ordayne for mankind.[75]

Reprobation for Hooker, as we have already seen, is not unconditional: it is the damnation merited by human guilt. But Hooker's view displayed here, of the actual resistance in those who are not saved, takes this position one step further. Those who are not ultimately saved 'achieve' this state not just because of the inherited guilt of Adam, but because of *actual refusal* to accept the grace that is offered consistent with God's will that all intelligent creatures achieve the saving knowledge of God.

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[74] *Dublin* 2; 4:103.29–104.9.
[75] *Dublin* 34; 4:145.2–8.

Election is entirely undeserved, as we have seen, but grace would be less than grace unless it could be resisted. There is thus (at least temporarily) the capacity, even in the elect, to resist grace:

> it must ever in the election of Saints be remembred, that to choose, is an Act *of Gods good pleasure, which presupposeth in us sufficient cause to avert, butt none to deserve it*.[76]

Those who achieve salvation have only God to thank, while those who fail have only themselves to blame; that is, by implication, God offers grace to all, but its riches are visible only in those who accept it (though they do not deserve it). Those who refuse it get what they deserve. We have already noted that Hooker interpreted scriptural passages implying that God 'hardens' human hearts as indicating not God's purpose, but the actual result. The difference here is the human capacity to resist. Hooker quotes Augustine's disciple, Prosper of Aquitaine, with approval: '*Jacob I have loved*, behold what God doeth bestowe freely; *I have hated Esau*, behold what man doeth justly deserve.'[77] This means that reprobation is not just an abandoning by God of some 'on account of' inherited and actual guilt; it is far from that sort of incomprehensible omission. Reprobates actually resist grace sufficient that is offered to them, as to all human beings.[78] 'Our obstinate resistance may hinder that infusion, which nothing in us could procure, or purchace.'[79]

Necessary and Efficacious Grace: the Perseverance of the Elect

This bold assertion of the capacity of the human being to resist an inward sufficient grace offered, especially in the sacraments, to all human beings without regard to their state of election, clearly makes Hooker agree with Peter Baro and Lancelot Andrewes in their position in the troubles in Cambridge in 1595. But, like Andrewes, Hooker differed from Baro, on the question of the possibility of defection in the elect. And indeed in this they agreed with most Calvinists.[80] The 'strong' party

[76] *Dublin* 39; 4:152.32–153.1.
[77] *Dublin* 39; 4:153.4–6.
[78] *Dublin* 42; 4:159.10–14, cited above in note 51, p. 205.
[79] *Dublin* 46; 4:165.21–23.
[80] It is said that Calvin and his followers 'added' indefectibility to the received account of grace. See article on 'Grace' in *ODCC* 698a.

in Cambridge had argued that such defection was not possible, either temporarily or finally. Whitgift was persuaded that such defection might be temporary, but *could not* be final. All would have agreed that it *would not* be final, since what was predestined was foreseen, and what was foreseen would take place. But for Whitgift there was a stronger form of necessity involved than this logical one: there was a causal necessity. In the elect, God would inevitably prevail.

The Sermons related to the controversies at the Temple seem to give a quite unqualified view of the perseverance of the elect—in fact, of the perseverance in grace of any one who had once partaken of grace.

> In this wee know wee are not deceyved nether can wee deceyve you when wee teach that the fayth wherby ye are sanctified cannot faile. It did not in the prophet, it shall not in you.[81]
>
> The faith . . . of true beleevers though it have many and grevous dounfals, yeat doth it still continew invincible, it conquereth and recovereth it selfe in the end. The dangerous conflictes whereunto it is subject are not able to prevail againste it.[82]
>
> . . . the justefied man being *alyve to god in Jesus Christe* our lord doth as necessarily from that tyme forwarde alwaies lyve, as Christe by whome he hath lyfe lyveth alwaies. . . . the man which is once *juste by faith* shall lyve by faith and *lyve forever*:[83]

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[81] *Cert.* 1; 5:73.23–25. Peter Heylyn was prepared to admit that Hooker accepted Dort's later account of perseverance, but held that the Sermons were early and that Hooker later adjusted his view. See Heylyn, *Historia Quinqu-Articularis* (London, 1681) Part III, chap. xxiii.8 (p. 626).

[82] *Cert.* 1; 5:76.17–21.

[83] *Just.* 26; 5:138.19–139.17. The whole of §26 deals with this conviction, which is in fact a cornerstone of Hooker's argument that led him into conflict with Travers on the state of salvation of Roman Catholics. For Hooker in *A Learned Discourse of Justification* 26, justifying faith is indefectible; those who are chosen, effectually called, and justified cannot deny the foundation precisely because God cannot finally fail them. Dewey Wallace seems to have misinterpreted Hooker's view of Lutheranism on this. In *A Learned Discourse* Hooker does note that the Lutherans are in error on certain points, but that does not mean they cannot achieve salvation. Wallace states that the 'error' involved is precisely the error of denying the perseverance of the elect: Hooker 'did not doubt that Lutherans would attain salvation in spite of holding an error so serious as that the elect could fall from grace.' Wallace, *Puritans and Predestination grace in English Protestant theology, 1525–1695* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1982) 35 ff. In fact, Hooker does not name the Lutheran error, but, if the note in the manuscript is his, he is referring to an error Lutherans received from Luther himself. As Wallace recognizes (pp. 34f.), Luther gave an account of the questions of predestination that was very similar to Calvin. It was his successors at mid-century that tempered his view of unconditional election and may have held so radical a view of human obstinacy that they suggested a denial of the perseverance of the elect. Much more likely, Hooker is referring to the

A contemporary summary of Hooker's doctrinal propositions in dispute at the Temple, Hooker gives a clear statement of this view: there may be temporary back-sliding, that is temporary lapses, but final perseverance is certain:

> the electe of god cannot so erre that they shoulde denye directlye the foundation for that Christ doth kepe them from that extremitie, and there is no salvation to such as deny the foundation directlye. . . . Antichrist may prevaile much against them [viz. the elect], and they may receave the signe of the beast in some degree, but not so that they shoulde directlye deny the foundation.[84]

This clear affirmation of the doctrine of the final indefectibility in the elect is repeated in the *Lawes*:

> . . . the scripture [*Revelation* 7.3, 9.4] . . . describeth them marked of God in the forehead whome his mercie hath undertaken to keepe from finall confusion and shame. Not that God doth sett any corporall marke on his chosen, but to note that he giveth his electe securitie of preservation from reproach . . .[85]

> The first thinge of [Christ's] infused into our hartes in this life is the Spirit of Christ, whereupon because the rest of what kinde so ever doe all both necessarilie depende and infalliblie also ensue . . .[86]

This view is repeated in the *Dublin Fragments*. There, Hooker comes to consider the text *John* 17:9, 20. Hooker preferred this prayer of Christ to another prayer of Christ for Peter in *Luke* 22:32, a text used in Cambridge in 1595 to support the Lambeth Articles against William Barrett's denial of perseverance in order to deny 'assurance.'[87] Hooker's choice of this verse, nevertheless, shows him clearly on the side of the Lambeth Articles:

> In that prayer for eternall Life which our Saviour knew could not be made without effect, he excepted them for whome he knew his suffrings would be frustrate, and commendeth unto God his owne. . . . That they

typical Lutheran doctrine of impanation or consubstantiation, or even the Christological error of the ubiquity of Christ's body, suggested by Luther and championed by his successors. *Just.* 17; 5:125.1–6 and note *k*.

[84] Lambeth ms 2006, f. 11^{r}; 5:274.31–276.2. Compare *Just.* 26; 5:136–146.

[85] *Lawes* V.65.7; 2:307.11–15.

[86] *Lawes* V.56.11; 2:243.9–11.

[87] H.C. Porter, *Reformation and Reaction*, 344, 359, 361. But see *Cert.* 5; 5:89.5–7.

> should be finallie seduced, and cleane drawne away from God, is a thing impossible. Such as utterly depart from them, were never of them.[88]

In the *Dublin Fragments*, there is an additional qualification placed on the indefectibility of the elect. Indefectibility is not *owned* (although it may be certain) until the elect have the perfect knowledge of God which is their final bliss. In this they are like the angels, not all of whom persisted:

> [The grace whereby angels and men] might be exempted from possibilitie of sinning…belongeth to their perfection whoe see God in fulnes of glorie, and not to them, whoe as yet serve him under hope.[89]

Thus, it appears, the elect will not finally defect, because glorification will confer stability of will on them. In the mean time, the outcome of their progress and back-sliding is *certain*, but this does not depend on them, but on God, who both foresees the outcome, and ensures it comes to pass (at the same time without compelling the creature, who retains a freedom to resist). In this mean time, the *means* of grace are essential; election does not provide an easy road to glory even though it is a certain one; the grace of exhortation is still required.[90]

In the elect, the grace of God will not in fact be 'unprofitable.' But this is simply to indicate the need for the normal means of grace, especially exhortation, in order to secure it. In the mean time, God's grace is sufficient, but it does not make sin and defection impossible:

> Grace excluding possibilitie to sinne, was neyther given unto Angells, in their first creation, nor to man before his fall, butt reserved for both till god be seene face to face in the state of glorie, which state shall make it then impossible for us to sinne, whoe now sinne often, notwithstand-

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[88] *Dublin* 46; 4:166.22–167.1. See Porter, *Reformation and Reaction*, 317.

[89] *Dublin* 28; 4:136.29–137.2. This view Hooker expressed early in Book I of the *Lawes*, in discussing 'the law which angels do work by,' *Lawes* I.4.3; 1:71.20–25. See *ST* Ia q62. a8 for the view that the angels, in beatitude, can no longer sin.

[90] *Dublin* 13; 4:112.23–32. See also Hooker's peroration to *A Learned and Confortable Sermon of Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, wherein perseverance involves never ceasing to work and pray for *assurance*, which is itself based on *hope*: '*The earth may shake, the pillers of the world may tremble* under usse, the countenaunce of heaven may be appalld, the sonn may losse his lyght, the mone hir bewtie, the stares there glorie. But…what is there in the world that shall chaunge [the heart of the man that trusteth in God]?…the assurance of my hope I will labor to kepe as a jewell unto the end and by labor through the gratious mediation of [Christ's] praier, I shall kepe yt.' *Cert.* 5; 5:81.27–82.18. Pollard mistakes this as resembling Calvin's assurance based on *Christ as mirror*. Arthur Pollard, *Richard Hooker* (London: Longmans, 1966), 26. For Hooker, Christ's prayer is the *cause* of perseverance, not its mirror.

> ing grace, because the providence of God bestoweth not in this present life, grace soe neerely illustrating goodnes, that the will should have noe power to decline from it. Grace is not therefore here given in that measure which taketh away possibilitie of sinning, and soe effectuallie mooveth the will, as that it cannot.[91]

But this drives Hooker to the edge of contradiction: grace is offered to all; grace cannot fail; but some, it seems, are not saved. And Hooker had already in the *Lawes* identified two classes of participation in Christ: all human beings participate in Christ in creation and in providence, but some do not in salvation.[92] In the *Dublin Fragments*, Hooker, in distinguishing the determinate will of God from God's occasioned will, identifies three forms of the determinate will:

> He willeth positively whatsoever himselfe worketh; he willeth by permission, that which his creatures doe. Hee only assisting the naturall powers which are given them to worke withall, and not hindring or barring the effects which growe from them. Whereunto wee may adde that negative or privative will alsoe wherby he withholdeth his graces from some, and soe is said to cast them a sleepe whome he maketh not vigilant [*Romans* 11:8]: to harden them whom he softneth not: and to take away that, which it pleaseth him not to bestowe.[93]

Hooker is clearly dealing here, in a typical fashion, with the interpretation of passages in Scripture where human obduration is attributed to God. But he goes further here than in other accounts and attributes something to God's purposive (and unoccasioned) will, that is, God's will without respect of anything external to it, even human sinfulness. This 'pre-lapsarian' withholding of grace might sound close to a decree of unconditional reprobation, since it seems to be entirely without regard to anything but itself. It apparently is not so, however, but related to God's determinate positive and permissive will.

Hooker finally, but briefly, does indicate that there is a distinction in the grace actually given by God *in this life*: there are some human beings who genuinely participate in God's grace but fall away, since they do not possess the 'grace which abideth':

> the same men [that is, the reprobate apostates] were once enlightned and had beene partakers of the heavenly guift of the holy Ghost, and had tasted of the good word of God, and of the power of the world to

[91] *Dublin* 4; 4:104.32–105.8.
[92] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:242.11–14.
[93] *Dublin* 26; 4:132.22–133.2.

> come. On the other side, *perpetuitie of inward grace*, belongeth unto none butt eternallie foreseene elect, whose difference from castawayes in this life, doeth not herein consist, that the one have grace allwayes, the other, never: butt in this that the one have *grace that abideth*, the other eyther not grace att all, or else grace which abideth not.[94]

This unnamed distinction, parallel to Augustine's distinction of *adiutorium sine quo non*, 'assistance without which something cannot be attained' and *adiutorium quo*, 'assistance by which something can be attained,' was parallel to the distinction, defended by the Jesuits and resisted by the Dominicans, between *sufficient* and *efficacious* grace, in the debates in the Roman Catholic world during precisely the same decade of the sixteenth century.[95] On the one hand, the distinction allows Hooker to maintain the perseverance of the elect, who alone receive 'efficacious grace,' and, on the other, the real participation in grace by the reprobate, who do not persist but do receive grace sufficient for salvation, though by God's 'privative will' efficacious grace is withheld. Hooker thus adopts, without a specific vocabulary, a view of grace approaching the Jesuit one. And, despite the concurrence, there is neither in Hooker nor in the opinions of the expert advisers to Whitgift in 1595, any reference at all to the parallel discussions in the Roman Catholic theology of grace.

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[94] *Dublin* 45; 4:163.26–165.1. Compare 'To many is given grace, to whom perseverance in grace is not given.' *ST* Ia IIæ q109. a10.

[95] Karl Rahner, 'Augustin und der Semipelagianismus,' in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 62 (1938), 181. See Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace*, cc. 26–38 [x–xii], *NPNF*, 1st ser., v, 482–487. See also G. W. H. Lampe in Cunliffe-Jones, *A History of Christian Doctrine* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1978) 166f. The debate between Bañez and the Dominicans and Molina and the Jesuits on the question was referred to a commission, the Congregatio de Auxiliis, appointed by pope Clement VIII in 1597. Although the congregation twice reported against the Jesuits, the pope and his successor Paul V refused to accept the recommendation. In 1607, Paul V ended the discussions, without condemning either view, and forbade that the Jesuits be accused of Pelagianism or the Dominicans of Calvinism. The scholastic distinction had already been used by Peter Martyr in relation to the worth of the death of Christ, *Locus on Predestination*, 44, in Frank A. James ed., 62. The distinction would be used by Lancelot Andrewes in advising Whitgift on the seventh Lambeth Article, *Minor Works*, 293. It was rejected by Samuel Harsnett in his Paul's Cross Sermon of 1584, *Three Sermons* (London: Bedel and Collins, 1658), 157f., 161, 163f., 169.

Summary

When Richard Hooker came to write his only known treatise on predestination, he did so in terms consistent with those he had used from his earliest public discourse, and did not back down from the opinions that had led to anonymous criticism. His account is based on the 'voice of the Church', what the Church has decided in expression of its 'authority in controversies of faith' (Article 20)—a moderate Augustinian account, avoiding the excesses of Faustus and Lucidus, and supported by a broad traditional theology that included Thomas and Peter Martyr.

God wills that all be saved, and offers undeserved grace to all; according to the will of God, Christ died for all. God gives grace sufficient for salvation to all, even to the obdurate, and all may resist that grace. God deals graciously, and providentially, with all and forces none. Yet not all are elect, and those who are elect are absolutely dependent on God's grace for their salvation. The elect, though they may temporarily and totally lapse, will finally be saved. Temporary justification and obedience may be found in those who are not elect. Those not elect deserve the punishment for the vices and personal impediments they put up to God's grace offered; God is not the cause of their ultimate damnation.

Finally, the elect must not presume on election, but live in hope. They are required to attend to the universal external vocation of God and the Christian gospel, and to use the means God offers, including the sacraments in which inward grace is offered. This universal external vocation includes exhortation to virtue, which, through the grace of God, the elect achieve, and for which they are rewarded, though they are not capable of such virtue on their own.

CHAPTER NINE

FAITH AND ASSURANCE

Debora K. Shuger

In 1586, Walter Travers was forbidden to continue preaching at the Middle and Inner Temple as punishment for having used his sermons to censure the new Master, Richard Hooker. Shortly thereafter Travers protested his silencing to the Privy Council, charging that the doctrines Hooker espoused had 'not ben heard in publick places, with in this land, synce Quene Maries daies.'[1] Neither the Privy Council, however, nor Archbishop Whitgift, to whom Hooker addressed his response, took Travers's view of the matter, since his suspension was not reversed. The sermons of Hooker to which Travers had objected concern faith, assurance, and justification, issues at the very heart of Reformed theology. The Hooker-Travers's dispute thus marked the first *doctrinal* (as opposed to liturgical or ecclesiological) breach between the Elizabethan state-church and its godly critics.

How one understands the significance of the dispute hinges on one's reading of the doctrinal issues involved. This essay will focus on the first two, faith and assurance, and hence on *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, which is the only one of Hooker's works to address these topics at length. Yet it will end up drawing on most of Hooker's homiletic writings, since these grapple time and again with the questions and commitments informing *The Certaintie*: final perseverance, the problem of evil, the place of doubt and error in the life of faith. It would, I think, be a mistake to approach these issues only through the lens of the Hooker-Travers dispute: only, that is, in terms of Hooker's divergence from Reformed orthodoxy. Yet the existence of this dispute—combined with the fact that both parties spell out the specific point over which they disagreed—makes it the obvious point of departure. I want therefore to begin with the

[1] Walter Travers, *A Supplication made to the Privy Counsel* (Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1612), in *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, vol. 5, *Tractates and Sermons*, 5:208:8–10.

Reformed teachings on faith and assurance that *The Certaintie* rejects, and by rejecting these provoked Travers's public denunciation. Yet the Reformed position turns out to be fairly complex, and if Hooker repudiated certain elements, he affirmed others. The first part of this essay treats the repudiation; the second, the continuities. The third and final section deals with Hooker's incorporation of Thomistic material on faith and assurance. The Thomistic elements in *The Certaintie* are probably more extensive than generally recognized, but also less inert. They do not, that is, simply replace the Protestant doctrines Hooker critiques, but they act on the Reformed material that *The Certaintie* retains and are acted upon by it. The end-product is something quite different from either Calvin or Aquinas. Nor does it really resemble the liberal, 'proto-Arminian' theology that roiled Cambridge in the 1590s, since this bent its critique against the doctrine of perseverance, which Hooker passionately affirms. Hooker's position does not have a label, and is best not assimilated to a pre-existent one.[2]

I

The Certaintie argues against a position that now probably strikes few readers as plausible enough to merit refutation: namely, that 'wee must needes be much more sure of that wee beleev than of that wee see,' since the Holy Spirit, whose 'operation' is 'much mightier . . . than the common light of nature whereby wee discerne of sensible thinges,' has been 'geven us to no other end but . . . to make the trueth of thinges beleeved evident unto our mindes.'[3] This is the position Hooker rejects. One might think it a straw man, were it not for the fact that Hooker's rejection of it was precisely what provoked Travers's condemnation; moreover, it was the only part of *The Certaintie* to which he objected. In his letter to the Privy Council, Travers thus acknowledged that, it being his 'dewtie . . . to teach the trueth,' he had felt obliged to speak

[2] On the divergent attempts, from the seventeenth century through the twenty-first, to enlist Hooker under one or another ecclesio-political banner, see Diarmaid MacCulloch, 'Richard Hooker's Reputation,' *English Historical Review* 117 (2002): 773–812; Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1–10, 318.

[3] *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, *FLE* 5:72.5–10.

out against Hooker's claim 'that *the assurance of that we believe by the word, is not so certeyne as of that we perceive by sense*.'[4]

The issue, as both men concurred, was whether faith implies assurance. In the sixteenth century, this was not a straw man. Rather, at stake in the dispute between Hooker and Travers was *the* distinctive Protestant understanding of faith as certainty: the *certainty* of one's own salvation and the certainty of *one's own* salvation. This understanding of faith characterizes Reformation theology from the beginning. As Melanchthon affirms in his 1532 commentary on Romans,

> This controversy indeed concerns matters of the utmost importance . . . since without this doctrine of faith, no true worship and adoration of God can exist. . . . [For it teaches] how consciences can be rendered certain [*certus*], that we have remission of sins, that God is favorable towards us, that we have been accepted by God.[5]

Since we can never perfectly fulfill the law, the Roman doctrine of justification by works leaves us tormented by doubt as to whether God is pleased with us; but this is 'to undo the whole Gospel . . . because God cannot be worshipped by one who doubts (*cum dubitatione*).' The whole point of the Gospel is that, by its promise of unearned forgiveness and mercy, 'it removes this doubt (*dubitatio*) from us.'[6] Its central message is this offer of salvation to all who believe that 'God is certainly (*certo*) favorable to them, on Christ's account,' who 'hold as certain (*certo*) that God now looks upon them with favor.' Indeed, 'the Gospel aims at this one thing: to teach that mercy is certain (*certus*).'[7] Faith, that is, is not merely 'historical knowledge'—as, for example, that Jesus of Nazareth was crucified and three days later rose from the dead; rather, 'the object of belief (*fides*) or faith (*fiducia*) is the promise of mercy. Faith must be certain, for a person who doubts God's love and forgiveness—that is, who doubts that God loves and forgives *him*—inevitably ends up fearing God as an enemy, and therefore hating Him. Hence 'God can neither be truly worshipped nor adored unless . . . our minds are freed from doubt (*a dubitatione*).'[8]

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[4] Travers, *A Supplication*, 5:200.6–7.

[5] Philipp Melanchthon, *Römerbrief–Kommentar 1532*, ed. Rolf Schäfer, with Gerhard Ebeling in *Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl*, 7 vols. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1965), 33–4 (translation mine).

[6] Melanchthon, *Römerbrief*, 35–6.

[7] Melanchthon, *Römerbrief*, 39–40, 52.

[8] Melanchthon, *Römerbrief*, 40–1, 52.

For Melanchthon, the certainty of faith stands over and against the Roman church's teaching that our acceptance by God is contingent upon works and therefore inescapeably uncertain: the certainty of faith is 'a certitude (*certitudo*) [that] rests solely on the promise of mercy, which God offers on Christ's account, and not on the worthiness of our own works.'[9] Tyndale's understanding of the certainty of faith similarly opposes papal doctrine. Like Melanchthon, and like all Protestants, he denies that salvation must (or can) be earned, but he also targets the view, which goes back to Augustine's *De utilitate credendi*, that faith is taking on trust something one has been told, that it rests on the authority of another's words and *not* one's own direct experience; we believe what a person tells us, even if it defies our preconceptions, because we think the *person* trustworthy: 'As if one told me that the turke had wonne a citie and I beleved it[,] moved with the honestie of the man.' Such belief, which 'hangeth of the trueth and honestie of the teller,' is what Tyndale calls 'historicall faith.' However, he adds, the faith by which we are justified is not historical but 'felynge faith,' the faith of one who had been present in the city 'whan it was wonne and their were wounded and had there lost all that he had and were taken presoner there also. That man shuld so beleve that all the world coude not turne him from his faith.' For such 'faith is none opinion / but a sure felynge.... Neyther hangeth it of the honestie of the preacher but of the power of God and of the spirit / and therefore iff all the preachers of the world wold goo a boute to persuade the contrary / it wold not prevayle / no moare than though they wold make me beleve the fire were cold / aftir that I had put my fingre therein.'[10] Faith is not a matter of trusting a historical report but of felt experience, with all the clarity of direct physical sensation. One knows God's forgiveness the same way one knows that fire is hot: by coming in contact with it. So, Tyndale continues, 'when thou art asked / whi thou belevest that thou shalt be saved thorow christ...answere thou wottest and felest that it is true. And when he asketh how thou knowest that it is true / answere because it is written in thine herte. And if he aske who wrott it / answere the spirite of God.'[11] It is customary in recent scholarship

[9] Melanchthon, *Römerbrief*, 39.

[10] William Tyndale, *An Answere unto Sir Thomas Mores Dialoge*, ed. Anne O'Donnell and Jared Wicks (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 48–9.

[11] Tyndale, *An Answere unto Sir Thomas More*, 53.

to talk about the Reformation in terms of an attenuation and remotion of divine presence, but this will scarcely work for Tyndale, for whom faith is as immediate and sensuous an experience of God as the Host for a late-medieval Catholic.[12]

Tyndale's contention that faith has the certainty of sense perception clearly differs from Hooker's view, yet not so his understanding of faith as feeling, as like the immediate contact of touch and taste—a matter to which we will return. Most Reformed theologians, however, generally eschew Tyndale's tactile imagery, preferring instead to describe faith as a type of seeing or knowing. So Bullinger defines faith as the 'evident demonstration [of things not seen], whereby we manifestly prove that which otherwise should be doubtful'; it is 'a most evident seeing . . . of things invisible,' whereby 'in mind we do see [*cernere*] those things as well, as with our eyes we do behold things sensibly perceived and easy to be seen.'[13] In Calvin's words, it is 'a stedfast and assured knowledge of Gods kindnes toward us [*divinae erga nos benevolentiae firmam certitudinem*],' an 'undoubted knowledge of Gods will [*indubitatam voluntatis divinae notitiam*],' 'a full and fixed assurednes, such as men are wont to have of things found by experience and prooved.'[14]

These definitions retain Melanchthon and Tyndale's 'Lutheran' conception of faith as certainty—the kind of certainty one has of things touched, seen, or proven—and in particular, as Calvin's definition implies, as the certainty of one's own salvation. Yet there are differences of nuance and emphasis. In the Reformed tradition, the certainty of faith seems less a matter of feeling certain than *being* certain: less, that is, a matter of conviction than knowledge—a knowledge apprehended not by the light of reason but 'the enlightning of the holy Ghost,' by whose teaching we 'may know [*sciamus*] those things given us of God.'[15] As R. T. Kendall comments, 'the position which Calvin wants pre-eminently to establish (and fundamentally assumes) is that faith is *knowledge*.'[16] Moreover, the

[12] One suspects that the reason Tyndale was comfortable with a Zwinglian-memorialist view of sacraments is precisely because sensuous participation of the divine is available to faith, i.e., not through loss of corporal presence but relocation.

[13] Henry Bullinger, *The Decades*, 4 vols., trans. H. I., ed. Thomas Harding, Parker Society Publications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849–52), 1:82.

[14] John Calvin, *The Institution of Christian Religion*, trans. Thomas Norton (London: Arnold Hatfield for Bonham Norton, 1599), 3.2.7, 39, 15, from the Latin edn. *Institutio Christianae religionis*, ed. Augustin Marlorat (London: T. Vautrollier, 1576).

[15] *Inst*. 3.2.33, 39.

[16] R. T. Kendall, *Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 19.

Reformed tradition tends to conceive of faith as virtually equivalent to personal assurance: faith is the certainty of one's own salvation, rather than, as for Melanchthon, of the mercy of God freely given to all who trust in Him. As the Lambeth Articles put it, 'The true believer, i.e. one who possesses justifying faith, is certain (*certus*) by the full assurance of faith of the forgiveness of his sins and of eternal salvation through Christ.'[17] So Beza explains that faith is not simply believing in God, but 'a certain knowledge which . . . the Holy Spirit engraves . . . in the hearts of the elect,' whereby 'each of them, being assured in his heart of his election, appropriates to himself and applies to himself the promise of salvation in Jesus Christ.'[18] For Perkins, similarly, justifying faith is not simply belief in the Creed, but requires 'a particular faith whereby we apply to ourselves the promises.'[19] As these definitions imply, the 'us' in Calvin's description of faith as 'sure knowledge of the divine favour towards us' should be read as the plural form of 'me,' and not as the collective singular of the Creed's 'for us men (*propter nos homines*) and our salvation.'

The Reformed stress on the personal application of the divine promises, its identification of faith with assurance, cannot be understood apart from the doctrine of temporary faith.[20] The doctrine goes back to Calvin, who argued that the reprobate often experience something very close to faith: they acknowledge Christ to be the author of salvation, they willingly assume his name, have some feeling of the word's divine power, and at times are 'mooved with the same feeling that the elect are, so that in their owne judgement they nothing differ from the elect.'[21] However, the faith of such reprobate and the faith of the elect differ in that the former have only 'a confused feeling of grace,' while the elect alone attain 'the peculiar testimonie' and 'speciall faith' of

[17] *Documents of the English Reformation*, ed. Gerald Bray (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 400; see also Porter 366; Kendall, 25.

[18] Theodore Beza, *The Christian Faith*, trans. James Clark (East Essex: Focus Christian Ministries Trust, 1992), 2; on-line at http://www.ondoctrine.com/2bez0001.htm (accessed 2/20/2005). This is a translation of Beza's *Confession de foi du Chrétien* (1558).

[19] William Perkins, *The Work*, ed. Ian Breward, The Courtney Library of Reformation Classics (Abingdon: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970), 535.

[20] See Kendall, *Calvin*, 21–24, 69.

[21] *Inst.* 3.2.11. For Hooker, by contrast, the *experience* of saving faith is essentially unlike the analogous state of mind in the ungodly, who may at times strongly suspect that there is a God, but 'the more sure they are of the truth the more they quake and tremble att it.' *Just.* 26; 5:136–7.

their own forgiveness. The reprobate believe generally in divine mercy but are 'not certaine whether it will extend unto them or no,' and thus remain 'pinched with a miserable carefulnesse, while they doubt whether he will be mercifull to them.... But there is a far other feeling of full assurednesse [πλεροφορία], which in the Scriptures is always assigned to Faith, even such a one as... doth clearly put it out of doubt.' Hence, Calvin concludes, he only is a true believer who is 'perswaded with a sound assurednesse that God is his mercifull and loving father.'[22]

This distinction between temporary and saving faith took deep root in English Calvinism. William Perkins, the pre-eminent Calvinist theologian of Hooker's generation, thus divided reprobates into those not-called and those granted the temporary faith of an ineffectual calling. A reprobate might 'confusedly believe the promises of God,' might believe 'that some shall be saved, but... not that he himself particularly shall be saved.'[23] For only the elect 'in God's good time are sure of [their] election in Christ to eternal life.' And this assurance will be attained by 'all they that are elect,'[24] for, Perkins explains, it follows 'from the nature of faith' that the elect are 'assured [*securus*] of salvation.' Assurance of one's own election thus itself supplies the crucial evidence that one is, in fact, elect, or in Perkins's words, 'true faith is an infallible assurance,' just as only an infallible assurance is true faith.[25]

As this "'full persuasion' of election" constituted 'the foundation-stone of the confidence of the Calvinist,'[26] so it likewise formed the key-stone of his piety. Perkins's insistence that each Christian 'diligently try and examine himself whether he be in a state of damnation or a state of grace' placed the question of assurance at the centre of puritan spirituality.[27] One scrutinized one's faith to discern the workings of a 'full persuasion' of the Father's love and forgiveness, since by finding in onself this assurance one was thereby assured of being in a state of grace. An Elizabethan preacher thus urged his parishioners, 'It behoveth you... greatly every man to examine his owne estate, and to try whether you be... children or no children.'[28] In particular, each

[22] *Inst.* 3.2.11, 15–16.
[23] Perkins, *Work*, 252.
[24] Perkins, *Work*, 257.
[25] Perkins, *Work*, 252, 257; H. C. Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958), 304.
[26] Porter, *Reformation*, 310.
[27] Porter, *Reformation*, 220; Kendall, *Calvin*, 33–34.
[28] Perkins, *Work*, 28.

person was to examine his faith, 'because God justifies none 'but whom he hath called to a true, effectual, and lively faith.'[29] The preacher then went on to extol the value of faith by paraphrasing 1 Corinthians 13, but with the startling—and thoroughly Protestant—substitution of 'faith' for 'charity': 'If I offer unto God all the sheepe and oxen, that are in the world…if I breake my very heart with calling upon God, and weare out my tongue with preaching, if I sacrifice my body and my soule unto him, *and have no faith, all this availeth nothing*.' (47). As in so much of the Reformed tradition, 'a true, effectual, and lively faith' implies certainty—above all, certainty concerning one's own salvation. The preacher thus assured his congregation, '*beloved, wee knowe that wee are not reprobates*, because our spirit doth bear us record, that the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ is in us.' This internal witness of the Spirit speaks with the clarity of sense experience; for, the preacher continued, 'it is as easie a matter for the spirit within you to tell whose yee are, as for the eies of your body to judge where you sit, or in what place you stand.'[30]

The preacher was Richard Hooker. The passages quoted above come from his earliest surviving works, the *Two Sermons upon S. Judes Epistle*.[31] These are undated, but internal evidence indicates that they were written around 1582–3, just a couple of years prior to *The Certaintie*. The sermons on Jude are unremarkable affirmations of the Reformed theology of 'blessed assurance.'[32] *The Certaintie* and almost all the sermons thereafter return to the same questions, but with different answers. The nature of saving faith—whether and to what extent it excludes doubt, dereliction, and error—lay at the heart of Hooker's pastoral theology from beginning to end. Sometime between 1582 and 1585, however, his position changed. What the preceding has tried to show is that the understanding of faith that Hooker rejected in *The Certaintie* was not simply a view espoused by Travers or by Puritans (however one chooses to define that term) but part of the doctrinal core of Reformation Protestantism. Travers was quite right to find the sermon alarming.

[29] Perkins, *Work*, 44.
[30] Perkins, *Work*, 28.
[31] *FLE* 5:1–57.
[32] *Jude* 14; 5:30.9.

II

The sharp contrast drawn thus far is real enough, as both Hooker and Travers recognized. Yet it depends, as such sharp contrasts often do, on simplification and selective quoting. Travers, one recalls, objected only to a single passage in *The Certaintie*. As his silence concerning the remainder suggests, a good deal of the sermon remains within the channels of Reformed theology.

Some aspects of this continuity seem straightforward. Both in *The Certaintie* and the later sermons, Hooker not only retains but insists upon the doctrine of perseverance: the doctrine that those whom God has once justified can, in the words of the Westminster Confession, 'neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.'[33] That all those whom God calls receive the grace of final perseverance is, like double predestination, a doctrine specific to the Reformed tradition. Prior to the 1590s, however, it seems not to have received much explicit notice. Calvin's *Institutes* mentions perseverance only once.[34] Hooker's sermons, by contrast, repeatedly hinge on the promise that 'the fayth wherby ye are sanctified cannot faile,'[35] for although 'we are apte prone and redy to forsake god,' yet he will not 'forsake us.'[36] We will return to the extraordinary use Hooker makes of the doctrine of perseverance in the third section. For now, I want only to note that he does embrace it, and that this commitment marks a significant difference between Hooker's theology and the liberal Anglicanism that took shape at Cambridge in the 1590s. The Cambridge avant-garde, like Hooker, rejected the standard Reformed teaching on assurance, but they typically based that rejection on a denial of perseverance, since it follows that if persons who had received justifying grace could, as a consequence of their sins, totally and finally fall away, then they could never be sure of salvation. The theological motive for thus jettisoning assurance and perseverance was, above all, a sense that it was 'dangerous presumption' to claim that inner certainty of God's favour was proof positive that one would

[33] *Documents*, 499; see also Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 182n; Egil Grislis, 'The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker,' in *RHC*, 239.
[34] *Inst.* 3.2.40.
[35] *Cert.* 5:73.24–25.
[36] *Just.* 5:140.3.

be saved in the end, no matter what one's conduct in the meantime.[37] The Council of Trent had similarly denounced 'the vain confidence of heretics,' for no one should 'promise himself any thing as certain with an absolute certainty,' but rather 'those who think themselves to stand [should] take heed lest they fall…for if you live according to the flesh, you shall die.'[38] This concern, which Arminius shared, that Reformed doctrine set the bar of salvation too low has no place in Hooker's sermons, which seem far more troubled by its unbearable demands. It is the definition of faith as full assurance, not the doctrine of perseverance that Hooker finds problematic.

Yet towards the end of *The Certaintie*, Hooker might be thought to qualify his affirmation of perseverance by apparently making God's not forsaking us conditional on human effort: 'His [Christ's] praier must not exclude oure labor.… Suerlie if we looke to stand in the faith of the sonn of god, we must howerlie continually be providinge and settinge oure selves to strive.…To oure safetie oure owne sedulitie is requiredd.'[39] This cannot, however, be read as proto-Arminian hedging, since Reformed theologians interject precisely the same caveat. Bullinger thus denies that 'we may snort idly and take our ease' leaving all to the 'impelling of God.' Rather, although 'men's affairs and state are wholly governed by God's providence,' yet 'they must not therefore sit (as we say) with their hands in their bosoms idly, and neglect good means,' for 'the Lord requireth our endeavour.'[40] Beza likewise holds that 'each believer must watch above all to maintain, by continual supplication…[the] testimony which the Spirit of God gives to His own; he must also develop, by a continual exercise of good works…the gift of regeneration which he has received.'[41] The canons of Dort similarly argue that the 'confidence of perseverance' begets in the faithful 'farre greater care to walke more circumspectly in the waies of the Lord…lest by reason of the abuse of his fatherly bounty, Gods gratious countenance…bee againe turned away from them.'[42]

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[37] Porter, *Reformation*, 402.

[38] *The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Oecumenical Council of Trent*, ed. and trans. J. Waterworth (London: Dolman, 1848), chaps. 9, 13. On-line at the Hanover Historical Texts Project (http://history.hanover.edu/project.html#early [accessed 5/14/2005]).

[39] *Cert.* 5:81.11, 20–25.

[40] Bullinger, *Decades* 2:181, 184, 191.

[41] Beza, *Christian Faith*, 8.

[42] *The Judgement of the Synode Holden at Dort, Concerning the five Articles* (London: John Bill, 1619), 60–61 (chap. 5, sect. 13).

How this insistence on cooperation with grace coheres with the doctrine of perseverance belongs to a different discussion. For our purposes, what matters is that Reformed orthodoxy admits Hooker's claim that Christ's prayer does not exclude our labor. It is neither unusual nor Arminian, nor did Travers object to it.

Thus far the continuities between Hooker and the Reformed tradition seem reasonably straightforward, but there are also deeper and more complex filiations. It takes little imagination to see that the Reformed understanding of faith as 'a full and fixed assurednes, such as men are wont to have of things found by experience and prooved,' and therefore 'far other' than the 'unquiet doubtfulnes' of temporary faith,[43] could elicit gripping anxiety over whether one's own faith measured up or was only the vague pseudo-faith of the reprobate. Insofar as such doubts testified that one belonged among the eternally forsaken, desolation opened on to despair—the despair of those who in Hooker lament 'we ar hanged up lyke bottels in the smoke, cast into corners like the sherdes of a broken pott, tell not usse of the promises of godes favor . . . they belonge not [to] us, they ar made to others.'[44] Hooker's sermon addresses this spiritual crisis, addresses souls terrified that they do not believe. He thus maintains that faith does not rest on evidence sufficient to allow the sort of full persuasion we have of things experienced or proven; rather, all the faithful, including 'the perfeitest that have lived upon earth,' have wrestled with doubt, striving 'to hope even against hope to beleeve even against all reason of beleeving.'[45] So even God's holy prophet Habbakuk was 'weake in faith,' although nonetheless remaining 'faithfull in weaknes.'[46] And though 'extremity of greife' leaves men 'many times in judgment so confounded' that it seems to them 'as if they did not beleeve when they do, and as if they did dispayre when they do not,' yet this 'inward desolation' of a 'grieved spirit . . . is no argument of a faithles mind.'[47] For the grief itself presupposes 'a desire to beleev,' and therefore 'a secret love . . . of those thinges that are believed.' No one, however, loves something that he thinks unreal. Hence, 'by desiring to beleev,' those who mourn their loss of faith 'prove

[43] *Inst.* 3.2.15.
[44] *Cert.* 5:80.15–18.
[45] *Cert.* 5:70.27, 71.10.
[46] *Cert.* 5:76.22.
[47] *Cert.* 5:74.20–21, 75.18–19.

them selves to be true beleevers.'[48] In the end, despite our doubts and fears, 'the frailtie of oure nature' and 'oure deceivable imaginations,' we remain safe, because our salvation rests not on the quality of our faith but on 'the praier of Christ [which] ys more then sufficient.'[49]

Yet, if Hooker here responds to the spiritual crisis precipitated by Protestantism's understanding of faith, he was scarcely the first to do so. At this point, however, the threads binding Hooker's theology to the Reformed tradition become entangled, because the same Reformed theologians who define faith as 'a full and fixed assurednes' also (and often on the same page) grapple with the spiritual cost of this definition along lines very close to Hooker's: acknowledging that faith is always imperfect; that it may, and usually does, coexist with doubt, anxiety, and desolation; that a desire to believe suffices; that we are saved not by the strength of our faith but by the Son of God. It seems clear that such acknowledgements are in tension with the understanding of faith as assurance. Sixteenth-century theologians recognized this. Thus immediately after declaring that 'There is none (I say) faithfull, but he that leaning upon the assurednesse of his owne salvation, doth confidently triumph upon the Devill and death,' Calvin admits that 'the faithfull have a perpetuall strife with their owne distrustfulnesse.' However, he at once adds, 'they do never…depart from that assured confidence which they have conceived of the mercy of God.'[50] He does not explain how such distrust and confidence can be simultaneously present, although aware of the apparent contradiction. Having acknowledged that 'in all things alway unbeleefe is mingled with faith' and that in 'this present life' we are never 'healed from all disease of distrustfulness,' Calvin raises the question of whether it follows that 'Faith standeth not in a certaine and cleare knowledge, but in a darke and doubtfully entangled knowledge of Gods will towards us?'—and thus whether his own definition of faith is wrong. The answer he gives is of course 'no,' since 'Faith doth at length with wrastling overcome those hard troubles,' but this seems to gloss over his earlier claim that faith is 'alway' mingled with unbelief in this life.[51]

The tension between these claims characterizes sixteenth-century Protestantism. Hooker's *Certaintie* seems to be the first serious attempt

[48] *Cert.* 5:76.15.
[49] *Cert.* 5:81.8.
[50] *Inst.* 3.2.16–17.
[51] *Inst.* 3.2.4, 18.

to resolve the contradiction entailed by holding that justifying faith cannot be and yet always is mingled with doubt. His solution requires discarding the first part of this conjunct, but not, however, the second. That is, while Hooker denies the standard Reformed understanding of faith as 'a full and fixed assurednes,' much of what he affirms—about faith, about doubt, about desire, about assurance—is also standard Reformed teaching. Among English Calvinists, one finds passages closely resembling Hooker's sermon in the pastoral writings of Greenham and Perkins—works published after *The Certaintie* was preached but prior to its 1612 publication. The sermon has similar points of contact with the early English Protestant, Tyndale, and with the massively influential Swiss reformer, Bullinger.[52] These are, it needs to be emphasized, only *points* of contact, since all these writers also takes stances inconsistent both with Hooker's thought and, seemingly, with other tendencies in their own. The similarities are partial, yet they are also significant and extensive enough to make it clear that *The Certaintie* is part of the considerable body of Protestant literature dealing with the interior vicissitudes of belief.

One finds throughout this literature a recognition that even God's dear children regularly find that their faith is weak, and are anguished by that weakness, by the fear that such sinful doubts exclude from salvation. Bullinger thus renders the inner lament of those grieved in spirit in a prosopopœia that points ahead to Hooker's similar voicing of such anguish: "The chosen sheep," say they, "of Christ, do know Christ's voice; and being endued with a stedfast faith, stick in Christ inseparably.... [but] as for me, as I feel no such manner of drawing, so do I not with a full and perfect faith stick in the Son of God."[53] Nor is it only the least in the kingdom of God who suffer thus. The opening of Greenham's *A most sweet comfort for an afflicted Conscience* describes how

> *David*, a man chosen according to the Lordes owne heart: *Ezekiah*, a pure worshipper of God...*Jeremiah*, the Prophet of the Lorde...were rare and singular in the graces and favour of God: yet when they felt this wounde pearcing them with griefe of heart, they were as Sparrowes mourning, as Cranes chattering...as bottles parched in the smoke, they were as Doves mourning, not able without sighes and grones to utter their

[52] In 1586 Whitgift required all ministers without a university degree to obtain and annotate the *Decades* as a prerequisite for being licensed to preach.

[53] Bullinger, *Decades* 2:189.

> wordes, their hearts clove to the dust, and their tongues to the roofe of their mouthes.[54]

The image of the parched bottle from Psalm 119 recalls Hooker's prosopopoeia of those who, similarly pierced by grief of heart, lament, 'we ar hanged up lyke bottels in the smoke.' Like Greenham, Tyndale invokes the example of David, who, in his suffering, often cried out 'that he had lived well and folowed the right waye of God in vaine,' as evidence that 'there is no man so good / but that there cometh a tyme uppon hym / when he fealeth in hym selfe no moare faith or love unto god / then a sycke man oftymes feleth the tast of his meate which he eateth.'[55] Even the canons of Dort acknowledge that 'the faithfull doe wrastle in this life with divers doubts of the flesh . . . [and] do not alwaies perceive in themselves this full assurance of faith, and certaintie of perseverance.'[56]

Like David's, Tyndale adds, the Apostles' faith collapsed under the weight of temptation. After the Crucifixion, they took for granted that Jesus was lost to them in death, forgetting all He had done and taught, and yet 'there was none of them that was fallen in hys hert from chryste. For assone as the wemen brought worde / Peter and Jhon ran unto the sepulchre and saw and wondred and wold fayne have beleven that he was risen and longed for hym.'[57] The implicit claim that such hoping against hope, without actual belief, much less full assurance, is enough to hold on to Christ gets spelled out in the pastoral writings of Perkins and Greenham—as well as in Hooker's sermon. 'If we feele this in ourselves,' Greenham writes, 'that we would fain love the Lord, and be better . . . . then let us comfort our selves. . . . [For] such as we be in desire and purpose, such we be in reckoning and account with God, who giveth that true desire and holy purpose to none but to his children whom he justifieth.'[58] The same argument forms the *leit-motiv* of Perkins's 1597 *A Grain of Mustard-Seed*, which returns time and again to the proposition that those who 'feel themselves out of Christ' and yet 'thirst' after Him should take comfort, for 'the desire to believe, in the

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[54] Richard Greenham, *Paramythion, Two Treatises of the Comforting of an Afflicted Conscience* (London: Richard Bradocke, for Robert Dexter, 1598), 6–7.

[55] Tyndale, *An Answer*, 35.

[56] *Judgement of the Synode*, 59 (chap. 5, sect. 11).

[57] Tyndale, *An Answer*, 36.

[58] Greenham, *Paramythion*, 68–69.

want of faith, is faith,' God accepting 'the desire to do the thing, for the thing done.'[59]

The ground of our assurance thus lies not in the nature of our own belief but in the nature of God, who will not, as Hooker repeatedly insists, forsake us, although, left to our own devices, we would assuredly forsake Him.[60] So Perkins explains to those terrified by their own unbelief, 'faith doth not justify in respect of itself, because it is an action or a virtue: or because it is strong, lively and perfect, but in respect of the object thereof, namely Christ crucified,' for although it is faith that enables us to apprehend what Christ offers, 'yet our salvation stands rather in this, that God apprehends us for his own, than we apprehend him for ours.'[61] Greenham draws out the implications of this divine initiative: namely, that God reaches out to gather even weak and doubtful believers into his flock. Addressing those who feel themselves 'forsaken of God,' whose faith 'is weake and colde,' he avers that 'the Lorde God our most gracious father doth not cast us off, because through our imperfections we are unable or afraide to drawe neerer to the throne of grace; but rather…seing us a farre of desirous to come unto him, meeteth us by the way, & by grace & strength of his own hand, directeth our steps unto his kingdom.' We are not 'to loke on our faith which the Gospell hath called us unto,' judging on that basis whether or not we are in a state of grace, 'because we never beleeve as we ought.' Rather, the soul's eyes should look out to that 'which the Gospell offereth,' namely 'Gods mercy and peace in Christ: in whose lappe if we can lay our heads with Saint *John*, then we are in felicitie, and perfect quietnes.'[62]

There is much in Greenham, Perkins, and the other theologians quoted above, that does not sound at all like Hooker. I am not suggesting that Hooker should be read as a more-or-less typical Reformed divine of the Elizabethan period. Yet the impression of absolute otherness that one gets from reading Hooker's sermons against Perkins's *Golden Chain* or the Lambeth Articles is misleading. His sermons focus on the same issues of faith and assurance that stand at the centre of

[59] Perkins, *Work*, 398–401. See Debora Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 70–87.

[60] *Just*. 26; 5:140.2–3.

[61] Perkins, *Work*, 401–2.

[62] Greenham, *Paramythion*, 72–3.

Reformed pastoral theology. They speak to the same spiritual anxieties with which Reformed divines grappled, and offer much the same consolation. Hooker rejects too large a swathe of Calvinist doctrine to be meaningfully considered a Reformed thinker, yet he writes about faith and assurance from within the Reformed tradition.

III

Perhaps it would be better to say that Hooker's theology of faith and assurance has its roots in the Reformed tradition. It evolves, however, in a different direction. Hooker's sharpest divergence from Reformed doctrine, the one Travers seizes upon, has to do with his adoption of Aquinas's distinction between the certainties of evidence and adherence, and we will begin this final section with a consideration of this Thomistic material, before turning to the ways Hooker reworks the traditions on which he draws.

Hooker's two certainties derive from Aquinas, but, as Hooker must have known, the Thomistic distinction rests on the key passages in Aristotle laying out what Wesley Trimpi has christened 'the ancient dilemma of knowledge and representation,' a dilemma central to virtually all pre-modern epistemology.[63] Briefly put, the ancient dilemma states that there exists an inverse proportion between the excellence of an object and its knowability: the more excellent the object, the less knowable to us. The dilemma is implicit in the *Posterior Analytics*' distinction between what is 'prior and more knowable . . . in nature' and what is so 'in relation to us.' The latter, the objects ' "prior" or "more knowable" in relation to us,' are those 'nearer to our perception'; conversely, objects "prior" or "more knowable" in the absolute sense are 'further from it.' Since 'the most universal concepts are furthest from our perception, and particulars are nearest to it . . . these are opposite to one another.'[64] Moreover, the things furthest from sense perception, and hence least knowable to us, are also the most excellent. As Aristotle explains in the opening chapters of *Parts of Animals*:

[63] Wesley Trimpi, *Muses of One Mind: The Literary Analysis of Experience and its Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 87–129; Debora Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 194–98.

[64] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1.2 (71b35–72a6).

> Of substances constituted by nature some are ungenerated, imperishable, and eternal, while others are subject to generation and decay. The former are excellent and divine, but less accessible to knowledge. The evidence that might throw light on them . . . is furnished but scantily by sensation; whereas respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in their midst. . . . [Yet] the scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live; just as a half-glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than an accurate view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions.[65]

As Aristotle's references to the divine indicate, the ancient dilemma describes, above all, the problem at the heart of religious epistemology, echoed in St. Thomas's observation that, 'although it can grasp but little about them . . . the human intellect desires, loves and enjoys the knowledge of divine things . . . more than the perfect knowledge that it has of the lowest things.'[66] The obvious, nearly tautological, implication of the Aristotelian position would seem to be that these divine and excellent things, since we can know very little about them, are therefore matters about which we have least certainty. This may have been Aristotle's point, but it is not the inference Aquinas draws. The term for the tentative assent we normally give to claims which lack compelling evidence, and about which we therefore feel uncertain, is, St. Thomas notes, 'opinion.' Like opinion, faith involves assent under conditions of insufficient evidence, but the assent is total, not tentative.[67] People will die for their faith, not for opinions. According to Thomas, this total assent, despite insufficiency of evidence, occurs because in faith the *will* commands the intellect to assent to what it cannot itself see. The will chooses to make that leap because it apprehends the object of faith as good.[68] For, Thomas explains, 'the reward of eternal life is promised

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[65] Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, 1.5 (644b21–645a1), in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[66] *Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1948), 444.

[67] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 14.1, trans. Alfred Freddoso (http://222.nd.edu/~afreddos/translat/aquinas3.htm [accessed 10/5/2004]).

[68] The will's natural object is the good. Hence Voak's claim that for Hooker, 'the will of a demon directs its intellect to assent to the truth,' although the demon does not consider that truth 'something good,' is misleading. Rather, the demons, as Voak correctly notes, 'are compelled by the evidence to believe in Christian doctrine'—after all, they've *seen* hell. But since the demon's intellect assents because of the truth of Christian doctrine is evident to it, his will plays no role in the matter: which is to say

to us if we believe; and the will is moved by this reward to assent to the things that are said.' Yet will's command does not quiet the restless motion of the intellect, which continues to play and puzzle over 'those things which it believes, even though it assents to them with absolute firmness. For just taken by itself, the intellect is not satisfied.' This is to say that faith and doubt, like Milton's twins, cleave inseparably together, or in Thomas's words, in one who believes there can nevertheless 'arise a movement with respect to the contrary of that which he holds with absolute firmness.'[69]

However, despite such doubts, faith remains certain (*certus*) and that in two senses. Faith is more certain than the other intellectual virtues, Thomas avers, first because that which has a more certain cause is itself more certain, and the cause of faith is divine truth, which is a more certain cause than human reason; although, he adds, if one considers certainty not with respect to its cause but on the part of the subject (*ex parte subiecti*), where the 'more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain he is,' then in this sense 'faith is less certain.' Hence the doubts experienced by believers arise not because the objects of faith are themselves uncertain but because we are (*illa dubitatio non est ex parte causae fidei sed quoad nos*).[70] In these passages, the two kinds of certainty correspond to Aristotle's distinction between things more knowable in the order of being and those better known to us. It is the same distinction Hooker makes in contrasting 'thinges in them selves most certain' and 'thinges more evident although in themselves they be lesse certain.'[71] In this contrast between two types of certainty, the things believed are certain, although we are not certain of them. (So one might still say that the laws of physics are more certain than the

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that the demons *know*; they do not believe. On the same grounds, the reprobate cannot properly be said to have faith, but only to be 'perswaded of the truth': that is, they may think that there is a God in the same way that a thief may think that a security camera is watching him, but one would not say that the former therefore believe in God any more than one would say the thief believes in the Eighth Commandment. See Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 198–99; Hooker, *Cert.* 5:71, *Just.* 26; 5:136–37; Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 14.2.

[69] Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 14.1–2; see also Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIa IIae q. 4 art.1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (http://www.newadvent.org/summa [accessed 1/3/2005]); *Commentum in quatuor libros sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, 3.23.2.2, in vol. 7 of *Opera omnia* (Parma: Petrus Fiaccadori, 1852–73; repr. New York: Musurgia, 1948).

[70] Aquinas, *ST* IIa IIae q. 4 art. 8. The Latin is based on the *Summa theologiae*, 5 vols., 3rd edn. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1961).

[71] *Cert.* 5:70.4–6.

outcome of the 2004 presidential campaign, but I am only certain of the latter.)

Thomas also identifies a second sense in which faith is certain, one that becomes the basis for a second distinction between two types of certainty. 'Certitude' (*certitudo*), he thus observes, may signify firmness of adherence (*firmitas adhaesionis*), and in this sense, faith is more certain than any knowledge (*scientia*). However, if 'certitude' is taken as the evidentness of that to which one assents, then faith does not have the certainty of *scientia*. There is thus a certainty that 'derives from the evidence itself of those things which are said to be certain; but the certitude of faith derives from a firm adherence [*adhaesio*] to that which is believed.'[72] This differentiation of two types of certainty, which has no exact counterpart in Aristotle, hinges on the fact that in Latin *certus* means both a) established by evidence, proven and b) resolved upon, decided, as in Dido's '*certa mori*' (resolute for death).[73] '*Certus*' in this second sense, pertains to an act of the will: in matters of faith, the decision to trust, to hold on—even if by one's fingertips—so that 'all the world is not able quite and cleane to remove him from it,' to strive 'to hope even against hope [and] to believe even against all reason of believing.'[74] It is, of course, what Hooker means by 'certainty of adherence.' For Hooker, as for Aquinas, 'this certaintie is greater in us'[75] than, but also, *pace* Calvin, essentially different from, such certainty as 'men are wont to have of things found by experience and proved.' The certainty of assurance is 'greater in us' than the certainty of evidence not because we have fewer doubts regarding 'matters of fayth' than of 'thinges whereof wee have sensible knowledge,' but because 'the hart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth believe' such that 'all the world is not able quite and cleane to remove him from it.'[76]

Hooker follows Thomas closely in these passages, but not exactly. The differences occur at two points. Hooker describes faith in terms of the heart cleaving to what it believes, not of the will choosing to assent. Moreover, Hooker omits Thomas's explanation of what it is that moves the will: namely, the promise of heavenly reward. The Thomistic

[72] *ST* IIa IIae q. 4 art. 8. See also *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 14.1.

[73] Vergil, *Aeneid* 4.564. Milton's Adam uses the word in this sense in *Paradise Lost* 9.952–3: 'However I with thee [Eve] have fixt my Lot,/ Certain to undergoe like doom.'

[74] *Cert.* 5:71.10–11.

[75] *Cert.* 5:71.1–2.

[76] *Cert.* 5:70.23, 71.1, 71.9.

account points ahead to Pascal's wager. In both, the will makes, to put it vulgarly, a cost-benefit analysis which concludes that the promise of eternal blessedness outweighs the risk of error. For Hooker, conversely, the inducement to belief is not a future good but the remembered taste of '*heavenly sweetnes*.'[77] The element of rational calculation disappears, as does any sense of deliberate volition. The passivity of the self in Hooker's version, as well as the intense sensuous immediacy of the experience, call to mind Herbert's 'The Glance,' whose first stanza recalls the time

> When first thy sweet and gracious eye
> Vouchsafed ev'n in the midst of youth and night
> To look upon me, who before did lie
> Welt'ring in sin;
> I felt a sugared strange delight,
> Passing all cordials made by any art,
> Bedew, embalm, and overrun my heart,
> And take it in.

The stanza that follows likewise echoes Hooker in its depiction of how the memory of this tasted sweetness becomes the one thing that keeps the soul from letting go of what it believes during 'many a bitter storm . . . ev'n able to destroy.' For at such times

> . . . still thy sweet original joy,
> Sprung from thine eye, did work within my soul,
> And surging griefs, when they grew bold, control,
> And got the day.[78]

Hooker seems, in fact, closer not only to Herbert than Aquinas, but also to Tyndale, for whom faith originates in and grounds itself upon a moment or moments of direct contact, although Tyndale imagines the experience as like touching fire, not tasting sweetness. The latter metaphor, however, makes palpable the connection, at which Tyndale's language only hints, between this felt experience of real presence and its sacramental counterpart. In *The Certaintie* the remembered sweetness of God is the source and substance of faith. The epistemology of the *Lawes* is conducted in a more rationalist key, but the language of ecstatic tasting recurs in the description of Eucharistic communion, where 'in

[77] *Cert.* 5:71.9.

[78] Herbert, 'The Glance,' in *George Herbert and Henry Vaughan*, ed. Louis Martz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 155–56.

the woundes of our redemer wee there dip our tongues . . . our hunger is satisfied and our thirst for ever quenched.'[79]

As Hooker omits Thomas's claim that the motive of faith is the desire for one's own blessedness, so he edges away from the Reformed identification of faith with assurance of one's own salvation. For Hooker, faith is 'hold[ing] the foundation'—namely, 'Christe crucefied for the salvation of the worlde'—even if 'but weakly and as it were by a slender thred.'[80] Nowhere in his writings does there appear the slightest interest in the defining project of Reformed spirituality: the search for, in the words of the puritan MP and diarist Simonds D'Ewes, the 'assurance of mine own salvation in the world to come' by scrutinizing one's life for 'evidence of marks and signs' of election, a project that in D'Ewes's case involved listing 'threescore and four signs or marks drawn from several graces' discovered in the course of 'some threescore days of fasting' and written up 'first in English and afterwards in Latin, with a large and elaborate preface in Latin also to it.'[81] For Hooker, the overriding question is not whether I am saved but whether God is good. Thus, although *The Certaintie* deals with fears of personal abandonment, the sermon centres on Habbakuk's agonized blasphemy in response to the terrible contradiction between God's word and the actual events. For although the prophet knew that God had promised to continue His mercies to Israel forever, yet

> behouldinge the land which god had severed for his owne people and seenge yt abandoned unto heathen nations . . . behouldinge the lordes owne royall seate made *a heape of stones, his temple defiled, the carcases of his servantes cast oute for the foules of the aire to devoure and the fleshe of meke ones for the beastes of the field* to feed on . . . the conceipt of repugnancie between this, which was object to his eyes and that which faith upon the promise of the law did looke for made so depe an impression and so stronge that he . . . infereth as we see *The law dothe faile*.[82]

Hooker does not condemn Habbakuk for the outburst. Rather, the whole argument of the sermon centres on the claim that such anguished questioning of God's justice does not render one an unbeliever, which

[79] *Lawes* V.67.12; 2:343.9–10.
[80] *Just.* 14; 5:122.17, 123.22.
[81] Simonds D'Ewes, *The Autobiography and Correspondence*, 2 vols., ed. James Halliwell (London, 1845), 1:250, 353–4. On the role of Beza in making sanctification, as well as assurance, crucial evidence of election, see Kendall, *Calvin*, 29–38.
[82] *Cert.* 5:79.6–20.

is why Hooker begins by denying the Reformed identification of faith with assurance.

'The prophets case,' Hooker adds, 'is the case of many.'[83] Throughout the sermon he repeats his conviction that most people, even 'the perfeitest that have lived upon earth,'[84] find it excruciatingly difficult to believe in the face of suffering—both their own and the world's. Hooker's *Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*, which belongs to the same 1585–1586 sermon series as *The Certaintie* and *Of Justification*, rehearses the bitter 'accusations' against God with which, Hooker notes, 'bookes both prophane and sacred are fraught.'[85] Although the section begins as an attempt to reproduce what others have 'from time to time complained of,'[86] in passages like the one quoted below Hooker seems to be speaking in his own voice. The righteous, he thus observes, 'if they perish not[,] as often times they doe[,] at their enemies will and pleasure[,] are found not seldome in such sort to live that their deadliest adversaries could hardlie wish them greater woe then to continue as they are,' given which, 'doth it not stand even with reason to conclude, Surely this is not that which equitie and justice requireth?'[87] So too, if 'the supreme guide and governour of heaven and earth' acts contrary to every instinct of human morality, by 'keeping down the good and virtuous but crowning the heades of malignants with honour . . . this can hardlie seeme just or according to righteousness.' God himself has promised those who keep His commandments 'not onlie long life . . . but with life prosperitie and peace,' so that for '*Impietie to prevail against innocencie even as far as it listeth, god him selfe looking on*, who can but wonder and be amazd' or keep himself from asking 'can these things cleave together[:] God true in his word and we such in our estate?'[88]

The questions that haunt these sermons concern not merely the insufficiency of evidence for the promise but the apparent *contradiction* between evidence and promise; they seek to respond to the fear that reality belies God's word, God's justice, and God's love. As Hooker lays down in *The Certaintie*, faith involves striving to believe 'against all reason of beleeving'—against the insinuations of Satan who 'laboreth

[83] *Cert.* 5:73.13.
[84] *Cert.* 5:70.27.
[85] *Pride* 3; 5:346.25.
[86] *Pride* 3; 5:346.24.
[87] *Pride* 3; 5:347.16–20.
[88] *Pride* 4; 5:347.27–349.15.

continuallye to pervert . . . the minde with vane imaginations of repugnancie and contrarietie between the promise of god and those thinges which sense or experience . . . haith inprinted.'[89] This is a tricky passage: the voice of the devil and reason seem disconcertingly alike. Moreover, it is hard to see how believing against the evidence of the senses and experience could result in anything other than delusion. To understand what Hooker is getting at here, it is helpful to replace 'Satan' with 'Iago' as name for the one who waves before our eyes the evidence that shatters our belief in what we love. In *Othello* above all, but also in *Much Ado About Nothing*, Shakespeare transposes the scenario that troubles Hooker's sermons: where evidence discredits faith, and faith crumbles in the face of ocular proof to the contrary, and yet in the end it was the proof, not the promise, that turns out to have been the cheat. And as Iago's plausible appeals to reason and evidence poison the mind of a brave man who loves his wife, so the no-less-plausible doubts that Satan instils convince God's prophet that '*the law dothe faile*.'[90] The Shakespearean analogy clarifies why, for Hooker, believing against the evidence need not be self-deception, but also why belief is so terribly difficult to sustain.

For Hooker, doubt seems the almost inevitable response to the apparent contradiction between the event and the promise; for although the 'simplicitie of faithe' takes God at 'his bare word and on that it resteth,'[91] it remains nonetheless true that His goodness and justice are often not evident, but rather, as Milton's Archangel foretold,

> so shall the world go on,
> To good malignant, to bad men benign,
> Under her own weight groaning.[92]

This analysis of doubt is fundamentally different from, for example, Greenham's, for whom spiritual anguish functions primarily as a sign—an hysterical symptom, as it were—of repressed guilt. As doubt, for most Reformed writers, arises from sin lurking within the self, so their attempts to assuage spiritual anxiety focus on what Kendall terms the 'reflex act'—on locating in oneself the faith and sanctifying graces

[89] *Cert.* 5:77.18–21.
[90] *Cert.* 5:76.27.
[91] *Cert.* 5:77.16–17.
[92] *Paradise Lost* 12.537–9.

that betoken one's election.[93] Hooker's sermons, by contrast, seek to reassure the 'greeved spirit'[94] by urging the essential goodness of the divine nature. The 'Sermon on Matthew 7.7' thus insists that 'our Lord groundeth every mans particular assurance . . . upon the general rule and axiome of his providence': 'that those who seek will find, that those who knock will have the door opened to them.' And these axioms never fail, Hooker continues, for 'it is the glory of god to give. His very nature delighteth in it.'[95] *Of Pride* likewise proclaims that our assurance springs from the conviction that 'it is not with God as it is with men whose titles show rather what they should be then what they are. God will not be termed that which he is not. His name doth show his nature. Were not his affection most fatherlie the appellation of a father would offend him.'[96] The soaring conclusion of *The Certaintie* centres on the same affirmation of the divine goodness: '*I know in whom I have beleved* . . . I have a sheperd full of kindnes full of care and full of power: unto him I committ my self.'[97]

Hooker never denies that 'a distrustfull and doubtfull apprehending of that which wee ought most stedfestly to beleeve' is sin,[98] but he also refuses to make perfect faith a requirement, or even a *desideratum*, for 'fayth being perfect (as it is if it be not at all mingled with distrust and feare) what is there to exclud other christian vertues from the like perfection? and then what need wee the righteousnes of Christ?'[99] The first part of *The Certaintie* is at bottom an argument that faith cannot in this life be perfect, cannot attain full assurance in Reformed sense. There is simply too much evidence against it—a matter 'sufficiently knowen to every fayth full man that doth know him selfe.'[100] Yet, albeit that the faith of God's children 'when it is at the strongest is but weake,' He will save them 'maugre even their own both infidelity and despaire.'[101] For granted that 'we are apte prone and redy to forsake god . . . is god as redy to forsake us?'[102] To this rhetorical question, Hooker gives an

[93] See Kendall, *Calvin*, 33.
[94] *Cert.* 5:75.18.
[95] 'A Sermon of Richard Hooker found in the Study of the late learned Bishop Andrews,' *FLE* 5:393.14–19.
[96] *Pride* 3; 5:345.4–8.
[97] *Cert.* 5:82.11–14.
[98] *Cert.* 5:74.1.
[99] *Cert.* 5:71.25–28.
[100] *Cert.* 5:70.29–30.
[101] *Sermon on Matt. 7:7*; 5:390.20.
[102] *Just.* 26; 5:140.2–3.

extraordinarily strong negative. It is the negative implicit in doctrine of perseverance that Hooker takes over from the Reformed tradition. 'The fayth wherby ye are sanctified cannot faile,'[103] for 'if Christe the fountayne of life maie flitt and leave the habitacion where once he dwelleth what shall become of his promise *I am with youe to the worldes ende*?'[104]

Particularly in *A Learned Discourse of Justification* (the second of the three surviving sermons on Habbakuk), however, Hooker draws out the implications of the doctrine of perseverance in a way foreign to both the Reformed and Roman tradition. The doctrine of perseverance, as Hooker understands it, entails that 'by him which hath once sincerely beleeved in Christ[,] the foundacion of Christian faith can never be directly denyed,' for 'in promising to save' his flock, He also 'promised no doubte to preserve them . . . from that whereby salvation is irremediably loste': namely, from 'infidelity[,] extream dispaire[,] hatred of god and all godlynes.'[105] Faith 'ceaseth to be faith when it ceaseth to beleeve that Jesus Christe is the only saviour of the world'[106] but, Hooker adds, other 'error[s] in thinges apperteyning to god,' although 'repugnant unto faith,' do not destroy it. 'I do not deny,' he explains, that 'through errour' the Galatians 'wandered[,] although they were his sheep'; and yet 'I should denye that they were his sheep if I should graunte that through errour they perished.'[107] Even if they never learned of, and hence never repented, their misbelief, 'I can see no cawse why . . . [they] mighte not by mercye be saved even in errour.'[108] Indeed, 'they in all ages whose hartes have delighted in the princypall truth and whose soules have *thirsted after rightuousnes*, if they recyved the mark of errour, the mercye of god even erring and daungerously erring mighte save them.'[109]

Hooker, that is, takes the doctrine of perseverance, which held that those whom God calls, can never 'totally fall from faith and grace,' although they might nonetheless, as the canons of Dort explain, fall into sin 'seduced by the concupiscence of the flesh,'[110] and extends it in

[103] *Cert.* 5:73.24–25.
[104] *Just.* 26; 5:139.8–10. See also Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 182.
[105] *Just.* 26; 5:140.12–14, 140.27–141.1, 141.13, 14.
[106] *Just.* 26; 5:137.24–26.
[107] *Just.* 26; 5:142.14–16.
[108] *Just.* 26; 5:143.20–22.
[109] *Just.* 27; 5:147.22–25, *Just.* 36; 5:165.7ff.
[110] *Judgement of the Synode*, 55 (chap. 5, sect. 4).

The Certaintie by adding that they might also nonetheless wrestle with doubt and diffidence to the point that they did not believe that they believed (74), and the further extends it in *Of Justification* by adding that they might also nonetheless fall into doctrinal error, and yet persevere to the end, since '*the seed of God*' abiding in them is incorruptible. 'Greater and clerer assuraunce we cannot have of any thing' than that those who have once sincerely believed will never 'syn the synne of infydelity which is an inward abnegacion of Christe.'[111] This construal of perseverance entails, as Hooker's contemporaries grasped at once, a radically minimalist notion of saving faith. *Of Justification* spells out the entailment, arguing at length that Christians who believe—who falsely believe—in free will, meritorious works, co-operation with grace, invocation of saints, purgatory, and the other doctrinal trappings of popery might, for all that, have places reserved for them alongside good Protestant folk at the Supper of the Lamb.

Such a claim flew in the face of the Reformed insistence on doctrinal purity as the mark of the true church, and Travers was predictably appalled.[112] Moreover, the manuscript accounts of the controversy occasioned by the Habbakuk sermons suggest that the main bone of contention was precisely Hooker's claim that belief in Christ as saviour, even a weak and tormented belief, and even if bundled together with grave doctrinal error, counted as saving faith—and, in particular, its corollary that 'Papistes lyving and dyinge Papistes maye notwithstanding be saved.'[113] On this point, St. Thomas is closer to Travers than Hooker: according to the *Summa theologiae*, 'as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.'[114]

In his invaluable *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, W. K. Jordan concludes that, in arguing that 'a Roman Catholic could be saved despite error in a cardinal doctrine of faith,' Hooker 'probably went further than any Anglican in his century.' Yet, as Jordan also points out, Hooker's position was not far from Elizabethan policy—a policy

[111] *Just.* 26; 5:141.22.
[112] Walter Travers, *A Supplication*, 5:204.
[113] 'The Hooker-Travers Controversy,' Harleian MS 291 fol. 183 r°, *FLE* 5:289.3. See also 5:282–291. See Anthony Milton, 'The Church of England and Rome,' in *The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642*, ed. Kenneth Fincham (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 193, 200, 206–7.
[114] *Summa theologiae* IIa IIae q. 5 art. 3.

that the early Stuarts continued—which, as far as belief (as opposed to outward conformity) was concerned, 'demanded of its subjects only their adherence to the general framework of dogma which both Protestants and Catholics regarded as infallibly true.'[115] One can find anticipations of Hooker's refusal to hinge salvation on doctrinal purity in early sixteenth-century Protestantism: above all, in the Henrician martyr John Frith's decision to die rather than acknowledge transubstantiation as 'a necessary article of our faith' since then 'I should damnably condemn all the Germans and Almains [i.e., Lutherans] with infinite woe.'[116] In Reformed ecclesiology, however, 'the true church was essentially defined in terms of the purity of its doctrine.'[117] Yet by the early seventeenth century a significant number of important English churchmen had come to Hooker's conclusions. These thinkers, whom de Mas (somewhat confusingly, to Anglo-American ears) terms latitudinarians, 'held the validity, with respect to the goal of salvation, of all [Christian churches] .... Their way of thinking ... considered doubt and uncertainty as inseparable from religious feeling (which could never rest on absolute certainty), and not as a terrible threat lurking within the mind of the believer.'[118] These '*latitudinari*' were mostly, but not exclusively, high-churchmen; their number included Archbishop Laud, who refused ever to 'take it upon me to express that tenet or opinion, the denial of the foundation only excepted, which may shut any Christian, the meanest, out of heaven.'[119] Yet moderates like Hall and Ussher similarly refused to exclude from hope of salvation any who 'profess the blessed name of God, our Redeemer, and look to be saved by his blood.'[120] One can, of course, find analogous statements in Continental writers of the period, but these tend to be relatively isolated and marginalized

[115] W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932–36), 1:227, 123.

[116] Jeffrey Knapp, *Shakespeare's Tribe: Church, Nation, and Theater in Renaissance England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 171.

[117] A. Milton, 'The Church of England and Rome,' 206.

[118] 'Di tutte [le Chiese] reconoscevano la validità ai fini della salvezza .... Il loro modo di ragionare ... considerava il dubbio e l'incertezza come l'anima del sentimento religioso (che non può mai essere fondato sopra una certezza assoluta), e non come una terribile insidia posta all'interno della conscienza stessa del credente.' Enrico de Mas, *Sovranitá politica e unitá Cristiana nel seicento Anglo-Veneto* (Ravenna: A. Longo, 1975), 19 (translation mine).

[119] William Laud, *Works*, 7 vols. in 5, ed. William Scott and James Bliss (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1857; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1977), 2:402.

[120] Hall, *Christian Moderation*, quoted in Jordan, *Religious Toleration*, 2:149.

figures—Acontius, Castellio, Sarpi, the mystic Hans Denck—not, as in England, eminent mainstream divines. In early Stuart England, a 'latitudinarian' model of the invisible church flourished within the dominant culture, supported by the *gravitas* of both temporal and sacred authority. That Hooker articulates and defends this model in 1586—that he was apparently the first to do so, at least in such a public forum—lends support to Peter Lake's provocative description of him as the inventor of Anglicanism, or at least a 'particular strain' of it.[121]

IV

Lake, who makes this comment in his essay on the Laudian style, joins Hooker's name with those of Andrewes, Buckeridge, and Neile, which is surely a legitimate association, and with respect to the *Laws*, the most significant one. The afterlife of the sermons presents a more complicated picture. Some of the manuscripts were preserved by Andrewes, but others by Ussher. In 1649 the Leveller pamphleteer and agitator, William Walwyn, then in prison, wrote that he had the great Habbakuk sermons of 1586 almost by heart from 'hearing and reading continually.'[122] Almost a century after it was preached, *The Certaintie* reappears at the centre of the long introspective meditation that concludes the autobiography of the great dissenting minister, Richard Baxter, and will provide the conclusion for this essay as well.

The passage begins with Baxter describing how over the years his own spiritual struggles had come to centre less on the temptation to despair, to question his own election—the characteristic crisis of Reformed spirituality—than on the temptation that Hooker's sermons confront: the temptation to disbelieve. 'I had,' he confesses, 'certainly apostatised to infidelity' under this latter assault had 'I been void of internal experience and the adhesion of love.'[123] The final phrase seems an allusion to Hooker's certainty of adherence, 'adherence' being, of course,

[121] Peter Lake, 'The Laudian Style: Order, Uniformity and the Pursuit of the Beauty of Holiness in the 1630s,' in *The Early Stuart Church*, ed. Fincham, 181; see also Lake, *Puritans and Anglicans? Presbyterian and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 221.

[122] William Walwyn, *The Leveller Tracts, 1647–1653*, ed. William Haller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 362.

[123] Richard Baxter, *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, ed. Matthew Sylvester (London: Parkhurst, 1696), 109–111.

Hooker's translation of Thomas's '*adhæsio*,' in Baxter's rendering 'adhesion.' The passage goes on to accept the inevitability of doubt, Baxter acknowledging that even now 'no petition seemeth more necessary to me than 'Lord, increase our faith: I believe, help thou my unbelief.' That *The Certaintie* lies behind these reflections becomes unmistakeable in the observation that immediately follows: 'Among truths certain in themselves, all are not equally certain unto me…My certainty that I am a man is before my certainty that there is a God, for *Quod facit notum est magis notum*.' These sentences evoke the ancient dilemma and its Aristotelian basis in the distinction between, in Hooker's phrasing, 'thinges in them selves most certain' and 'thinges more evident although in themselves they be lesse certain.'[124] Immediately after making the distinction between truths 'certain in themselves' and those 'certain unto me,' Baxter, in fact, explicitly refers to Hooker: 'even of the mysteries of the Gospel I must needs say with Mr. Richard Hooker, *Eccl. Polit.*, that whatever men may pretend, the subjective certainty cannot go beyond the objective evidence.' This would appear to be the *first* use of 'subjective' and 'objective' in their modern sense (a quarter-century before the earliest citation in the *OED*). One's initial impression is that they are Baxter's shorthand for certainty of adherence and certainty of evidence, but something is deeply wrong here. The allusion, as Baxter indicates, is not to *The Certaintie* but to Hooker's declaration in Book II of *The Lawes* that 'it is not required or can be exacted at our hands, that we should yeeld unto any thing other assent, then such as doth answere the evidence which is to be had of that we assent unto.'[125] This seems to endorse a strikingly rationalist grammar of assent, but the *Lawes*, which deals primarily with the outward ordering of 'society supernatural,' does not explain whether or how this dictum pertains to faith or 'the mysteries of the Gospel.'[126] To transpose it into that

[124] *Cert.* 5:70.4–7.

[125] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:179.25–27.

[126] In the section from which Baxter cites, Hooker seems to exclude such mysteries from these evidentiary criteria, observing that 'with Christian men' Scriptures is received 'as the word of God' and hence as more 'sure' than 'that which we have necessary reason for, yea, that which we see with our eies' (II.7.5; see also V.63.1). The assurance of *Christians* regarding Scripture is thus greater than, but also different from, assent based on reason or evidence—the same claim Hooker defends in *The Certaintie*. In Book III, however, Hooker at one point seems to say the opposite: that there are 'proofes…manifest and cleere' for the divine authority of Scripture (III.8.14), from which it would seem to follow that our assent to Christianity does not require any leaps of faith but rests securely on demonstrative reason. If this is what Hooker means,

context, as Baxter does, misses the basic nature of the ancient dilemma. For the ancient dilemma entails, as both Aquinas and Hooker clearly grasp, that the subjective certainty of faith always exceeds the objective evidence. As Aristotle had written two millennia earlier, our reliance on sense perception means that the things most 'excellent and divine' remain least 'accessible to knowledge.'[127] *Nunc videmus per speculum et in aenigmata*. From the perspective of the ancient dilemma, Baxter's claim that 'subjective certainty' in matters of faith 'cannot go beyond the objective evidence' makes no sense. But Baxter is no longer thinking in terms of the ancient dilemma, but, as the sentences that follow reveal, of early Enlightenment natural religion. The subjective certainty of faith must, he thus explains, base itself on 'natural truths'—on 'objective' reasons rather than either revealed truths or the subjective witness of 'internal experience and the adhesion of love.' 'Of late,' he adds, he has come more than ever to 'discern a necessity of a methodical procedure in maintaining the doctrine of Christianity,' a procedure that presupposed only 'natural verities' of the sort one would employ to 'prove to a heathen or infidel the Being of God.' Baxter sketches this procedure only a page after having described how, when he found himself doubting 'the truth of Scripture or Christianity,' only the 'adhesion of love' kept him from apostasy. His theology, that is, moves in the space of a page from the world of Hooker to that of Locke, the pivot point signalled by the substitution of the new terms 'subjective' and 'objective' in place of the rather different ancient contrast between 'truths certain in themselves' and those whose evidence makes them 'certain unto me.'

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his position has changed drastically since 1586. The sentences that follow, however, suggest that it is not what he means, since they radically qualify the initial claim that one can prove the divine authority of Scripture: *for those who believe the Gospel*, reason 'confirmeth me in this my beleefe the more'; for those who do not believe, reason does 'somewhat help…to bring me to the number of beleevers'; hence, one ought not 'to exclude utterly all force which any kind of reason may have in that behalfe' (III.8.14–15). To claim that there is *some* evidence, *some* rational ground for belief is consistent with the ancient dilemma (and hence with *The Certaintie*), which denies only that the evidence is sufficient to constitute proof, and hence certainty. (For a different reading of these passages, see Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 227–29.) I am deeply grateful to Torrance Kirby for pointing out to me some of the key passages in the *Lawes* dealing with this question.

[127] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.1 (993b8–11).

CHAPTER TEN

REASON AND LAW

W. J. Torrance Kirby

The Source of Law

> The statelinesse of houses, the goodliness of trees, when we behold them delighteth the eye; but that foundation which beareth up the one, that root which ministreth unto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosome of the earth concealed: and if there be at any time occasion to search into it, such labour is then more necessary then pleasant both to them which undertake it, and for the lookers on. In like maner the use and benefite of good lawes, all that live under them may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit the groundes and first originall causes from whence they have sprong be unknowne, as to the greatest part of men they are.[1]

Richard Hooker's radical, foundational proposal at the outset of the first book of his treatise *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* is easily summarized: 'God is Law'. From a metaphysical or theological point of view this claim taken by itself is neither original nor wholly remarkable. Indeed Hooker's claim that God is law—the hidden 'first originall cause'—can reasonably be interpreted as a restatement, or better a reformulation of classical '*logos* theology' such as one finds in the Hellenistic thought of Philo of Alexandria derived by him from pre-Socratic thought (Heracleitus) and the Stoics;[2] or in such early-church fathers as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, Eusebius of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria or Augustine[3] and which was reformulated in later Christian theology variously, for example, by Aquinas and Calvin.[4] For all of these theologians, an

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[1] *Lawes* I.1.2; 1:57.6–16.

[2] Henry Chadwick, 'Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought,' in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (ed. A. H. Armstrong; Cambridge: University Press, 1967) 137.

[3] Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian thought and the classical tradition: studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

[4] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ* Ia qq. 14, 15, 22, 33–35; IIa IIae, qq. 90–96. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I.5; II.14.

uncreated divine principle, the Word (*logos*, or *ratio*, or *paradeigma*—reason, order, plan) constitutes the 'idea of ideas', the Platonic 'archetypal idea' and therefore the 'first principle' of all created order while the creation itself, both visible and invisible, proceeds from and is wholly dependent upon this original, un-derived and hidden divine principle as its first and primary cause.

For Hooker, however, the investigation of this hidden law or *logos* represents a great deal more in actuality than a purely metaphysical claim concerning the nature of the first principle. As the argument of his treatise unfolds, it becomes plain that Hooker is just as deeply invested in the full practical, political, even constitutional consequences of his claim that 'God is law' as he is committed to its underlying metaphysical necessity. Indeed the burden of his argument is to show that the Elizabethan constitutional and ecclesiastical order he seeks to explain and defend—the 'stately house' as it were of the established Church and the 'goodly tree' of the flourishing commonwealth—has its ultimate ground and justification in a first principle altogether hidden. Indeed it is of the utmost significance for Hooker that *both* his metaphysical ontology *and* his polemical apology of the Elizabethan religious settlement rest squarely upon this one simple proposition: *God is Law*. Hooker's adaptation of classical *logos* theology is exceptional and indeed quite original for its extended application of the highest metaphysical principle to the most concrete institutional issues of a particular time and place. His sustained effort to explore the intimate connections of pressing political and constitutional concerns with the highest discourse of hidden divine realities—the knitting together of theology and politics—is the arguably the defining characteristic of Hooker's thought. As C. S. Lewis points out, Hooker's universe is 'drenched with Deity'.[5] Everything created 'participates' the divine first principle—by this participation, all things have God in them and, correspondingly, all things are in God. Hooker's proposition that God is law is the substance of this idea.

Hooker defines law in general as 'that which doth assigne unto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the forme and measure of working…so that no certaine end could ever be attained, unlesse the actions whereby it is

[5] C. S. Lewis, *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, excluding drama* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 462.

attained were regular, that is to say, made suteable for and correspondent unto their end, by some canon, rule or lawe.'[6] This definition places him in a scholastic teleological tradition derived ultimately from the metaphysics of Aristotle. Hooker's adaptation of this definition, however, goes beyond any ordinary Aristotelian or Thomistic account of causality. Working from the definition, Hooker asserts that everything works according to law, including God himself: 'the being of God is a kinde of lawe to his working: for that perfection which God is, geveth perfection to that he doth.'[7] There are certain structural similarities between this argument in Book I of the *Lawes* and Thomas Aquinas's short treatise on law in the second part of the *Summa Theologiae*.[8] The principal resemblance is Hooker's adoption of Aquinas's neo-platonic metaphysical logic. Just as the neo-platonic cosmology accounts for the genesis of the world by means of a downward emanation or procession from the principle of original unity, so also Hooker derives a diverse hierarchy of laws from the eternal law as their 'highest wellspring and fountaine'. His emphasis upon the divine unity is marked: 'our God is one, or rather verie Onenesse, and meere unitie, having nothing but it selfe in it selfe, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things besides.'[9] All species of law participate in the undifferentiated unity of the eternal law and are derived from it by way of 'procession'. Hooker adheres to the Christian neo-platonic lex divinitatis whereby the originative principle of law remains simple in itself while proceeding out of itself in its generation of manifold derivative forms of law. He distinguishes between a first and a second eternal law on the ground that God is a law both to himself (*in se*) in his divine simplicity and to all creatures besides (*ad extra*). His discussion of the first eternal law is thus closely analogous to a traditional 'logos' theology.

The second eternal law comprises the divine order as 'kept by all his creatures, according to the severall conditions wherewith he hath indued them.'[10] It has a variety of 'names' depending on the different orders of creatures subject to the one divine government. The two

[6] *Lawes* I.2.1; 1:58.26–29.
[7] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:59.6.
[8] *ST* Ia qq. 90–96. These similarities have often been noted by Hooker's interpreters. See, e.g., John Sedberry Marshall, *Hooker and the Anglican tradition; an historical and theological study of Hooker's Ecclesiastical polity* (London: A. C. Black, 1963), Peter Munz, *The place of Hooker in the history of thought* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1952).
[9] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:59.14–19.
[10] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.9–10.

principal derivative genera of the second eternal law are the natural law and the revealed law of the scriptures, usually referred to by Hooker as the divine law. The entire system of the laws is thus expressed in the classically neoplatonic twofold motion of procession from (*exitus*) and return to (*reditus*) the original unity of the eternal law. The natural law, by a further procession, comprises in turn subordinate species of law which govern irrational natural agents as well as rational; the law governing the rational creatures is distinguished further into the 'law cœlestial', which orders the angels, and the 'law of reason', sometimes called the 'natural law' which orders humankind. All of these subspecies represent the outward and downward *processio* of the second eternal law. On the other side, the law of God's special revelation, the revealed law of the scriptures presupposes the disorder introduced into the cosmos by the Fall, and is provided in order to secure the final restoration or 'return' of the creation to its original condition of unity under the eternal law. The distinction between the two summa genera of natural law and divine law which corresponds to the logical structure of procession and return is also reflected in the epistemological distinction of a twofold knowledge of God, namely by the light of supernatural revelation and by the natural light of reason. There are in addition composite species of law, such as human positive law and the law of nations, which are derived by a reflection upon the general principles contained in the natural law. These derivative species of law are a consequence of human sin and, like the divine law, are given as a corrective to the disorder introduced by the Fall (*remedium peccati*). In all of this the human creature as the *imago dei* is the focal point of the cosmic operation of procession from and return to the original order established in and by the divine simplicity.

The structure of this generic division of law shows that Hooker has read Aquinas very closely indeed. Hooker's distinction between the first and second eternal laws proves, nonetheless, to be a highly significant departure from the scholastic model. The effect of the distinction between these two aspects of the eternal law is simultaneously to widen and to decrease the distance between the creator-lawgiver and the created cosmos. The gathering together of all the derivative species of law within the second eternal law reduces the sense of a dispositively mediated hierarchy between creator and creature and emphasizes rather the common participation of the manifold derivative species of law in their one source. At the same time the distinction between the first and second eternal laws entails a sharper hypostatic distinction between the hidden

original cause and creature. This treatment of the eternal law exhibits the marked Augustinian character of Hooker's thought, a general theological bent which he shares with other magisterial Reformers.

'All things', Hooker maintains, including God's own self, 'do worke after a sort according to lawe.'[11] Whereas all creatures work 'according to a lawe, whereof some superiour, unto whome they are subject, is author', nonetheless 'only the workes and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the lawe whereby they are wrought. The being of God is a kinde of lawe to his working.'[12] As the very principle of law itself, God alone is *causa sui* and therefore *gubernator sui*, and by virtue of the inexplicable fullness of such being, is the cause and lawgiver as well to all that is derivative of his creative will. 'Being the first, it can have no other then it selfe to be the author of that law which it willingly worketh by. God therefore is a law both to himselfe, and to all other things besides.'[13] All that is—both the first principle itself and all that derives from it—have their ground concealed within the simplicity of that same first principle or cause, hidden, as it were, like a foundation stone or treeroot 'in the bosome of the earth'. Hooker's ontological claim concerning the divine ultimacy of law constitutes the decisive starting point—the 'first originall cause', *archē, principium*, or 'beginning'—of the argument of his lengthy treatise, that is of the systematic exposition of the generic division of law itself in the first book, and of the entire subsequent unfolding of his argument in defense of the religious Settlement of 1559.

The exposition of this legal ontology, if it may so be identified, takes the form of a generic division of the various forms of Law, modelled formally, at least to some extent, upon a similar analysis by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*.[14] Hooker's approach to the definition of law is remarkable for its simultaneous appropriation of a systematically Neo-platonic structure of argument and an appeal to orthodox Protestant assumptions with respect to the relation of the orders of Nature and Grace.[15] Hooker offers a brief sketch of his argument in his first chapter which provides a useful starting-point for understanding

[11] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:58.33–59.1.
[12] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:59.12–5.
[13] *Lawes* I.2.3; 1:60.16–18.
[14] See *ST* Ia IIae, qq. 90–96.
[15] See Neelands's essay 'Scripture, Reason and "Tradition",' *RHC*, 77. For an important discussion of related questions see W. J. Hankey, 'Augustinian Immediacy and Dionysian Mediation in John Colet, Edmund Spenser, Richard Hooker and the Cardinal

the Neoplatonic structure of his elaborate system of laws, all derived from the original 'Onenesse' of law that is the very being of God. He begins with an allusion to the polemical occasion of the treatise in the ecclesiological controversies which arose in England as a consequence of the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559, and makes explicit the intimate connection intended between the metaphysical and the polemical arguments of the treatise:

> Because the point about which wee strive is the qualitie of our *Lawes*, our first entrance hereinto cannot better be made, then with consideration of the nature of lawe in generall, and of that lawe which giveth life unto all the rest, which are commendable just and good, namely the lawe whereby the Eternall himselfe doth worke. Proceeding from hence to the lawe first of nature, then of scripture, we shall have the easier accesse unto those things which come after to be debated, concerning the particular cause and question which wee have in hand.[16]

By proceeding from 'the One' to the many—as he himself expresses his methodology, from 'generall meditations' to the 'particular decisions'—Hooker establishes an order of argument which is itself presented as a form imitative of the divine creative *processio*. By this account, the idea of law presents itself as both a 'monad' and a 'dyad'. First there is the law 'which God hath eternallie purposed himself in all his works to observe.'[17] This eternal law is the 'highest welspring and fountaine' of all other kinds of law, the 'meere unitie, having nothing but it selfe in it selfe, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things.'[18] Of this original divine simplicity, of such 'verie Onenesse', says Hooker, 'our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as in deed he is, neither can know him: and our safest eloquence concerning him is our silence, when we confesse without confession that his glory is inexplicable, his greatnes above our capacitie to reach. He is above, and we upon earth, and therefore it behoveth our wordes to be warie and fewe.'[19] Nonetheless, since God works not only as law to himself, but also as 'first cause, whereupon originallie the being of all things dependeth', and therefore also as law 'to all other things

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de Bérulle,' *Augustinus in der Neuzeit: Colloque de la Herzog August Bibliothek de Wolfenbüttel 14–17 Octobre 1996*, ed. Dominique Courcelles (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 125–160.

[16] *Lawes* I.1.3; 1:58.11–19.

[17] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.7.

[18] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:59.21–22.

[19] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:59.14–19.

besides', there is a concomitant outward showing of this first law. The showing forth of the divine power in God's 'externall working'—as distinct from those 'internall operations of God' as Trinity, namely 'the generation of the Sonne, and the proceeding of the Spirit'[20]—is for no other purpose than 'the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant vertue. Which abundance doth shew it selfe in varietie, and for that cause this varietie is oftentimes in scripture exprest by the name of *riches*. *The Lord hath made all things for his owne sake*.'[21]

The divine working which manifests itself in the riches and variety of the creation is presented by Hooker in a very singular and interesting fashion. At the beginning of the third chapter he observes as follows:

> I am not ignorant that by law eternall the learned for the most part do understand the order, not which God hath eternallie purposed himselfe in all his works to observe, but rather that which with himselfe he hath set downe as expedient to be kept by all his creatures, according to the severall conditions herewith he hath indued them.[22]

Hooker distinguishes two distinct 'modes' of the eternal law which he in fact goes on to identify simply as the 'first eternall lawe' and the 'second law eternall'.[23] The distinction between these two species of the eternal law marks a boundary of sorts between realms of apophatic and kataphatic theological discourse. The first eternal law is, as we have seen, the law as it is for the divine lawgiver, the law 'whereof it selfe must needs be author unto it selfe'. This is a unity concerning which, Hooker states, our safest eloquence is silence. The divine logos or wisdom whereby God works in creating is 'that law eternall which God himself hath made to himselfe, and therby worketh all things wherof he is the cause and author'. This first eternal law 'has bene of God, and with God everlastingly: that law the author and observer whereof is one only God to be blessed for ever, how should either men or Angels be able perfectly to behold? The booke of this law we are neither able nor worthie to open and looke into.'[24] By contrast, the second eternal law comprises the divine order as 'kept by all his creatures, according to the severall conditions wherewith he hath indued them'.[25] Here the

[20] *Lawes* I.2.2; 1:59.7–8.
[21] *Lawes* I.2.4; 1:61.7–10.
[22] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.6–10.
[23] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.27 and 29.
[24] See *Lawes* I.2.5; 1:61.28–62.11.
[25] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.9–10.

eternal law continues to be one, yet is adapted or accommodated nonetheless to the finitude of mortal capacity. It is with the second eternal law that the variety of the forms of law first comes into view, yet a variety which is understood by Hooker throughout as 'contained' by the original unity that is the eternal law. The first and second eternal laws are one and the same law 'laid up in the bosome of God' viewed either from the standpoint of the eternal present and self-identity of the divine law-giver, or from the standpoint of its reception by all creatures 'according to the several conditions wherwith he hath indued them'. In this distinction between the two species of the eternal law, Hooker presents a subtle theological account of the mediation of the many from the One. This second eternal law has in turn a variety of 'names' depending on the diverse orders and kinds of creatures subject to the single divine government.

There is indeed a considerable variety among the manifold forms of law derived from the fount of the first eternal law and understood by rational creatures under the aspect of the second eternal law (both angelic and human):

> Now that law which as it is laid up in the bosome of God, they call *æternall*, receyveth according unto the different kinds of things which are subject unto it different and sundry kinds of names. That part of it which ordereth natural agents, we call usually *natures* law; that which Angels doe clearely behold, and without any swarving observe is a law *cælestiall* and heavenly: the law of *reason* that which bindeth creatures reasonable in this world, and with which by reason they may most plainly perceive themselves bound; that which bindeth them, and is not knowen bu by speciall revelation form God, *Divine* law; *humane* lawe that which out of the law either of reason or of God, men propobablie gathering to be expedient, they make it a law. All things therfore, which are as they ought to be, are conformed unto *this second law eternall*, and even those things which to this eternall law are not conformable, are notwithstanding in some sort ordered by *the first eternall lawe*.[26]

Yet, in a manner to some extent analogous to the prior division of the eternal law into the two species of the first and the second eternal laws, here too at the level of the second eternal law the appearance of the 'manifold' riches of creation is itself ordered and limited within two principal derivative species of law: 'natural law' and 'revealed law'. The former division embraces governance of the totality of creation—

[26] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.14–29.

understood in Neoplatonic fashion as visible and invisible, material and formal, sensible and intelligible—by containing within itself a completely exhaustive categorisation or division of the creatures and their diverse modes of subjection to the second eternal law: 1) *natures* law of 'natural and necessary agents', or the material, non-thinking creation; 2) the *cœlestial* law of the purely intellectual and unfallen creation that comprises the angelic hierarchy (a law beheld by them 'without any swarving'); and 3) the law of *reason* which governs intellectual creatures 'in this world' where they, unlike the angels, find themselves 'bound'. The third category, which governs the rational but mortal creature, i.e. the human condition, is clearly understood by Hooker to be in some sense a mixed combination of the previous two categories. As intellectual natures mortals share the desire of the angels for an infinite good in which alone such a nature can be finally satisfied. 'Then are we happie therfore when fully we injoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our soules are satisfied with everlasting delight: so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God.'[27] Yet, 'of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subject we are unto sundry imperfections, griefs of body, defectes of minde, yea the best thinges we do arre painefull…'[28] The predicament of the mortal condition is to be of a mixed nature, both intellectual and physical. For Hooker—and here his commitment to Reformed soteriology shines through—there can be no overcoming of this hiatus between a 'natural' desire for divine perfection and a complete natural incapacity to achieve that end desired. The desire for *theosis* is a natural desire: 'so that nature even in this life doth plainly claime and call for a more divine perfection'.[29] However

> the light of nature is never able to finde out any way of obtayning the reward of blisse, but by performing exactly the duties and workes of righteousnes. From salvation therefore and life all flesh being excluded this way, behold how the wisedome of God hath revealed a way mysticall and supernaturall, a way directing unto the same ende of life by a course which groundeth it selfe upon the guiltines of sinne, and through sinne desert of condemnation and death.[30]

[27] *Lawes* I.11.2; 1:112.17–20.
[28] *Lawes* I.11.2; 1:112.24–113.
[29] *Lawes* I.11.4; 1:115.18–19.
[30] *Lawes* I.11.5, 6; 1:118.11–18.

Thus, there is a second primary division within the second eternal law, what Hooker calls the '*Divine* law'. Unlike the natural law, this other way of accesse to the divine wisdom is 'revealed'—and therefore constitutes a mystical and 'supernatural' way rather than a 'natural' way. It is through such supernatural means that the natural desire for an infinite good overcomes the circumstance of the mortal condition of being 'bound'.

Thus, for Hooker, the form of law 'to be kept by all creatures according to their several conditions' is comprised within three *summa genera*—the eternal law, the natural law and the divine law—where the latter two kinds are understood as comprehended within the first, and yet nonetheless radically distinct in their operation and in our knowledge of them. Together these *summa genera* constitute a comprehensive division of the all the many and various 'kinds' of law which are discussed throughout the remainder of Hooker's argument in the first book and indeed throughout the rest of the entire treatise. To understand their derivation is to gain critical insight into the underlying logical structure of Hooker's argument in the *Lawes*, and moreover provides a vital instrument for interpreting the manner of Hooker's reconciliation of a Neoplatonic ontology of participation with a Reformed soteriology. Viewed from the standpoint of their divine principle of origin—i.e. in the first eternal law—these three *summa genera* of law may be considered as simply one. Viewed from below, as it were, that is from the standpoint of creaturely, mortal finitude, the original unity takes on the aspect of articulated kinds which nonetheless all 'participate' and 'proceed from' the undivided unity that is their common source.[31] This profound account of the simultaneous unity and multiplicity of law and its species lies at the very heart of Hooker's metaphysical vision and provides in turn the necessary instrument for his sustained effort throughout the *Lawes* to demonstrate the consistency of the terms of the Elizabethan Settlement with the foundational principles of Reformed theology.

[31] On the concept of the *procession* of the forms of law see, for example, I.3.4; 1:68.6–8: '…the naturall generation and *processe* of all things receyveth order of *proceeding* from the setled stabilitie of divine understanding.'

Angelic Law and Natural Law

Hooker refers to the angels as 'intellectual creatures' constituted in diverse ranks by the eternal law of God, as it were 'an *Army*, one in order and degree above another'.[32] Moreover the 'law cœlestial' which governs the angelic beings provides a paradigm for order among mortals: 'Neither are the Angels themselves, so farre severed from us in their kind and manner of working, but that, betweene the law of their heavenly operations and the actions of men in this our state of mortalitie, such correspondence there is, as maketh it expedient to know in some sort the one, for the others more perfect direction.'[33] The obedience of the angels, with some rather notable exceptions, is more perfect and therefore, according to Hooker, they provide 'a paterne and a spurre' to the weaker human nature. Even with respect to the ceremonies of the liturgy we are told that 'some regard is to be had of Angels, who best like us, when wee are most like unto them in all partes of decent demeanor.'[34] This concept is beautifully summarised in the Collect appointed in the *Book of Common Prayer* for the feast of Saint Michael and All Angels: 'O Everlasting God, who hast ordered and constituted the services of Angels and men in a wonderful order: Mercifully grant that, as thy holy Angels alway do thee service in heaven, so by thy appointment they may succour and defend us on earth…'[35]

It must be acknowledged that there is some degree of difficulty in reconciling the authority of the natural law with the core assumptions of Reformation soteriology and scriptural hermeneutics. As we have already noted, Hooker's advocating of natural law to defend the constitution of the Elizabethan Church met with strong opposition from some of his contemporaries. To the anonymous authors of *A Christian Letter* Hooker's account of natural law appeared to overthrow the very foundation of the doctrine of the reformed Church of England by setting a qualification on the perfect sufficiency of scriptural authority.[36]

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[32] *Lawes* I.4.2; 1:71.10, 11.
[33] *Lawes* I.16.4; 1:137.13–18.
[34] *Lawes* I.16.4; 1:137.28–30.
[35] The Collect appointed in the *Book of Common Prayer* to be read on 29 September.
[36] *Lawes* I.14.5; 1:129.10–14: 'It sufficeth therefore that nature and scripture doe serve in such full sort, that they both joyntly and not severallye eyther of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicitie wee neede not the knowledge of any thing more then these two [and] may easily furnish our mindes with on all sides…' Compare II.8.3; 1:188.4–7: 'the unsufficiencie of the light of nature is by the light of scripture

In his debate with Archbishop John Whitgift earlier in the 1570s, Cartwright had argued that the dictum *sola scriptura* constituted a universal rule of human action and that whatever is not done in accord with God's revealed written word is sinful.[37] In the *Lawes* Hooker responds to Cartwright's four scriptural proofs of this position with an invocation of wisdom theology:

> Whatsoever either men on earth, or the Angels of heaven do know, it is as a drop of that unemptiable fountaine of wisdom, which wisdom hath diversly imparted her treasures unto the world. As her waies are of sundry kinds, so her maner of teaching is not meerely one and the same. Some things she openeth by the sacred bookes of Scripture; some things by the glorious works of nature: with some things she inspireth them from above by spirituall influence, in some thinges she leadeth and trayneth them onely by worldly experience and practise. We may not so in any one speciall kind admire her that we disgrace her in any other, but let all her wayes be according unto their place and degree adored.[38]

The author of *A Christian Letter* interprets Hooker's affirmation of the natural law and his concomitant appeal to the authority of reason as an open challenge to Reformed teaching on the perfect sufficiency of the scripture (*sola scriptura*). His appeal to diversity of access to the divine wisdom is construed as an affirmation that the 'light of nature' teaches knowledge necessary to salvation and that scripture, therefore, is merely a supplement to the natural knowledge of God.[39] The compatibility of natural law with such primary doctrines as justification by faith (*sola fides*) and salvation by Christ alone (*solus Christus*) is also called into question.[40] Hooker's appeal to natural law tradition, the light of reason, the authority of philosophy in general and Aristotle in particular[41] is thought to pose such a serious breach with the *Articles of Religion* that, as the *Letter* puts it, 'almost all the principall pointes of our English creed

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so fully and so perfectly herein supplied, that further light then this hath added there doth not neede unto that ende.'

[37] Thomas Cartwright, *A Replye to an Answere made of M. doctor Whitgifte…Agaynste the Admonition* ([Hemel Hempstead]: [J. Stroud], 1575), 26–27, cited in *Lawes* II.1.3; 1:146.1, II.2.1; 1:148.7, II.3.1; 1:150.19, and II.4.1; 1:151.18.

[38] *Lawes* II.1.4; 1:147.23–148.6. See *The Wisdom of Solomon* 11:4.

[39] See *ACL* 3; 4:11.1–14.9. *The Holye Scripture contayneth all thinges necessarie to salvation*. See especially 4:11.22.

[40] *FLE* 4:14.4–7 and also *ACL* §6, *Of fayth and workes, FLE* 4:19.17–23.9.

[41] Hooker refers to Aristotle as 'the Arch-Philosopher' and 'the mirror of humaine wisdom'. *Lawes* I.4.1; 1:70.20 and I.10.4; 1:99.28.

[are] greatlie shaken and contradicted'.[42] In short, against Hooker's protestations to the contrary, the author of *A Christian Letter* regards the appeal to the authority of reason and natural law in theological discourse as simply irreconcilable with 'all true christian doctrine'.

Present-day scholarly evaluations of Hooker's thought are more inclined to agree with the assessment of these sixteenth-century critics than with Hooker's own avowed apologetic intent. William Speed Hill, for example, maintains that Hooker's defence of natural law leads away from Protestant orthodoxy in the direction of the Anglican *via media* and that it was precisely 'the doctrinal implications of this position—specifically its apparent proximity to Rome—that the authors of *A Christian Letter* feared and opposed'.[43] With respect to the specific charges made in *A Christian Letter* concerning Hooker's appeal to the authority of natural law, H. C. Porter argues that they were entirely justified. According to Porter, Hooker's critics perceived *correctly* that 'the whole of Hooker's work…was a celebration of our natural faculty of reason', and that therefore he had indeed deviated from the path of Protestant orthodoxy.[44] By upholding the authority of reason and natural law Hooker had abandoned the magisterial reformers' insistence upon the principle *sola scriptura*, and had in fact embraced the Thomist dictum 'grace comes not to destroy nature but to fulfill it, to perfect it'.[45] In his recent Introduction to the first book of the *Lawes*, Lee Gibbs adopts much the same view when he observes that Hooker is closer to a Thomistic

[42] *ACL* §20. *Schoolemen, Philosophie, and Poperie*. *FLE* 4:65.16—68.19: 'yet in all your discourse, for the most parte, Aristotle the patriarch of Philosophers (with divers other human writers) and the ingenuous [sic!] schoolemen, almost in all pointes have some finger; Reason is highlie sett up against holie scripture, and reading against preaching; the church of Rome favourablie admitted to bee of the house of God; Calvin with the reformed churches full of faults; and most of all they which indevoured to be most removed from conformitie with the church of Rome; Almost all the principall pointes of our English creed, greatlie shaken and contradicted…Shall wee doe you wronge to suspect you as a privie and subtill enemie to the whole state of the Englishe Church, and that you would have men to deeme her Majestie to have done ill in abolishing the Romish religion, and banishing the Popes authoritie; and that you would bee glad to see the backesliding of all reformed churches to bee made conformable to that wicked synagogue of Rome…and that you esteeme…the bookes of holy scripture to bee at the least of no greater moment then Aristotle and the Schoolemen: Or else doe you meane to bring in a confusion of all thinges, to reconcile heaven and earth, and to make all religions equall: Will you bring us to Atheisme, or to Poperie?'

[43] Hill, 'Doctrine and Polity', *SRH*, 175.

[44] H. C. Porter, 'Hooker, the Tudor Constitution, and the *via media*,' in *SRH*, 103

[45] *Lawes* I.14.5; 1:129.6. See Porter, *SRH*, 103–107. See also W. David Neelands, 'Hooker on Scripture, Reason and "Tradition",' *RHC*, 76–82.

'conjunctive view' of the relation between grace and nature, scripture and reason than he is to 'the more disjunctive perspective of his Calvinist antagonists (*FLE* 6(1):97)'. Gibbs points out that Hooker's emphasis on the rationality of law depends on a teleological perspective derived from Aristotle and Aquinas while the magisterial reformers adhere to a nominalist, voluntarist emphasis on the essence of law as command rather than reason.[46] By this account a rationalist, realist account of law like Hooker's is by definition incompatible with the assumptions of Reformation theology. According to Gibbs, Hooker's more optimistic view of human nature enabled him to close the breach between reason and revelation, nature and grace which had been opened by the magisterial reformers and maintained by the more radical disciplinarian puritans.[47] In this fashion, Hooker's theological position is identified as essentially neo-Thomist.[48] To regard natural law as a revelation of the divine nature is, on this view, to depart from the established bounds of Protestant orthodoxy into the territory of scholastic divinity or, as the authors of *A Christian Letter* put it, 'the darknesse of schoole learning'.[49] Hooker's contemporary critics and present-day scholarship are agreed at least on this point: the theology of disciplinarian puritanism with its rejection of natural law theory is more consistent than the theology of Hooker with the teaching of the magisterial reformers. In what remains of this discussion we shall argue that such a portayal of the role of natural law in Hooker's theology is questionable; on the contrary, we shall seek to demonstrate that his embrace of the natural law tradition is in fact consistent with a well-established pattern in the practical theology of the magisterial reformers.[50]

In *A Learned Sermon on the Nature of Pride*, Hooker defines law in general as follows:

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[46] Gibbs maintains that the controversy turns on 'the difference between two natural law traditions. Hooker stands predominantly within the medieval rationalist and realist tradition represented by Aquinas, while the magisterial Protestant Reformers and their disciplinarian progeny stand squarely in the camp of the medieval voluntarists and nominalists'. Lee Gibbs, Introduction to Book I, *FLE* 6(1):103.

[47] *FLE* 6(1):124.

[48] 'For Hooker, as for Aquinas, law is grounded on reason (*aliquid rationis*).' See *FLE* 6(1):97. Gibbs emphasizes Hooker's dependence on Aquinas throughout his Introduction.

[49] *FLE* 4:65.1.

[50] For a significant critique of this prevailing consensus, see Nigel Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason*, 1–33.

> …an exact rule wherby humane actions are measured. The rule to measure and judge them by is the law of god… Under the name of law we must comprehend not only that which god hath written in tables and leaves but that which nature hath *ingraven in the hartes of men*. Els how should those heathen which never had bookes but heaven and earth to look upon be convicted of perversnes? *But the Gentils which had not the law in books had* saith the apostle *theffect of the law written in their hartes. Rom. 2*.[51]

The passage quoted from Paul's *Epistle to the Romans* is the crucial scriptural text cited by Hooker in support of the authority of natural law.[52] This is hardly surprising since *Romans* 2:15, as we have seen, is the *locus classicus* for virtually all discussion of natural law throughout the history of Christian thought. It is important here to note the derivation of the natural law. Since the eternal law 'reads itself' to the world, there is the paradox of keeping an invisible, unknowable law 'alwayes before our eyes'.[53] The eternal law, though unknowable *in itself*, is the highest source of all other kinds of law and is made known *to us* under two primary aspects: on the one hand, it is revealed by God's word written in the scriptures and, on the other, it is manifest in creation and known by the law inscribed on human hearts *by nature*. These two primary modes or *summa genera* whereby the one eternal law is made accessible to human understanding are termed respectively by Hooker the divine law and the law of nature.[54] Although we are 'neither able nor worthy to open and looke into' the book of the eternal law, the

[51] *FLE* 5:312. The *Sermon on Pride* is one of seven tractates by Hooker first published postumously in 1612. It has recently been reedited and published in *FLE*, volume 5, ed. Laetitia Yeandle with commentary by Egil Grislis (1990), 309–361. For a textual introduction see *FLE* 5:299–308. Compare with the definition of law in general at *Lawes* I.2.1; 1:58.26–29: 'That which doth assigne unto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the forme and measure of working, the same we tearme a *Lawe*.' See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia Iae, q. 90, art. 1, reply 1: 'lex sit regula quaedam et mensura'.

[52] Rom. 2:14,15: 'For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which shew the work of the law *written in their hearts*, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the means while accusing or else excusing one another.' Hooker's refers to this passage frequently. See *Lawes* I.8.3; 1:84.7–16, I.16.5; 1:138.27–139.8, II.8.6; 1:190.11–16, III.2.1; 1:207.14–21, III.7.2; 1:217.30–218.3 where he refers to the 'edicts of nature', III.9.3; 1:238.31–239.4 and V.1.3; 2:20.4–9 for the concept of the '*semen religionis*'.

[53] *Lawes* I.16.2; 1:136.4–15.

[54] See *Lawes* I.1.3; 1:58.11–19. See I.8.3; 1:84.9 and I.8. *passim* for the identification of Natural Law with the law or light of reason. Compare III.11.8; 1:253.15–20.

books of scripture and nature reveal its contents in a manner adapted to our finite capacity.[55]

Hooker is certainly not alone among Reformation theologians in holding that the knowledge of God, and thus also of the eternal law, is attainable by means of *both* scripture and reason. It is furthermore a commonplace of the exegesis of the reformers that the twofold obligation to honour God and deal justly with one's neighbour is taught by both natural and divine law. The interplay between the natural and the revealed knowledge of God gives shape to the magisterial reformers' complex, dialectical approach to the authority of natural law; and the theory of natural law in turn constitutes a critical link between theology and ethics in their thought as well. Hooker's account of the twofold manifestation of the eternal law through the *summa genera* of natural law and divine law, the *duplex gubernatio dei*,[56] gives practical expression as it were to Calvin's epistemological motif of the *duplex cognitio dei*. Hooker's eternal law as the divine '*processio*' manifests itself in the works of creation as natural law and as divine '*redditus*' in the economy of redemption as divine law. While the eternal law in itself 'cannot be compassed with that wit and those senses which are our owne', it is nevertheless manifest in the 'glorious workes of nature'.[57] Hooker claims that the pagan philosophers were able to attain to a knowledge of the nature of God and of his Law:

> the wise and learned among the verie Heathens themselves, have all acknowledged some first cause, whereupon originallie the being of all things dependeth. Neither have they otherwise spoken of that cause, then as an Agent, which knowing *what* and *why* it worketh, observeth in working a most exact *order* or *lawe*. . . . all confesse in the working of that first cause, that *counsell* is used, *reason* followed, a *way* observed, that is to say, constant *order* and *law* is kept, wherof it selfe must needs be author unto itselfe.[58]

Quite remarkably, Hooker seems to suggest in this passage that a *Logos* theology can be discerned in the pagan understanding of Law as the

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[55] See *Lawes* I.2.5; 1:62.10; I.2.2; 1:59.12–20; and V.56.5; 2:237.18–25. 'Now amongst the Heathens which had noe bookes whereby to know God besides the volumes of heaven and earth . . .' *Grace and Free Will*, §12, *FLE* 4:111.21–23.

[56] Hooker employs this expression in his treatment of the divine operations *ad extra* in *Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination*, Trinity College Dublin, MS 364, folio 80, printed in *FLE* 4:83–97; see esp. 86, 87.

[57] *Lawes* I.11.5; 1:116.21.

[58] *Lawes* I.2.3; 1:59.33–60.14.

divine first principle and perhaps also, by implication, an adumbration of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Homer, Plato, the Stoics, and no less an authority than 'Thrice-great' Hermes are enlisted in support of the proposition implicit in these expressions of *Logos* theology, namely that God *is* Law.[59]

For Hooker the foundation of a theological reflection on ethics is the twofold knowledge of God. Knowledge of the creator is not to be confused with knowledge of the redeemer, yet a complete account of Christian virtue demands both species of knowing. Hooker's credentials as a reformer stand forth when he maintains that only through the supernatural revelation of the scriptures is it possible to hope for a participation of the divine nature. Scripture alone can reveal the supernatural way of salvation:

> The light of nature is never able to finde out any way of obtayning the reward of blisse, but by performing exactly the duties and workes of righteousnes. From salvation therefore and life all flesh being excluded this way, behold how the wisedome of God hath revealed a way mysticall and supernaturall…concerning that faith hope and charitie without which there can be no salvation; was there ever any mention made saving only in that lawe which God him selfe hath from heaven revealed?[60]

Only by divine grace can the soul attain to a saving knowledge whereby it might participate in the divine nature and 'live as it were the life of God'.[61] Owing to man's wilfull rejection of the order of creation, the natural law by itself is insufficient to secure the unity of the cosmos under God. With a marked Augustinian emphasis Hooker notes that fallen humanity continues to possess a *natural* desire to be happy,[62] and thus to be reunited with the eternal source of order; yet, on account

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[59] *Lawes* I.2.3; 1:60.4–11: 'Thus much is signified by that which *Homer* mentioneth Διός δ' ἐτελείτο βουλή (*Jupiter's Counsell was accomplished*). Thus much acknowledged by *Mercurius Trismegistus* τὸν πάντα κόσμον ἐποίησιν ὁ δημιουργὸς οὐ χερσὶν ἀλλὰ λόγῳ (*The creator made the whole world not with hands, but by* Reason). Thus much was confest by *Anaxagoras* and *Plato*, terming the maker of the world an Intellectual worker. Finallie the Stoikes, although imagining the first cause of all things to be fire, held nevertheless that the same fire having arte, did ὁδῷ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου (*Proceed by a certaine and a set Waie in the making of the world*). 'All translations are Hooker's own. In the *FLE* Commentary on Book I, it is observed that Hooker derives his references to Anaxagoras, Plato and the Stoics from the fifth-century Stobaeus's *Eclogues.* See P. G. Stanwood, 'Stobaeus and Classical Borrowing in the Renaissance,' *Neophilologus*, 59 (1975): 141–146.

[60] *Lawes* I.11.5,6; 1:118.11–15,119.12–15.

[61] *Lawes* I.11.2; 1:112.20.

[62] *Lawes* I.11.4; 1:114.8–10.

of original sin, man is 'inwardly obstinate, rebellious and averse from all obedience unto the sacred *Lawes* of his nature…in regard of his depraved mind little better then a wild beast'.[63] Thus observance of the natural law is no longer effectual in preserving the divinely constituted order of creation. According to Aristotle 'it is an axiome of nature that naturall desire cannot utterly be frustrate'.[64] Reason cannot escape the predicament of desiring both a participation of the divine nature while, at the same time, being constitutionally incapable of finding its way to the consummation of its own deepest longing.[65] While nature demands a 'more divine perfection',[66] the means whereby this perfection is attained cannot themselves be natural. Thus the redemption or mystical 'return' to God of all creation can only be by supernatural means. In *Notes toward a fragment on Predestination*, Hooker distinguishes between the two species of the divine governance:

> Government is that work of God whereby he *sustains created things* and disposes all things *to the end which he naturally* chooses, that is *the greatest good* which, *given* the law *of creation*, can be elicited. For, given the law of creation <is the rule of all> it was not fitting that creation be violated through those things which follow from creation. So God does nothing by his government which offends against that which he has framed and ratified by the very act of creation. The government of God is: general over all; special over rational creatures. There are two forms of government: that which would have been, had free creation not lost its way; that which is now when it has lost its way.[67]

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[63] *Lawes* I.10.1; 1:96.26–29.

[64] *Lawes* I.11.4; 1:114.15. Hooker cites the Proemium of Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. See Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio in duodecim libros* (Turin: Marietti, 1950), 6. That nature does nothing in vain is a central doctrine of Aristotle's *Physics*. See *De Caelo*, 271a34. See Comm., *FLE* 6(1):513.

[65] The classic discussion of this predicament is Augustine's *Confessions*. See the account of the 'natural weight' of the soul in *Conf.* XIII.ix.10, 11 (Oxford: The University Press, 1991).

[66] See W. David Neelands, 'Scripture, Reason and "Tradition",' *RHC*, 83–85.

[67] John Booty's translation of Hooker's original Latin notes in *FLE* 4:86.28–87.12: 'Gubernatio est ea Dei operatio qua res *creatas sustentat* disponitque omnia *in finem ab ipso naturaliter* expetitum id est *maximum bonum* quod *posita creationis* lege potest elici. Etenim posita creationis lex <est regula omnium> per ea quae secuta sunt creationem violare non decuit. Nihil itaque operatur Deuos [*sic*] gubernando contra id quod creando fixum ratumque habuit. Gubernatio Dei: Generale super omnia; Speciale super creaturas rationales. Gubernationis duplex modus: Qui fuisset si creatura libera non exorbitasset; Qui nunc est cum exorbitarit.'

Throughout his discourse on the *duplex gubernatio dei* Hooker adheres strictly to the magisterial reformers' dialectical exposition of the two realms of creation and redemption and their respective uses of the law.

In Hooker's view strife within the Elizabethan Church over constitutional forms ultimately stems from disagreement over the interpretation of the proper relation between the two *summa genera* of law, especially with respect to the precise delineation of their proper spheres of authority. Epistemologically the struggle turns on the precise manner of interpreting the proper functions of natural and revealed theology. Hooker sees the debate over the ecclesiastical constitution in terms logically linked to the *duplex cognitio dei*, and thus to one of the crucial distinctions of reformed theology. In this approach to the question of law he follows a pattern of discourse already well established by other magisterial reformers. In *A Learned Sermon on the Nature of Pride* he acknowledges the difficulty of making the distinction between the 'waie of nature' and the 'waie of grace'.[68] For Hooker, this is *the* great question of sixteenth-century theological discourse: 'the want of exact distinguishing between these two waies [viz. of Nature and Grace] and observing what they have common what peculiar hath bene the cause of the greatest part of that confusion whereof christianity at this daie laboureth.'[69] The question whether Hooker's theology exemplifies a conjunctive rather than a disjunctive view of the relation between Grace and Nature is a great deal more complicated than twentieth-century criticism has frequently allowed. As with the thought of the Reformation theologians we have considered, Hooker's position is dialectically complex. In his theology, as in theirs, there is simultaneously disjunction and conjunction in the relation between the two kingdoms, the two kinds of discourse and the two ways of righteousness. The knowledge of God as creator must be kept distinct from the knowledge of God as redeemer; yet these two forms, although distinct, are by no means separable, and thus they cannot be denoted as simply 'disjunctive'. By analogy, the natural law and the revealed law of scripture are distinct modes or aspects of the eternal law, yet they are nonetheless inseparable in origin. Both are expressions of the one eternal law. The orders of nature and grace are very clearly distinguished by the magisterial

[68] *Pride* 5:313.7.

[69] *Pride* 5:313.19–23. For further discussion by Hooker of the relation of Nature and Grace, see the Dublin Fragment on *Grace and Free Will*, *FLE* 4:101–113.

reformers, Hooker included. Yet these distinct orders or realms of law are understood to be united in the simplicity of their common divine source as well as in our knowledge of them. For all of the magisterial reformers whose theology we have considered, knowledge of God is granted through a contemplation of both the splendour of creation and the written word of the scriptures. For Hooker there is necessarily a conjunction of the orders of Grace and Nature, both in their divine author and in the souls of rational creatures. To uphold the doctrine of *sola scriptura* is not to denigrate the authority of the light of reason. Hooker can be taken as speaking for the principles of these reformers collectively when he states:

> Injurious we are unto God, the Author and giver of humane capacity, judgement and wit, when because of some things wherein he precisely forbiddeth men to use their own inventions, we take occasion to disauthorize and disgrace the works which he doth produce by the hand, either of nature or of grace in them. We offer contumely, even unto him, when we scornfully reject what we list without any other exception then this, the brain of man hath devised it.[70]

In the marginal notes penned on his own copy of *A Christian Letter*[71] and in the incomplete theological tractates which comprise the beginning of a formal response,[72] we see clearly that the most pressing theological question Hooker faced was the need to justify continuity with the natural law tradition within the limits of Protestant orthodoxy.

Hooker's generic division of laws rests on a carefully defined tension between natural and revealed theology. His affirmation of the authority of human reason consequent upon the revelation of the divine wisdom to the observer of 'the glorious workes of Nature' is a

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[70] *Lawes* VII.11.10; 3:210.27–211.6. Compare Calvin, *Inst.* 2.2.15 where he argues that to despise the admirable light of truth displayed in the profane authors is to insult their divine Creator and Giver.

[71] See John Booty's Introduction to 'Hooker's Marginal Notes', *FLE* 4:xxviii–xxxiii. The autograph notes on *ACL* are transcribed from Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 215b.

[72] Hooker spent the short remainder of his life writing a response to the criticisms contained in *ACL*. He did not live to see his answer published. The Dublin Fragments on *Grace and Free Will*, *Grace and the Sacraments*, and *The tenth Article touching on Predestination* (*FLE* 4:81–167) constitute a portion of his intended though unfinished reply to *ACL*. See especially *Dublin* 5–6; 4:103.9–24, 104.2–9, 105.18–106.4. The copy texts for the Dublin Fragments, Trinity College, Dublin, MSS 121 and 364, folio 80, were first published in *The Works of … Mr. Richard Hooker*, ed. John Keble, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1836), and reprinted in 7th ed. revised, vol. 2, 537–597.

crucial presupposition of his theologico-political system. A significant number of Hooker's seventeenth-century readers shared this view and some sought to extend the boundaries of his natural theology a great deal further. His influence ranged over classical 'anglo-calvinists' James Ussher, Robert Sanderson and Thomas Barlow; Arminians or 'anti-calvinists' William Laud, Jeremy Taylor and Henry Hammond; Cambridge Platonists Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth and Nathanael Culverwell; Latitudinarians Edward Stillingfleet, Joseph Glanvill and John Wilkins; and Deists like John Locke and Charles Blount. As the speculative theological discourse of the seventeenth-century Church of England unfolds, natural theology assumes increasing influence. Hooker was often cited as an 'orthodox' authority by representatives of radical theological rationalism. In virtually every generation since Hooker's death theologians have returned to the *Lawes* as to a mirror of first principles of the doctrine and method of the Church of England. Quite often his readers have found distorted and mutually contradictory images there. Throughout the seventeenth century and later attempts were frequently made to claim Hooker in support of a wide variety of divergent theological positions. The diversity of these appeals reflects the complex and elusive character of his thought, and very possibly also its claim to comprehensiveness.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SCRIPTURAL HERMENEUTICS

Egil Grislis

Hooker developed his hermeneutical views[1] in a controversial context, opposing the more radical Puritans along with other dissidents and Roman Catholics. He regarded both groups as intransigent, 'Two things there are which trouble greatly these later times, one that the Church of Rome cannot, another that Geneva will not erre.'[2] Within this context, Hooker's position was complex. With regard to soteriology, like Archbishop John Whitgift (c. 1530–1604)[3] Hooker was close to the moderate Puritans. Ecclesiology, however, was a different matter. In three book titles of the *Lawes*, Hooker spelled out the three key religious differences with the Puritans which presented grave political dangers to the established Church of England. The Puritans had claimed: [1] '*That Scripture is the onely rule of all things which in this life may be done by men*;'[4] [2] '*in Scripture there must be of necessitie contained a forme of Church-politie the lawes whereof may in no wise be altered*;'[5] [3] '*our forme of Church-politie is corrupted with popish orders rites and ceremonies banished out of certaine reformed*

[1] Egil Grislis, 'Richard Hooker's Method of Theological Inquiry,' *Anglican Theological Review* 45.2 (April 1963): 190–203; Egil Grislis, 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker,' 159–205, in: W. Speed Hill, ed., *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works* (Cleveland and London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972); Egil Grislis, 'Introduction to Commentary: Tractates and Sermons,' 619–655, in: *The Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker*, General editor W. Speed Hill, vol. 5. (Cambridge, MA and London, England: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1990); William P. Haugaard, Introduction to 'Books II, III, & IV,' *FLE* 6(1): 125–175.

[2] 'Hooker's Autograph Notes on *A Christian Letter* (1599),' §19; 4:55.4–6. John Jewel had already characterized the situation in one regard, 'If the church of Rome cannot err, what need have they of that church either of the scriptures, or of the fathers, or of councils?' *The Works of John Jewel*, edited for The Parker Society by the Rev. John Ayre (Cambridge: The University Press, 1847), 2.901.

[3] 'I know there be some (both of the learned and unlearned sort) among you that have milder spirits than the rest: such I do not blame…' *The Works of John Whitgift*, ed. for The Parker Society by Rev. John Ayre (Cambridge: The University Press, 1851), 1:55.

[4] *Lawes* II.title; 1:143.

[5] *Lawes* III.title; 1:193.

Churches whose example therein we ought to have followed.'[6] To respond to such major assaults, the understanding of scriptural hermeneutic was central, although not the only issue at stake.

I

Hooker shared with the mainstream of the Church of England, including the Puritans, the central Reformation affirmation of the *sola scriptura*. It was an unwavering belief that God was the author of the Scriptures, the exclusive deposit of divine revelation.[7] Stating judiciously, Hooker affirmed that even though the Scriptures contained an 'infinite varietie of matter of all kinds, 'the principal intent of scripture is to deliver the lawes of duties supernaturall.'[8] Thus the way to salvation was not a human discovery, but 'surely a way which is supernaturall, a way which could never have entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God him selfe had not revealed it extraordinarilie.'[9] This revelation took place in history. That is, the divine disclosure went through a process of human life, as it was not just thrown at humankind, but experienced within the reality of life.

> In the first age of the world God gave lawes unto our fathers, and by reason of the number of their daies their memories served in steed of bookes; whereof the manyfolde imperfections and defects being knowne to God, hee mercifully relieved the same by often putting them in minde of that whereof it behoved them to be specially mindefull. In which respect we see how many times one thing hath bene itinerated unto sundrie of the best and wisest among them.[10]

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[6] *Lawes* IV.title; 1:271. See William Haugaard in *FLE* 6(1): 127–128.

[7] *Lawes* I.13.1; 1:122.7–24; see *Two Sermons Upon S. Judes Epistle* I.2.; *FLE* 5: 15.17–25. John Jewel's formulation is poetic and precise, 'the holy scriptures… are the bright sun of God, which bring light unto our ways, and comfort to all parts of our life, and salvation to our souls; in which is made known unto us our estate, and the mercy of God in Christ our Saviour witnessed.' *JW* 4.1163. John Whitgift stated precisely: '… the papists make their tradi=tions necessary unto salvation; and therefore they are to be rejected, because the word of God containeth all things necessary to salvation.' *WW* 2:236. Calvin commented aggressively, 'apart from the Lord's Word there is not an agreement of believers but a faction of wicked men.' *Institutio*, IV.2.5; *Opera Selecta*, ed. Petrus Barth et Guilelmus Niesel (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1962); LCC, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 2.1046.

[8] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:124.31–32.

[9] *Lawes* I.11.5; 1:116.5–7.

[10] *Lawes* I.13.1; 1:122.7–13; see *Jude* 1.2; *FLE* 5:15.17–25.

While the statement is reminiscent of the formulation by John Calvin (1509–1564), it has Hooker's distinctive stamp. According to Hooker, patriarchal memory was good but not perfect—it had 'manyfolde imperfections and defects,' and needed repeated reminding. Accordingly, the encounter was dialogical. According to Calvin, the essentially one-sided revelatory experience lacked active human participation. Namely, to the patriarchs the 'firm certainty of doctrine was engraved in their hearts, so that thay were convinced and understood that what they had learned proceeded from God.'[11] Hence for Calvin the patriarchal memory was secondary. For Hooker memory and freedom of response were essential and therefore he stressed patriarchal wisdom and ability—they were 'the best and the wisest.' Nevertheless, despite their differences in regard to human participation, for both Calvin and Hooker the entire process of revealing and recording of the Scriptures was definitely in God's hands, most clearly from the time when 'the lives of men were shortened.'[12] In the final analysis, both affirmed the reliability of the Scriptures. Hooker explained: 'First therefore of Moyses it is said, that *he wrote all the wordes of God*;[13] not by his own privat motion and devise: for God taketh this act to him selfe, *I have written*.[14] Further more were not the Prophetes following commanded also to do the like? Unto the holy Evangelist Saint John how often expresse charge is give: *Scribe, write these thinges*?'[15]

In his *Two Sermons on St. Jude's Epistle*, Hooker recorded a colourful version of this insight:

> so oft as he employed them in this heavenly worke, they neither spake, nor wrote any word of their owne, but uttered sillable by sillable as the spirit put it into their mouths, no otherwise then the Harp or the Lute doth

[11] *Inst.* I.6.2; *OS* 3.62.3–6; LCC, 1.71. Indeed, Hooker did not always agree with Calvin, most obviously in regard to the doctrine of double predestination. At the same time, Hooker's theology had a general Calvinist mold. Herein Hooker followed the English tradition, well characterized by John Whitgift's angry outburst against Thomas Cartwright, 'This book of Institutions, which is distinguished into chapters and not into books, I read and noted through before you (as it should seem) knew whether there were any such book or no; and because I have laboured in it, noted it, and am well acquainted with it, therefore I use it, and follow it, and so will I do still. . . .' Whitgift acknowledged not merely a particular edition, but celebrated the work of Calvin in general. *WW* 2:268, see also 2:502.

[12] *Lawes* I.13.1; 1:122.14.

[13] *Exodus* 24:4.

[14] *Hosea* 8:12.

[15] *Lawes* I.13.1; 1:122.16–21.

> give a sound according to the discretion of his hands that holdeth and striketh it with skill. The difference is only this. An instrument whether it be a pipe or harpe maketh a distinction in the times and sounds, which distinction is well perceived of the hearer, the instrument it selfe understanding not what is piped or harped.[16]

Divine inspiration, seen as the creative work of God, was indeed perfect yet necessarily personal. This was the traditionally held ecclesial position in Hooker's time—but not to be mistaken for fundamentalist literalism.[17] That Hooker should have thought similarly is no surprise. But he also introduced a significant difference—the human element. Even in his earlier writings in the midst of celebrating the holiness of the revealed Scriptures, Hooker confessed that it was difficult to interpret the Scriptures correctly: 'And after much travaile, and much paines, when we open our lips to speake of the wonderfull workes of God, our tongues doe faulter within our mouthes, yea many times wee disgrace the dreadfull mysteries of our faith, and grieve the spirit of our hearers by words unsavory, and unseemly speeches.'[18] Thus even though the text itself was in principle infallible, its interpretation was human and could be faulty. And such was not the situation merely for the average, faithful priests, but also for the 'wisest' scholars as well: 'Yet behold, even they that are wisest amongst us living, compared with the Prophets, seem no otherwise to talke of God, then as if the children which are caried in armes should speake of the greatest matters of state.'[19]

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[16] *Jude*, I.4; 5:17.6–14; see *Inst.* IV.8.6; *OS* 5.138.11–13; LCC, 2.1154.

[17] Thomas Becon's statement was characteristic, 'That the holy scripture is a doctrine sound, certain, true, and in all points absolutely perfect: in the which, as in a most plentiful and rich storehouse, thou mayest abundantly find whatsoever is even to the uttermost sufficient and necessary unto salvation and everlasting life.' *Prayers and Other Pieces*, ed. for The Parker Society by Rev. John Ayre (Cambridge: The University Press, 1844), 319. Reginald H. Fuller has offered an appropriate explanation for contemporary understanding: 'the claim for inerrancy of Scripture was never made by the Church of England even in the time of the Reformation, when there was a strong emphasis on the Bible as the word of God.' 'Scripture,' 79, in: Stephen Sykes and John Booty, eds., *The Study of Anglicanism* (London: SPCK and Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990). More recently, however, but without sufficient evidence, Nigel Atkinson has asserted that 'Hooker's confidence in Scriptures as 'the strongest proof of all'…rests on a thoroughgoing doctrine of verbal inspiration.' *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason: Reformed Theologian of the Church of England*, Foreword by Alister McGrath (Carlisle, Cambria, UK: Paternoster Press, 1997, 94.) Atkinson is even prepared to speak of a 'full plenary inspiration,' 95, n. 56. Such modernizing, it seems, does not clarify Hooker's position.

[18] *Jude* I.4; 5:16.4–9.

[19] *Jude* I.4; 5:16.11–14.

The problem is obvious: the infallible text is subject to the interpreter's finitude and potential fallibility. And the presence of sin always threatens.[20] On one occasion Hooker illustrated the perennial human situation in reference to John Calvin—'*Nature worketh in us all a love to our owne counsels. The contradiction of others is a fanne to inflame that love. Our love set on fire to maintaine that which once we have done, sharpneth the wit to dispute, to argue, and by all meanes to reason for it.*'[21] In case of the fanatics, the Puritans included, 'their misfashioned preconceipt' could almost totally distort their interpretation of the Scriptures.[22]

Most significantly, Hooker defended his position by pointing to the Scriptures which recorded situations of repeated human failure to grasp the depth of revelation: 'Sometimes acknowledging with the wise man, *hardly can we discerne the things that are on earth, and with great labour finde wee out the things that are before us, who can then seeke out the things that are in heaven?*[23] Sometimes confessing with Job the righteous, intreating of *things too wonderful for us, we have spoken we wist not what*'[24] Of course, Hooker did not suggest that God inspired *docta ignorantia*. Rather, Hooker suggested that even in the biblical persons we discover finite humanity[25] with all that it entails—namely a dialectical tension between perfection and fallibility.

Most suggestive for a careful and relativistic reading of the Scriptures was Hooker's observation that they are not uniformly inspired, that is, that certain texts offer a more intense revelation than do others, for example

> prophecies, although they containe nothing which is not profitable for our instruction, *yet as one starre differeth from another in glory*, so every word of prophecy hath a treasure of matter in it, but all matters are not of

[20] Egil Grislis, 'The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker,' *Anglican Theological Review* 84.4 (Fall 2002): 881–896.

[21] *Lawes* Pref.2.7; 1:10.10–13. However, even though on occasion—most notably on predestination and on church government—Hooker disagreed with Calvin, his theology incorporated much of the wisdom of Calvin. It can be stated, that Hooker's theological endeavor was a large scale and thoughtful synthesis of John Calvin and St. Thomas Aquinas. See Egil Grislis, 'Introduction to Commentary: *Tractates and Sermons*,' *FLE* 5:631–632. Nevertheless, some caution is in order. Hooker did not go out of his way to state his great familiarity with Calvin's *Institutes*—even though it was a fact.

[22] *Lawes* Pref.3.9; 1:16.17–18.

[23] Wisdom 9:16.

[24] Job 42:3; *Jude* I.4; 5:16.17–22.

[25] Calvin, following St. Augustine, noted that in accommodation to our limited understanding, God, like a nurse to an infant, lisped to us. *Inst.* I.13.1.

> like importance, as al treasures are not of equal price. The chiefe and principal matter of prophecie is the promise of righteousnesse, peace, holinesse, glory, victory, immortality *unto every soule which beleeveth*, that Jesus is Christ, *of the Jew first, and of the Gentile*.[26]

The insight was not new. Already Thomas Cranmer (1489–1556) had appealed to the observation by St. Augustine, 'Dark places are to be expounded by more plain places; for that is the surest way of declaring the scriptures, to expound one scripture by another.'[27] But Hooker moved this insight to a more prominent place of the discussion: with the affirmation of the perfection of the Scripture, the effects of both human finitude and sin were not to be neglected.

II

Nevertheless, despite preceding qualifications, Hooker continued to admire the perfection of this holy book. Such had been the position of the Church of England. John Whitgift had put it this way, 'the scriptures do contain all things necessary to be believed, and to salvation….'[28] Hooker concurred—the Scriptures 'are with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wanteth any thing, the lacke whereof might deprive us of life; nor any thing in such wise aboundeth, that as being superfluous, unfruitfull, and altogether needlesse, wee should thinke it no losse or daunger at all if we did want it.'[29] Returning to this insight on several occasions, Hooker continued to affirm that this 'word of God,' this 'heavenlie truth touchinge matters of eternall life' was not a text of human creation, but was 'revealed' by God.[30] Other matters aside, Hooker shared this basic affirmation with the Puritans and was fully aware of it: 'We therefore have no *word of God* but the Scripture.'[31] Moreover, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, Hooker went out of his way to underscore that the Scriptures were perfect, since 'God him selfe can neither possibly erre, nor leade into error.'[32]

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[26] I Corinthians 15:42; *Jude* I.5; 5:17.26–18.4.
[27] *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.28 quoted in Thomas Cranmer, *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, edited for The Parker Society by the Rev. John Edmund Cox, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1846), 17; see also 14.
[28] *WW* 1:189; see also 191.
[29] *Lawes* I.13.3; 1:124.22–26.
[30] *Lawes* V.21.2; 2:84.14–15.
[31] *Lawes* V.21.2; 2:84.17–18.
[32] *Lawes* II.6.1; 1:167.27–28.

However, the Scriptures were both sublime as to revealed content and basically as open to human understanding. Human reason could distinguish several significant facets, which Hooker outlined in a panoramic sentence of 137 words:

> By scripture it hath in the wisedome of God seemed meete to deliver unto the world much but personally expedient to be practised of certaine men; many deepe and profound points of doctrine, as being the maine originall ground whereupon the precepts of dutie depend; many prophecies the cleere performance whereof might confirme the world in beliefe of things unseene; many histories to serve as looking glasses to behold the mercie, the truth, the righteousnes of God towards all that faithfullie serve, obey and honor him; yea, many intire meditations of pietie to be as paternes and presidents in cases of like nature; many things needful for explication, many for application unto practicular occasions, such as the providence of God from time to time hath taken to have the severall bookes of his holie ordinance written.'[33]

Restated in contemporary terminology, the Scriptures are a text for the Christian faith, the source of doctrines, the foundation for ethics, the text for prophesies which confirm the faith, historical examples of God's mercy, truth, righteousness, and many spiritual reflections which serve as guides—all revealing the various ways of the divine self-disclosure and guidance. Here the profundity of Hooker's insight and ambiguity of presentation abide side-by-side. It is indeed all there—but which is which? Hence before a meaningful appeal to the Scriptures can be made, or before one declares, 'the Scripture says,' Hooker demanded that the texts be classified according to their genre. The same text obviously does not speak of all of the complex dimensions of faith! Moreover, in addition, Hooker believed, that the scriptures contained various other materials as well—'whereof we might happely be ignorant, and yet be saved.'[34] Nevertheless, these latter materials were not included 'needlesse.'[35] Indeed, all the various aspects of the scriptures 'are with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wanteth any thing, the lacke whereof might deprive us of life; nor any

[33] *Lawes* I.13.3; 1:123.23–124.8. On several occasions the very length of a sentence may suggest the intensity of Hooker's concerns. Hooker's most famous sentence of 197 words celebrated his central idea of law and order; see *Lawes* I.3.2; 1:65.20–66.4. Hooker's longest sentence of 528 words criticized pride, his significant ethical concern, *Pride* I; 5:319.11–320.9.

[34] *Lawes* I.13.3; 1:124.9–10.

[35] *Lawes* I.13.3; 1:124.11.

thing in such way aboundeth, that as being superfluous, unfruitful, and altogether needlesse, wee should thinke it no losse or daunger at all if we did want it.'[36] While on one level such an insight might have reflected the Augustinian sense of the plenitude of being, for Hooker, as for St. Thomas,[37] it was a soteriological rather than an aesthetic plenitude.[38]

In attesting that the Scriptures are perfect, in this remarkably complex and variegated manner, Hooker broadened the one-dimensional view of the *sola scriptura* view of his church, as had been outlined by John Whitgift, who had written, 'It is most true, that nothing ought to be tolerated in the church as necessary unto salvation, or as an article of faith, except it be expressly contained in the word of God, or may manifestly thereof be gathered. . . .'[39] Hooker agreed but stressed the limitless richness of the Scriptures: 'albeit scripture do professe to conteyne in all things which are necessary unto salvation; yet the meaning cannot be symplye of all things that are necessarye, but all things that are necessarye in some certaine kinde of forme; as all things that are necessarye, and eyther could not at all, or could not easily be knowne by the light of naturall discourse.'[40] As an example, here Hooker also pointed to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the Baptism of Infants. Hooker did not question the truth of these doctrines. But he knew very well that these two doctrines are 'in scriptures no where to be found by expresse literall mention, only deducted they are out of scripture by collection.'[41]

The example is fascinating, since Hooker, in accord with the Church of England, preferred such deduction to literal reading of the biblical text. Some biblical literalists of Hooker's time—notably the Socinians and the Anabaptists—were universally identified as heretics and shown no mercy. Their appeal to *sola scriptura* failed to save either their reputation or often enough even their lives.

For the doctrine of the Trinity, the traditional text of appeal was I John 5:7b–8a, 'in heauen, the Father, the Worde, and the holie Gost; and these thre are one. And there are thre, which beare recorde in the

[36] *Lawes* I.13.3; 1:124.22–26.
[37] *ST*, Ia q. 22 art. 4 and Ia q. 23 art. 5.
[38] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:124.31–32.
[39] *WW* 1:180.
[40] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:125.32–126.5.
[41] *Lawes* I.14.2; 1:126.22–24.

earth.'[42] The great humanist and biblical scholar Desiderius Erasmus (c. 1469–1536) did not find this text in the Greek manuscripts that he consulted, and therefore omitted it from the first edition of the Greek New Testament.[43] Of course, a controversy followed, and Erasmus, under ecclesial pressure, quickly 'restored' the text. A modern and authoritative scholar affirms: 'That these words are spurious and have no right to stand in the New Testament is certain....'[44] Obviously, Hooker knew the original position of Erasmus and therefore did not appeal to the spurious New Testament text.

Now as for Baptism, Erasmus had rejected the validity of infant baptism—not directly but by a clever implication.[45] The Anabaptists had flatly denied that the New Testament contained an explicit command to baptize infants.[46] While the establishment—Magisterial Protestant and Roman Catholic—won the debate by force, the question about truth remained open.

Hooker did not feel threatened by this situation and wrote, 'For let us not thinke that as long as the world doth endure, the wit of man shal be able to sound the bottome of that which may be concluded out of the scripture....'[47] It may also be observed that Hooker did not need to connect this observation with infant baptism since he knew, 'That infantes have right to the sacrament of baptisme wee all acknowledge.'[48] Here Hooker relied on the consensus of the Christian tradition. Moreover, Hooker could point to the doctrine of covenant which traditionally had included both adults and infants. From adults God required 'faith and baptisme,' and from infants 'baptisme alone.'

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[42] *The Geneva Bible*.

[43] Cornelis Augustijn, *Erasmus: His Life, Works and Influence*, transl. by J. C. Grayson (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 92.

[44] Bruce M. Metzger, ed., *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London, New York: United Bible Socities, 1975), 715.

[45] Erasmus had written, 'But what evil genius had bewitched the miserable Anabaptists? I hear that they are more deluded by error than inspired by malice as they rush to speedy destruction the way they do. Isn't the baptism which has sufficed the Catholic Church for fourteen hundred years good enough for them?' *Erasmus and the Seamless Coat of Jesus: De Sarciendo Ecclesiae Concordia: On Restoring the Unity of the Church*... Translation with Introduction and Notes by Raymond Himelick (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1971), 96. Erasmus had written in the sixteenth century, but noted that traditional infant baptism was attested only for fourteen hundred years!

[46] For one account of the soul searching conflict, see Egil Grislis, 'Menno Simons and Martin Luther on Infant Baptism,' *Journal of Mennonite Studies* 12 (1994): 7–25.

[47] *Lawes* I.14.2; 1:126.27–29.

[48] *Lawes* V.62.19; 2:286.6–7.

For both baptism was 'complete,' since they received 'mysticall perfection' and were 'cleansed from all synne.'[49]

III

As Hooker declared the perfection of the Scriptures, he on occasion offered the following definition, 'the words of his mouth are absolute, and lack nothing which they should have, for performance of that thing whereunto they tend.'[50] That is, Hooker was affirming the soteriological perfection of the Scriptures, and was not attributing to the Scriptures either scientific or historical infallibility. Hooker was convinced that the Puritans had crossed these limits. Attributing to the scriptures such wisdom that the scriptures did not provide, they had in fact twisted them to their own liking.

When speaking of this soteriological orientation, Hooker affirmed with deep conviction that the Scripture is superior to 'probable,' even 'necessary reason,' as well as to empirical knowledge, such as 'that which we see with our eies.'[51] On this soteriological level Hooker could readily declare his agreement with the Puritans, namely that the purpose of the Scriptures was to save our souls. Hooker wrote, 'It is on both sides confest that the worde of God outwardlie administred (his spirit inwardlie concurringe therewith) converteth, edifieth, and saveth soules.'[52]

For Whitaker the Puritan, the special aid of the Holy Spirit was above all relevant for epistemology, as it assured unfailing correctness, 'We say that the Holy Spirit is the supreme interpreter of scripture, because we must be illuminated by the Holy Spirit to be certainly persuaded of the true sense of scripture. . . .'[53] This was no mere external assistance, but rather as the author interpreting himself: 'If the scriptures should be interpreted and understood by the same Spirit whereby they were written, then it is necessary for all who would interpret or understand

[49] *Lawes* V.62.15; 2:282.3–4, 7–9.
[50] *Lawes* II.6.1; 1:168.3–5.
[51] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:179.19–20.
[52] *Lawes* V.21.5; 2:87.10–12; cf. *Lawes* V.21.3.
[53] *Disputation on the Holy Scripture, Against the Papists, Especially Bellarmine and Stapleton*, trans. and ed. for The Parker Society by William Fitzgerald (Cambridge: The University Press, 1849), 415.

them to consult the Holy Spirit.'[54] In this view, the Puritan interpretation of the Scriptures was infallible and hence above controversy. In contrast, while acknowledging the soteriological role of the Holy Spirit, Hooker did not extend it to exclude human responsibility and hence the possibility of error.

Thus Hooker differed significantly from the Puritans by his explicit reliance on reasonand consequently on tradition endorsed by a learned ecclesial consensus. Here one can only regret that often enough Hooker did not meet a thoughtful response from his contemporary Puritan opponents. Puritan intransigency may well have sharpened the tone of Hooker's polemic statements. Yet however sharp, Hooker's polemic had a theological point.

One major example will have to suffice. In the Preface to *Lawes* Hooker offered a summary of the Puritan hermeneutic: '*By what meanes so many of the people are trained into the liking of that discipline*,[55] and made eight major observations: (1) The people are presented with an account of the faults of the present church leaders, '*the faults especially of higher callings are ripped up with marvelous exceeding severity and sharpnes of reproofe*….'[56] (2) All the existing '*faults and corruptions*' are attributed to the structure of the Church government.[57] (3) Then as '*the only soveraigne remedy of all evils*' is offered the Puritan own form of Church government.[58] (4) Repeatedly proclaimed false interpretation establishes in people's minds an inflexible hermeneutical pre-understanding, '*that an* Elder *doth signifie a layman admitted onely to the office of rule or governement in the Church; a* Doctor *one which may only teach and neither preach nor administer the Sacramentes; a* Deacon *one which hath charge of the almes box and of nothinge else: that the* Scepter, *the* rod, *the* throne *and* kingdome *of Christ are a forme of regiment, onely by Pastors, Elders, Doctors and Deacons*….'[59] (5) This established, the claim follows that the belief in such errors is a clear proof of having '*the speciall illumination of the holy Ghost, whereby they discerne those things in the word, which others reading yet discerne them not*.'[60] (6) Moreover, then the further claim is made that by such a '*perswasion*' the Holy Spirit in this manner '*seale them to be Gods children*'—while all others are merely

[54] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 451.
[55] *Lawes* Pref.2.10–3.16; 1:12.2–21.9.
[56] *Lawes* Pref.3.6; 1:15.15–16.
[57] *Lawes* Pref.3.7; 1:15.20.
[58] *Lawes* Pref.3.8; 1:16.3.
[59] *Lawes* Pref.3.9; 1:16.29–17.2.
[60] *Lawes* Pref.3.10; 1:17.12–14.

'*worldlings, timeservers, pleasers of men not of God*.'[61] (7) Then '*for feare of quenching that good Spirit*,' they zealously proclaim their convictions in word and deed, (8) in order to make certain that their ardent dedication to the Puritan cause does not remain unnoticed.[62]

Having outlined Puritan general methodology, Hooker did not seek to hide his disdain.[63] Hooker's central critique was directed against the Puritan claim '*that it is the speciall illumination of the holy Ghost, whereby they discerne those things in the word, which others reading yet discerne them not*.'[64] Of course, the moderate Puritan position could also be stated positively without attacking others, as can be seen in the writings of William Whitaker.[65]

In his general response, Hooker branded the Puritan argumentation as self-centred rhetoric.[66] Having placed 'their *Me thinketh*' over against the established Church of England,[67] they displayed a false 'confidence' that 'for the most part riseth from too much credit given to their owne wits' and as a consequence 'they are seldome free from error.'[68] Where Hooker actually identified his Puritan opponents, he most often directed his criticisms against Thomas Cartwright and occasionally also against Walter Travers.[69] In the judgment of some, these were regarded as the key Puritan thinkers.[70] But Hooker did not think that their popularity was matched by their profundity.

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[61] *Lawes* Pref.3.11; 1:18.10, 11–12, 16–17.

[62] *Lawes* Pref.3.12; 1:18.30–31.

[63] *Lawes* Pref.3.12; 1:18.31–32.

[64] *Lawes* Pref.3.10; 1:17.12–14; cf. Pref.3.16.

[65] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 364. Whitaker was Regius Professor of Divinity and Master of St. John's College, University of Cambridge.

[66] *Lawes* II.1.3–4.2; 1:146.9–152.15.

[67] *Lawes* IV.4.2; 1:286.4.

[68] *Lawes* V.Dedication.2; 2:2.5–7; cf. II.6.4. At issue was the Puritan myopic approach to the Scriptures. It had been already identified by Whitgift: 'Such and such things were not in the apostles' time; *ergo*, they ought not to be now. Which kind of argument is very deceitful, and the mother and well-spring of many both old and new schisms….' *WW* 1:60, 61.

[69] See A. F. Scott Pearson, *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism, 1535–1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925; repr. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966) and S. J. Knox, *Walter Travers: Paragon of Elizabethan Puritanism* (London: Methuen, 1962).

[70] S. J. Knox notes that 'Thomas Fuller…made this characteristic statement: 'Allowing Mr Cartwright for the Head, Mr Travers might be termed the necke of the Presbyterian party,' 11.

IV

The centre of Hooker's critique of the Puritan hermeneutic was directed against the glib superficiality of their appeal to the work of the Holy Spirit. Of course, Hooker also believed in the Holy Spirit and His work—but without expecting such belief to avoid thoughtful reflection and thorough research. To begin with, at issue were the role of reason and the authority of the Church. Here Hooker's approach was first of all characterized by an elitism that sharply diverged from general Puritan populism. This was less visible on the level of ontology as both affirmed that the invisible Church was the body of Christ. The sharpest differences emerged in regard to the visible Church both in reference to the polity of the government of the Church and in regard to the manner of the presence of the Holy Spirit. Generally, Hooker simply dismissed the Puritan claims that the Holy Spirit guided equally the educated and the unsophisticated. Hooker's scorn of the 'common sort' was constant:[71]

> a man whose capacitie will scarce serve him to utter five wordes in sensible maner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of scripture to thinke his own bare *Yea*, as good as the *Nay* of all the wise, grave, and learned judgements that are in the whole world. Which insolency must be represt, or it will be the verie bane of Christian religion.[72]

Both ecclesial administration and legitimate scriptural interpretation, according to Hooker, belonged exclusively to the elite. Here Hooker appealed to historical precedent: 'The sentences of wise and expert men were never but highly esteemed.'[73] And 'the learneder and wiser we are, the more such argumentes in some cases prevayle with us'—except, of course, among those who are not aware of their own 'ignorance' and

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[71] *Lawes* Pref.3.3–4; 1:14.7–23. Such statements need not be seen as generalizations, but rather as specific rebuttals of Puritan arrogance. The Anglican tradition was basically inclusive, cf. John Jewel, 'God hath not excluded the lay-people that believeth in him from the understanding of his holy secrets,' *JW* 2:677, and even 'Oftentimes the unlearned seeth that thing that the learned cannot see.' *JW* 2:683. Nevertheless, see *Lawes* IV.12.2; 1:320.6–8; *Lawes* Pref.4.4; 1:23.28; *Lawes* II.7.2; 1:176.9; *Lawes* IV.14.1; 1:337.20; *Lawes* V.71.7; 2:378.14. Elitism existed also among the Puritans. William Whitaker had declared, albeit not against fellow Puritans but Roman Catholics, 'unskilled persons are easily deceived; especially if there be any encourager at hand to lend an impulse, as there are at present everywhere too many.' *Disputation*, 16, cf. also 361 and 473.

[72] *Lawes* II.7.6; 1:183.14–19; cf. also Pref.3.3–4.

[73] *Lawes* II.7.2; 1:176.3–4.

therefore prefer mere authority.[74] Indeed, Hooker was even convinced that insights of the 'learnedest divines' should be accepted, even if they presented no proof but offered only a 'bare judgement.'[75] This was, of course, what Hooker had done, in acknowledging his own debt to Aristotle—'that most judicious *Philosopher*, whose eye scarce any thing did scape which was to be founde in the bosome of nature.'[76] Yet there were exceptions. Hooker's prime example was Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) and followers, the 'wise malignantes,'[77] disoriented by sin and misleading others.

As Hooker had counseled others, for a reliable scriptural interpretation Hooker himself looked to judicious and wise scholars, often experts in the classical languages. Most of them were the Fathers of the Early Church, notably Saint Augustine and St. Chrysostom. But Hooker also valued medieval sources as well as his contemporary thinkers, some referred to, other acknowledged only minimally, even silently, although used widely, as e.g. John Calvin. In this process of learning from the wisdom of others, Hooker developed further his own hermeneutical insights. In the controversy with Scripture quoting—and misinterpreting—Puritans necessarily demanded that Hooker took hermeneutical concerns seriously. And he did. Yet as he was not writing biblical commentaries, his hermeneutical insights were recorded somewhat sporadically, where the argument required it, rather than in a fully systematic manner.

With great care, Hooker continued to balance two major insights: the absolute truth of the Scriptures and their existential relativity, due to human historical finitude and sin. In this tension Hooker saw no basic contradiction, since the revealed divine truth of the infinitely wise God had to be received by human beings of limited and sinful comprehension. In such a situation, objectivity was more a challenge than an accomplishment. While finitude as well as ignorance and sin could not be ever fully eliminated, Hooker thought that several guard posts could be offered to enhance the chances for a correct interpretation of the Scriptures and thus underscored the absolute necessity to rely on the direct meaning of texts,

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[74] *Lawes* II.7.2; 1:176.9–10 and cf. 12.
[75] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:180.35–181.2.
[76] *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [Keble 2.12]; 3:341.8–9.
[77] *Lawes* V.2.4; 2:26.8.

> I holde it for a most infallible rule in expositions of sacred scripture, that where a literall construction will stand, the farthest from the letter is commonlie the worst. There is nothinge more daungerous then this licentious and deludinge arte, which chaungeth the meaninge of wordes, as alchymie doth or would doe the substance of meatals, maketh of any thinge what it listeth, and bringeth in the ende all truth to nothinge.[78]

As John S. Marshall has noted, the '*literal method*' was the characteristic approach of Renaissance humanists that had become familiar in England, for example, through the writings of John Colet (c. 1467–1519) and Erasmus. Here '*literal* does not mean in exegesis the text taken without reference to metaphor, literary type, or the whole cultural context which makes clear the meaning intended by the author.'[79] Ironically, the Puritans were not always able to follow their own methodology and on occasion succumbed to their theology. The case in point was the doctrine of baptism. Cartwright, like Calvin, in John 3:5 ('Unlesse a man be borne againe by water and of the Spirit') had read 'water' as a mere metaphor for the 'Spirit of God.'[80] Hooker vigorously objected.[81]

Yet while Hooker was deeply concerned about scriptural clarity and the best available precision, he was also aware that misunderstanding was sometimes inevitable. In Hooker's observation, the reality of potential fallibility of private judgment was most clearly visible in regard to the translation of Scripture texts. Hooker observed,

> the judgment of the Church, as we see by the practise of all nations, Greekes, Latines, Persians, Syrians, Aethiopians, Arabians, hath bene ever that the fittest for publique audience are such as following a middell course betweene the rigor of literall translators and the libertie of paraphrastes, doe with greatest shortenes and plainenes deliver the meaninge of the holie Ghost. Which beinge a labor of so greate difficultie, the exact performance thereof we may rather wish then looke for.'[82]

Yet, despite the obvious difficulties in translation, Hooker's preference was clear, 'Of both translations the better I willinglie acknowledg that

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[78] *Lawes* V.59.2; 2:252.5–11.

[79] *Hooker and the Anglican Tradition: An Historical and Theological Study of Hooker's* Ecclesiastical Polity (Sewanee, TE: University Press at the University of the South, 1963), 46–47. For a wider humanist context, see R. J. Schoeck, 'From Erasmus to Hooker: An Overview,' *RHC* 59–73.

[80] *Lawes* V.58.4; 2:251.5–20; *Inst.* IV.16.25.

[81] *Lawes* V.59.1; 2:251.21–252.5.

[82] *Lawes* V.19.2; 2:68.19–26.

which commeth neerer to the verie letter of the originall veritie. . . .'[83] Fluent in classical languages, Hooker knew that each idea in one language carried nuances which somewhat changed by translation in another language. Moreover, a measure of ambiguity was present even when only one language was considered: 'But for as much as wordes are resemblances of that which the minde of the speaker conceiveth, and conciptes are images representing that which is spoken of, it followeth that they who will judge of wordes should have recorse to the thinges them selves from whence they rise.'[84] In contrast to concrete objects that can be empirically explored, the difference between *res*, the reality itself, and its *signum* or symbolic description at best may be a close approximation, the case is far more complicated with abstract ideas. Only God knows the absolute reality, and therefore can interpret it with authority and absolute precision.[85]

In the meantime, however, Hooker had no doubts that what counted existentially was the effectiveness of the Scriptures in regard to their soteriological intent. Here Hooker acknowledged his partial agreement with the Puritans: 'It is on both sides confest that the worde of God outwardlie administred (his spirit inwardlie concurringe therewith) converteth, edifieth, and saveth soules.'[86] At the same time, Hooker nowhere suggested that the Holy Spirit will rectify this essential ambiguity between text and translation. Rather, Hooker pointed to a workable solution: the entire Scriptures offered a distinctive soteriological orientation to Jesus Christ, 'the very foundacion of our faith,'[87] which would enable to cope with less than perfectly clear words and issues. Hooker wrote, 'The mayne drifte of the whole newe Testament is that which Saint *John* setteth downe as the purpose of his owne historie, *These things are written, that yee might believe that Jesus is Christ the Sonne of God, and that in believing yee might have life through his name*.[88] The drift of the old that which the Apostle mentioneth to *Timothie, 'The holie Scriptures are able to make thee wise unto salvation.'*[89] So that the generall end both of olde and newe is one, the difference betweene them consisting in this, that the old did make wise by teaching salvation through Christ that should

[83] *Lawes* V.19.3; 2:70.15–17.
[84] *Lawes* V.19.3; 2:69.5–9.
[85] See Calvin, who largely depended on St. Augustine, *Inst.* IV.14.3–6.
[86] *Lawes* V.21.5; 2:87.10–12.
[87] *Just.* 16; 5:123.9.
[88] John 20:31.
[89] II Tim. 3:14.

come, the newe by teaching that Christ the Saviour is come, and that Jesus whome the Jewes did crucifie, and whome God did rayse agayne from the dead is he.'[90] While this soteriological concern was the foundation of the individual's faith and assurance,[91] it was also related to the religious life of the community and its faith expressed in worship. William P. Haugaard has called attention to the sometimes overlooked difference between the Continent and England. The Continental Protestants first developed their definitions of faith, elaborating them with great precision and at considerable length. But in liturgical matters differences prevailed within each ecclesial family and were readily accepted. By contrast, in England the Reformation 'first established its liturgy and then took twelve years to produce and authorize its Articles of Religion.'[92] This orientation to worship—so profoundly expressed in the *Book of Common Prayer*—continued to sustain a Christo-centric perspective in the reading and exposition of the Scriptures.

V

While according to Hooker the Scriptures were perfect for their divinely intended soteriological purpose, they did not incorporate all of the divine Wisdom. The divine Providence, and at times the Holy Spirit, was also active in nature, in reason, and in redeemed and upgraded reason. Hence the correct interpretation of the Scriptures was a real possibility, but not certainty. Here the most significant task was the proof of the revelatory character of the Scriptures. Hooker explained as follows: 'Because we maintaine that in scripture we are taught all things necessary unto salvation, hereupon very childishly it is by some demaunded, what Scripture can teach us the sacred authoritie of the scripture, upon the knowledge whereof our whole faith and salvation dependeth.'[93]

Two of the more familiar options for establishing the authority of the Scriptures were not acceptable for Hooker: Roman Catholic appeal to Tradition and the authority of the Church as well as the claim by

[90] *Lawes* I.14.4; 1:128.3–14.
[91] *Lawes* I.14.4; 1:128.3–14.
[92] *FLE* 6(1): 6.
[93] *Lawes* III.8.13; 1:230.25–29; Hooker accepted the conclusion, but acknowledged the need for an extra-scriptural proof. *Lawes* II.4.2; 1:153.14–16.

Calvin and the Puritans that the Scriptures were self authenticating.[94] William Whitaker, the Puritan, had summed up the Puritan position with clarity, 'The sum of our opinion is, that the scripture is αὐτόπιστος, that is, hath all its authority and credit from itself; is to be acknowledged, is to be received, not only because the church hath so determined and commanded, but because it comes from God; and that we certainly know that it comes from God, not by the church, but by the Holy Ghost.'[95] This approach depended on the pre-understanding that there were no errors in the scriptures, not even any lapses of memory by the individual writers. Whitaker explained: 'But it does not become us to be so easy and indulgent as to concede that such a lapse could be incident to the sacred writers. They wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, as Peter tells us, 2 Pet. 1:21. And all scripture is inspired of God, as Paul expressly writes, 2 Tim. 3:16. Whereas, therefore, no one may say that any infirmity could befall the Holy Spirit, it follows that the sacred writers could neither be deceived nor err in any respect. Here, then, it becomes us to be scrupulous as not to allow that any such slip can be found in scripture.'[96]

Hooker understood the situation differently: Scripture was not self-authenticating, 'it is not the worde of God which doth or possiblie can assure us, that wee doe well to thinke it his worde.'[97] Hooker supported his claim with an analogy to other sciences, 'No science doth make knowne the first principles whereon it buildeth, but they are alwaies either taken as plaine and manifest in them selves, or as proved and graunted already, some former knowledge having made them evident.'[98] This, Hooker thought, was not the case with the scriptures. He appealed to traditional Christian belief: 'Scripture teacheth al supernaturally revealed truth,' which although necessary for salvation,[99]—is not self evident, as was the well known example that '*every whole is more then any parte of that whole*.'[100] Therefore it was necessary to be 'perswaded by other meanes that these scriptures are the oracles of God….'[101] Here reason had its decisive role. By such emphasis, Hooker spelled out his

[94] *Inst.* I.8.5.
[95] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 279, 280. See also 289.
[96] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 37.
[97] *Lawes* II.4.2; 1:153.17–18.
[98] *Lawes* III.8.13; 1:230.32–231.2.
[99] *Lawes* III.8.13; 1:231.2–4.
[100] *Lawes* III.8.13; 1:231.8–9.
[101] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:126.10–11.

distinctive approach that differed from both St. Augustine and John Calvin.

St. Augustine's famous formulation was as follows: 'But should you meet with a person not yet believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe. For my part, I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church.'[102]

In the age of Reformation, St. Augustine's claim was often used by the Roman Catholic Church in the refutation of the sixteenth century Protestants. On the Protestant side, the appeal was to *sola scriptura*—and a restructuring of St. Augustine's argument. John Calvin responded, 'Augustine is not . . . teaching that the faith of the godly men is founded on the authority of the church; nor does he hold the view that the certainty of the gospel depends upon it. He is simply teaching that there would be no certainty of the gospel for believers to win them to Christ if the consensus of the church did not impel them.'[103]

Hooker was prepared to learn from both interpreters. First, Hooker celebrated the creative role of experience: 'That which al mens experience teacheth them may not in any wise be denied.'[104] Second, Hooker reported the results of this universal experience, 'And by experience we all know, that the first outward motive leading men so to esteeme of the scripture is the authority of Gods Church.'[105] Third, Hooker recorded a warning to any recalcitrant individual, 'For when we know the whole Church of God hath that opinion of the scripture, we judge it even at the first an impudent thinge for any man bredde and brought up in the Church to bee of a contrarye mind without cause.'[106] Finally, convinced that the witness of the Church is not a direct proof for the truth of the Scriptures, Hooker nevertheless acknowledged that through the witness of the Church there began an experiential process that can lead to the reasonable conclusion that the Scripture is the Word of God: 'Afterwards the more we bestow our labor in reading or hearing the misteries thereof, the more we find that the thing it selfe doth answer our received opinion concerning it. So that the former inducement

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[102] Augustine, *Against the Epistle of the Manicheans*, *NPNC*, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1956), 4:131.
[103] *Inst.* I.7.3; *OS* 3.67.23–27; LCC, 1.77.
[104] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1:231.19–20.
[105] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1:231.20–22.
[106] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1:231.22–25.

prevailing somewhat with us before, doth now much more prevaile, when the very thing hath ministred farther reason.'[107]

Here Whitaker was in a basic agreement with Hooker's position. Whitaker also noted his own agreement with John Driedo (c. 1480–1535) and St. Robert Cardinal Bellarmine (1542–1621). The latter, drawing upon St. Augustine, had distinguished between a 'propounding cause' and 'the prime foundation,' attributing to the church only the former. Whitaker approved, 'For, unless the church commended the sacred books to us, and led us, as it were, by the hand, to the very fountains of divine truth, we should never emerge out of the darkest shades of error.'[108] At the same time, Whitaker differed from Hooker and Cardinal Bellarmine in that he narrowed down the argument and attributed the ultimate and therefore sole authority exclusively to the Holy Spirit: 'The faithful, therefore, do not believe merely on account of the church's authority…For all the faithful are endowed with the Holy Spirit. Now his authority is greater than that of the church.'[109] Hence for Whitaker no further argument or proof was necessary.

Although Hooker affirmed a central (but not exclusive) role of the Holy Spirit in the church, Hooker nevertheless described His activity as making use of the human mind and experience. The process of establishing the revelatory character of the scriptures was not irrational. Here, as in society at large, reason had a central role. Hooker had already pointed to the concept of order, necessary for the survival both in the political and ecclesiastical realms. In both settings order was built with the assistance of reason, and interpreted with the category of Law. In so far as such constructs depended on divine wisdom, it was fitting to admire this wisdom in its expressions of reason and order as well.[110]

Moreover, Hooker could widen the realm of rationality even further, and include common sense, that accepted the necessity of reasoning in common life. As an example, Hooker observed that there are ordinary facts of life which are known by way of human testimony—and accepted as true without challenge: 'That there is a Citie of Rome, that *Pius Quintus* (1504–1572) and Gregory the 13. (1502–1585) and others have beene Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainely enough

[107] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1:231.25–30.
[108] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 322.
[109] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 321.
[110] *Lawes* II.1.4; 1:147.5–148.6.

perswaded.'[111] Even more clearly, reliance on human authority was intrinsic in the learning of languages: the meaning of words we are always told by others!

Now in regard to the Scriptures as well, to reject all human authority would 'shake the very fortresse of Gods truth,' since 'the scripture could not teach us the thinges that are of God, unlesse we did credite men who have taught us that the wordes of scripture doe signifie those things.'[112] This was an argument from within an elitist tradition where the learning of classical languages was assumed to precede serious reading and interpretation of the Scriptures. It made good sense for Hooker to re-emphasize this observation: 'what warrant have they… [that any sentence of the Scriptures] doth meane the thing for which it is alleged?'[113]

In addition, Hooker was prepared to defend the role of human authority even further as he came to reflect on the learned interpretation of the Scriptures. Here the judgment of experts was most necessary and their use of human reasoning essential. Hooker then appealed to general experience of humankind, 'The sentences of wise and expert men were never but highly esteemed.'[114] However, it was not only to the use of reason that Hooker appealed. In addition, the Scripture experts were also 'assisted with the grace of almightie God.'[115] Consequently these experts 'may growe unto so much perfection of knowledge, that men shall have just cause' to 'incline their mindes towards that which the sentence of so grave, wise, and learned in that faculty shal judge most sound….'[116] Here the weight of Hooker's argument depended on the observation that he was not talking about 'meere naturall men' discoursing about 'things divine.' The latter 'have not the eyes wherewith heavenly thinges are discerned.'[117] In contrast, the wise interpreters were 'indued with principall gifts'—and consequently are the 'principall pillers' in the Church.'[118]

[111] *Lawes* II.7.3; 1:177.18–21.
[112] *Lawes* II.7.3; 1:177.26–27 and 31–33.
[113] *Lawes* II.7.9; 1:184.35–185.2.
[114] *Lawes* II.7.2; 1:176.3–4.
[115] *Lawes* II.7.4; 1:178.14–15.
[116] *Lawes* II.7.4; 1:178.15–19.
[117] *Lawes* II.7.4; 1:178.22–179.1.
[118] *Lawes* II.7.4; 1:179.2–8.

VI

Cautious, scholarly, and faithful, Hooker assumed that the quest for truth was universal, 'The truth is, that the mind of man desireth evermore to know the truth according to the most infallible certainety which the nature of thinges can yield.' Here Hooker suggested three hierarchical steps in the process for reaching the truth: [1] 'that which we have by plaine aspect and intuitive beholding;' [2] 'by strong and invincible demonstration;' [3] and 'in case these both do fayle, then which way greatest probability leadeth, thether the mind doth evermore incline.'[119]

But beyond these three steps of the interpretation of the Scriptures, Hooker looked for a still more definitive approach, and declared with authority the following: the truth which Scriptures teach is sure 'because wee hold that his speech revealeth there what himselfe seeth.' Consequently, this formulation is 'the strongest proofe of all, and the most necessaryly asserted unto by us.' To Hooker his explanation seemed clear: what the believers have experientially received as Scripture is—'the scripture.' Our assent is given because the Scripture 'doth answere the evidence,' presumably the ultimate reality encountered in the Christian mystical experience.[120]

Of course, by experience Hooker did not mean an instant persuasion, characteristically the Puritan view, but rather the work of the Holy Spirit extended over time. By sharp contrast, when the Puritans proclaimed 'bare and unbuilded conclusions,' they and their deceived followers, who had accepted these conclusions without 'any great certaintie,' sooner or later began to despair—that the Holy Spirit was not working in them![121]

As reason had assisted in forming the conviction that Scriptures are revelatory, so also reason was further indispensable for dealing with a situation where the time-bound relativity of the scriptures required contextual and contemporary evaluation. Namely, Hooker had noted that 'Some truthes there are, the veritie whereof time doth alter….'[122] Moreover, Hooker observed that on many important issues

[119] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:179.8–18.
[120] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:179.26–27.
[121] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:180.11–12.
[122] *Lawes* II.4.6; 1:156.4–5.

the Scriptures were silent. Hooker thought that this fact enhanced the significance of reason: 'it is no more disgrace for scripture to have left a number of other thinges free to be ordered at the discretion of the Church, then for nature to have left it unto the wit of man to devise his owne attyre.'[123] With obvious irony, Hooker pointed out that with an absolute *sola scriptura* approach, there would occur such absurd situations, where servants would 'stand still' unless ordered to work with a specific Scripture quotation.[124] The conflict was serious. The Puritans, in Hooker's view, had both neglected and maligned reason. They had thoroughly misinterpreted Apostle Paul: 'the light of nature is made hatefull,' and '*the starre of Reason and learning*' has been turned into 'an unluckie Comet.'[125] Hooker deeply regretted these Puritan tirades: 'as if the waye to be ripe in faith, were to be rawe in wit and judgement; as if reason were an enimie unto religion, childish simplicitie the mother of ghostlie and divine wisdome.'[126] And this was no empty rhetoric. Hooker had discerned the deep-seated Puritan prejudice against reason which emerged even in settings where the use of reason was necessary. We may note that even the learned Whitaker shared this negative attitude toward reason, for example, 'Human reasonings and testimonies, if one use them too much or out of place, are like the armour of Saul, which was so far from helping David that it rather unfitted him for the conflict.'[127] Repeatedly, Whitaker contrasted reason with the Holy Spirit, and gave all the praise to the latter, 'If we do not understand, the reason is because we have not the Spirit, by which our hearts should be enlightened.'[128]

In contrast, Hooker sought to offer a more balanced interpretation of Apostle Paul. Hooker observed that natural men '*knewe both God, and the lawe of God*'[129]—but in a limited way. For deeper insights it was necessary to have 'the *speciall* operation of Gods good grace and spirit.'[130] Then it becomes clear that 'nature hath need of grace,' and 'grace hath use

[123] *Lawes* III.4.1; 1:213.4–7.
[124] *Lawes* II.8.6; 1:191.11.
[125] *Lawes* III.8.4; 1:221.17–20.
[126] *Lawes* III. 8.4; 1:222.26–28.
[127] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 19.
[128] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 290; also 364.
[129] *Lawes* III.8.6; 1:223.14, referring to Rom. 1:21 and 1:32.
[130] *Lawes* III.8.6; 1:223.16–17.

of nature.'[131] Here reason was not a 'supplement…but…a necessary instrument.'[132] When Hooker acknowledged the role of both—'partely scripture and partly reason'[133]—he did not intend to suggest an equal division of labour, because 'Scripture indeed teacheth things above nature, things which our reason by it selfe coulde not reach unto.'[134]

However, when reason had been redeemed by grace and thereby 'repaired'[135] as well as upgraded and therefore could be described as '*divinely enhanced reason*,'[136] reason served as an effective instrument. Here Hooker noted several key instances. With the assistance of grace, 'naturall reason' had been effective in 'conversion or confirmation.'[137] Again, reasoning alone remains 'uneffectual of them selves to worke faith…if the special grace of the holy ghost concur not to the inlightning of our minds.'[138] Just how the Holy Spirit accomplished this supernatural 'inlightning,' Hooker did not explain. He merely acknowledged that this work remained 'privy and secret.' However, the 'truth' thus communicated, needed to be shared. The sharing was done more effectively, 'when we gather by reason from the qualitie of things beleeved or done, that the spirit of God hath directed us in both; then if we settle our selves to beleeve or to do any certaine particular thing, as being moved thereto by the spirit.'[139]

At the same time, even 'naturall reasoning' must point out the difference 'betweene true and false construction.' Otherwise, insisted Hooker, 'faith without reason' cannot 'appeare reasonable.'[140] In other words, occasionally Hooker could even praise natural reason without any reference to the work of grace.[141] He then noted in a common sense manner that no meaningful discussion was possible 'without the use of naturall reason.'[142] Nevertheless, for any in depth interpretation of

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[131] *Lawes* III.8.6; 1:223.28–29, cf. I Cor. 2:14.
[132] *Lawes* III.8.10; 1:227.4–5.
[133] *Lawes* III.9.1; 1:236.8.
[134] *Lawes* III.8.12; 1:230.7–8.
[135] John E. Booty, 'The Judicious Mr. Hooker and Authority in the Elizabethan Church,' 99, in Stephen W. Sykes, ed., *Authority in the Anglican Communion: Essays Presented to Bishop John Howe* (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1987).
[136] Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 97, see also 200.
[137] *Lawes* III.8.11; 1:229.14–15.
[138] *Lawes* III.8.15; l.232.23–25.
[139] *Lawes* III.8.15; 1:233.3–9.
[140] *Lawes* III.8.17; 1:233.15 and 20, and 25–26.
[141] Such had been the view of Calvin, *Inst.* I.15.2 and III.1.1.
[142] *Lawes* III.8.17; 1:234.8–9.

Scripture and theology it was necessary to have 'the aide and assistance of Gods most blessed spirite' or 'reason, aided with the influence of divine grace.'[143]

Despite such statements, Hooker could also extol the role of reason without an explicit reference to grace or the Holy Spirit. In the broadest sense, Hooker partook of the Renaissance celebration of reason. Herschel Baker put it concisely, 'Richard Hooker, one of the most luminous characters of the sixteenth century, gave a definite statement to the principle of order. His stately *Of the Laws of the Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594–1597) is more than a defense of the Anglican *via media* against querulous Puritans: it becomes the most sustained and noble plea in our language for an orderly universe comprising orderly social and religious institutions at the disposition of an orderly good.'[144]

Moreover, Hooker's Thomistic ontology served well to distinguish between the two divine realms: nature and supernature, that is, reason and revelation. Providentially sustained complementariness assured the distinctiveness of both. Wherever this central orientation of Hooker's thought is overlooked, the temptation seems to arise to dislodge Hooker from his religious framework. Then Hooker is accused of an unresolved conflict between reason and grace[145] or corrected by introducing such an alien category as 'common grace.'[146] Indeed, often enough influenced by the *Zeitgeist* of his age, Hooker spoke of 'right reason,' without spelling out its relationship to grace.[147] Of course, Hooker did not always make clear whether his understanding of reason is a reference to natural reason (which I now designate as Reason I), or to reason in so far as it is corrupt by sin and to a measure dysfunctional (Reason II)[148] or, finally, as reason redeemed by grace or aided by the Holy Spirit and to a measure restored as well as upgraded in its capacities (Reason III).

Hooker was not ever prepared to disparage Reason I. At time in praising Reason I, he seemed to ignore his own comments on the

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[143] *Lawes* III.8.18; 1:235.1–2 and 15–16.

[144] *The Image of Man: The Idea of the Study of Human Dignity in Classical Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance* (1947, repr. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 234.

[145] See Gunnar Hillerdal, *Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1962).

[146] Nigel Voak, *Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 100.

[147] See Robert Hoopes, *Right Reason in the English Renaissance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 123–124.

[148] Egil Grislis, 'The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker,' *Anglican Theological Review*, 84.4 (Fall 2002): 881–896.

corrosive influence on Reason II by original or actual sin. But then, Hooker did not insist on the so-called total depravity. His sense was that sinful reason was damaged, yet having lost its 'ablenes' reason still retained its 'aptnes.'[149] In general, Hooker's acknowledgment, even praise, of Reason I was extensive: both nature and human reason were creations of God and therefore not to be despised, 'The light of naturall understanding wit and reason is from God, he it is which thereby doth illuminate every man entering into the world.'[150] Here, in order to defend the coherence of Hooker, Nigel Voak has suggested that Hooker was making use of the notion of so-called 'common grace.' Unfortunately, Hooker did not ever explicitly use that term. Rather, like Luther and Calvin, he assumed God's providentially restorative presence among His creation. Luther—despite his *sola gratia* emphases—could generally assume the active presence of the Holy Spirit in preserving certain cultural values, as for example the administrative order within the ancient Roman empire and the personal courage to sustain it. On occasion Luther even thought that a pagan thinker like Cicero was among the saved![151]

The potential inconsistencies in Luther's thought are not totally absent from the far better organized theological reflections by John Calvin. On several occasions Calvin's dialogical encounters with the classical world, notably Seneca and Cicero, clearly enrich his theological perspective—without an unduly rigid systematization of the borrowed

[149] '*Grace and Free Will*,' *Dublin* 1; 4.101.28–31: 'You peradventure thinck aptness and ablenes all one, whereas the trueth is, that had wee kept our first ablenes grace should not neede, and had aptnes beene alsoe lost, it is not grace that could worke in us more then it doeth in brute creatures.' With limited texts of Hooker before him, Gunnar Hillerdal has accused him of several contradictions in his study *Reason and Revelation*. Basically these are three: first, if divine malediction has weakened human reason, it cannot but err—and therefore cannot exercise free will (110); secondly, Hooker's distinction between 'plain reason and reason aided by grace' (112) neglects to explain his dependence on the wisdom of pagan thinkers: 'does he think that God also bestows grace upon the heathens?' (119); and thirdly, Hooker's acceptance of the idea of 'deification' (126) leads him to claim 'that the Christian can move to a point over and above logical discourse and that all questions then will be answered by the grace of God. From a strictly philosophical view-point this is, of course, an astonishing turn to a kind of irrationalism (135).'

[150] *Lawes* III.9.3; 1:238.25–27.

[151] Egil Grislis, 'Luther's Courage of Faith,' 103–126, in Egil Grislis, ed., *The Theology of Martin Luther: Five Contemporary Canadian Interpretations* (Winnipeg, MB: The Lutheran Council in Canada, 1985), and Egil Grislis, 'Martin Luther and the World Religions,' *Word & World* 18.2 (Spring 1998): 143–154; Calvin, *Inst.* II.2.17 and II.3.6–8.

material.[152] At the same time, a threefold delineation of the work of divine activity of Providence enabled John Calvin to distinguish three distinctive effects: (1) in its largest circle, Providence included all creation, ruling over the just and the unjust. In this providing activity Calvin did not include salvation. (2) In the second and smaller circle Providence exercised saving activities, such as the sustenance of faith, even the temporary faith of the non-elect. (3) In its most central and intensive way Providence included election to salvation, eternal and unchangeable. In accord with Calvin's understanding of a double predestination, the first and broadest activity of Providence did not include salvation. In this realm Calvin could indeed make rare use the idea of 'common grace.' While later followers of Calvin could extend the use of 'common grace' systematically and widely, Calvin ordinarily made use of such concepts as creation, preservation, God, His Providence, and the Holy Spirit.

Hooker followed in Calvin's footsteps Therefore to claim that Hooker made use of 'common grace,' without explicitly referring to it, is not particularly illuminating. Of course, in so far as God's Providence in Hooker's view was all-inclusive, he did not know of a totally autonomous reason, existing outside the realm of Providence. Thus the distinction between life sustaining Providence and saving Predestination allowed Hooker to appreciate 'right reason' (Reason I) as providentially sustained—but also to distinguish it from reason redeemed by grace (Reason III)—as well as from reason that had abused its freedom and was to a measure corrupt (Reason II).

While such distinctions are generally clear in principle, in practice Hooker did not always make it absolutely clear whether he was thinking of Reason I, or Reason II, or Reason III. To say this, however, is not to suggest that Hooker is contradictory. All thoughtful reason to him was respectable (Reason I), but only reason assisted and redeemed by grace (Reason III) was useful concerning salvation and reflection on supernatural matters. Acknowledging the reality of the Fall and the dire effects of sin, Hooker did not fail to note the negative and continuing

[152] See Egil Grislis, 'Calvin's Use of Cicero in the *Institutes* I:1–5-A Case Study in Theological Method,' *Archiv fuer Reformationsgeschichte* 62.1 (1971): 5–37, and Egil Grislis, 'Seneca and Cicero as Possible Sources of John Calvin's View of Double Predestination: An Inquiry in the History of Ideas,' 28–63, in E. J. Furcha, ed., *Papers from the 1986 International Calvin Symposium: McGill University* (ARC Supplement # 3, Montreal: Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, 1987).

consequences. His weakness consisted in failing to pay consistent attention to the relationship between Reason I and Reason II. At the same time Hooker's most decisive contribution was the acknowledgment of the role of saving grace or the Holy Spirit in redeeming and upgrading reason (Reason III), e.g., 'Saving grace is the guift of the Holy Ghost which lighteneth inwardly the mindes, and inflameth inwardlie the hearts of men, working in them that knowledge approbation and love of things divine, the fruite thereof is aeternal life.'[153] Yet in seeing grace as an experience of enlightenment, Hooker was not suggesting an instantaneous event. Enlightenment was not a moment of sudden ecstasy, but ordinarily a judicious scholarly search that may lead toward the experience of truth. The transition from Reason I to Reason III can therefore be gradual. Illumination by reason and grace being a process; its stages could be distinguished theoretically, but not separated in fact. Hence Hooker very often pointed to the role of time: 'The thinges which so long experience of all ages hath confirmed and made profitable, let not us presume to condemne as follies and toyes, because wee sometimes knowe not the cause and reason of them.'[154] But as reflection continued, initial acceptance could be changed into critique and rejection: 'The wisdome which is learned by tract of time, findeth the lawes that have bene in former ages establisht, needefull in later to be abrogated.'[155] In fact, 'needlesse lawes unabolisht doth weaken the force of them that are necessarie.'[156] In other words, Hooker did not speak of a clear-cut situation. Rather, there were occasions where outdated laws had to be abolished and that on the grounds of 'long experience:' 'to change any such lawe must needes with the common sorte impaire and weaken the force of those groundes, whereby all lawes are made effectuall.'[157] Ordinarily, in principle and by general observation, the experiences and insights were basically validated only by 'tract of time.' In this significant way, 'by tract of time,' God had taught the world.[158] Several of Hooker's epigrams underscored this perspective, viz., 'wisdom and youth are seldom joygned in one,'[159] and, 'there are fewe thinges

[153] *Dublin* 12; 4:111.28–33.
[154] *Lawes* IV.1.3; 1:274.27–30.
[155] *Lawes* IV.14.1; 1:336.27–29.
[156] *Lawes* IV.14.1; 1:336.30–31.
[157] *Lawes* IV.14.1; 1:337.18 and 20–22.
[158] *Lawes* IV.14.7; 1:344.26.
[159] *Lawes* V.7.1; 2:35.4–5.

knowne to be good, till such time as they grow to be ancient.'[160] At issue was no mere passage of time, but time well used in religious work and reflection. As already noted, such was the case also in the interpretation of the Scriptures: 'the more we bestow our labor in reading and hearing the misteries thereof, the more we find that the thing it selfe doth answer our received opinion concerning it.'[161]

To put it in another way, Hooker was fully aware that many had diligently read the Scriptures but not necessarily understood them. Such was Hooker's considered response to the populist appeal by the Puritans. Hugh Trevor-Roper has noted with insight, 'Unlike the Puritans, who were essentially unhistorical, he recognized the legitimacy of historical change.'[162] As his deepest convictions guided him, Hooker replied in an elitist manner. Namely, Hooker celebrated both wisdom and those wise men that shared this wisdom. They were a people in a category of their own. Hooker designated them 'the wiser and more judicious sort.'[163] Here Hooker did not hesitate to generalize—'The sentences of wise and expert men were never but highly esteemed.' Indeed, learning and wisdom would increase the likelihood that arguments provided by such people would persuade others. Yet Hooker was sufficiently cautious to add—'in some cases.'[164] Moreover, so exalted was the statue of these wise men in the eyes of Hooker, that he was prepared to accept their interpretation even 'no kind of proofe appearing.' Namely, 'although it did not appeare what reason or what scripture led them to be of that judgement, yet to their very bare judgement somewhat a reasonable man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbecilities which are incident into our nature.'[165]

Now while such a statement did not necessarily contradict the point of view of the Establishment as spelled out by Archbishop Whitgift, it did not clearly specify the detailed hierarchical structure of the Church of England. Here Whitgift was significantly more precise. He put the

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[160] *Lawes* V.7.3; 2:37.8–9.

[161] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1:231.25–28.

[162] *Renaissance Essays* (London: Secker and Wartburg, 1985; repr. Fontana Press, 1986), 109.

[163] *Lawes* I.16.2; 1:136.1.

[164] *Lawes* II.7.2; 1:176.3–4 and 10.

[165] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:180.33–181.4; Egil Grislis, 'The Role of *Consensus* in Richard Hooker's Method of Theological Inquiry,' 64–88, in Robert Cushman and Egil Grislis, eds., *The Heritage of Christian Thought: Essays in Honor of Robert Lowry Calhoun (*New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1965).

case in this way: 'Is it not as lawful for a godly prince, with the advice and consent of godly and learned bishops, and other of the wisest, to make orders in the church? &c.'[166] Of course, the Puritans did not reject learning as such, and could appreciate the wisdom to gather learned men for the discovery of a consensus. But it was a highly subjective approach nevertheless, as the ultimate appeal to the *sola scriptura* meant the acceptance of those interpretations only which were thought to be inspired by the Holy Spirit—and recognized as such by the Puritans! Whitaker put it this way: '…we allow that it is a highly convenient way of finding the true sense of scripture, for devout and learned men to assemble, examine the cause diligently, and investigate the truth; yet with this proviso, that they govern their decision wholly by the scriptures. Such a proceeding we, for our parts, have long wished for.…'[167]

Thus while Hooker's hermeneutical approach to reason was necessarily individual in specific analyses, and corporeal in evaluation and application. These two operative dimensions of reason Hooker viewed as mutually supportive, for 'God hath not moved theire heartes to thinke such thinges, as he hath not inabled them to prove.'[168] Consequently, what the 'ecclesiasticall authoritie shall probablie thinke and define to be true or good,' far outweigh the claims of an individual, unless he offered a necessary conclusion by reason![169] But where 'proofe infallible' was not available, there 'the mind doth rather follow probable perswasions.'[170]

When, however, the Puritans—in Hooker's view speaking as individuals only rather than as a legitimate society—offered 'only probable collection' of arguments rather than a 'sentence definitive,'[171] or 'reasons demonstrative,'[172] Hooker flatly rejected their views. Hooker insisted that 'our owne private, and but probable resolution be by the lawe of publique determinations overruled.'[173] At the very same time, Hooker's preference for the probable judgment of society did not rest on a mere superiority in numbers, but on reason. Hooker argued 'that authority of men should prevaile with men either against or above reason, is no

[166] *WW* 1:261,261; also 1:371 and 414, 415.
[167] Whitaker, *Disputation*, 434.
[168] *Lawes* V.10.1; 2:47.8–9.
[169] *Lawes* V.8.2; 2:39.12–13.
[170] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:180.30–31.
[171] *Lawes* Pref.6.3; 1:31.14 and 19–20.
[172] *Lawes* Pref.6.6; 1:33.18.
[173] *Lawes* I.16.5; 1:139.23–25.

part of our beliefe.'[174] In fact, to follow authority against reason would be 'to follow like beasts the first in the heard' which Hooker evaluated as 'brutish.'[175]

The authority that Hooker attributed to society as a whole he conceived in an elitist perspective, always pitting an inchoate 'multitude' over against the insights of 'the wise.'[176] Consistently Hooker looked up to 'the wiser and more judicious sort.'[177] As we have noted, even their 'bare judgment' was decisive.[178] As Hooker subsequently specified, he did not have in mind a mere aggregate group of individuals, but 'the bare consent of the whole Church.'[179] It was this legitimate corporate authority that counted![180]

At the same time Hooker knew very well that it was possible for men to err.[181] He thought that this fact been discovered again and again: 'Mens consultations are alwayes perilous. And it falleth out many times that after long deliberations, those things are by their wit even resolved on, which by tryall are found most opposite to publique safety.'[182] The Church can therefore never claim infallibility. In his own time, Hooker was prepared on occasion to sail against the current winds. For example, he was prepared in his early writings to acknowledge the Christian character of the Roman Catholic Church, always to distance himself from Calvin's strict double predestination, as well as to accept the possibility of a variety of administrative Church structures.[183]

At the very same time, Hooker was convinced that 'the mind of man desireth evermore to knowe the truth according to the most infallible certainety which the nature of thinges can yeeld.'[184] And in his own research Hooker was ever diligent and judicious, without, humbly, claiming that he had always succeeded in his quest. He left a place sometimes to 'lawfully doubt and suspend our judgement.'[185] In this way, Hooker's conceptual clarity in defending the scriptures as

[174] *Lawes* II.7.6; 1:181.13–14.
[175] *Lawes* II.7.6; 1:181.11–13.
[176] *Lawes* Pref.8.3; 1:39.24.
[177] *Lawes* I.16.2; 1:136.1.
[178] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:181.2.
[179] *Lawes* V.8.3; 2:39.22.
[180] *Lawes* II.7.8; 1:184.6–9.
[181] *Lawes* III.5.1; 1:214.5–11.
[182] *Lawes* III.11.9; 1:254.1–4.
[183] *Lawes* III.2.1; 1:207.8–10; cf. also *Lawes* III.2.2.
[184] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:179.8–10.
[185] *Lawes* II.7.5; 1:179.29.

the revealed Word of God was nevertheless repeatedly qualified not only by acknowledgment of human finitude and sin, but also by the celebration of the mysterious greatness of God, ever greater than it was possible to confess it fully.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE CHURCH

William H. Harrison

Hooker's ecclesiology is defined by three sets of considerations: first, soteriology and the church's end, which is union with Christ ('*theosis*' or 'deification'); secondly, sacramental life, which is the means by which humanity enters into the aforementioned union; and thirdly the concrete and historical considerations which enable the church, in distinct places and times, to sustain its sacramental life.

In the *Lawes*, Hooker's concerns are practical and polemical: he wishes to define the nature of the church in a way which both enables it to serve its divine purpose and, simultaneously, includes the Elizabethan arrangement and excludes the Puritan critique.[1] The root image which he employs is the church as the 'Body of Christ.' The church is Christ's body, visible on earth, being made one with Christ in an ongoing process of *theosis*, or 'deification.' This is helpful language both because it focuses on the church's end and because it emphasizes the earthly reality of the church's being. The conversation is largely about the visible church in the world.

Due attention to the institution requires some consideration of humanity, as having certain natural capacities and as living in history. The church has the ability to understand the divine message through interpreting scripture; this provides its overall sense of purpose. Directed by this understanding, the church may (and must) establish its own laws and form itself in whatever way best serves its end. This must be done in a reasonable way, and by means suited to the culture in which the church is to function, justifying organization of the ecclesiastical structure and practices on a national basis. The English church, therefore, is justified in maintaining itself as a distinct entity, while incorporating

[1] The extent to which Hooker's text was formed by rhetorical and polemical considerations has been investigated in: W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The Philosopher of the "Politic Society": Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker,' *SRH*, 3–76, and Rudolph P. Almasy, 'Language and Exclusion in the First Book of Hooker's *Politie*,' *RHER*, 227–242.

characteristics from both Protestant and Catholic streams of Western Christianity.

Ultimately, Hooker draws together all of his resources to argue for a particular way of doing ecclesiology, which intentionally seeks a middle way, and for a defence of a specific manifestation of that way, the English church of his time. His church is understood as having all of the characteristics of 'the church' in England and, therefore, is the means by which God accomplishes salvation in Hooker's place and time.

The Mystical and the Visible Church

Hooker's most basic ecclesiological distinction is between 'that Church of Christ which we properly term his body mysticall'[2] and the 'visible Church.'[3] The former consists of all whom God saves, from all of history; it is not less real for having an invisible unifying principle ('such a real body there is').[4] The latter is made up of all people who have, do, or will profess the one Lord, accept the one faith and receive the one baptism.[5] It includes all who are Christians 'by externall profession,' whatever the state of their relationship with God.[6] Even those in grievous sin remain part of this society.[7]

As William Haugaard has demonstrated,[8] Hooker's understanding of the mystical church does not easily assimilate to a conventional Protestant (Lutheran or Calvinist) notion of the invisible church. Instead, Hooker's use of the term 'mystical' seems to connect with his rich sense of the church as sacramental in a more Thomistic manner. This body is known only by the power of reason, without physical evidence, precisely because the union with Christ is its defining characteristic and this union is not visible or measurable; it is not such as can be known by the power of the senses. Nonetheless, the mystical body is not primarily defined by predestination or election.[9] As Haugaard points out, the

[2] *Lawes* III.1.2; 1:194.27–28.
[3] *Lawes* III.1.3; 1:195.26–27.
[4] *Lawes* III.1.2; 1:194.33–195.1.
[5] *Lawes* III.1.3; 1:196.5–7.
[6] *Lawes* III.1.7; 1:198.17.
[7] *Lawes* III.1.8; 1:198.27–199.25.
[8] William P. Haugaard, Introduction to 'Books II, III & IV' in *FLE* 6(1): 172–173.
[9] Hooker's understanding of the issues of predestination and election is under debate. Current perspectives appear in: W. David Neelands, 'Richard Hooker and the Debates about Predestination, 1580–1600,' *RHER*, 43–61; Daniel Eppley, 'Richard Hooker

common term (in Augustine and Aquinas, as well as the 16th century conversation) for the body which is composed solely of the elect is the 'invisible church.'[10] Hooker's intention is to construct a clear linkage between God's transformative presence in the church and the visible body's mediating activity.

Hooker uses the terms 'inherent copulation'[11] and 'mystical conjunction'[12] to describe the relationship between the mystical church and Christ. The sexual analogy is intended to suggest a unity which is as absolute as human nature permits, while the language of 'mystical' remains as a safeguard to ensure that we do not understand this as a physical union in the most obvious of senses. Hooker uses the language of 'deification' (*theosis*) with its echoes of Irenaeus, the Cappadocians, and the Eastern Christian tradition, to describe the impact on human nature of the meeting of divine and human in Christ.[13] 'Finallie, sith God hath deified our nature, though not by turninge it into him selfe, yeat by makinge it his owne inseparable habitation, wee cannot now conceive how God should without man either exercise divine power or receive the glory of divine praise.'[14] Human nature is raised by its association with divine nature in Christ.

Hooker hastens to emphasize that the divine nature remains unchanged by this union,[15] while the human nature continues to retain its intrinsic characteristics as human, with the addition of certain divine benefits.

> As therefore wee have showed how the Sonne of God by his incarnation hath changed the maner of that personall subsistence which before was solitarie and is now in the association of flesh, no alteration thereby accruinge to the nature of God; so neither are the *properties of mans nature* in the person of Christ by force and vertue of the same conjunction so much altered, as not to staie within those limites which our substance is

on the Un-conditionality of Predestination,' *RHER*, 63–77; Egil Grislis, 'Providence, Predestination, and Free Will in Richard Hooker's Theology,' *RHER*, 79–95.

[10] Haugaard, 172–173.

[11] *Lawes* V.56.1; 2:234.31.

[12] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:239.3.

[13] Torrance Kirby notes that *theosis* ('deification' or 'divinization') is the goal of prayer for Hooker, where prayer must be understood as including the whole of Common Prayer (including Baptism and Eucharist) as outlined in the Elizabethan *Book of Common Prayer*. W.J. Torrance Kirby, 'Angels descending and ascending: Hooker's discourse on the 'double motion' of Common Prayer,' *RHER*, 112.

[14] *Lawes* V.54.5; 2:224.14–17.

[15] *Lawes* V.54.5; 2:223.23–24.

> bordered withall; nor the *state and qualitie* of our substance so unaltered, but that there are in it many glorious effectes proceedinge from so neere copulation with deitie. God from us can receive nothinge, wee by him have obteyned much. For albeit the naturall properties of deitie be not communicable to mans nature, the supernaturall guiftes graces and effectes thereof are.[16]

In the union of natures in Christ, as described by Chalcedon (for Hooker intends to be precisely orthodox at this point), the divine and human natures each retain their basic characters, but some special capacities are given to the human.

Hooker gives significant effort to clarifying this point for two reasons. One purpose is the refutation of the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body, which for Luther is a means of understanding how the bread and wine can become the body and blood of Christ. Hooker rejects Luther's theory, insisting that it implies the loss of an essential characteristic of human nature, which is to be positioned in place and time. 'Definite or locall presence' is a natural property of human bodies.[17] The divine substance which Christ shares with the Father and the Spirit is infinite and, therefore, present in all locations; not so the humanity which Christ shares with us.[18] Thus, Hooker argues a controversial issue in eucharistic theology—an appropriate activity in the context of a discussion of sacraments.

However, the second reason for Hooker to raise this issue is more important for ecclesiology and may have greater significance for the contemporary reader. Hooker's next move is to discuss soteriology and the workings of divine grace, with specific reference to sacramental theology. The title for this section is intriguing: '*The union or mutuall participation which is betweene Christ and the Church of Christ in this present worlde*.'[19]

The language of participation is, for Hooker, central to understanding the purpose of the Christian church in the world. Through Christ, we receive 'the *participation of divine nature*.'[20] 'Wee are . . . adopted sonnes

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[16] *Lawes* V.54.5; 2:223.20–32.
[17] *Lawes* V.55.6; 2:230.35–231.1.
[18] *Lawes* V.55.3, 4; 2:228.21–229.23.
[19] *Lawes* V.55.9; 2:234.26–27. Italics are Hooker's, indicating that this is a title.
[20] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:238.18. Italics are Hooker's, indicating quotation from 2 Peter 1:4. A helpful account of how this participation is brought about appears in Charles W. Irish, '"Participation of God Himselfe:" Law, the mediation of Christ, and sacramental participation in the thought of Richard Hooker.' *RHER*, 165–184.

of God to eternall life by participation of the onlie begotten Sonne of God, whose life is the wellspringe and cause of ours.'[21] We become transformed into Christ's likeness, made 'such as him selfe is of whome wee com.'[22] Salvation is found in Christ's life and death, because 'when Christ sanctified his owne flesh givinge as God and takinge as man the holie Ghost, he did not this for him selfe onlie but for our sakes, that the grace of santification [sic] and life which was first received in him might passe from him to his whole race as malediction came from Adam unto all mankind.'[23] In the union of God and humanity in Christ, human nature is sanctified and humanity is enabled to participate in the divine nature.

We, who are merely human and retain the essential characteristics of humanity, nonetheless receive some of the benefits of divine life. These gifts include present 'newnes of life,' which is the immediate meaning of eternal life to the Christian, as well as 'the future restauration of our bodies,' which occurs in the resurrection.[24] Those who receive these gifts constitute the mystical body of Christ; the nature of this body is found in its participation in Christ's being and, therefore, in the life of the divine Trinity. Sacramental participation in Christ is the centre of Hooker's doctrine of the church.

Moreover, both of the aforementioned categories of benefits are intimately tied to the work of the visible church, with the result that, although the mystical church of Christ's body cannot be seen or measured, the conjunction between the divine and human can be fostered by the visible church. Both gifts of God 'presuppose a participation of the grace efficacie merit or vertue of [Christ's] bodie and blood, without which foundation first laid there is no place for those other operations of the Spirit of Christ to ensue.'[25]

Participation begins through imputation, whereby we have accounted to us as our righteousness the accomplishments of Christ.[26] These benefits apply equally to all who receive them.[27] Hooker does not specify who these are but the use of the Protestant language of justification implies that they must be the saved elect. As I have argued

[21] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:239.11–13.
[22] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:239.26.
[23] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:241.18–23.
[24] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:242.1–2.
[25] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:242.2–5.
[26] *Lawes* V.56.11; 2:243.3–5.
[27] *Lawes* V.56.11; 2:243.23–25.

elsewhere,[28] Hooker's priority in the *Lawes* is not really this matter of imputed righteousness, however, but the sanctification which occurs in the believer through 'habituall and reall infusion, as when grace is inwardlie bestowed while wee are on earth and afterwardes more fullie both our soules and bodies made like unto his in glorie.'[29] The agent of this sanctifying activity is the Holy Spirit, who is infused into our being and transforms us into Christ's body.

> From hence it is that they which belonge to the mysticall bodie of our Savior Christ and be in number as the starres of heaven, devided successivelie by reason of theire mortall condition unto manie generations, are notwithstandinge coupled everie one to Christ theire head and all unto everie particular person amongst them selves, in as much as the same Spirit, which anointed the blessed soule of our Savior Christ, doth so formalize unite and actuate his whole race, as if both he and they were so manie limmes compacted into one bodie, by being quickned all with one and the same soule.[30]

Hooker has a very strong doctrine of the mystical body of Christ. He understands the Spirit as making Christians truly one with Christ, in an altogether real act of incorporation.

Justification by imputation is an instantaneous change; it has the same impact on all. Sanctification by infusion, for the human recipient, is a process which occurs over time; Christ enters into those whom he transforms 'by degrees,' until the final day of exaltation.[31] The process also varies from person to person, since clearly some are better Christians than others. All are fully sons, but some are better sons than others are.[32] This is a pivotal assertion in Hooker's work, because it gives support to his argument for variation in the the polities of churches. If, indeed, sanctification varies according to person, then, logically, it will vary according to personal history. Consequently, the church needs to form itself in a way which will aid in the process, since the church is at the centre of God's transforming action in the world.

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[28] William H. Harrison, 'Powers of Nature and Influences of Grace in Hooker's *Lawes*' *RHER*, 15–24. Lee Gibbs showed the distinction between justifying righteousness and sanctifying righteousness in Hooker's work (focusing on the sermons) in: Lee W. Gibbs, 'Richard Hooker's *Via Media* Doctrine of Justification,' *Harvard Theological Review* 74.2 (1981): 211–220.

[29] *Lawes* V.56.11; 2:243.7–9.

[30] *Lawes* V.56.11; 2:243.14–23.

[31] *Lawes* V.56.12; 2:244.19–23.

[32] *Lawes* V.56.12; 2:244.7–11.

The variation in degree of transformation is partly because sanctification calls for a response from us; there is an element of the receptionist in Hooker's soteriology. Altogether logically, this element is mirrored in Hooker's sacramental theology, for which he is setting the stage. The importance of the visible church is that this body is responsible for the ministration of the sacraments, which are not merely beneficial or effective means of God's working, but are truly necessary to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit in the members of Christ's body. Sacraments are 'heavenlie ceremonies, which God hath sanctified and ordeined to be administred in his Church, first as markes wherebie to know when God doth imparte the vitall or savinge grace of Christ unto all that are capable thereof, and secondlie as meanes conditionall which God requireth in them unto whom he imparteth grace.'[33] Grace accomplishes the work (having Christ as its cause[34]), but the sacraments are necessary both as signs and channels of grace.

Or so Hooker begins. However, he also wants to assert that God is able to save without sacraments, presumably to sustain the possibility of election for someone who has not encountered the church or stands in some extraordinary position in relation to the church. Thus, Hooker settles on asserting that sacraments are the ordinary means by which God accomplishes the divine purposes;[35] they are usually necessary and, therefore, may not be disregarded, though God may choose to save some people without baptism or eucharist. Even the weakened position remains strong, though. The visible church is a powerful means of God's grace and is not lightly circumvented, although God retains the capacity to do so.

The Sacramental Church

The visible church, for Hooker, is something more than a body which preaches the Gospel and orders the earthly life of believers. Instead, the church is sacrament, having a divine aspect in its being which enables it to do God's work and participate in God's transformative activity in creation. By God's own gift, the church is made necessary to the work of bringing people into the life of Christ; the visible *ecclesia* is a necessary

[33] *Lawes* V.57.3; 2:245.32–246.2.
[34] Irish, 'Participation of God Himselfe,' *RHER*, 180.
[35] *Lawes* V.57.4; 2:246.33–34.

instrument of God's grace. As David Neelands has astutely realized, this results in a view in which the invisible church essentially becomes one with the visible. 'There is no effective or practical difference between the visible and invisible church, except at the end, when it shall be clear if there be any in the church who do not persevere.'[36]

We have seen that Hooker uses the language of 'participation' in Christ's 'bodie and bloude' to speak of salvation. This is, of course, a reference to the Christ event and Christ's own incarnation, death and resurrection. The language points, however, to something more: our sacramental participation in the Christ event through baptism and eucharist.

Baptism is the starting point of participation in Christ. It is the means whereby the church is 'incorporated into Christ' and receives both justification and the first impetus to sanctification.[37] Baptism is the action of God, the church and the particular person undergoing the rite. It 'is an action in parte morall, in parte ecclesiasticall, and in part mysticall: morall, as being a dutie which wee performe towardes God; ecclesiasticall, in that it belongeth unto Godes Church as a publique dutie; finallie mysticall, if wee respect what God doth thereby intende to worke.'[38] Hooker wants to emphasize that the inclination of some Calvinists to lean solely on the power of God's election is inadequate; there must be a new birth in baptism. 'Predestination bringeth not to life, without the grace of externall vocation, wherein our baptisme is implied.'[39] Baptism makes us the children of God. Invoking the action of the Holy Spirit in the life of the recipient, this sacrament begins the process of sanctification in that person. Sanctification, therefore, finds its beginning in an act of the visible church which is also a divine act; or, perhaps, one might better phrase it in the reverse: sanctification is God's salvific action, but the church is called to share in the act which begins the process and the process does not, ordinarily, begin without the church's work. Indeed, the language of 'external vocation' here does not focus upon an internal response in the believer. Instead, this is an assertion of the church's formal intention, expressed in specific

[36] W. David Neelands, 'Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and Invisible Church,' *RHER*, 109.
[37] *Lawes* V.60.2; 2:254.23–255.13.
[38] *Lawes* V.62.15; 2:280.22–281.3.
[39] *Lawes* V.60.3; 2:256.16–18.

words and actions, combined with the verbal and physical response of the recipient.

Confirmation continues God's work in people. The combination of praying and laying on of hands, which is both a power and a duty of the church, brings 'that guift or grace of the holie Ghost, not which maketh us first Christian men, but when wee are made such, assisteth us in all vertue, armeth us against temptation and synne.'[40] Hooker insists that the capacity to give such grace to others by these means, which is to say, the power to confirm, belongs solely to bishops, in their capacity as successors to the apostles.[41] This is, of course, further evidence of the power of the visible church.

After baptism (and its continuation in confirmation), we may both grow and decline in our participation in Christ. Our sanctification is not inevitable. As Hooker says,

> It may be that the grace of baptisme would serve to eternall life, were it not that the state of our spirituall beinge is dailie so much hindered and impaired after baptisme. In that life therefore where neither bodie nor soule can decay, our soules shall as little require this sacrament as our bodies corporall nourishment. But as longe as the daies of our warfare last, duringe the time that wee are both subject to diminution and capable of augmentation in grace, the wordes of our Lord and Savior Christ will remain forcible, *Except ye eat of the flesh of the sonne of man and drinke his blood yee have no life in you*.[42]

The eucharist is, therefore, necessary to the process of incorporation into Christ's body. In the eucharist, we receive the body and blood of Christ. This enables us to know as Christ knows and live as Christ lives, for our life (communally, as well as individually) becomes one with Christ's. We become Christ's body, which is the church. 'The reall presence of Christes most blessed bodie and bloode is not . . . to be sought for in the sacrament, but in the worthie receiver of the sacrament,'[43] not because Hooker rejects a doctrine of real presence in the elements (he accepts such a doctrine) but because the significance of the eucharist lies in its consequences. It is a 'true and reall participation of Christ' by which each recipient becomes a '*mysticall member*' of Christ and receives all the

[40] *Lawes* V.66.4; 2:323.26–29.
[41] *Lawes* V.66.4–66.9; 2:323–330.
[42] *Lawes* V.67.1; 2:330.19–29.
[43] *Lawes* V.67.6; 2:334.30–32.

benefits of Christ's sacrifice, including '*a reall transmutation of our soules and boodies*' through God's mighty power.[44]

As with baptism and confirmation, so with eucharist: the tremendous power of sacramentally offered grace is in the hands of the visible church. The church exercises God's power as the church participates in Christ's life. The church, then, is a visible sign of an invisible grace; the church is also the purveyor of grace under visible signs, as the Body of Christ exercises sacramental ministry to enable all to enter union with Christ. Here, the place of the church's ministerial structure becomes evident. The visible church consists of all the baptized. The pure cannot be distinguished from the impure within that body. It is one, containing believers from before the coming of Christ and after.[45] The church of Christ, the portion of the church of God which has entered since the Incarnation, is bound 'by reason of that *one Lorde* whose servantes they all professe them selves, that *one faithe* which they al acknowledge, that *one baptisme* wherewith they are all initiated.'[46] The church is truly the meeting place of divine and human. That said, there is still an ordering principle in the church. The clergy have a special and elevated role. They have both power and authority over others in the church, a standing which comes by commission from God.[47] The power of the keys is theirs, exercised through them by the Holy Ghost.[48] Indeed, whatever they do, the clergy are acting as God's labourers. 'Whether wee preach, pray, baptise, communicate, condemne, give absolution or whatsoever, as disposers of Gods misteries, our wordes, judgmentes, actes and deedes, are not oures but the holie Ghostes.'[49] As the ordinary ministers of the sacraments, they constitute the hand by which the church (and, therefore, God) draws people into unity with Christ.[50] The priority of *theosis* is at the root of the church's ministerial structures.

Torrance Kirby has drawn our attention to the collision here between the Reformation Augustinianism (a form of Platonism) which emphasizes

[44] *Lawes* V.67.7; 2:335.32–336.15.
[45] *Lawes* III.1.3; 1:195.26–28.
[46] *Lawes* III.1.3; 1:195.30–196.7.
[47] *Lawes* V.77.1; 2:424.4–425.14.
[48] *Lawes* V.77.7; 2:428.29–429.24.
[49] *Lawes* V.77.8; 2:430.19–22. See also John Booty's Introduction to 'Book V,' *FLE* 6(1): 191.
[50] *Lawes* V,50.1; 2:207.13–19.

the immediacy of the union between the human and Christ,[51] on the one hand, and the sense of ecclesial mediation which Kirby traces to an alternate Platonism, rooted in Pseudo-Dionysius.[52] For purposes of ecclesiology, the unification of the two is found in Hooker's strong doctrine of the Body of Christ. There seems to be a kind of 'mediated-immediacy,' which is understandable in traditional anthropological terms.[53] Here, Hooker seems to be less interested in a hierarchy of laws than in order and distinction within the body. Such distinctions are both traditionally Greek (Plato's *Republic*) and solidly Pauline.[54] All people are immediately united to Christ, one with him in mystical union. However, within that one body, there are people with different capacities and purposes; they do different work. Thus, the formal hierarchy of the church may mediate the action of God's grace to those under its charge, but only as one part of the body does to another part. All are made one in Christ and brought into unity with him, but the higher part must take the lead.

The Church as Interpretative Community

The church's task is to be the Body of Christ on earth, which means fulfilling supernatural duties such as the propagation of the gospel; ministration of the sacraments; and continuance of divine worship. Hooker outlines these duties in Book VII, in the context of discussing the ecclesiastical responsibilities of the episcopate. Prayers are to be read in all churches; the 'Sacraments of God' are to be duly administered; the 'mysteries of Salvation' are to be 'painfully taught;' God is to be 'every where devoutly worshipped;' and all of this is to occur 'perpetually, and with quietness.'[55] These duties are required of us by God according to revelation; they come within the category of 'lawes of duties supernaturall'[56] and their necessity is beyond debate. Laws of

[51] W. J. Torrance Kirby, 'Grace and Hierarchy: Richard Hooker's Two Platonisms,' *RHER*, 32.

[52] Kirby, 'Grace and Hierarchy,' 27.

[53] Note that this argument does not resolve the larger question of the relationship between the two Platonisms in law and soteriology. I intend only to address the issue of the integration of immediate union with Christ, on the one hand, and ecclesial mediation, on the other.

[54] E.g., I Cor. 12:28, as Hooker notes in V.78.8; 2:444.10–15.

[55] *Lawes* VII.18.5; 3:257.1–5.

[56] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:124.31–32.

supernatural duties are given in scripture where the *telos* of the church is found and the way of salvation is explained. 'Scripture teacheth al supernaturally revealed truth, without the knowledge whereof salvation cannot be attayned.'[57] Thus far, Hooker accords with the *sola scriptura* of the Reformation, as well as the position of the *Book of Common Prayer*.

Hooker's theory of interpretation, however, pushes him beyond the limits of most Reformation thinking about the authority of scripture, incorporating a central role for the church and its intellect. Unintentionally, Calvin seems to have made room for a radical biblicism in Puritan thought with his strong emphasis upon the absolute priority of the scriptural text. This biblicism can be seen in the Ramist, manualist tradition of ethics, evident in the work of Cartwright, Ashton and others.[58] Hooker, by contrast, takes the more Thomistic approach of arguing that the Holy Spirit enables us to encounter God and God's purposes in the biblical text by first addressing human reason through the church. By this means, Hooker provides a corrective for Reformed thought, attempting to steer it back into a safer, more reasonable, path.

Salvation is not an unconscious process. Instead, it depends upon the relation between the transformative power of divine grace and the receptive capacity of human intelligence:

> Whosoever doth serve honor and obey God, whosoever believeth in him, that man would no more do this then innocents and infants doe, but for the light of naturall reason that shineth in him, and maketh him apt to apprehend those things of God which being by grace discovered, are effectuall to perswade reasonable mindes and none other, that honour obedience and credit belong of right unto God.[59]

This assertion of the value of natural human intellect, which is elevated and transformed by supernatural grace, strikes at the root of the difference between Hooker and his Puritan opponents. The Puritans gave every sign of valuing intelligent preaching and controversial speaking and writing. However, they did not value the human intellect and could not accept it as having a significant, let alone decisive, role in the process of salvation. Any such assertion would appear to deny their understand-

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[57] *Lawes* III.8.13; 1:231.2–4.

[58] William H. Harrison, 'Prudential Method in Ecclesiology: Authority in Richard Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*,' (PhD thesis, Boston College, 2000), 67–73. See also Leon Howard, *Essays on Puritans and Puritanism*, ed. James Barbour and Thomas Quirk (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1986), 78–81.

[59] *Lawes* III.8.11; 1:229.17–23.

ing of the three Reformation *solæ: sola fides, sola gratia*, and *sola scriptura*, especially as these were linked to the radical Calvinist emphasis upon divine action to the exclusion of human response.

For Hooker, this assertion of the importance of reason to salvation is a means of rebalancing the relationship between scripture, reason, and the church. If the Gospel makes its appeal to human intelligence, then that Gospel must be declared with evidence. The Bible provides the requisite evidence, but is not self-authenticating as God's revelation. No scripture can tell us what is scripture; that knowledge comes prior to our approach to the text and must be provided from elsewhere.[60] The necessary assurance comes from the church. The church has an existential priority over scripture; it is the visible body which attests to the divine origin and saving validity of the words found in the text. 'And by experience we all know, that the first outward motive leading men so to esteeme of the scripture is the authority of Gods Church.'[61] The church trains people to know that the Bible contains God's revelation. As they grow in understanding of the text, through reading or hearing it, they find that their intelligence confirms the wisdom of the church.[62]

The necessity for the activity of a human, sacramental body to convey the value of scripture becomes more evident as one considers the nature of the text. Scripture's usefulness to humanity is itself dependent upon the human capacity to understand the text. The Bible does not teach us how to read itself; the act of reading is one of the skills which we learn elsewhere, it is 'knowledge concerning certain principles whereof [scripture] receaveth us already perswaded.'[63]

Moreover, reading the Bible is a complex act of interpretation, an act which is the province of the church, employing its intelligence. Many central and necessary Christian doctrines, such as the Trinity, the co-eternity of the Son with the Father, the procession of the Spirit (from Father and Son—Hooker is definitely Western on this point) and the duty of baptizing infants, are not found in the Bible, but are dependent upon the church's reflection upon scripture and its meanings.[64] In other words, the Gospel is not necessarily obvious to the one

[60] *Lawes* III.8.13; 1:230.25–231.15.
[61] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1.231.20–22.
[62] *Lawes* III.8.14; 1.231.25–30.
[63] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:126.6–8.
[64] *Lawes* I.14.2; 1:126.18–24.

who opens the text. The community must employ its intelligence to understand what scripture is intended to convey. The 'use of naturall reasoning about the sense of holy scripture concerning the articles of our faith' is necessary,[65] for there is no other means of getting to the true meanings carried by the text. Hooker derides mere paraphrasal.[66] Schooling for life in the church must engage the Bible at a deeper level. Indeed, as Haugaard points out, Hooker is an early practitioner of the use of historical context as an interpretative tool for reading scripture, a sophisticated hermeneutical move inspired by the Renaissance.[67]

Vincent Kavanagh has drawn to our attention that while Hooker speaks of 'natural reason' in this section of Book III, he clearly emphasizes the importance of the Holy Spirit's direction. The church does not come to insights about the meaning of scripture except under the guidance of the Spirit. Hooker insists that reason is not, by itself, adequate to convince people of the truth of scripture or the church's interpretation thereof; 'the special grace of the holy ghost' must 'concur…to the inlightning of our minds.'[68] Moreover, summing up chapter eight's discussion of the value of the church's reason, Hooker reminds us that he 'must crave that [he] be not so understood or construed, as if any such thing by vertue thereof could be done without the aide and assistance of Gods most blessed spirite.'[69]

As I have argued elsewhere,[70] this does not make Hooker a fideist as Kavanagh insists. Instead, Hooker is making two basic claims. The first is that both understanding and participating in divine salvation are divine gifts. Only supernatural grace can accomplish this. This is nothing more than a wholly conventional Christian argument; only a strong Pelagian might argue otherwise. The second is that the church does not act without the presence and activity of God. The church is not a purely human institution and it does not move forward under an impulse generated solely by us. For Hooker, the church is the Body of Christ. The Spirit works in and through it, transforming each member—intellect and all. The matter at issue is not whether those outside the church can know truth and compose right laws; most certainly they

[65] *Lawes* III.8.16; 1:233.15–17.
[66] *Lawes* III.8.16; 1:233.18–234.2.
[67] Haugaard, 'Books II, III & IV,' *FLE* 6(1): 157–161.
[68] *Lawes* III.8.15; 1:232.20–25.
[69] *Lawes* III.8.18; 1:234.32–235.2.
[70] Harrison, 'Powers of Nature,' 21–22.

can, but the point is not particularly relevant to the question. Hooker's argument is that the sacramentally-formed church, participating in Christ's life, acts on God's behalf.

The Church as Law-Maker

The Holy Spirit, then, is to be understood as a directing force in the life of the church, acting in and through the natural intelligence of human beings within the church. As Hooker put it:

> The thing we have handled according to the question mooved about it; which question is, whether the light of reason be so pernitious that in devising lawes for the church men ought not by it to search what may be fit and convenient. For this cause therfore we have endevoured to make it appeare how in the nature of reason it selfe there is no impediment, but that the selfe same spirit, which revealeth the things that god hath set down in his law, may also be thought to aid and direct men in finding out by the light of reason what lawes are expedient to be made for the guiding of his Church, over and besides them that are in scripture.[71]

Identifying appropriate laws is to be done through the power of the church's intellect. Because we are considering the church (in this case, the church in England), rather than some other, non-ecclesiastical, politic society, we may safely assume that God's hand will lead that intelligence.

This is the ground of Hooker's judgement, named in the 'Prologue,' that he could defend the claims of reason against any assertion that all laws for the church (indeed, all laws necessary to human life, as Hooker portrays the Puritan stance[72]) are given by direct revelation from God and are to be found in scripture. Hooker explicitly rejects this understanding of the role of the Bible in the church's life, insisting that its authority is limited to conveying the laws of duties supernatural. Instead,

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[71] *Lawes* III.8.18; 1:235.2–11.

[72] The debate about how far Puritans adopted this position is laid out in Haugaard, 'Books II, III & IV,' 161–164. Haugaard notes that Cartwright was, to a degree, pushed into this stance by Whitgift. Haugaard, like Cargill Thompson before him, does not regard this as fair to either the position or practice of Cartwright and other leading Puritan writers. Undoubtedly, Hooker takes advantage of a polemical misstep on Cartwright's part, in an effort to demonize the opponent. That said, Puritans came closer to this way of thinking than is ordinarily supposed, as I have suggested in my earlier comments on the Ramist, manualist tradition in Puritan ethics. See also William H. Harrison, 'Prudential Method,' 67–73.

Hooker argues that the ability to exercise discretion in the matter of its own ordering is at the centre of the church's life. If the church is to live out its sacramental mission as the Body of Christ, then it must make prudential judgements based upon its own historical experience and, thereby, form itself in the way that seems most suited to the particular character of its place and time.

The Church and the Middle Way

If the visible church is an integral part of God's work in the world, as Hooker suggests, then there must be some sort of order, some organization, to sustain its mission. The church must develop practices which enable it to do its work in a given historical context. The church has the freedom to order itself in these matters of law and practice. Perhaps the most important distinction in the *Lawes* is 'between matters of perpetual necessity to all mens salvation, and matters of Ecclesiasticall politie: the one both fully and plainly taught in holy scripture, the other not necessarie to be in such sort there prescribed; the one not capable of any diminution or augmentation at all by men, the other apt to admit both.'[73]

Hooker stands at the beginning of modernity, the pivotal characteristic of which is the encounter with history. In the sixteenth century, people began to be deeply aware of real change in the life of the church. One of the roots of Luther's displeasure with the church was his awareness that it did not look the same in his day as it did in the first century. Thus far, he was correct. His basic answer to the problem, the effort to call the church to a straightforward fidelity to scripture, set up the dynamic of the Reformation. The most extreme form of Puritan response asserted that answers to all questions regarding human behaviour are to be found in the Bible.

In contrast, Hooker followed Melanchthon and other moderate European Reformers by distinguishing between matters necessary to salvation and *adiaphora*, things indifferent. The first category constitutes the laws of supernatural duties previously discussed. These are unchangeable. 'Touching pointes of doctrine, as for example the unitie of God, the trinitie of persons, salvation by Christ, the resurrection of the body,

[73] *Lawes* III.11.16; 1:263.8–13.

life everlasting, the judgment to come, and such like, they have bene since the first hower that there was a Church in the world, and til the last they must be believed.'[74] Elsewhere, Hooker emphasizes that the sacraments are to be included in the category of things necessary to salvation, although little in the forms used to undertake sacramental actions is specifically required.[75]

In relation to these matters, the church functions solely as an interpretative agent. Laws of supernatural duties are either evident in scripture or may be adduced therefrom by 'collection'[76] an essentially logical procedure of drawing together biblical references, understanding their meaning in context, and presenting the conclusion toward which those meanings tend. Note that Hooker's refusal to accept mere paraphrasal and simplistic quotation implies that, for him, the procedure of collection is not thin or mechanical. His hermeneutic is rich and complex. Nonetheless, in this context, the christological and trinitarian positions taken by the early church councils are understood as absolutely reliable deductions from the altogether clear and certain evidence provided in scripture. In these things, 'the Church is bound till the worldes ende;'[77] there is no freedom to change.

Today's theologian, following John Henry Newman's 19th-century discovery of the development of doctrine, cannot accept this account of the way in which Christian theology is done. One may argue that the questions faced by the early councils and the answers which those bodies reached are eminently reasonable. Nonetheless, those questions and answers are something more than logical deduction, however sophisticated and thoughtful; they are the product of the historical encounter of various streams of thought. That meeting was not inevitable, though it was (in some important ways) valuable and helpful. No fair-minded, 21st-century theologian will argue that Chalcedon's account of the two natures in Christ is either evident in scripture or made logically inevitable thereby. Instead, it represents a development in Christian thought, reached by the church through its struggle to understand the meanings and implications of the biblical narrative. This, however, is a reflection beyond the reach of the 16th-century. Hooker can quote Tertullian asserting the unchangeability of the *regula fidei* with no sense

[74] *Lawes* III.10.7; 1:244.10–14.
[75] *Lawes* III.11.13; 1:259.2–13.
[76] *Lawes* I.14.2; 1:126.21–24.
[77] *Lawes* III.11.13; 1:260.13.

of incongruity.[78] Hooker knows Tertullian's work, but is not really aware that Tertullian played an early part in the historical development of central Christian doctrines, both by providing vocabulary and by forcing the question of whether God is a physical entity (Tertullian thought so). To Hooker, Tertullian is simply a Christian thinker who is correct about some things and incorrect on other matters, rather than being one of a series of people pushing forward a conversation which will unfold over time, leading to new discoveries. For Hooker, the central tenets of Christianity are given in scripture and have become a part of the deposit of faith, allowing no room for modification.

Such is not the case, however, with other issues in the church's life. 'Things indifferent,' those matters which have to do with the ways in which the church incarnates its message in particular historical contexts, may, must and do change with time and place. No ecclesiastical polity is defined in Scripture; nor does Scripture provide anything beyond some general rules and useful examples for such matters.[79] Instead, matters of polity are left to prudence, to 'the discretion of the Church.'[80] Ecclesiastical polity is unlike the core beliefs of Christianity; the latter must be known and accepted if a person is to be saved. Note that such beliefs, in this case, are understood as including the basic purposes of our Christian activity, for 'the glorie of God and the good of his Church was the thing which the Apostles aymed at, and therefore ought to bee the marke whereat we also levell.'[81] How we glorify God and serve the good of the church, however, will vary according to time and place.

> But seeing those rites and orders may be at one time more, which at an other are lesse availeable unto that purpose: what reason is there in these thinges to urge the state of one onely age, as a patterne for all to followe? It is not I am right sure their meaning, that we should now assemble our people to serve God in close and secret meetings, or that common brookes and rivers shoulde be used for places of baptisme, or that the Eucharist shoulde bee ministred after meate, or that the custome of Churche feasting should be renewed, or that all kinde of standing provision for the ministerie shoulde be utterly taken away, and their estate made againe dependent upon the voluntary devotion of men. In these

[78] *Lawes* III.10.7; 1:244.18–20.
[79] *Lawes* III.2.1; 1:207.1–208.8, cf. also III.4.1; 1:212–13.
[80] *Lawes* III.4.1; 1:213.6. I have discussed the nature and role of prudence in William H. Harrison, 'Prudence and Custom: Revisiting Richard Hooker on Authority' *Anglican Theological Review* 84.4 (Winter, 2002): 897–913.
[81] *Lawes* IV.2.3; 1:278.15–17.

> thinges they easily perceive how unfit that were for the present, which was for the first age convenient enough.[82]

Change is necessary and appropriate. Polity is an instrumental, though not incidental, 'accessorie' to the way of salvation.[83] 'In such thinges because discretion may teach the Church what is convenient, we holde not the Church further tyed herein unto scripture, then that against scripture nothing be admitted in the Church.'[84] The Church must not contradict scripture, so that it will not risk concealing the truth which it is bound to convey. Otherwise, it may do as its judgement suggests.

Scripture may not be contradicted. This is a central principle of Hooker's thought. Yet in the statement quoted above, Hooker seems to allow, even urge, that the church not follow all biblical examples. This is possible because Hooker is more subtle about his interpretation of the principle of biblical priority than some people might be; he means Scripture as properly interpreted, in light of its assigned *telos* and the meaning and context of particular passages. Insofar as Scripture is conveying the message of salvation, nothing may be done against its words. Scripture contains material of other sorts, though, including a variety of natural laws, positive laws and examples. Through this maze of information, human intelligence must be our guide.

> When scripture doth yeelde us precedents, how far forth they are to bee followed; when it giveth naturall lawes, what particular order is thereunto most agreeable; when positive, which waye to make lawes unrepugnant unto them; yea though all these shoulde want, yet what kind of ordinances woulde be moste for that good of the Church which is aimed at, al this must be by reason found out.[85]

Ultimately, the authority of Scripture in matters of church polity is subject to human reason. Even when Scripture provides guidance on such issues, people must make judgements about the applicability of Scripture's rules and examples. Scripture, therefore, will not resolve the church's questions about how to organize itself for its mission.

The Puritan failure to understand the Bible and its uses is matched by an inability to find a helpful principle to direct the judgements which the church must make. The Puritan theory of reformation, as Hooker

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[82] *Lawes* IV.2.3; 1:278.17–30.
[83] *Lawes* III.3.4; 1:211.23–28.
[84] *Lawes* III.3.4; 1:211.18–21.
[85] *Lawes* III.9.1; 1:236.15–21.

wants to portray it, has two parts. The first is on the level of general principle. Hooker finds the argument stated in Cartwright's writings: '*Common reason also doth teach that contraries are cured by their contraries*.'[86] In other words, the solution to any problem lies at the extreme opposite point on a spectrum. Radical change is inherently good and necessary; moderation is mere weakness and automatically results in a failure to cure an evil. As the Puritans would have it: 'to rectifie a crooked stick we bend it on the contrarie side, as farre as it was at the first on that side from whence we drawe it, and so it commeth in the end to a middle between both, which is perfect straightnes.'[87] If a stick which bends to the right is not drawn as far to the left as it was bent to the right, then it will not become straight but will remain bent. The Puritan commitment (again, in Hooker's mind), at the level of general principle, is to extreme change.

Hooker, in contrast, shares Aristotle's concern for moderation. In Hooker's approach, the wise physician,

> he which will perfectly recover a sicke and restore a diseased body unto health, must not endevor so much to bring it to a state of simple contrariety, as of fit proportion in contrarietie unto those evils which are to be cured. He that will take away extreme heate by setting the body in extremitie of cold, shal undoubtedly remove the disease, but together with it the diseased too.[88]

The mean—'fit proportion'—must be sought. Appropriate remedies for illness are not found by going to extremes, but by following a moderate course and applying the right kind of medication, neither too strong nor too weak; in the right quantity, neither too great nor too small; at the right time, neither too early nor too late. 'The first thing therefore in skilfull cures is the knowledge of the part affected, the next is of the evill which doth affect it, the last is not onely of the kinde, but also of the measure of contrarie things whereby to remoove it.'[89] Merely seeking the point of extreme opposition is not an adequate procedure to ensure health, either for the individual body or for the Church.

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[86] *Lawes* IV.8.1.z; 1:298. Italics are Hooker's. They indicate that the text is derived from Thomas Cartwright.
[87] *Lawes* IV.3.2; 1:283.6–9.
[88] *Lawes* IV.8.1; 1:298.18–24.
[89] *Lawes* IV.8.1; 1:298.24–299.2.

Ultimately, prudence must be exercised, in order that one may reach 'the middle point of evennesse and moderation.'[90]

The second part of the Puritan theory of extremes consists of a particular application to the English situation. The Puritans believed that the English Church had retained within its precincts too many Romanist practices. On the principle of extremes as outlined above, any hint of Romanism would be too much; a cure could only be brought about by the complete elimination of all semblances of Romanism. The real point of the Puritan argument was not to advocate radicalism as such, but to advocate a thorough cleansing of the English church, so that all devices of the Papist enemy would be completely removed. Thus, the Puritans insisted that '*Christianitie and Antichristianitie, the Gospell and Poperie be contraries, and therefore Antichristianity must be cured not by it self, but by that which is (as much as may be) contrary unto it*.'[91] An absolute change and new birth must take place, the opposite of Romanist practice must be adopted. Indeed, 'It were more safe . . . to conforme . . . indifferent ceremonies to the Turkes which are farre of, then to the papistes which are so neere.'[92]

Hooker rejects this radical position. Against it he pits both his tolerance for Romanism and his practical mindset. Hooker is quite prepared to accept that the Church of England will have much in common with the Church of Rome; their ancestry is the same and so is their inheritance.[93] Indeed, the reformed churches, including the Church of Geneva, are in the same position.

> We follow the church of Rome in mo things; yet they in some things of the same nature about which our present controversie is: so that the difference is not in the kind, but in the number of rites only, wherein they and we doe follow the Church of Rome. The use of wafer-cakes, the custome of godfathers and godmothers in baptisme are things not commanded nor forbidden in scripture, thinges which have bene of olde and are reteined in the Church of Rome even at this very hower. Is conformitie with Rome in such thinges a blemish unto the Church of England, and unto Churches abroad an ornament?[94]

[90] *Lawes* IV.8.4; 1:300.11–12.
[91] *Lawes* IV.8.1.z; 1:298. Italics are Hooker's. The text is derived from Thomas Cartwright.
[92] *Lawes* IV.3.2; 1:282.10–12.
[93] *Lawes* IV.5.1; 1:288.
[94] *Lawes* IV.6.1; 1:289.6–15.

Though Hooker has no high opinion of the Church of Rome, regarding Romanists as 'heretiques,'[95] he does not share the Puritan fear of them and their ways. To Hooker, the Church of Rome is a Christian Church, though it has fallen into error. Some commonality is both acceptable and healthy. The Church of England cannot be expected to become Arian and dispose of 'the very beliefe of the Trinitie,' merely because it is also held by the Church of Rome![96]

Moreover, the desire to root out all semblances of Romanist ways from the Church of England is hardly practical. Identifying those aspects of a church which require reformation and to devise the appropriate reforms is a difficult task, which few have the wisdom to essay and over which many will differ.[97] Moreover, practices that are abolished sometimes prove to be the best and most appropriate for their intended purposes, so that churches in Germany and France which have attempted to throw off all vestiges of Romanism have been forced to return to some 'middle point of evennesse and moderation.'[98] In the end, radicalism proves to be impractical and moderation is necessary, as well as being philosophically and theologically acceptable.

Hooker emphasizes that the effort needed to find this middle point involves more than the mind; his approach is not solely intellectual. Instead, Hooker is quite concerned about the interference of grief and anger into the conversation about polity and, of course, he accuses his opponents of being misled by these emotions. He targets the Puritans for taking anti-Papal and anti-Jewish attitudes to such an extreme that their upset interferes with their judgement.[99] Hooker presents himself as remarkably tolerant of Jewish people and practices. He emphasizes that many early Christians were Jewish and that the Council of Jerusalem had gently and wisely tolerated both Jewish and Gentile Christians and their respective forms of life.[100] The focus is on wise and reasonable dealing and the slow change of Jewish custom into Christian custom, as, for example, the terms 'Aulter,' 'Priest' and 'Sacrifice' remain, though

[95] *Lawes* IV.6.2; 1:289.26.
[96] *Lawes* IV.8.2; 1:299.5–6.
[97] *Lawes* IV.8.2–3; 1:299.2–300.21.
[98] *Lawes* IV.8.4; 1:300.11–12.
[99] The critique of anti-Papal animosity appears in *Lawes* IV.9.2; 1:302.18–303.21. The critique of anti-Jewish extremism occurs in *Lawes* IV.11.1; 1:308–319.
[100] *Lawes* IV.11.5–11.8; 1:311.29–314.30.

their meanings change.[101] Hooker wishes to defend the language of priesthood, but his priority is the church's ability to share customs with others as long as the church makes calm and intelligent decisions suited to the its needs. This is, indeed, Hooker's psychological priority: that reason should rule over emotion. 'At such times as we are to deliberate for our selves, the freer our mindes are from all distempered affections, the sounder and better is our judgements.'[102]

The middle way, then, consists in an intellectual orientation: seeking the Aristotelian mean, rather than focusing upon extreme solutions. It is dependent upon an attitude: the preference for temperate judgement over righteous anger. However, attitude and intellectual direction are incomplete without some particular method of channelling one's efforts. Hooker is attentive to this issue, setting priorities and giving structure to ecclesial decision-making.

The first priority is always the inherited custom of the church. We have seen that Hooker does not accept the idea that what is given in history must automatically rule in matters of church polity. Nonetheless, that which the church has previously done has an inherent value and must not be quickly or easily overridden. The onus for justifying change is always on the one who desires modification, rather than on defenders of the existing order.

> If they thinke that we ought to prove the ceremonies commodious which we have retained, they do in this point very greatly deceave them selves. For in all right and equitie that which the Church hath received and held so long for good, that which publique approbation hath ratified, must cary the benefite of presumption with it to be accomped meete and convenient. they which have stoode up as yesterday to chalenge it of defect, must prove their challenge.[103]

The 'benefit of presumption' stands with existing custom, which attains the status of law in the community.[104] Why? One reason is that the church has proved it by long use, by 'experience,' in Hooker's understanding of the term.[105] If the church finds a practice to be good through

[101] *Lawes* IV.11.10; 1:315.20–316.19. Hooker suggests that the move is from a literal meaning, having to do with a an actual slaying of creatures, to a metaphorical meaning, connected to the eucharistic language of participation.
[102] *Lawes* IV.9.2; 1:302.29–32.
[103] *Lawes* IV.4.2; 1:286.8–15.
[104] *Lawes* IV.5.1; 1:288.20–23.
[105] See my discussion of 'experience' in the *Lawes*, Harrison, 'Prudence and Custom,' 905–906.

long trial, then it ought to be slow to dispense with that practice in favour of the new and untried, which may not work so well. Another reason for valuing that which is has to do with the virtue of 'public approbation.' People become habituated to inherited customs; deeper understanding and love come with familiarity. Breaking that attachment is unwise. Doing so too often may threaten the trust which people place in their leaders, thereby undermining public order and causing people to doubt the validity and authority of all other laws.[106]

Customs, whether they attain the status of written law or remain unwritten, have the meaning and force of law. People are duty-bound to obey them. When people become accustomed (note the similarity to the word 'custom') to such obedience, the customs become a part of the people's identity. A change of custom is a shift in identity, which can be a profoundly existential matter.

Moreover, as Hooker notes in his discussion of episcopacy in Bk. VII, God has a way of blessing and sustaining the decisions of the church as such decisions gain the approval of the whole ecclesial community. Circumstances arise which require the church to make a decision about how to proceed in some matter pertaining to its life, as in the need for a formal and permanent structure to deal with disorder in the church.[107] The church is led by natural reason ('the common light of all men'[108]) and the power of the Holy Spirit ('Divine appointment;'[109] also 'so great helpe of heavenly direction from above'[110]) to establish a custom. The custom receives 'Divine approbation afterwards, and is in that respect to be acknowledged the Ordinance of God, no less then that ancient Jewish regiment, whereof though *Jethro* wer the Deviser, yet after that God had allowed it, all men were subject unto it, as to the Polity of God, and not of *Jethro*.'[111] Thus, the Holy Spirit speaks through the church which the Spirit is bringing into union with Christ, giving divine legitimacy to decisions made by human minds. The proof of God's support is in God's blessing; the custom proves to be good in the life of the church, which shows (in this matter, at least) the consistency of human reason with divine intention. Thus, laws of

[106] *Lawes* IV.14.1; 1:337.4–22.
[107] *Lawes* VII.5.2; 3:161.5–18.
[108] *Lawes* IV.7.1; 1:294.4.
[109] *Lawes* VII.5.2; 3:161.13.
[110] *Lawes* IV.7.1; 1:294.4–5.
[111] *Lawes* VII.5.2; 3:161.14–18.

the church, properly made and sustained, are authorized by God; they must be obeyed as such.[112]

As we have noted, circumstances arise which require the church to make a decision about how to proceed in some matter pertaining to its life. This represents the first of two judgements which the church must make. In this case, the church judges that existing customs are not adequate to serve present needs.

Hooker recognizes two reasons that customs may be found to be unhelpful. One is simply that a custom may be wrong from its inception and continue to be wrong. The judgements which brought a practice into being may have been erroneous or even sinful, as in the case of idolatry.[113] Hooker treats this issue subtly, though, and emphasizes that change is appropriate only if the custom *continues* to be wrong. Proving error in origins is not adequate to provoke reconsideration.[114] Hooker notes that heretics insisted upon pouring water on the baptizand only once, to symbolize rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, while other heretics 'abused' the laying on of water three times to emphasize their belief in a Trinity of three distinct natures.[115] His point is that either once or thrice is acceptable and may serve the life of the church, even though one was devised for evil and the other converted to it. The church may choose to do either without significant damage to itself, if its Trinitarian and baptismal theology remain orthodox. Pouring once or three times may have been unhelpful in one historical context; either may be helpful today. Equally, naming the days of the week after pagan gods was clearly impious originally, but by Hooker's time the custom had lost all religious significance and was harmless for all.[116]

The other ground for change in customs is more significant for Hooker's ecclesiology, though, because he is quite clear that no-one claims that the ceremonies which the Puritans want changed on the grounds of too-great similarity with Rome are evil in their nature or origin.[117] The second reason is that circumstances change. For Hooker, the structures and practices of the church are a means to an end. The end is the sacramental union of the world with Christ. What serves

[112] *Lawes* III.93; 1:238.11–13.
[113] *Lawes* I.8.11; 1:91.25–92.22.
[114] *Lawes* IV.12.3–5; 1:321.5–323.33.
[115] *Lawes* IV.12.3; 1:321.17–33.
[116] *Lawes* IV.12.4; 1:322.15–21.
[117] *Lawes* IV.12.5; 1:322.28–323.2.

this end one day may be useless for it, or even inimical to it, the next. Therefore, the church's customs must change, so that the intended purposes may be fulfilled.[118]

The second judgement which the church must make, then, is the judgement of prudence in the present. It answers the question: 'What ought we to do now?' The responses to this query give any politic society its customs, whether they operate as formally written laws or unwritten law. Moreover, the legitimacy of any custom is derived from the reasonable judgement which is at its root. God blesses human laws because of their origin in human reason, which is, when rightly employed, a reflection of the divine reason. Thus, human laws, as we have seen, bear the authority of divine laws, though human laws have human origins.

We, as rational beings created in the divine image, possess the capacity to find correct answers to the question about right action. Law-makers in the church are analogous to the physicians of whom we have already spoken, whose task and ability is to find the right cure for the patient's disease, rather than merely seeking the most radical or, for that matter, the most biblical, answer for the patient's needs. This is, intentionally, a practical example. It illustrates the practical kind of work involved in law-making.[119] When Hooker insists that the church look for the mean in Aristotelian fashion, he is speaking of the kind of matters of action to which Aristotle referred in his discussion of cultivating virtue (*Nicomachean Ethics*).

Like Aristotle, Hooker emphasizes that the privilege of composing and changing laws for a politic society does not belong independently to each of its members. What Hooker claims to hear in the Puritan stance is a contrasting of the individual '*Me thinketh*' to the received orders of the Church of England.[120] One is inclined to question Hooker's fairness on this issue. The Puritan insistence upon the authority of the Bible and the power of consistories and other common decision-making bodies hardly reeks of modern individualism. The argument which stands between Hooker and the Puritans is not really about whether

[118] *Lawes* III.10.3; 1:242.9–16.

[119] One might, however, question whether the physician in Hooker's example is using something more like Aristotle's *techne* than the law-makers *phronesis*. For Hooker's purposes, the distinction does not seem to be important.

[120] *Lawes* IV.4.2; 1:286.4–5.

ecclesiastical and political authority should be exercised by the community; both are in full agreement on this point. Instead, the debate is about how communal power ought to be employed. Nonetheless, the section does remind the reader of something important about Hooker's ecclesiology: the requirement that decisions must be made by duly-authorized judges. If people wish to demand changes in the customs of the church 'then must theye shewe some commission, whereby they are authorized to sit as judges and we required to take their judgement for good in this case.'[121]

This is a preoccupation of Hooker's throughout the *Lawes*. It is evident in the Preface, where Hooker insists that those who attack the existing institutions of the church ought to place their case before appropriate public authority for some 'judiciall and definitive sentence.'[122] This concern also shows up in conversations about the prerogatives of the magistrate, in Books I and VIII, and in discussion of the significance of bishops, in Books V and VII. Hooker's attitude to established authority has a central role in his account of religion as formative of good judges, in the early chapters of Bk. V.[123] As he bluntly states: 'That which the Church by her ecclesiasticall authoritie shall probablie thinke and define to be true or good, must in congruitie of reason overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever.'[124] 'Inferior judgments' includes the voice of any individual who might oppose the ecclesiastical authorities. The higher part of the body must rule the lower.

Thus, Hooker's understanding of order gives priority to existing orders and practices. Obedience is due to that which exists, because of its roots in rational judgements. However, every politic society, including the church, establishes a leadership structure. Part of the task of those leaders is to observe society and identify when change is necessary. They will judge the suitability of customs. If change is required for that society to fulfill its purpose, then the leaders will seek the best possible course of action, which will be the mean rather than any sort of extreme or radical action. The church must remember that it will always be guided by the Holy Spirit in this process and God's blessing will be upon its decisions; the action of divine grace is the

[121] *Lawes* IV.4.2; 1:286.1–3.
[122] *Lawes* Pref.6.1; 1:29.26–27.
[123] *Lawes* V.1–3; 2:16.1–29.26.
[124] *Lawes* V.8.2; 2:39.11–14.

centre of the church's life. The Church of England, trusting in God, its own wisdom, and the customs which it inherits is wisest to stick to its middle way, rather than giving in to radical demands for purification, with their prejudiced anti-Papism, or, for that matter, turning to follow Rome in error.

The Church in Historical Context: Hooker and the National Church

Hooker's argument for the legitimacy of autocephalous, national churches is rooted in the centrality of custom and human intelligence to ecclesiastical decision-making. Hooker's understanding of practical ecclesiology specifically justifies some degree of local freedom, but this freedom is not absolute. Customs find their focus at the national level, where political authority resides and major decisions are made and enforced; therefore, the nation-state is the most reasonable unit around which to build church structures. The English church is justified both in existing and in exercising authority within its boundaries. It may, if it chooses, sustain its traditional episcopal system and employ its own liturgical arrangements. Moreover, the English ecclesiastical structures may legitimately permit the civil magistracy to hold direct power with the ecclesiastical polity, for the purpose of ensuring a reasonable degree of uniformity in church matters.

'Ecclesiasticall Politie' is a fundamental and necessary—even defining—characteristic of every body which is organized as a church.[125] The term is intended to be inclusive of whatever sorts of laws and structures which are required for the activity of the church as a public organization. The organizations which possess distinct polities are those which we specifically name as distinct. The use of the name itself is, by itself, indicative of our recognition of a church's independence; for it 'the name of a Church is given with addition, betokening severaltie, as the Church of Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England, and so the rest, must be indued with correspondent generall properties belonging unto them, as they are publique Christian societies.'[126] Hooker is, of course, cleverly picking up biblical distinctions and suggesting, as he will immediately argue, that there is no single, clear polity in Scripture.

[125] *Lawes* III.1.14; 1:206.20–21.
[126] *Lawes* III.1.14; 1:206.15–19.

Instead, there is a variety of churches which are linked, but possess at least some degree of independence. By linking the Church of England with biblical churches to whom New Testament letters were composed, Hooker states the particular claim to legitimacy of the English church as following in the biblical example.

This same statement also emphasizes the territorial nature of particular churches. Each of the examples given is identified by geography, rather than the name of a leader or a peculiarity of organization or theological stance. This is decisive in the *Lawes*, because Hooker does not wish to undermine the Church of England's claim to the obedience of all its members to the laws which are duly passed within its structures. Indeed, Hooker writes precisely to assert that claim and secure appropriate obedience. Within the area ruled by a geographic church, there cannot be a variety of churches, because this would violate the twin priorities of custom and order which Hooker holds dear.

This may be a debatable argument, but it suits Hooker's examples and follows reasonably from his understanding of the relationship between custom and human intelligence in communal law-making. However, there is a difficulty with Hooker's list of churches which is evident at first glance: none of the biblical examples really coincides with the sort of polity which England had become in Hooker's day. Either Rome, Corinth and Ephesus must each be regarded as a city or city-state, with the corresponding implication that Hooker supports the existence of independent city or regional churches (perhaps in a kind of incipient congregationalism or in the form of free dioceses) or Rome must be regarded as the imperial city, with a claim to direct the polity of subject churches, which might be grounds for the re-establishment of papal authority over the English church.

Hooker does not explicitly respond to this question. Indeed, by the nature of the argument, the conundrum may be irresolvable. If custom is central to the formation of laws and custom varies by geography, then what prevents the infinite divisibility of the church on ever-smaller geographical boundaries? Alternatively, there is today significant unity of custom over a large portion of the world, as Western consumerism takes hold on a broad scale. One might easily argue that there is no justification for national churches, with their own characters, and that all should be part of a single, more-or-less uniform, world church.

Insofar as Hooker has an answer to the problem, it comes in the form of his defence of the magistracy and its relation to the English church. There is, in Hooker's view, a compactness to English political

and ecclesiastical relations. As has often been noted, Hooker regards all citizens as being simultaneously members of the Church of England. This compactness is itself rooted in custom; the country's choice of constitution is deemed to have occurred long ago, so that the present is understood as living out past commitments. This common history and formal unity give a recognizable integrity to the whole, such that magistrate and church are seen to rule together for the common good. As Torrance Kirby demonstrates, Hooker follows mainstream Protestant arguments in defending the royal supremacy precisely because the magistrate is seen as serving God in the task of ordering the polity of the church.[127] Ultimately, his real priority is union with Christ and that is best accomplished, from Hooker's perspective, in an exceedingly compact ecclesiastical-political arrangement with a Christian monarch.

This represents something of an idealization of the English constitution, even in Hooker's time, since: 1) separatist groups existed, and 2) relations between ecclesiastical and political authorities were often strained because of different priorities. Moreover, in the modern West, Hooker's stance is very nearly irrelevant, because contemporary liberal democracies tend to reject any formal association with churches. Western states do not necessarily avoid specifically religious visions; the United States commonly invokes religious language to speak of its sense of world mission. However, the same people who use that language tend to be leery of strong ecclesiastical organizations, especially churches which have a sacramental priority. National churches have come to build themselves on foundations different from that envisaged by Hooker, commonly under Tractarian influence. John Keble's recognition, evinced in the 'National Apostasy' sermon, that the unity of ecclesiastical polity and civil polity would be untenable in late modernity seems to have been borne out. The contemporary state has no interest in fostering unity with Christ.

Implications

Hooker's polity hinges upon the centrality of the sacramental life as the heart of God's transformative activity in the world. His fear of

[127] W. J. Torrance Kirby, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), *passim*, esp. 92–125.

Puritanism was, in part, a concern that the order in which he lived was under attack; if the Puritans succeeded in undermining the Elizabethan religious/social/political arrangement, then the whole of society would come unglued, Hooker claimed (and probably believed). The events of the 17th century become the grounds for debate about Puritanism and its place in world history. Hooker seems, however, to have had an even deeper reason to oppose Puritan thinking, at least as he understood it. Presbyterian and anti-vestiarian attitudes did not appear to be consistent with his vision of the meaning of Christianity, which resides in God's work of *theosis* through the sacramental life.

Hooker gives us this vision of salvation and, thereby, establishes the sacramental life as the heart of the ecclesiological and theological task. This is a rich vision and a helpful one, not least because it provides grounds for ecumenical conversation. The patristic influence upon Hooker is evident and out of it comes a theology which resonates with the traditions of Eastern Christianity, as well as being open to the various forms of Western thought.

The sacramental life can serve, as Hooker intends, to prepare us for the task of interpretation, especially biblical interpretation. The church can become the faithful carrier and presenter of God's word which Karl Barth calls it to be, precisely because the church is being transformed into the Body of the Word. The church can participate in this transformation because it is intelligent and God's word is intelligible, as Bernard Lonergan reminds us. The sacramental life makes the church into an authoritative interpreter of the narrative which is given to it.

By the same token, the church may know itself to be free to order itself as best serves its mission as agent of *theosis* in the world. Custom must receive its due weight, for it too is the voice of God. Wise decisions made in the past, which have served well for many years, should not be dismissed carelessly; the church must bear the consequences of change, whether wise or foolish. However, the church can also face present challenges confident in its ability to make laws to suit historical circumstances. In Hooker's understanding, such laws come with divine authority even though they be different from the church's rulings in other ages.

Hooker also leaves us with a challenge, which remains today for churches which trace their lineage to his Church of England. With the above as ground and framework, we are left to work out what being a

national church means in the present context. If the Anglican Communion is to find means of sustaining its common life, then we must decide what we are as national churches, how this affects our interpretative and law-making activities, how it relates to our particular customs and our exercise of prudence, and how (whether?) sustaining national churches serves God's transformative activity in the world.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

UNIFORMITY AND COMMON PRAYER

James F. Turrell

The fifth book of Richard Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Eccelsiasticall Politie*, printed in 1597, is at once a systematic discussion of worship in the sixteenth-century Church of England, in its liturgical and theological aspects, and a volley in the polemical wars between conformists and puritans in the reign of Elizabeth I. In some respects, Hooker was ahead of his day, offering arguments that would not be widely deployed for decades to come, and indeed, his work itself was not especially popular in his own day. Yet Hooker was also very much a product of his time, with his work unavoidably shaped by the context in which he operated. What we find in Hooker's Book Five, then, is not a work of systematic theology *per se*, but a sort of hybrid. It might best be described as a systematic defence of the existing liturgy of the Church of England against particular objections, a defence that at times strikes out in novel ways as it argues in support of the use of a particular worship pattern. Nowhere is this novelty more apparent than in Hooker's discussion of common prayer. In contrast to the conformists who had gone before him and to the puritans alike, Hooker placed common prayer at the pinnacle of Christian life, as something that outshone sermons and private devotions in its importance to the individual believer and to the Church.

More than the rest of the *Lawes*, Book Five was tied to its context in late sixteenth-century England, in bitter conflicts over worship. In historians' shorthand, these conflicts pitted 'puritans' against 'conformists,' although each of these terms is notoriously slippery. Puritans, who termed themselves the 'godly,' were those distinctively zealous Protestants who found the Church of England to be insufficiently reformed.[1] The first generation of puritans were in large measure inspired by the

[1] Peter Lake, 'Defining Puritanism-Again?' in Francis J. Bremer, ed., *Puritanism: Transatlantic Perspectives on a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Faith* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, distributed by Northeastern University Press, 1993), 3–29.

experience of some of their number, of exile during the Mary Tudor's reinstatement of Catholicism. Living on the continent, many of these exiles absorbed the worship and piety of their Calvinist neighbours, and on their return these sought further reform of the Church of England's prayer book and governance along continental Reformed lines. Elizabeth I, however, intended no such reform, and instead she reinstated an approximation of the *status quo ante*, resuscitating the church of her brother Edward VI in many respects. In subsequent years, most, though not all, puritans objected to certain aspects of the Church's polity and liturgy. Conformists, by contrast, embraced the Church of England as it was. Confusing the categories, some puritans were 'conformable' or 'conforming,' able to live with what they saw as defects in the liturgy and polity of the Church, for the sake of their evangelistic mission. These were able to accept the prayer book, perhaps discreetly omitting certain offensive bits, in order to continue in their livings. Nevertheless, in broad terms, puritans and conformists were defined by their views of the worship and governance of the Church of England as it currently existed, with puritans as opponents and conformists as defenders.

This division supplied the background for Hooker's works, most especially for the discussion of worship in Book Five of his treatise *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie*. Some recent Hooker scholars have argued that Hooker's work was a polemical apologetic for the Church of England's doctrine, discipline, and worship against puritan attacks, not primarily a work of theology.[2] A corollary to this position holds that Catholicism was a spent force by the 1590s, no longer a vigorous threat to the Church of England when Hooker's work appeared, explaining why Hooker engaged almost exclusively with puritanism.[3] But it is by no means clear that the *Lawes* as a whole were intended to be a polemical rejoinder in the ongoing debate. In W. Speed Hill's estimation, Book V may be more of a polemical rejoinder than the rest of the work, under pressure from Hooker's associates, Edwin Sandys and George Cranmer.[4] Going further, Patrick Collinson and

[2] W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker,' in W. Speed Hill, ed., *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of his Works* [*SRH*] (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve Univ. Press, 1972), 13–16.

[3] Robert K. Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981), 32–36.

[4] W. Speed Hill, 'The Evolution of Hooker's *Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity*' in *SRH*, 146–7.

Peter Lake have argued effectively that the threat from puritanism was diminishing in the 1590s, when Hooker's work appeared, and that the threat from Catholicism, particularly on the international scene, was serious. Rather than seeing the *Lawes* as a polemical piece aimed at resurgent puritanism, they suggest that the *Lawes* as a whole be viewed as a constructive piece of theology, as Lake put it 'an attempt to sort out a conformist case much afflicted by its own internal contradictions.' Lake sees Hooker as using puritanism as a convenient straw man in his effort to create a new synthesis, in the process reacting against a Calvinist orthodoxy that was a hallmark of much conformist thought.[5] Nevertheless, the content of Book Five, which is a detailed defence of the Book of Common Prayer and a theological rationale for corporate worship, sacraments, and ceremonies, cannot be separated from its polemical context.

Background to Book Five: Puritan Objections to the Book of Common Prayer

The sixteenth century conflict over worship entailed a series of battles. The first—the Vestarian Controversy of the 1560s—centred on the fairly esoteric issue of the garb worn while the minister presided in worship. Puritans rejected the surplice, the white garment worn over a cassock by an officiating minister, as 'the popish rag.' Conformists argued that the vestments of the clergy were *adiaphora*, things indifferent, and therefore something that might be determined by lawful human authority. Some puritans objected that such things as vesture needed Biblical warrant, while others objected to the surplice on the grounds that its association with popery made it no longer 'indifferent,' but an offence.[6]

Another battle centred on the ministry itself, with a segment of the puritan movement proposing a presbyterian system of governance for the church. This debate began in the 1570s and reached a fever-pitch

[5] Patrick Collinson, 'Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment,' in Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed., *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* [*RHC*] (Tempe, Ariz.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 175–9; Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?* 145–97, 225–30. The quotation is at 145.

[6] Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 71–77; Robert Crowley, *A Briefe Discourse against the Outwarde Apparell and Ministering Garmentes of the Popish Church* (Emden: Egidius van der Erve, 1566).

in the 1580s.[7] It intruded into worship inasmuch as certain sacramental rites in the Church of England, such as ordination and confirmation, were reserved to bishops alone.

Finally, the Book of Common Prayer itself was the source of numerous puritan objections, almost from the beginning of the Elizabethan church. The prayer book was even attacked in parliament: a bill proposed in 1572 would have allowed clergy to set aside portions of the prayer book in order to engage in 'godly preaching exercises,' with the Act of Uniformity to be enforced only against Catholics.[8] The bill failed, but the rhetoric of the puritans continued to press for the wholesale change of the liturgy throughout the period.

One basis of puritan objections was the prayer book's retention of much from traditional liturgy. Although it softened some of the Reformed language of its immediate predecessor, the 1559 Book of Common Prayer was, for the most part, a gentle revision of the 1552 prayer book rather than a revival of the much more traditional 1549 prayer book. For example, the 1559 book famously merged the words said during the administration of communion from both earlier books, allowing for some semblance of a belief in the real presence of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine. It also eliminated from the Litany the memorable petition, 'from the Bishop of Rome and all his detestable enormities…good Lord, deliver us.'[9] These shifts may have been aimed at accommodating religious traditionalists, or they may have been a sort of ecumenical gesture towards the international political stage. Nevertheless, the 1559 book was resolutely an advanced Protestant's prayer book. The structure of the service of Holy Communion still followed that of the 1552 book, which was purposefully configured to eliminate any resemblance to the mass and which went out of its way to place the ritual focus not on the consecration of bread and wine, but on the consumption of the same by the believer.[10]

Despite this Reformed ethos, the *Admonition to the Parliament* in 1572 memorably referred to the prayer book as 'an unperfect book, culled and picked out of that popish dunghill, the…mass book, full of all

[7] Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 103–55.

[8] Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 119.

[9] See F. E. Brightman, ed., *The English Rite* 2nd edn. (London: Rivingtons, 1921), 176–7, 700.

[10] On the 1552 revision, see Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Thomas Cranmer: A Life* (New Haven: Yale, 1996), 507; Colin Buchanan, *What Did Cranmer Think He Was Doing?* (Bramcote, Notts.: Grove Books, 1982), 22–25.

abominations.'[11] In truth, for all that its liturgical structures were new and quite different from those of the medieval mass, elements of the traditional liturgy survived in the language of the new book. The same Litany that was excised of its petition for protection from the Pope also included considerable material from the Sarum litany that had been used in much of late-medieval England. The eucharistic prayer similarly retained much from the Sarum missal.[12] While the prayer books also cribbed from impeccably Protestant sources, notably German church orders, as well as from a variety of other sources, and while any medieval material was reconfigured in its structure and translated into English, the puritans had a point. It did not help matters that Elizabeth and her administration seemed bent on locking in place the religious picture of the last year of her brother Edward VI's reign, resisting any and all developments thereafter, and that the conservative prayer book revision was a part of that effort.

Some avant-garde puritans went further in their objections to the Book of Common Prayer, attacking not just the 1559 prayer book in particular but the very concept of prayer books in general. These critics objected to the use of set forms of prayer. The Admonition to the Parliament spoke longingly of the church in the days of the apostles, in which ministers 'were not so wed to any one form of prayers, but as the Spirit moved them, and as necessity of time required, so they might pour forth hearty supplications to the Lord,' contrasting that situation to the present day, in which 'now they are bound of necessity to a prescript order of service and book of common prayer….'[13] A set form of prayer hamstrung the Holy Spirit and was a falling-short from the biblical precedent for Christian worship.

For these avant-garde puritans, prayer was to be done extemporaneously by the minister, with the laity in only some instances encouraged to make the limited response of an 'Amen.' The laity were rendered passive, and their role was simply to listen while the minister engaged in the work of worship.[14] By contrast, in the prayer book there were

[11] *Admonition*, B.v.

[12] See F.E. Brightman, *English Rite, passim*.

[13] *Admonition*, A.iii.v.

[14] Horton Davies, *Worship and Theology in England: vol. 1 from Cranmer to Hooker, 1534–1603* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; repr. Grand Rapids, 1996), 268–273, 289–90; William Bradshaw, *English Puritanisme* ([London: William Jones's secret press], 1605), 20. Bradshaw says that the only voice in prayer was to be the minister's, except when the people respond with an 'Amen.' Davies claims that in general the laity were

at least a few responses uttered by the laity, and the use of set forms of prayer meant that a certain familiarity with their content could be acquired by regular churchgoers, even if they did not have their own prayer book.[15] Puritan congregations would be at the mercy of the minister's creativity, never knowing what might proceed from his mouth. But for the avant-garde puritans, the primary concern was to emulate the example they believed they had found in scripture, of free prayer by the pastor.

The crucial source of many of the puritan objections to the prayer book was, as with the surplice, a disagreement over the concept of *adiaphora*, of things indifferent. William Bradshaw, in his *English Puritanisme*, summarized puritan views that had been strongly held for decades when he stated flatly that every action and ceremony in worship 'ought evidently to be prescribed by the word of God, or else ought not to be done' and termed it a 'sin to perform any other worship to God . . . than that which God himself requires in his word.'[16] The *Admonition* itself objected to the Book of Common Prayer not least because it contained 'a great number of things contrary to God's word.'[17] If one took the Bible as one's sole warrant for worship, the prayer book was clearly lacking. Many of its ceremonies and texts were, by its proponents' own admission, not biblical, but mandated by human authority. For a number of puritans, the discussion of the prayer book ended there.

If many puritans attacked the prayer book directly, as either a popish remnant or an imprisoning of the Spirit, many more objected to specific bits of the liturgy. The bits singled out were generally traditional practices left over from traditional, pre-reformation religion. The use of the ring in marriage, with its accompanying text; bowing at the name of Jesus; kneeling for communion; making the sign of the cross in baptism; and use of the optimistic funeral rite in the prayer book

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encouraged to respond with an 'Amen,' but it is worth noting that in New England in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, puritan congregations did not make even that much of a response. It was considered a mark of conformist Anglicanism if the congregation said, 'Amen.' [Paul Victor Marshall, *One, Catholic, and Apostolic: Samuel Seabury and the Early Episcopal Church* (New York: Church Publishing, 2004), 27].

[15] Judith Maltby, *Prayer Book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), 24–30.

[16] Bradshaw, *English Puritanisme*, 2. For a further discussion, see Christopher Durston and Jacqueline Eales, 'Introduction: The Puritan Ethos, 1560–1700' in Christopher Durston and Jacqueline Eales, eds., *The Culture of English Puritanism, 1560–1700* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), 17–18; also Davies, *Worship and Theology in England*, 258–60.

[17] *Admonition*, A.iii.v.

were among the practices attacked by the puritans. Each of these was branded as superstitious in controversial literature.

In general, appeals were often made to the principal of scriptural warrant, since the Bible was notoriously silent on these particular ceremonies, but specific objections were also lodged. The use of the ring in marriage was seen by puritans as superfluous, and therefore best omitted, something that a few ministers did.[18] The text that accompanied the giving, in which the husband said to the wife, 'With this ring I thee wed: with my body I thee worship…' had obvious problems.[19] Unsurprisingly, numerous puritans objected to the idea of the 'worship' of another human being, despite the conformists' rejoinder that the use of 'worship' simply reflected an older sense, meaning 'to pay proper respect,' evident in the address of some civic officials as 'your worship.'[20] Bowing at the name of Jesus was likewise attacked by puritans, as was kneeling for communion—both savoured of idolatry.[21] The sign of the cross was, in puritan eyes, a medieval Catholic vestige, without biblical foundation. Worse, some parishioners might see the minister make the sign of the cross over a newly baptized baby and believe that it was permissible to cross one's self when praying.[22] The objections in controversial literature often resulted in direct action in the parishes. Puritan ministers frequently omitted the cross, and puritan lay-folk occasionally asked their own minister to skip the gesture. Some even pulled the infant away, covering its face, when the minister went to make the sign.[23] In terms of burial practices, radical puritans advocated burial without a minister or prayers, while most did not. Puritan objections typically took aim at the prayer book's commendation of the departed 'in sure and certain hope of the resurrection,' a hope that could not really be certain in light of orthodox Calvinist theology of predestination.[24] Here, again, lay-folk sometimes took direct action, burying the dead

[18] David Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 344–5.

[19] *The Book of Common Prayer 1559*, John E. Booty, ed. (Charlottesville, Va., 1976), 293.

[20] *Admonition*, B.iii.v; John Whitgift, *The Works of John Whitgift, D.D.* 3 vols., ed. John Ayre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Parker Society, 1853), III:355–56.

[21] *Admonition*, A.v.r, B.ii.r, B.v.r.

[22] *Admonition*, B.iii.v, Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death*, 124–6.

[23] Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death*, 130–3. Not until 1626 does Cressy note an incident in which a puritan woman presented the posterior of the child to be signed with the cross; by then, the polemical war between puritan and conformist had worsened.

[24] Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death*, 396–8, 403–8.

without a minister present.[25] Many received communion without kneeling—sometimes with the complicity of the minister.[26]

In all these things, puritan clergy and laity who neglected the public liturgy of the church posed a disruptive threat to the settled order. It did not take the street-theatre of laity snatching children from the minister at the font to cause contention; the laity frequently complained of ministers who omitted particular ceremonies or the wearing of the surplice, accusing them of violating the rules and consequently disrupting the peace of the church.[27] For a national church such as the Church of England, the Christian commonwealth united church and state in one body—an ideal that was expressed by John Whitgift in the *Admonition* controversy, but also by Richard Hooker, as we shall see. With this view of the Christian commonwealth in mind, the authorities and many conformists saw dissent in ceremonies as posing a potential threat to the civil peace, both because such dissent denied the lawful authority of the monarch (and the monarch's appointed officials, the bishops) in governing religious life and because of the evident fruits of such dissent in contentious parishes.

Background to Book Five: John Whitgift's Writings

Conformists did not wait until the publication of Hooker's fifth book to offer a polemical response to the threat of ceremonial nonconformity to the settled order of the church. After the publication of *An admonition to the Parliament* in 1572, John Whitgift (then Vice Chancellor of Cambridge University, later Archbishop of Canterbury) wrote *An answere to a certain Libel intituled, An admonition to the Parliament*, which appeared in 1573. This was met by Thomas Cartwright's *A Replye to an answere made of M. Doctor Whitgifte Agaynste the Admonition to the Parliament*, also in 1573. Whitgift responded in 1574 with the *Defense of the Answere to the Admonition against the Replie of T.C.*, only to have Cartwright fire back with *The Second replie of T.C. against Maister Doctor Whitgiftes second answer* in 1575. This amounted to a pamphlet war—if one can call the later,

[25] Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death*, 404–5, 418.

[26] By the 1610s, this resulted in periodic efforts to enforce kneeling, e.g., London Metropolitan Archives, Diocese of London Office Act Book, DL/C/324, p. 86; DL/C/310, p. 208, 301, 313–14.

[27] Martin Ingram, 'Puritans and the Church Courts, 1560–1640,' in Durston and Eales, eds., *Culture of English Puritanism*, 75–8; Maltby, *Prayer Book and People*, 33–76.

very thick volumes 'pamphlets.' The exchange summarized the best arguments of the day for and against the settled order of the church.

Whitgift's arguments in the *Defense* for the conformist embrace of the Book of Common Prayer and its ceremonies centred upon the necessity of obedience to lawful authority in matters indifferent. For Whitgift, nothing was to be done in church that was contrary to scripture, but lawful human authority might command certain things concerning which scripture was silent.[28] As he put it, God 'hath left authority unto his church to make laws, and appoint orders and ceremonies, as shall from time to time be thought most expedient and profitable for the same; so that nothing be done contrary to his word, or repugnant to the same. And this authority hath the church used, even from the apostles' time…'[29] For example, the surplice should be worn because it fell within the legitimate authority of the magistrate to decree certain apparel for some officials, and scripture did not prohibit the garment; therefore the magistrate might properly command the wearing of the surplice.[30] Those who refused to wear the surplice then offended against the magistrate.[31] Private individuals could not defy these rules, but the church authorities might freely change them over time.[32]

In addition to the appeal to the lawful authority of the magistrate, Whitgift pointed to the acceptance of ceremonies by both early church figures and recent reformers. He noted with satisfaction that Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Irenaeus all wrote of ceremonies in use in the liturgy of their day that had no foundation in scripture.[33] Similarly, Whitgift often appealed to Martin Bucer and Wolfgang Musculus to show that aspects of the prayer book attacked by the *Admonition* were perfectly acceptable to these reformers.[34] Whitgift did not deny that certain practices of ancient origin might have become corrupted. Nevertheless, they should be retained (although cleaned up). As he noted, 'If all things should be abrogated because they were kept of the papists, there would be a marvellous alteration both in the church and in the commonweal.'[35] Citing both the early church fathers and the recent

[28] *WW* I:180–183, 190.
[29] *WW* I:279.
[30] *WW* I:69–71, II:4–5, 17.
[31] *WW* II:5.
[32] *WW* I:227.
[33] *WW* I:213–6.
[34] E.g., *WW* III:49–51, 116–7, 123–124.
[35] *WW* II:566.

reformers allowed Whitgift to demonstrate that the things attacked by puritans not only had earlier origins but also were seen as legitimate by reformers with impeccable credentials.

At root Whitgift's *Defense* was based on an appeal to order. The lawful authority of the Christian magistrate to govern the church was to be respected, the church was free to decree ceremonies for expediency, and a revolution in church worship and governance was to be avoided (that 'marvellous alteration' he cited). Indeed, for Whitgift a set form of worship had one chief virtue: it fostered order. As he wrote, 'There is no reformed church that I can hear tell of but it hath a certain prescript and determinate order, as well touching ceremonies and discipline as doctrine…Is it meet that every man should have his own fancy, or live him as he list? Truly I know not whereunto these your doings can tend, but either to anabaptism, or to mere confusion.'[36] While Whitgift was prepared to defend particular ceremonies in the prayer book, and even to claim that it was heavily based on scriptural language and imagery, the chief virtue of the Book of Common Prayer in his eyes was that it made for orderly worship, and the chief reason to comply with its use was that it had been decreed by the crown. Ultimately, for Whitgift, the power of the magistrate of the Christian commonwealth extended to the establishment of proper worship, and the decrees of lawful authority were to be obeyed, to maintain order.

This sort of argument based on authority over matters indifferent would form a part of the rationale Hooker offered in Book Five. Indeed, Whitgift anticipated elements of Hooker's later arguments, to such a degree that one nineteenth-century commentator acknowledged Hooker and Richard Bancroft as 'fresh champions ready to defend the cause' of conformity, in explaining why Whitgift never responded to Cartwright's *Second replie*.[37] The intellectual connection between Whitgift and Hooker is not coincidental: later, as archbishop of Canterbury, Whitgift would be Hooker's patron, and Hooker dedicated Book Five of the *Lawes* to Whitgift. Despite the significant lag in time between the Admonition controversy and the publication of Book Five, one can view Hooker's work as final rejoinder to Cartwright *et al.*

Ironically, by 1597 when Book Five appeared, puritanism posed less of a threat to the settled order than it had over the previous decades.

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[36] *WW* III:321.
[37] *WW* III:x.

A series of moves by the authorities, led by Archbishop Whitgift, had resulted in the break-up of the presbyterian networks and the prosecutions of a number of puritan clergy.[38] The more extreme elements in English puritanism were no longer to threaten the Elizabethan church. Yet at the same time, the puritan ethos continued within the church, and the church itself was dominated by a broad, Calvinist theological consensus that even extended into some matters of piety.[39] Puritanism was less of a threat to the settled order, and more of a movement safely within the bounds of the church, than it had been before.

Book Five and Common Prayer

In this context, Richard Hooker built on the foundation laid by Whitgift, but he also pressed the defence of the prayer book through novel arguments. Hooker was engaged in a new and more ambitious effort. While he accepted the argument that lawful human authority might decree such things as ceremonies and rites—as things indifferent—Hooker went further. He portrayed the Book of Common Prayer as having inherent worth, apart from its establishment by the powers-that-be and its role in hedging in the chaos that might otherwise overtake worship. Indeed, he argued for the positive value of ceremonies and liturgy—something that was profoundly novel in his day.

But Hooker was not entirely novel in his approach. Indeed, he borrowed from Whitgift's defence of the prayer book the assertion that worship forms could be decreed by lawful human authority, absent a contrary command in scripture. This flexibility extended to all matters except doctrine, so that both governance and worship might be freely modified by the church. As Hooker put it,

> The Church hath authority to establish that for an order at one tyme, which at an other time it maie abolish, and in both doe well. But that which in doctrine the Church doth now deliver rightlie as a truth, no man will saie that is may hereafter recall and as rightlie avoutch the

[38] Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 385–431.

[39] Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590–1640* (Oxford: OUP, 1987); Patrick Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society, 1559–1625* (Oxford: OUP, 1982), 84–5 and *passim*; Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 433–35.

> contrarie. Lawes touching matter of order are changeable, by the power of the Church; articles concerning doctrine not so.[40]

Indeed, a certain creativity in discipline or worship was a necessity: '…to devise any certaine forme, for the outward administration of publique duties in the service of God, or thinges belonginge thereunto, and to find out the most convenient for that use, is a pointe of wisdome ecclesiasticall.'[41] While doctrine might not be lightly changed, worship fell into a different category and might be freely determined by the church authorities. This is, in essence, the same argument proffered by Whitgift.

But Hooker's appropriation of Whitgift's argument took place in the immediate context of a discussion of the role of tradition. Whitgift, to be sure, had cited the historical tradition as justification for a number of church practices. Hooker, by contrast, offered an explicit discussion of the role of tradition as a basis for church worship and discipline, before turning to specific historical antecedents for specific cases. In Hooker's view, one should defer to tradition in determining church practices: the church should be 'slow and unwilling to chaunge without verie urgent necessitie the ancient ordinances rites and longe approved customes of our venerable predecessors. The love of thinges ancient doth argue staiednes, but levitie and want of experience maketh apt unto innovations.'[42] The default position of the Church of England, therefore, should be to maintain inherited practices until they were shown to be harmful. And Hooker very much doubted that the practices complained of by puritans could be shown to be harmful:

> …in thinges the fitnes whereof is not of it selfe apparent nor easie to be made sufficientlie manifest unto all, yeat the judgment of antiquitie concurringe with that which is receyved may induce them to think it not unfitt, who are not able to alleage any knowne waightie inconvenience which it hath, or to take any strange exception against.[43]

While some traditions, even 'divine and Apostolicall constitutions,' ought no longer to be followed because of necessity and the public good, in

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[40] Richard Hooker, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, ed. W. Speed Hill (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977) [henceforth *Lawes*], V.8.2; 2:38.17–23.

[41] *Lawes* V.8.2; 2:38.10–14.

[42] *Lawes* V.7.3; 2:36.26–37.3.

[43] *Lawes* V.7.4; 2:37:20–25.

general Hooker was exceedingly deferential to tradition as a formulary of the church, when considered in the abstract.[44]

Hooker also followed Whitgift in arguing that the freedom and flexibility given to the church to determine matters of discipline and worship did not extend to private individuals. Hooker resisted even the appeal to individual revelations of the Holy Spirit as a basis for freedom of action:

> Now where the worde of God leaveth the Church to make choice of hir own ordinances . . . if it should be free for men to reprove, to disgrace, to reject at theire owne libertie what they see done and practised accordinge to order set downe, if in so greate varietie of waies . . . the Church did give everie man license to followe what him selfe imagineth that Gods Spirit doth reveale unto him . . . what other effect could hereupon ensewe, but the utter confusion of his Church under pretense of beinge taught, led, and guided by his spirit. . . .[45]

Hooker shared Whitgift's concern for order, and disorder in church worship was to be avoided. Worship was to take place with a common script, determined by lawful human authority, for the sake of maintaining order.

This affection for order undergirded one of Hooker's overall arguments in favor of a settled liturgy, as he claimed that religion fostered order in the commonwealth as a whole. Faithful Christians were more easily governed, as they had the fear of God to augment the authority of the state in making positive laws. Further, religion better qualified persons for leadership in the commonwealth. For these reasons, the proper maintenance of religion—including of public worship—was of great importance to the state.[46]

This appeal to the utility of religion to the maintenance of order in the commonwealth was guaranteed to resonate with the anxieties of the Tudor era. The Tudor state was notoriously weak. Its justices of the peace were unpaid volunteers, drawn from the local gentry. There was no professional police force; the constables and watchmen that policed the towns were unpaid (although in some towns the constable had a paid

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[44] *Lawes* V.9.1; 2:41.

[45] *Lawes* V.10.1; 2:46.10–28.

[46] *Lawes* V.1.1–2; 2:16–19; see also W. J. Torrance Kirby, 'Angels descending and ascending: Hooker's discourse on the 'double motion' of Common Prayer,' in W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed., *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation* [*RHER*] (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 116–17. On the 'politique' use of religion, see also V.2.3–4; 2:25–7, and see Faulkner, 29–30.

assistant, the beadle). There was not much of a standing army outside of wartime. The trained bands, which could be called out to impose the will of the authorities with military force, were notoriously under-equipped.[47] The commonwealth did not have the capacity to wield force or enforce law without the cooperation of a number of segments of society, and even then, the coercive force available was limited.

The authorities' lack of coercive power was potentially disastrous, because the Elizabethan period was marked by increasing economic strain. A series of bad harvests, combined with long-term price inflation, put small farmers and artisans under severe stress. In some places, there were regional famines in 1597–99.[48] The overall economic strain caused a number of negative effects on the social order. For one, it gave rise to a remarkable number of riots in the period, as local communities demonstrated in support of traditional rights, including the right to buy food at reasonable prices or the right to graze animals on common land.[49] Even apart from riots, the poor economy contributed to vagrancy, and vagrancy was perceived as a serious threat to the social order. In the patriarchal Tudor society, the household was perceived to be the building block of the social order. The family household was perceived as a miniature version of the commonwealth, with the wife, children, and servants subordinated to the direction of the father/husband. Vagrants were itinerant persons who did not fit into any household, and together with those younger persons too poor to establish themselves as householders and unable or unwilling to work as servants, they formed a class of 'master-less' men and women. Master-less persons were a source of concern to ordinary folk, who saw them as a source of disorder and crime.[50] Religion, then, offered a way to inculcate proper obedience to lawful authority, and common worship was the chief opportunity that the authorities had to convey its message.

While the puritans were certainly great devotees of order, and while they would have agreed with Hooker that religion offered a means to train up good, obedient subjects, Hooker bent religion's instructive role

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[47] Keith Wrightson, *English Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1982), 149–72; David Underdown, *Fire from Heaven: Life in an English Town in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992), 95–7.

[48] Wrightson, *English Society*, 142–45.

[49] Wrightson, *English Society*, 173–82.

[50] Wrightson, *English Society*, 141–2; Underdown, *Fire from Heaven*, 79–89, 102–3; Susan Dwyer Amussen, *An Ordered Society: Gender and Class in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 31, 38, 40–1.

to serve his own ends. Uniformity in worship was crucial to preventing common worship, the tool of order, from itself becoming disordered. The peculiar worship form of the prayer book in turn need not conform exactly to the Bible or to the tradition of the church, in order to meet present necessity. Finally, an attack on the prayer book was itself an attack on one of the central props of the regime, a threat not just to the church as it was established but also to the commonwealth as a whole. By linking the prayer book to the effort to maintain order in the commonwealth, Hooker at once raised the stakes and strengthened his hand in defending the established liturgy.

If in many respects Hooker had appropriated elements of Whitgift's defence of the prayer book (though at times pushing them further), in other respects Hooker's defence was novel. One chief example was his defence of the positive value of ceremonies. Hooker doubted that any church could function without ceremonies of human invention.[51] Indeed, ceremonies served useful functions. The sign of the cross in baptism, for example, was 'a ceremonie the use whereof hath bene profitable although we observe it not as the ordinance of God but of man,' because it put Christians in mind of their duty and allegiance to Christ.[52] Similarly, such gestures and postures as bowing at the name of Jesus were 'harmeles ceremonies' that show 'a reverende regard to the Sonne of God.'[53] Ceremonies had a positive benefit, because they could edify, a view that went well beyond what Whitgift had asserted.[54]

More than its component ceremonies, the liturgy had a positive value in Hooker's eye that went beyond the didactic. Liturgy had the power to 'help that imbecilitie and weakenes in us, by means whereof we are otherwise of our selves the lesse apt to performe unto God so heavenlie a service, with such affection of harte, and disposition in the powers of our soules as is requisite.'[55] Liturgy stirred up devotion and helped flawed human creatures pay proper worship to God. Whatever role ritual might have had as symbolic communication, it also functioned on this deeper level of cognition.

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[51] *Lawes* V.65.5; 2:305:3–6.
[52] *Lawes* V.65.2, V. 65.11; 2:301.29–31, 2:310.
[53] *Lawes* V.30.3; 2:133.7–10.
[54] Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?: Presbyterian and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 164–5.
[55] *Lawes* V.25.1; 2:113.23–26.

Hooker argued that this use of ritual had been a hallmark of human societies: 'no nation under heaven either doth or ever did suffer publique actions which are of waight whether they be civil and temporall or els spiritual and sacred, to pass without some visible solemnitie; the very strangeness whereof and difference from that which is common, doth cause popular eyes to observe and to marke the same.'[56] Those who rejected, or limited, the role of ritual discarded a chief tool or means of religion and piety. Ceremonies, and liturgy in general, in fact had a number of advantages over the word-heavy discourses favoured by the puritans: 'Wordes both because they are common, and doe not so stronglye move the phancie of man, are for the most part but sleightlye heard: and therefore with singular wisdome it hath bene provided, that the deeds of men which are made in the presence of witnesses, should passe not onely with wordes, but also certaine sensible actions, the memory whereof is farre more easie and durable then the memorie of speech can be.'[57] Ritual, therefore, was not to be rushed through, despite puritan complaints of the length of the service.[58] Ritual offered singular benefits to the believer, benefits that could not be got through other means.

Indeed, it is in this reinterpretation, of liturgy as a whole and of its component ceremonies, that Peter Lake sees Hooker making his greatest changes to the conformist position. Lake argues that this reinterpretation 'was little short of the reclamation of the whole realm of symbolic action and ritual practice from the status of popish superstition to that of a necessary, indeed essential, means of communication and edification, a means moreover in many ways more effective than the unvarnished word.'[59] Ceremonies functioned 'through a series of correspondences' to 'affect the internal realm of men's minds and characters'—elsewhere, Lake describes them as means of 'subliminal communication.'[60] Lake's interpretation is not overstated—in the *Lawes* Hooker described a powerful, and positive, role for what Whitgift and other conformists had dismissed as mere *adiaphora*. Ceremonies—and specifically, those decreed by the authorities of the Church of England—were not merely to be

[56] *Lawes* IV.1.3; 1:274.15–20.
[57] *Lawes* IV.1.3; 1:274.20–7.
[58] *Lawes* V.32.1–2; 2:136.28–137.18.
[59] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 165.
[60] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 166–7.

used because they were established by lawful authority, but because they were an important, even crucial, aspect of true religion.

Hooker saw a similar dynamic at work in the sacraments. Puritans, he wrote, believed that the sacraments functioned only to teach and instruct, in much the same way that sermons did. This was a fair assessment: puritans emphasized the role of sacraments as signs of the believer's faith and seals of God's promises, but for them sacraments did not actually produce or bring about anything. If anything, they merely testified to a grace that had already been received.[61] The sacraments, in short, were something like performed texts. For Hooker, by contrast, they served a variety of purposes that went well beyond their nature as performed texts. They served as 'bonds of obedience to God, strict obligations to the mutual exercise of Christian charity, provocations to godliness, preservations from sin, memorials of the principal benefits of Christ.'[62] While in some respects these functions are reminiscent of the puritans' performed texts, they went further. The sacraments did not merely instruct, but served as a 'means conditionall which God requireth in them unto whom he imparteth grace.'[63] As Bryan Spinks puts it, for Hooker, 'sacraments signify and cause grace . . . They are not themselves the cause of grace, but a visible means that God uses . . . Yet we must not doubt that sacraments really give what they promise and are what they signify.'[64] As Charles Irish describes the dynamic, while the sign itself does not convey grace, God has decreed that the sign is the ordinary 'instrument' of grace, though the ultimate giver is God himself.[65] Thus, Hooker's estimation of the role of the sacraments far outstripped that of the puritans. As Peter Lake noted, for Hooker 'the sacraments defined, indeed, they went a long way towards creating,

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[61] Davies, *Worship and Theology in England*, 1:62, 281. But Peter Lake has a slightly different interpretation: in his view, puritans 'did not reduce the sacraments to the status of mere signs or symbols . . . which must inevitably play second-fiddle to the word preached,' but rather saw them as serving the community of the visible godly as 'seals on, or confirmations of that community's identity.' (Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 181.) Yet even in Lake's interpretation, the puritans held an attenuated view of the function of sacraments, compared to Hooker.

[62] *Lawes* V.57.2; 2:245.21–23.

[63] *Lawes* V.57.3; 2:246.1–2.

[64] Bryan Spinks, *Two Faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology: Sacraments and Salvation in the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker* Drew University Studies in Liturgy 9 (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1999), 142, 161–2. Spinks notes that for the puritan William Perkins, sacraments do not serve as instruments of grace.

[65] Charles W. Irish, '"Participation of God Himselfe:" Law, the mediation of Christ, and sacramental participation in the thought of Richard Hooker,' in *RHER*, 180.

the Christian community.'[66] Sacraments actually conveyed something to the believer on a non-cognitive level. Both the liturgy as a whole and the sacraments in particular, then, worked in a way beyond words to draw the individual closer to God, operating on a level that Hooker found more important than the verbal.

This contrasted with the puritan view of worship, which gave primacy to the word. Indeed, for puritans, sermons and not sacraments stood as the primary means of grace. The godly gave primacy to the sermon as the crucial element in Sunday worship: it was the primary means by which God drew souls to himself.[67] The most important job of the parish minister was to 'preach the gospell solemnly and publickely to the Congregation, by interpreting the written word of God and applying the same by exhortation and reproofe unto them.'[68] For puritans, worship was dominated by the word.

In the Elizabethan church, conformist worship was itself word-heavy. On most Sundays there would not be a sufficient number of communicants to offer the eucharist. The normal Sunday service was thus comprised of morning prayer, the litany, and the ante-communion (the first part of the communion office, breaking off at the prayer for the whole state of Christ's church).[69] Nevertheless, even though it was received infrequently, communion provided conformists with a non-verbal means of accessing the divine, and one considered to be more powerful and efficacious than sermons or the reading of prayers. If conformist worship was heavy with words, it was not monopolized by them, in contrast to puritan worship, and this was a point Hooker took pains to make.

Hooker also expanded the definition of preaching beyond the conventional one used by puritans. Hooker described four types of what he termed 'preaching': catechizing, the public reading of the scriptures, the public reading of 'other profitable instructions,' and sermons. Each qualified as preaching, because each was 'the open publication of heavenlie mysteries.'[70] Catechizing was the instruction of youth in the rudiments of religion, and when it was done as a public performance,

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[66] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 181.
[67] Davies, *Worship and Theology in England*, 69, 72, 294–295.
[68] Bradshaw, *English Puritanisme*, 17.
[69] Brightman, ed., *English Rite*, 715.
[70] *Lawes* V.18.1; 2:65.18–19.

it qualified as preaching.[71] Public reading of scripture counted as preaching because through it the church published the testimony it had received from the apostles.[72] Public reading of other, non-canonical texts also counted as preaching—and among these texts, Hooker included both the apocryphal books and the official Book of Homilies, first published in the reign of Edward VI in 1547 and reissued under Elizabeth in 1571.[73] These homilies were to be read during worship in those churches where there was not a preaching minister. Finally, Hooker recognized sermons as preaching, the only one of the four types that puritans would have recognized.

The puritans' view of each of these additional forms varied, though they would equate none of them with the preaching of sermons. Puritans had no complaints with catechizing, which they found no less important than the conformists did. Puritan clergy authored their own catechisms, and puritan divines emphasized the importance of catechizing in the godly household and in the parish church. Indeed, puritan and conformist catechisms alike shared much common ground in content as well as method, with most controversial subjects being treated with caution in basic catechisms.[74] The puritans also did not object in any way to the public reading of scripture. It was the 'other profitable instructions' to which the puritans objected vociferously, finding them in fact to be far from profitable.

The puritans objected to the reading of the apocrypha in public worship on the basis that this practice equated the apocryphal texts with the canonical texts. By contrast, they argued that only the word of God should be read in church, and therefore the noncanonical texts should be excluded. Cleverly, the authors of the Admonition to the Parliament added a linguistic argument: 'the very name Apocrypha testifieth that they were red in secrete and not openly,' as the word *apocrypha* in Greek meant 'hidden.'[75]

Puritans rejected the Book of Homilies for a different reason: its use as a substitute for sermons. The Admonition drew the smirking

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[71] *Lawes* V.18.2–3; 2:65–67.
[72] *Lawes* V.19.1; 2:67.
[73] *Lawes* V.20.1–12; 2:72–83.
[74] Ian Green, *The Christian's ABC: Catechisms and Catechizing in England c. 1530–1740* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
[75] *Admonition*, B.ii.r; Walter Bauer, William Arndt, Felix Gingrich, Frederick Danker, eds., *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, 2nd edn. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), 93.

comparison between the early church and the early modern Church of England: in the early church, the word was preached, 'nowe it is supposed to be suffycyent, if it be red.'[76] It was a point of popery that the church had taken the office of pastor, which 'by the word of God' was supposed to be 'an offyce of preaching,' but 'they make it an offyce of reading.'[77] Indeed, it was a general view of puritans that was the highest calling of the minister to preach the gospel, and parishioners should reject any minister who could not preach, but only read homilies.[78] The Admonition paraphrased the apostle Paul: 'we cannot beleeve except we heare, and we cannot heare wythout a preacher.'[79] The preaching of sermons was a means of grace, but the reading of homilies was not.

None of these three forms would have been equated by puritans with preaching. Catechizing and the reading of scripture, though important, could not be equated with a sermon, and the reading of the offensive apocryphal books and the homilies would have been of no utility in the care of souls. Only the preaching of sermons, crafted by godly ministers, could provide the means of strengthening faith in the believer. Only the preaching of sermons might convey grace.

But by framing three other modes of discourse as preaching, Hooker undercut some of the puritans' complaints against the prayer book and the established church. If one accepted Hooker's redefinition of catechizing, scripture-reading, and homily-reading as preaching, then all of the parishes in England had preaching, and there was no such thing as a nonpreaching minister. But apart from winning this debating point, Hooker's reframing of public catechizing and reading allowed him to diminish the role of sermon-preaching (despite his claim that 'we seeke not to derogate from anie thinge which they can justlie esteeme, but our desire is to uphold the just estimation of that from which it seemeth unto us they derogate more than becometh them').[80] Indeed, at one point Hooker even ranked Bible-reading above sermon-preaching: the puritans elevation of the sermon over scripture-reading was an error, because it gave greater glory to the word of the preacher than

[76] *Admonition*, A.iiii.r.
[77] *Admonition*, B.[i].r.
[78] Bradshaw, *English Puritanisme*, 17–19.
[79] *Admonition*, B.[i].v.
[80] *Lawes* V. 22.1; 2:87.26–88.1.

to the Word of God.[81] Elsewhere, Hooker equated sermon-preaching, catechizing, scripture-reading, and homily-reading on the same level, holding that there was no superiority to sermon-preaching. This was a clear denial of the puritans' approach to worship.

Hooker's other novel idea was his assertion of the peculiar efficacy of corporate prayer. While Christians were supposed to pray individually, they were also supposed to come together corporately and pray publicly as the Body of Christ. This shift towards corporate prayer in the reformed liturgy, and away from the individual devotions that had occupied the laity during the medieval mass, was one of the hallmarks of the English reformation. The Book of Common Prayer was aimed at establishing a uniform, reformed worship experience for all, clergy and laity, literate and illiterate alike. It changed the lay experience of religion from a strictly interior affair to one that was external, enacted in words that were audible and comprehensible, shared by minister and congregation, and in gestures, likewise performed by both minister and congregant. These words and gestures were well known by the laity, even if they did not themselves own prayer books, simply through repetition.[82]

As the Body of Christ, the Christian assembly took on a mystical significance, far greater than the sum of its parts, a significance that transcended time and space. Because it was the Body of Christ, the assembly joined its prayer to that of the communion of saints, the faithful in other places and ages. Through the corporate body, the Body of Christ, believers participated in communion with Christ himself.[83] Because it was this Body at prayer, Hooker wrote, the act of public prayer 'must needes be accompted by so much worthier then the other, as a whole societie of such condition exceedeth the worth of anie one.'[84] He cited the examples of the apostle Paul (whom he described as 'likelie to prevaile with God as much as one') and the king and people of Ninevah (counted, perhaps, as honorary Christians!), all of whom resorted to public prayer for their most urgent needs.[85]

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[81] *Lawes* V.22.10; 2:99.4–16.

[82] Ramie Targoff, *Common Prayer: The Language of Public Devotion in Early Modern England* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001), 9–10, 16–18, 23–5; Maltby, *Prayer Book and People*, 24–30.

[83] Kirby, 'Angels descending and ascending,' 118–19.

[84] *Lawes* V.24.1; 2:112.1–3.

[85] *Lawes* V.24.1; 2:112.4–10.

In addition to this mystical value as the body of Christ at prayer, common prayer had other advantages, more anthropological than theological in focus. First, common prayer offered more 'comforte' than private prayer, because 'the things we aske publiquely are approved as needfull and good in the judgment of all.' Second, if one's own 'zeale and devotion' had grown slack, the 'alacritie and fervor of others serveth as a present spurre' to the individual's devotion.[86] In each of these instances, the other Christians present aided the individual in her or his prayers, through their consent in the first case and through their example in the second. Hooker, as Ramie Targoff has noted, believed that corporate worship was far more effective than private prayer could be, and he was the first conformist to articulate such a view. Further, he asserted that public worship could mould the interior spirituality of the private individual.[87]

Common prayer, then, as the prayer of the corporate body, had peculiar efficacy and peculiar benefits. It also imposed peculiar obligations, not least of which was the necessity of following proper form in worship. Corporate worship, because it was a public action, had to be done with 'the most sollemnitie and majestie that the wisest could devise,' with great 'care to be had of externall appearance.'[88] Private prayer could be done at one's whim, at any time, in any place, and by any form, but the public nature of common prayer imposed the obligation of being properly regulated.[89] This necessitated prescriptive forms of the liturgy—something that Hooker asserted had always been present in the church, whatever the radical puritans might think:

> No doubt from God it hath proceeded and by us it must be acknowleged a worke of his singular care and providence, that the Church hath evermore held a prescript forme of common prayer, although not in all thinges everie where the same, yeat for the most part reteininge still the same analogie. So that if the liturgies of all ancient Churches throughout the world be compared amongst them selves, it may be easilie perceaved they had all one originall mould, and that the publique prayers of the people

[86] *Lawes* V. 24.2; 2:112.16–21.
[87] Targoff, *Common Prayer*, 51, 55. Targoff concurs that Hooker saw anthropological benefits of corporate prayer, but she misses the mystical significance of the Body of Christ at prayer (Targoff, *Common Prayer*, 52, 54).
[88] *Lawes* V.25.1; 2:113.28–114.2.
[89] *Lawes* V.24.1; 2:111.27–9.

> of God in Churches thoroughlie setled did never use to be voluntarie dictates proceedinge from any mans extemporall witt.[90]

Corporate prayer obliged one to use set liturgical forms, and those forms (and that obligation) had existed from the first days of the church.

The obligations also extended to the individual. By attending worship, in addition to being aided by the presence of others, the individual in turn aided those around her or him—or, by failing to attend worship, did harm to others. In Hooker's view, there was a certain benefit from the good example shown by the individual frequenting public prayer, and a correspondingly damaging example if one were to neglect it. The individual might pray privately on a daily basis, or might entirely omit private devotions, with no effects on his or her neighbours. But to attend or to fail to attend public worship had grave consequences for the community, through the power of example.[91]

For Hooker, the corporate nature of common prayer made it an entirely different matter than the private devotions of individuals. Corporate prayer was more important, more efficacious, and more subject to regulation. Set forms of prayer were a necessity, in his eyes, because without such forms corporate worship became a 'confusion,' an 'endles and senseles effusion of indigested prayers.'[92] Indeed, there was a premium placed on making public worship orderly and even beautiful, in the buildings that house it and in the attire worn by its ministers, as well as in the words themselves.[93] Further, the established liturgy of the prayer book allowed the congregation to make responses and to say some of the prayers with the minister. This heightened the laity's participation, and presumably, their edification as well. But set forms also allowed the entire prayer of the assembly to be truly common, for the liturgy reserved certain spoken prayers to the minister, speaking on behalf of the congregation. In order for that prayer to be comprehensible to and endorsed by those present, it needed to follow an established form.[94]

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[90] *Lawes* V.25.4; 2:116.14–23.
[91] *Lawes* V.24.2; 2:113.3–7.
[92] *Lawes* V.25.5; 2:116.27, 29–30.
[93] *Lawes* V.11.1; 2:47.13–15, V.29.1; 2:123.9–19.
[94] *Lawes* V.25.4; 2:116.10–117.6. In this, Hooker adopts a position established by Cranmer and repeated by subsequent conformists, such as Whitgift and Richard Bancroft, as Targoff notes (Targoff, *Common Prayer*, 27–9, 46–7).

Hooker, then, set corporate prayer as the highest form of the church's work, outstripping sermon-preaching and instruction. For the clergy, too, intercessory prayer became their defining function, the central element of their role.[95] This demanded personal qualifications for ministry: the minister's authority, 'the fervor of his zeale, the pietie and gravitie of his whole behavior must needes exceedinglie both grace and sett forward the service he doth.'[96] And more than that, the minister's manner of life was of concern, not so much as preacher but as intercessor: 'Vertue and godliness of life are required at the handes of the minister of God, not only in that he is to teach and instruct the people…but also much more in regard of this other parte of his function….'[97] Peter Lake has observed that in this respect, Hooker reinterpreted the ideal type of the parish minister as it had previously been cast by conformists, from that of preaching parson to that of intercessor. This accomplished a polemical end, in part: it meant that the non-preaching clergy that still held many livings were not as much of a hindrance and an embarrassment to the Church of England. But it also had a more profound side, redefining the ministry and the Christian community around the sacraments, in place of the Word.[98] In this respect, Hooker was truly radical.

Conclusion

Hooker's *Lawes* was, from its time of publication, attacked for its novelties. Several contemporaries perceived that Hooker had gone beyond a conformist's customary attack on nonconformity and presbyterianism to instead attack portions of what had been the mainstream English Reformed tradition.[99] Hooker's avant-garde approach was particularly notable in his discussion of worship in Book Five. In ascribing a positive value to ceremonies, Hooker had gone well beyond mainstream conformist rhetoric: John Whitgift, for example, had defended the

[95] *Lawes* V.25.3; 2:114.26–116.10.
[96] *Lawes* V.25.3; 2:115.1–3.
[97] *Lawes* V.25.3; 2:115.25–30.
[98] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 170–2; Patrick Collinson concurs (Collinson, 'Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment,' 175).
[99] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 146; Peter Lake, 'Business as Usual? The Immediate Reception of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 52 (July 2001), 456, 484–6.

settled liturgy of the *Book of Common Prayer* with the rather unsatisfying argument that it had been decreed by lawful authority, and that it was therefore a duty of Christians to obey and to use it. As we have seen, Hooker rehearsed that familiar point, and then, sweeping it to the side, made expansive claims for the benefits of the prayer book liturgy. For that matter, Hooker's view of the sacraments was also out of step with other conformists: Archbishop James Ussher, for example, had written of sacraments as instruments that increased faith, but decidedly did not convey grace.[100] Hooker's views were out of step with those of his day.

Hooker's arguments would prove more useful for the ceremonialists associated with William Laud in the 1620s and 1630s. Ceremonialist authors, such as Francis White, John Buckeridge, and Richard Montagu, endorsed Hooker's view that the sacraments were instruments and means of grace. Their vision of the church was of the assembly gathered in public worship around the sacraments; they saw ceremonies as an important part of the spiritual life of a Christian. They did go further than Hooker, of course, in the particular ceremonies they advocated and in their view of the eucharist as a sacrifice.[101] Further, it is not clear how many of the ceremonialists relied on Hooker for their views. Scholars have tended to see the roots of the ceremonialist position in a revival of patristic scholarship. In the case of Richard Montagu, as Bryan Spinks notes, 'Montague may have cited Morton, Hooker, and Calvin, but his views are defended and established by reference to Ignatius, Justin Martyr, Cyprian and Ambrose.'[102] Yet in this there is at least a parallel to Hooker, who himself relied heavily on patristic sources in his own argumentation.

The parallels are borne out in other sources as well. John Browning, in six sermons subsequently published as *Concerning Publike Prayer and the Fasts of the Church*, used a defence of the established liturgy that

[100] Spinks, *Two Faces*, 165–6. Interestingly, Spinks points out that the puritan Samuel Ward actually held the same position as Hooker (and cited Hooker)—the dividing lines between puritan and conformist in individual cases could be quite fuzzy, even as one might fairly speak of puritan and conformist tendencies (Spinks, *Two Faces*, 163–5; Bryan Spinks, *Sacraments, Ceremonies and the Stuart Divines: Sacramental Theology and Liturgy in England and Scotland, 1603–1662* [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002], 76).

[101] Spinks, *Sacraments, Ceremonies*, 81–98; Anthony Milton, *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Thought, 1600–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 496.

[102] Spinks, *Sacraments, Ceremonies*, 88.

had been constructed by Hooker. Like Hooker, Browning took pains to establish the inferiority of sermon-preaching, in this case by establishing that there were other sorts of hearing that were more profitable than the hearing of sermons:

> The first and neerest degree in hearing, whereby we come close up to God; is, the hearing of the sacred oracles of God: God's originall very Word; properly so called in the Old and New Testament… The second degree… is the hearing of the Word of God applied, either by generall, or particular Churches, in their Catechismes, their Councels, Confessions, their Ritualls, their Homilies, which, next to the Word of God, are most worthily preferred before all private works, or Preachings, being workes of many, and those most learned, and holy men… The third kind of hearing the Word of God: from particular and private men in their Sermons, or Homilies; which, being the workes of one man alone, are therefore most subject to errour…[103]

Browning also argued, like Hooker, that public prayer needed to use fixed forms, so that everyone present might 'mak[e] it his owne deed, by his owne Amen.'[104] Browning used other arguments: some original, such as his argument that a set form allowed congregants to prepare through meditation on the text at home before worship; some quite shopworn, such as the claim of the necessity of obedience to lawful authority.[105] We also know that Hooker was read by Charles I himself, who, along with his subordinate Laud, imposed a ceremony-rich style of worship on the church. Laudian bishops similarly made use of Hooker: Hooker's writings were commended by Robert Skinner, the ceremonialist bishop of Bristol.[106] Hooker was read by those associated with Laudian ceremonialism, and if they may not have owed him an exclusive debt, they appropriated at least some of Hooker's arguments in support of their program of liturgical change and enforcement.

But Hooker's views on the liturgy would become main-stream only in the second half of the seventeenth century and beyond. Before that time, Hooker was a marginal voice: the works of the great William

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[103] John Browning, *Concerning Publike Prayer and the Fasts of the Church* (London: Richard Badger, 1636), 49–50.

[104] Browning, *Concerning Publike Prayer*, 73.

[105] Browning, *Concerning Publike Prayer*, 74–75, 86–87.

[106] Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policies of James I and Charles I,' in Kenneth Fincham, ed., *The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1993), 42; Fincham, 'Episcopal Governement,' in Fincham, ed., *Early Stuart Church*, 81–82.

Perkins far outsold Hooker until after 1660. After the Restoration in 1660, Hooker was cleverly positioned as one of the chief theologians of that newly emergent '-ism', 'Anglicanism', when conformist divines set out to redefine the church's history, in search of a non-Laudian opponent of puritanism.[107] An early precursor of this effort may be found in William Nicholson's 1655 catechism, produced during the latter part of the Interregnum. Nicholson cited Hooker in support of his own sacramental theology, in defending the view that the sacraments were means of grace and that determining the precise mode of Christ's presence in the eucharist was not important.[108] But the full repositioning of Hooker as a founding father of Anglican theology came in the 1660s. Bishop Gilbert Sheldon, the architect of the Restoration church, appears to have been behind Hooker's elevation, commissioning the hagiographic biography by Izaak Walton, seeing in the Elizabethan divine a useful tool in the fight against the intellectual and ecclesiological descendants of the puritans.[109] Hooker provided the Church of England with a theology and a polemic ready-made for use against post-Restoration Nonconformity, together with a prefabricated defence of the Book of Common Prayer.

This repositioning of Hooker was part of the reorientation of the Church of England, as the word-centred piety of the pre-Civil War mainstream of the church was gradually displaced by a Restoration piety grounded in rites and rituals. John Spurr, in his authoritative study of the Restoration Church of England, argues that the church placed prayer at the heart of Anglican piety, and public prayer at its very centre. Public prayer was 'indispensible to salvation and was the due of God.' Indeed, corporate worship edified the individual, working 'through the coherence of its structure, its repetition of the creeds and the Lord's Prayer, its regular reading through the whole of scripture, and its construction from the words of the Bible.' While the words operated as 'rational instruments,' they also worked on the emotions and brought the individual in contact with the transcendent.[110] The picture of liturgical theology in the Restoration that Spurr paints resembles very much that offered by Hooker.

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[107] Spinks, *Two Faces*, 3; Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 227–9.
[108] Spinks, *Sacraments, Ceremonies*, 140.
[109] Spinks, *Two Faces*, 168–72.
[110] John Spurr, *The Restoration Church of England, 1646–1689* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), 334.

Indeed, a number of Restoration era divines echoed Hooker's themes. Writing in the wake of Charles II's return to England but before the 1662 Act of Uniformity that mandated use of a lightly revised Book of Common Prayer, John Gauden, the bishop-elect of Exeter, defended the use of a set liturgy in general and the prayer book in particular in terms that would have been familiar to Hooker. In terms reminiscent of both Hooker and Whitgift, Gauden noted that the Church of England had the freedom to determine its worship and ceremonies.[111] Only arrogance would lead someone to prefer their own, individual compositions over the form of prayers vetted and approved by the church as a whole.[112] Like Hooker, Gauden argued that a set liturgy was an aid to meaningful participation by the laity: otherwise, the congregation 'cannot tell how to say a judicious and fiduciary Amen to those extemporary, rude, confused, and yet eager effusions which some men vent…'[113] A fixed liturgy also fostered uniformity of doctrine, and it worked for the 'edification and salvation…of the meaner sort of people,' who might be instructed by its repetition.[114] Like Hooker, Gauden argued that there was a political utility to the enforcement of a single liturgy, as it served to bind the people, through their devotions, to the king.[115] Finally, and perhaps most notably, Gauden echoed Hooker in his view of ceremonies. Gauden noted, against what he acknowledged as the objections of many, that ceremonies had positive value. While he did not give them quite the ringing endorsement that Hooker did, Gauden did describe ceremonies as 'visible tokens or memorialls, apt by a sensible sign to affect the understanding with something worthy of its thoughts as signified thereby, which not only sacred, but even civil ceremonies, and all notions or formes under the empire of reason, do import among all rational men…'[116] Gauden, like Hooker, saw ceremonies as having the capacity to edify.

In the same year, William Annand, minister of Leighton Buzzard, argued along similar lines. Some of his arguments were conventional, owing as much to Whitgift as to Hooker. Annand noted Biblical precedent for the use of set forms, citing Moses, the prophet Joel, David,

[111] John Gauden, *Considerations Touching the Liturgy of the Church of England* (London: J.G. for John Playford, 1661), 36–38.
[112] Gauden, *Liturgy of the Church of England*, 6, 7.
[113] Gauden, *Liturgy of the Church of England*, 6.
[114] Gauden, *Liturgy of the Church of England*, 8–11.
[115] Gauden, *Liturgy of the Church of England*, 28.
[116] Gauden, *Liturgy of the Church of England*, 36–37.

Hezekiah, and Jesus himself as having used set forms. Further, the apostle Paul used set forms, and it was 'the Universal practice of the whole body of the Catholick Church in all Ages, present and past, and commanded for the future, to use set forms.'[117] More crucially, because the practice was not specifically forbidden in scripture, it was lawful for human authority to determine the forms of prayer, and once commanded by lawful authority individuals were obliged to use these forms.[118] But in other respects, Annand owed more to Hooker. Annand argued that set forms provided help for ministers who had difficulty in praying extemporaneously, but at the same time, they helped the congregation as a whole.[119] They enabled all present to understand the content of the prayers, through repetition; they allowed all present to assent to the prayers with their 'Amen.'[120] Annand thus borrowed Hooker's arguments in his defence of the prayer book.

Preaching in Norwich cathedral twenty-five years later, Erasmus Warren made similar arguments from Hooker's repertoire. Borrowing from both Hooker and Whitgift, Warren argued that public prayer required set forms to avoid confusion and disorder.[121] But in terms straight from Hooker, Warren argued further that public, corporate prayer was the 'prime duty of Christianity, and that it ranked ahead of preaching. The minister's particular function was 'to supplicate and intercede for the people,' and corporate prayer thus voiced was far more efficacious than individuals' prayers for the same thing.[122]

These examples were not isolated. Restoration conformist theologians, taken as a whole, adopted Hooker's view of the benefits of common prayer, and of the English church's liturgy in particular. Some used the familiar argument that the liturgy was *adiaphora*, and that the use of a set form was binding if, and only if, decreed by lawful, human authority. But others adopted Hooker's argument that a set liturgy was a means of achieving order, beauty, and reverence in worship.[123]

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[117] William Annand, *Panem Quotidianum, or, A Short Discourse Tending to Prove the Legality, Decency, and Expediency of Set Forms of Prayer*…(London: printed for the author and sold at the sign of the Crane in St Paul's Churchyard, 1661), 5–6, 10–12.

[118] Annand, *Panem Quotidianum*, 22, 40.

[119] Annand, *Panem Quotidianum*, 7–8.

[120] Annand, *Panem Quotidianum*, 18–19.

[121] Erasmus Warren, *A Defence of the Liturgies or, Publick Forms of Prayer…A Sermon*…(London: John Williams, 1687), 15–17.

[122] Warren, *Defence of the Liturgies*, 5, 10.


[123] Spurr, *Restoration Church of England*, 337.

Hooker's justification for a set liturgy was largely absorbed by conformists, even if some still cited the earlier, lacklustre argument offered by Whitgift and others.

Overall, Hooker's fifth book was ideally suited to the transformation of Anglicanism in the late seventeenth century from a word-centred piety to one grounded in ritual. It was therefore no surprise that Hooker's work was used widely. Spurr argues that the Restoration church redefined itself around the liturgy and episcopacy, as the identifiers of Anglicanism. Edification of the believer was accomplished by means of the edification of the church as a whole. The sacraments, and not sermons, were given pride of place as the means of grace for the believer. As Spurr put it, 'Lacking a strong doctrinal definition of herself, the English church was beginning to appreciate how her liturgy and piety contributed to her identity.'[124] Hooker offered a ready-made liturgical theology for that reinvention.

In subsequent centuries, too, Anglicans have largely adopted Hooker's view of the importance of common prayer. In many cases, they have had to disentangle his interpretation from its historical context, chiefly in lands where even the fiction of establishment that exists in England does not obtain. Hooker's emphasis on the benefits of common prayer to the Christian commonwealth is not as persuasive in the twenty-first century in the United States, for example (although there are unconscious, and probably coincidental, echoes of this in the arguments offered by some evangelical Christians to promote their political agenda). Yet Anglicans have retained Hooker's position that public prayer is prayer at its highest form. The Anglican tendency to focus energy and attention on the public liturgy, in place of preaching or of private devotions, has roots not so much in the Anglo-Catholic movement of the nineteenth century, nor purely in the Laudian movement of the seventeenth, but in the appropriation of Richard Hooker's theology of common prayer, as developed in Book Five of the *Lawes*. It is an achievement that might well have alarmed Thomas Cranmer, the architect of the very prayer book that Book Five celebrated and who had a far more Reformed theology and piety than that expressed in Book Five's appreciation of sacraments and ceremonies. Yet it would no doubt have pleased Richard Hooker himself.

[124] Spurr, *Restoration Church of England*, 375.



Richard Hooker. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Book V.* Edited by W. Speed Hill. The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, gen. ed., W. Speed Hill, 2. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CHRISTOLOGY AND THE SACRAMENTS

W. David Neelands

Hooker's summary of orthodox Christology, *as the church has come to define it* based on Scripture, and now protected by the authority of the church,[1] comes at a point of transition in Book V of the *Lawes*. As Hooker turns to consider Puritan objections to the rites and administration of the sacraments in the Church of England, he first considers Christ, since the force of sacraments is that they make us 'pertakers of Christ' and, therefore, partakers of God in Christ.[2]

I. Hooker's Cyrilline Christology

The treatment begins with a consideration of the triune God, whose three Persons are distinguished by a double procession, described in terms summarizing Augustine's treatise *De Trinitate*.[3] Hooker cites John of Damascus at this point, and the treatment is precisely parallel to that given by Thomas in the *prima pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*.[4] Hooker then

[1] This chapter is freely adapted from chapter V of my doctoral dissertation, *The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker* (ThD dissertation, Trinity College and University of Toronto, 1988), 226–292.

For an account of the relation between the authority of Scripture and the authority of the Church in matters of doctrine, see David Neelands, 'Hooker on Scripture, Reason and "Tradition"', in *RHC* 75–94.

[2] *Lawes* V.50.3; 2:208–9. The faults alleged in the administration of the sacraments are, in each case, dealt with after the general account of the sacrament or rite. Thus criticisms about baptism by women (V.61), interrogatories proposed to infants and answered by godparents (V.64), the use of the sign and ceremony of the cross in baptism (V.65), confirmation by bishops (V.66), the use of the singular 'take thou' instead of Jesus' 'ye', kneeling to receive communion, the lack of required community self-examination before communion, the admission of papists to communion, communion for a part of the congregation only and not the whole congregation, and private communion (V.68) are all dealt with after the general treatment of baptism, confirmation and eucharist.

[3] *Lawes* V.51.1; 2:209.12–24.

[4] *ST* IIIa qq. 27–43, esp. qq. 33, 34 and 36.

proceeds to account for the Incarnation.[5] The Incarnation is appropriate, consonant and 'convenient', and related to Christ's saving work.[6]

Hooker then proceeds to show how, since 'the divine mystery is more true than plain,' the authority of the church, through the early ecumenical councils, was required to preserve the divinity and the humanity of the Saviour from error. He describes the Councils of Nicaea I and Constantinople I very briefly, since he had already traced the Arian controversy in great detail in dealing with the so-called 'Athanasian Creed' and the Gloria Patri.[7] Having guarded its Trinitarian faith, the church had then to labour to protect the unity of the one Redeemer in his two natures. According to Hooker's analysis, it was Nestorius who caused the problem, his description providing a merely moral union, 'two persons linked in amity,' whereas the faith required 'two natures human and divine conjoined in one and the same person' which Nestorius could not adequately account for.[8] Nestorius and his disciples ignored the Scriptural references to the unity of the Redeemer, who as Son, took on human *nature*, not a human *person*. In explaining this, Hooker uses clearly Cyrilline language:

> If the Sonne of God had taken to him selfe a man now made and already perfected, it would of necessitie follow that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuminge and the other assumed, whereas the Sonne of God did not assume a mans person unto his own, but a mans nature to his owne

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[5] Significantly, the authors of *ACL* did not accuse Hooker of a precise Christological error. They did attribute to him two Trinitarian errors: 1. Hooker subordinates the Son by saying that the Father alone is originally that Deity which Christ originally is not. 2. Hooker denies the co-eternity of the Son and the procession of Spirit from the Father and Son literally set down in Scripture (*FLE* 4:9–11). The passage that *ACL* objects to in the first point has a decidedly 'Eastern' and non-Augustinian flavour, but Hooker had supported it with quotations from Tertullian, Hilary, Augustine and a commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius. *Lawes* V.54.2; 2:221.5–6.

[6] *Lawes* V.51.3; 2:210.17–211.13. The passage is reminiscent of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, but seems to come more *directly* from Thomas. Note the use of 'unconsonant' and 'inconvenient.' These words are marks of Thomas' theological discourse. Compare, on the necessity of the Incarnation: 'Hence it is manifest that it was *fitting* for God to become incarnate [*quod conveniens fuit Deus incarnari*]' *ST* III, q. 1, a. 1. See M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago, 1964), 185f. Hooker here clearly adopts an Anselmian account of the doctrine of satisfaction, but modifies Anselm's account of the 'necessity' in the way Thomas Aquinas had and apparently depends on Thomas. See *ST* III, q. 1, a. 2. Where Hooker does borrow directly from Anselm, the source is very clear, as at *Lawes* VI.5.2; 3:53.24–54.10. See David Neelands, 'Crime, guilt and the punishment of Christ: travelling another way with Anselm of Canterbury and Richard Hooker', *Anglican Theological Review*, 88 (Spring 2006): 197–213.

[7] *Lawes* V.52.1; 2:211–212. Compare V.42; 2:165–178.

[8] *Lawes* V.52.2; 2:212–213.

> person, and therefore tooke *semen* the seed of Abraham, the verie first originall element of our nature before it was com to have anie personall humaine subsistence. The flesh and the conjunction of the flesh with God began both at one instant, his makinge and takinge to him selfe our flesh was but one act. So that in Christ there is no personall subsistence but one, and that from everlastinge. By takinge only the nature of man he still continueth one person, and changeth but the maner of his subsistinge, which was before in the meere glorie of the Sonne of God, as is now in the habit also of our flesh. . . . Christ is a person both divine and humaine, howbeit not therefore two persons in one, neither both these in one sense, but a person divine because he is *personallie* the Sonne of God, humane because *he hath* reallie *the nature* of the children of men.[9]

Christ *is* divine; Christ *has* human nature. This is, succinctly put, the Alexandrian account of the Christological union, deriving from Cyril himself. The church adopted this pattern, according to Hooker, at the Council of Ephesus, and later, at Chalcedon, made a definition that would prevent a misunderstanding of Cyril in the direction of Eutyches.[10] The view was to be restated by the fifth ecumenical Council, Constantinople II, and by John of Damascus.

Hooker's direction may be better understood in contrast to his predecessors. Cyrilline Christology was not prominent in the English Reformation before Hooker. Christological matters were generally not at centre of the stage, since all parties close to power apparently accepted the standard conciliar definitions, especially that of Chalcedon.[11] Cranmer had used an argument from the two natures of Christ in the debates about the eucharistic presence.[12] His propositions involved no novelty or heterodoxy, but it may be significant that the one obvious use of Christological premises in the English Reformation had to do with insisting on a sharp division of the two natures rather than on the

[9] *Lawes* V.52.3; 2:213.24–214.31.

[10] *Lawes* V.52.4; 2:215–216.

[11] At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, the limits of heresy that would be dealt with by those holding the authority of the Queen was strictly defined. Scripture as interpreted by the early Christian teachers up to the Council of Chalcedon was treated as authoritative. See the Act of Supremacy (1559), §20 in *Documents of the English Reformation*, ed. Gerald Bray (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 327. This undermining of the elaborate causes for heresy that had underpinned the horrifying burnings for heresy about the eucharist in Queen Mary's reign, was a reversion to a medieval canonical standard. Compare Gratian, Decretum I, dist. 25, in *Corpus iuris canonici*, ed. Emil Friedberg (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), vol. 1, columns 34–35.

[12] F. A. Gasquet and Edmund Bishop, *Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer* (London: J. Hodges, 1890), 440, 419.

unity of the Person. And Thomas Cartwright appears to have made a strange 'Nestorian' suggestion at one stage, perhaps on the basis of an opinion of Beza.[13]

The suggestion has been made that Hooker derived his Christological account from Luther, who, in contrast to Calvin, is usually thought to have adopted a Cyrilline account.[14] But the clearer path of derivation must be from Thomas, who took over the Cyrilline account of John of Damascus, and enhanced it with his own metaphysics of *esse*. Although Hooker does not take over the Thomistic metaphysics in this regard, he clearly follows the pattern in his description of the hypostatic union, and uses the Aristotelian term, borrowed from Thomas, of 'subsistence.'[15] The Christological account will have, for Hooker, an impressive application when he comes to consider Christ's headship over the whole world in Book VIII: the error of dividing civil authority and ecclesiastical authority, as Thomas Cartwright had done, is analogous to dividing Christ's humanity and divinity.[16]

Hooker then goes on to discuss the concept of *communicatio idiomatum*: the attributes of either nature belong to the one person. Thus, since attribution is to the one person, and not to the two natures, Scripture often uses startling expressions to point to the *communicatio idiomatum*.[17] Hooker has been thought to treat the *communicatio* as 'merely verbal', because of his phrase 'cross and circulatory speeches.'[18] But this

[13] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:363–369. See discussion below.

[14] Ronald Bayne, in *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, The Fifth Book* (London, 1902), believes these chapters reflect 'implicit' sympathy with Luther, although Hooker explicitly condemns Lutheran ubiquitarianism. Bayne quotes Dorner on Luther's Christology to show the concurrence (page cix). The real source of the sympathy is, perhaps, a *common* dependence on Alexandrian Christology, or a common insight on the importance of the Alexandrian account in explaining the unity of the saving Person, and not a dependence of Hooker on Luther. Hooker, like Luther, inevitably provides a God-initiated soteriology, and so the consonance with Luther is not arbitrary. Wendel has pointed out some Cyrilline passages in Calvin. François Wendel, *Calvin: the origin and development of his religious thought* (London: Collins, 1963), 220f.

[15] *ST* IIIa qq. 2–6.

[16] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:363–369. See especially 3:364.16–26 and 3:368.1–5. Hooker deals with the Christological problems that underlie Cartwright's distinction between civil authority, which he relates to Christ's divinity, and ecclesiastical authority, which Cartwright relates to Christ's humanity. See Editor's Preface, 45 (Keble 1:xci, n. 1). Compare *ST* III, q. 8, aa. 2,3.

[17] *Lawes* V.53.1–4; 2:216–220.

[18] Bayne compares Hooker's Christology to Luther's generally, but treats Hooker's account of the *communicatio idiomatum* as 'merely verbal' or formal, like that of Calvin. See *Inst.* 2.14. Bayne, cix.

conclusion fails to note Hooker's clear dependence on Thomas' account of the *suppositum*, which Hooker calls the 'whole person'.[19]

Hooker ends this Christological transition with a chapter of elevated style that treats of the three 'gifts' Christ has received: by the gift of eternal generation, Christ has received deity; by the gift of union, flesh is made one with God, which has bestowed supernatural gifts on human nature; by the gift of unction, our nature is blessed with power and perfection beyond its nature, since Christ's human soul is given universal (though not infinite) knowledge, and Christ's human body is given incorruptibility (but not ubiquity).[20] While one of his motives in this chapter is clearly to rule out Lutheran ubiquity, the chapter is a rich transfer of a clearly Thomistic material, included in part because of the emphasis on the grace of God in which the human being through the sacraments of Christ may participate.[21]

II. Sacraments

Hooker has usually been regarded as an important voice on the Anglican view of the sacraments. This attention is entirely justified, since a good portion of Book V of the *Lawes* is given over to a discussion of the points of sacramental practice questioned by those voices within the Church of England in the late sixteenth century that pressed for further reform of the ceremonies of the Church. And it must be kept in mind that Hooker's ultimate purpose was to defend the ceremonies required by the *Book of Common Prayer*, not to go beyond what the prayer book and the Church said. Like those who went before in the preceding decades, and those who came after for several centuries, Hooker was limited to finding an account of which the official formularies were patient. There was very little serious charge of deviation from established doctrine on the eucharist on the part of the authors of *A Christian Letter*. They did, however, bring up some charges of views incompatible with the earlier and official voices of the Church of England. Their precise complaints are the following:

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[19] *ST* IIIa q. 2 a. 3. George William Morrel correctly notes the consonance with Thomas, *The Systematic Theology of Richard Hooker* (Ph.D. dissertation, Pacific School of Religion, 1967), 63.

[20] *Lawes* V.54.1–10; 2:220–227.

[21] *ST* IIIa qq. 7–8.

14. Hooker teaches wrongly on the sacraments: he holds that the sacraments themselves have a mystical force and virtue; he teaches that they are marks to know when God *imparts grace* rather than seals to strengthen faith already given; and he treats them as necessary 'means conditional.'
15. Hooker teaches that the 'intention of the church' makes these actions sacraments, not the ordination of God.
16. Hooker makes baptism (not just predestination) necessary to salvation.
17. Hooker does not hold that transubstantiation is against Scripture; he holds the ubiquity of Christ's manhood; he holds that it is the co-operation of Christ's omnipotent power now rather than his institution that makes the sacrament Christ's body and blood for us.
18. Hooker refers to beliefs not in Scripture or the Creeds, such as angels' histories, the sign of the cross, grace conveyed in baptism.[22]

It is characteristic of Hooker's account to be comprehensive with respect to the wide variety of previous Reformation accounts of the nature of the sacraments, with the one exception of the Lutheran account of Christ's presence in the elements. Thus Hooker recognizes a wide variety of other views as correct, though perhaps not as perspicuous or adequate as his own. The sacraments can accurately be considered as bonds of obedience, obligations to charity, and as memorials; they are the analogues in the new covenant of the sacraments of the Old Testament; they are 'warrants for the more security of our belief'; they are marks to distinguish Christians from others.[23]

Hooker appears not ever to have committed himself to one precise definition of 'sacrament,' but it is clear that the general consideration beneath such a definition would be the distinction between the form and the matter of the sacrament, that is, the *word* and the material *element*.[24] In this, Hooker was deliberately following a line of thought that descended from Augustine through Peter Lombard. Thus, for instance, in arguing for the necessity of certain ceremonials, over and above the essential parts of the sacraments, Hooker cites Augustine on what is essential.[25]

[22] *FLE* 4:38–53.
[23] *Lawes* V.57.2; 2:245.
[24] *Lawes* V.62.14; 2:279–280.
[25] *Lawes* IV.1.2; 1:273.20–27. Augustine's dictum was a commonplace in the sixteenth century. The text is from *Homilies on the Gospel of John*, tractate lxxx.3: 'The word is added to the element, and there results the Sacrament, as if itself also a kind of visible word.' *NPNF*, 1st ser., vii, 344.

Hooker repeatedly refers to the sacraments as (outward) signs of grace conferred. A sacrament is both a visible substance and an invisible gift from God.[26] For instance, in emphasizing the *generality* of the promised grace, that is, that grace is promised *to everyone*, and promised *in every celebration* of the sacraments, Hooker writes, 'Sacraments are those which are *signes* and tokens of some generall promised grace, which alwaies really descendeth from god unto the soul that duly receiveth them.'[27] Thus sacraments are found among the wider variety of religious signs. In discussing public religious ceremonial, Hooker argues that, since godliness is the end of ceremonials, in public religious observance we are to seek matters consonant with the greatness of God, the dignity of religion, and the celestial provenance of grace, for 'signes must resemble the thinges they signifie.'[28] This conviction about signification, which was based ultimately on Augustine's supposed Letter 98 [*alias* 23] to Boniface, had been expressed consistently since Cranmer.[29] But the signification in sacraments, as distinct from other religious ceremonials, is always to something 'secret' or mystical.[30]

In fact, Scripture reading and preaching share a great deal in this regard with the sacraments properly so called.[31] Preaching and the sacraments both have 'generative force and virtue'.[32] But the sacraments do more than teach, which is the ordinary use of Scripture reading and preaching. As the opening passage of this section of *Lawes* makes clear, the Church nourishes its members by both word and sacraments (V.50.1) Hooker rejects Cartwright's view that the sacraments are not 'necessary' since teaching can be accomplished in other ways.[33] It is

[26] *Lawes* V.50.2; 2:207–208.

[27] *Lawes* IV.1.4; 1:276.14–16.

[28] *Lawes* V.6.2; 2:33.29–30.

[29] *Writings and Disputations of Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, Martyr, 1556, Relative to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*, ed. for PS by J. E. Cox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1844), 123f, 225.

[30] *Lawes* V.50.2; 2:207.19–27.

[31] *Lawes* V.21.5; 2:87.10–12. This 'concurrence' of the Holy Spirit with the administration of the elements, was precisely Cranmer's account of the way grace was conferred in the eucharist! Hooker, of course, goes beyond Cranmer in distinguishing the sacraments from the other ways in which God may 'spontaneously' act, and stresses instrumental relation, rather than mere parallelism, which Cranmer had opted for. See discussion of symbolic instrumentalism below.

[32] *Lawes* V.50.1; 2:207.15–19.

[33] See the references to Thomas Cartwright ii, 364; i, 158; and iii, 126 in Francis Paget, *An Introduction to the Fifth Book of Hooker's Treatise of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1899), 148.

not just that the sacraments teach the mind, by other senses, what the Word teaches by hearing, but rather that the words added to the elements teach something about the special and unique character of the elements in that use: '… that [the words of Jesus] might infalliblie teach what [the elements] doe most assuredlie bringe to passe.'[34]

That is, without the accompanying words, which make the elements a sacrament, we would not know the divine significance of the elements. Revelation is required to tell us what sense and reason cannot. One of Hooker's most complex analogies in Book I illustrates this: just as the sense tells us of the need for food, and reason the need for temperance with respect of food, so 'divine law,' that is revelation in Scripture, is required to tell us the significance of the bread and wine in the eucharist, which significance is consonant with the use and virtue of food discovered naturally by sense and reason, but is beyond what sense and reason can tell, though it perfects and sustains what is learned there.[35] The error of Lutheran and papist alike is not to recognize that without the word, we know nothing of the significance of the sacrament, and, for Hooker, Scripture is silent about the presence of Christ *in* the elements, so it should not be talked about.[36] Thus Hooker's view of the relation between reason and revelation is the basis for his 'tolerance' of transubstantiation and consubstantiation together with his insistence on the minimalist Sacramentarian view (which we shall examine presently).[37]

The authors of *A Christian Letter* were disposed to object to the apparent softness on transubstantiation implied by Hooker's minimalism. To tolerate transubstantiation in any manner, even though one did not adopt it, was giving away the principles of the Reformation.[38] Hooker's answer declares simply that transubstantiation is, he believes, false; but his point is that, since scripture does not teach it, papists should not make it a matter of faith.[39] Hooker balances his agnosticism about the presence of Christ in the elements with an assertion that, as signs,

[34] *Lawes* V.58.1; 2:248.30–31.
[35] *Lawes* I.16.7; 1:140–142.
[36] This sort of argument, from the silence of Scripture, is analogous to Thomas' on the question, 'whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?' *ST* IIIa q. 1 a. 3.
[37] *Lawes* V.67.6; 2:334.30–335.30.
[38] *ACL* 17; 4:47.4–13.
[39] *ACL* 17; 4:47.14–29.

they really *exhibit* the grace conferred in them, though we cannot know whether they contain that grace.[40]

III. Baptismal Regeneration

There were far more differences of opinion within the Church of England of Hooker's time about baptism than about the eucharist. In baptism there were divisive issues about doctrine involved in the interpretation of the rite of baptism, as well as of the accompanying ceremonies and practices. In 1549 Cranmer had provided a very conservative rite, based on the Consultations of Hermann of Cologne, and, in 1552, revised little of the words of the baptismal rite derived from this early Reformation source, except for the omission of a prayer of 'blessing' on the water. Thus the Church of England's baptismal rites retained a strong sense of medieval sacramentalism that Cranmer might have been quite unable to explain.[41] The rites, for instance, spoke strongly of regeneration in the rites themselves. This suggestion of regeneration accomplished in the administration of baptism was cause for a serious debate about the efficacy of the administration of the sacrament itself. Since the normal subjects of the sacraments in the Elizabethan period, indeed, the only sort of subject the Elizabethan *Book of Common Prayer* provided for, were infants, the rise of a Calvinist consciousness about election during the reign of Elizabeth raised a genuine theological problem. For clearly—so people assumed—not every child baptised was of the number of the elect. This raised a question Cranmer had hardly faced—he had been forced to fight the Anabaptist logic, not the Calvinist; he had built in an apology for infant baptism, but had not particularly attended to the question of the relation of baptism to predestination—leaving it for a new age to ask how a baby who was not, in fact, elect, could be said to be regenerated. This debate outlived the sixteenth century and flared up again in the nineteenth century in the controversy about the baptismal theology of Charles Gorham, a controversy into which Hooker was drawn by both sides.

There had long been objections to the 'interrogatories' addressed to the godparents at baptism, and even to the presence of godparents

[40] *Lawes* V.67.6; 2:335.6–10.

[41] Cyril C. Richardson, *Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist [Cranmer Dixit et Contradixit]* (Evanston, Illinois: Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, 1949), passim.

at all. Zwingli had abolished the office of godparent, but the other Reformers were more conservative about the inherited practices. All acknowledged that baptism was connected with faith, and it was an attractive and available suggestion to link the faith, in some way or other, with the godparents. Hooker noted that godparents were not strictly required for baptism. Whether there were godparents or not was not determined by the institution of the sacrament. It was a 'matter indifferent,' that human, that is, ecclesiastical, authority might determine, and had determined.[42] Hooker justified the office of godparent in several different ways. In the first place, the articles of faith were appropriately recited in baptism, even though the infant could not understand them, because infants are beginning to move to the habit of faith, whose profession characterizes the whole church.[43]

Hooker also follows early Reformers, and Calvin, in another type of justification of infant baptism, and argues that there is a covenant in baptism, analogous to that referred to in the circumcision of the older covenant, and in that respect, the children of believing parents are included.[44] Further, it is not the parents, but the church that offers the children for baptism, by the ministry of the presenters, who in that represent the church: because the godparents affirm the faith, we can observe that it is the church's act, not the candidate's.[45] Hooker then cites Augustine's letter to Boniface to support the position that 'in the answer the effect wrought through the Sacrament is taken into account.'[46] For Cranmer, the godparents are primarily public sureties to bring the children to confirmation, so that they may profess the faith we all hope God has given them by that time; for Hooker, they are symbolic—'effectually' symbolic of the Church—the 'seed' is conferred in baptism by a real infusion of grace, and that seed grows into the mature habit of faith in the Christian on the way, and, one is to hope, into the indefectible trust of the saint.

There is, of course, no salvation, that is, no justification, without faith. But both faith and sacramental administration are necessary.[47] Moreover, it would be foolish to expect actual faith in children, who

[42] *Lawes* II.7.3; 1:177.
[43] *Lawes* V.64.2; 2:294.27–295.21.
[44] *Lawes* V.64.5; 2:298–299.
[45] *Lawes* V.64.5, 6; 2:300–301.
[46] Paget, *Fifth Book*, 168.
[47] *Lawes* V.60.4; 2:257.7–258.1.

inevitably receive the grace of baptism, since they cannot raise any barrier or resist God wilfully.[48] Baptism must be considered as necessary for rebirth: Hooker takes the allusion to water and the Spirit in *John* 3.5 literally and as referring to baptism. But this, he believes, is the ancient interpretation and the unvaried use of Christ and his Church.[49] Considerations of 'equitie' include recognition of baptism by blood and by desire in unusual circumstances.[50] Yet the unbaptised infants of Christian parents are not to be thought of as beyond salvation; Christ's intention for them will not allow this to be said. We are to presume that the parents desired baptism for them. Thus, in this sense, 'grace is not absolutely tyed unto sacramentes.'[51]

Although, as we have noted, Hooker does use the argument of covenantal inclusion as part of the set of arguments in apology for infant baptism, it is clear that he considers it a weak argument. Thus he considers sound the judgement of the church of Geneva against John Knox on the question of the refusal to baptise bastards and children of papists, but he considers the arguments weak. The college at Geneva ruled against Knox on the grounds that God's promise included the children of the faithful 'to a thousand generations.' Hooker accepts the condemnation, but refrains from accepting this extension of the argument of covenantal inclusion. Rather, he believes that so long as the outward acknowledgment of Christianity is not clean gone and extinguished, the children may be baptised.[52] Hooker emphasizes not so much the covenant as the ecclesiastical exercise of baptism, which is exercised by the church, and in which the candidate really receives Christ.[53]

Baptism is admission into the visible church.[54] 'But our naming of Jesus Christ the Lord is not enough to prove us christians, unles we

[48] *Lawes* V.62.15; 2:282.1–9.
[49] *Lawes* V.59; 2:251–253.
[50] *Lawes* V.60.5; 2:258–259.
[51] *Lawes* V.60.6; 2:260.3–4. The use of this quotation by Bayford in defence of Gorham obviously ignores totally the context in Hooker: Hooker is examining a very limited list of exceptions to the universal necessity of baptism; and his list involves reducing the exception to cases of 'equitie,' that is the *fairness* of Christ, and the presence in the exceptions of what is presumed as necessary in the sacraments, aside from the form and matter. J.C.S. Nias, *Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter* (London: SPCK, 1951), 58.
[52] *Lawes* III.1.12; 1:203–204.
[53] *Lawes* V.57.6; 2:248.6–7.
[54] *Lawes* III.1.3; 1:196.3–7.

also imbrace that faith, which Christ hath published unto the world.'[55] Yet, 'although we know the Christian faith and allow of it: yet in this respect we are but entring; entered we are not into the visible Church before our admittance by the doore of baptisme.'[56]

But the doctrine of election is a problem; for probably not all that are baptised are elect. Yet the converse is true: all of the elect must be baptised. Election does not make the means of grace unnecessary, and sacraments are necessary to sanctification and the path towards glorification[57] The means whereby we are actually brought to enjoy what God has foreseen and decreed for the elect, involves the very participation, by growth and degrees, in the humanity of Christ, which the sacraments confer.[58] Although not all are so, we are to presume that those who have received the sacrament of baptism are elect. In this, we but follow Paul, who called Christians elect after baptism and the children of wrath before:

> So that by sacramentes and other sensible tokens of grace wee may boldly gather that he, whose mercie vouchafeth now to bestowe the meanes, hath also longe sithence intended us that whereunto they leade… Predestination bringeth not to life, without the grace of externall vocation, wherein our baptisme is implied… Wee justly hold [baptism] to be the doore of our actuall enterance into Gods howse, the first apparent beginninge of life,… but to our sanctification heere a step that hath not anie before it.[59]

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[55] *Lawes* III.1.5; 1:197.4–6. Quoted by Bayford in defence of Gorham; Bayford held that this was Hooker's earlier view, from which he later departed. Bayford also quoted two other passages: that from V.60.6 cited above (n. 51), and 'the doore of our actuall enterance into Gods howse, the first apparent beginninge of life, a seale perhapes to the grace of *election* before received.' (*Lawes* V.60.3; 2:256.23–25). See Nias, 58. We shall see that, so far as election is concerned in relation to baptism, there is another side of Hooker's view, which more clearly ties baptism and election.

[56] *Lawes* III.1.6; 1:197.23–26. Bayford also quoted this, but the passage surely suggests, in the context, that just as Philip needed to baptise the eunuch, so admission to the visible church is, in some sense, required. The whole matter rests on Hooker's view of the visible church.

[57] *Lawes* V.60.3; 2:255.13–256.1. See Neelands, 'Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and Invisible Church', *RHER*, 99–110.

[58] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:241–242.

[59] *Lawes* V.60.3; 2:256.10–26. Bayford, in quoting from this passage, omitted the crucial last phrase, 'but to our sanctification…' which affirms that no one is elect who does not, as it turns out, actually receive the grace that begins in baptism and no where else. Nias, 103, 139.

Here certain points of Hooker's view of election come to the fore: there is not given to any an infallible assurance here and now of his own election; grace is given even to those who do not receive efficacious grace; grace is resistible, but the elect are indefectible.[60] Thus Hooker could say that all who receive baptism receive grace, that all the elect receive baptism, and that not all that receive baptism are elect. Just as we are to presume our salvation from our hope that we will be saved, even though we cannot have assurance of it, as Hooker teaches in the sermons on Habbakuk, so we are to presume that all the baptised are of the elect, even though there is no certain sign that they are.[61] The *ordo salutis* contains vocation as well as election and foreknowledge. Vocation is heard and uttered 'after' natural birth.[62] The sacraments are, therefore, inevitably related to the grace of predestination, as indicating our vocation and the justification that is the beginning of sanctification, which is itself the path towards glorification in us.

Thus Hooker comes to defend Cranmer's rites with a view of grace that is somewhat different from Cranmer's. Cranmer's baptismal rite apparently ignores the question of the problem of relating baptism to election, and suggests that in baptism God's grace is universally offered to infants, and appropriated by the vows of the sponsors for the candidates. These assumptions were to become a problem once the Calvinist revolution had been absorbed, for it would be ridiculous to assume that efficacious grace was given to all infants who came to baptism.[63] Thoughtful Calvinists thus drove a wedge between the sacraments and the availability of grace. But Hooker did not: for him, not all grace is efficacious, so there is no hesitation to say grace is conferred on all in baptism. As well, for Hooker, God indeed does not desire the death of any sinner; in some sense, God really offers a sufficient grace to all. And Hooker inserts baptism within the *ordo salutis* itself; it is a 'necessary' part of our external vocation, and thus, far from being in tension with the doctrine of election, presupposes election. Hooker can agree, with the obvious sense of the words of the rites, and with the permission of the Elizabethan articles, which had removed the suspicion about 'the work

[60] See chapter VIII, Predestination, in this volume.
[61] *Lawes* V.64.3; 2:296.13–24.
[62] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:238.27–29.
[63] See R. I. Wilberforce, *The Doctrine of Holy Baptism* (London: J. Murray, 1850), 254ff, for a description of the 'Puritan views' on this matter rejected by Sanderson and Hammond.

wrought,' that God uses both sacraments as instruments of grace, which is inevitably offered. And, by distinguishing between efficacious and sufficient grace, and by denying to any but those in glory the assurance of salvation, he can offer a sensible account of the link between the (unknown) decree of election, and the necessity of baptism.[64]

IV. Eucharistic Presence[65]

The vocabulary of 'exhibition' earlier noted was typically Zwinglian at the beginning of the Reformation period, and was tied to a symbolist account. Hooker's view of signs is much more infected with Calvinism and a revived Platonism than the view of Cranmer and the earlier English Zwinglians. So for Hooker, *exhibition* can amount to instrumental effectiveness: a developed Calvinist view read into the earliest Zwinglian vocabulary. To illustrate this development, it will be useful to compare Hooker's views with Cranmer's.

Hooker explicitly rejects the early Zwinglian view that Cranmer had adopted, that Christ was *present in* the eucharist only in his divinity.[66] This was the significance Cranmer gave to his oft-repeated term 'spiritual presence,' and the view persisted perhaps in certain 'separatist circles,' in contrast to the dominant Calvinist view that was shared by the court party, the conforming Puritans, and the outright separatists.[67] For Hooker, as for most English Calvinists, we are related to Christ not just as souls to his divine nature, but through our bodies and Christ's as well.[68]

Thus, although it is important to remember that Cranmer had a strong sense of the significance of the Incarnation with respect to baptism, this link was abandoned when he came to speak of the eucharist.

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[64] See Neelands, 'Richard Hooker and the Debates about Predestination 1580–1600' *RHER*, 43–61.

[65] Although Hooker deals at considerable length with one of the two principal points of conflict about the eucharist in the sixteenth century, the manner that Christ is present in the eucharist, he appears to have very little concern for the other principal question, the eucharist as offering and refers only rarely to the eucharist as sacrificial: *Lawes* IV.11.10; 1:316.6–14, V.67.12; 2:343.19, and V.78.2; 2:439.3–7. For a treatment of these passages and of Hooker's position in the history of English debate on this subject, see Neelands, *Theology of Grace*, 227–236.

[66] Cranmer, *Writings and Disputations*, 3.

[67] See, for instance, the case of Robert Johnson in 1574, *ODNB*.

[68] *Lawes* V.56.9; 2:240.30–241.1.

For Cranmer, the *dwelling in Christ* which was mentioned (not brought to pass) in the eucharistic liturgy was equivalent to having faith: Christ's presence was 'spiritual,' that is, only through his *divinity*, and available only through the gift of faith. Hooker, by contrast, built his whole sacramental theology, and his ecclesiology, on the Incarnation, and clearly signaled his view by presenting a long and detailed summary of orthodox Christology as the preface to his treatment of the church and its sacraments. This emphasizes that, for Hooker, there is a *participation* of Christ's *humanity* in the sacramental gift, no less than his divinity. And, for Hooker, this gift of Christ's presence is far more clearly narrowed to the sacraments of the gospel, whereas Cranmer had attributed this *spiritual* presence to many other rites, and to private prayer.

Although this has been sometimes denied, Hooker is unmistakably, like Cranmer and Zwingli on the one hand, and like Calvin on the other, a 'Receptionist.'[69] The 'presence' of Christ—and Hooker will

[69] Hooker's Receptionism has been denied: 'It is hardly open to doubt that Richard Hooker *personally believed* in the *Real Objective Presence* sacramentally identified with the elements, previous to reception; but that, in the face of the state of the Eucharistic controversy in his day, he desired to divert attention from current contentions and disputatings.' Vernon Staley, *Richard Hooker* (London: Masters, 1907), 150ff. Staley quotes Hooker: 'This bread hath in it more than the substance which our eyes behold.' (V.67.12) John Keble was slightly more cautious, but equally unjustified: 'I will say at once that I do not agree with those expressions of Hooker which are commonly quoted in proof that he denied a Real Objective Presence. I question, however, whether he really meant to deny any but a gross, corporal, carnal Presence.' *Letters of Spiritual Counsel and Guidance* (London, 1885), cxxi; quoted in Staley, 153. In the Editor's Preface to his edition, Keble held that Hooker, although reticent on the Presence, affirms it. Keble believed Hooker was reticent to the extent that affirming a Presence would compromise the 'most true and substantial' manhood of Christ, as Lutheran Ubiquitarianism would do; hence, according to Keble, Hooker's 'limitations, under which the doctrine of the Real Presence must be received.' Editor's Preface, 45 (Keble 1:xci). It will be seen at once that Keble has misplaced Hooker's problem: Hooker is not trying to provide the account Keble gave at all, but rather remains loyal to the doctrine of the Church of England as he has received it, in its Calvinist period dress. J. R. Parris' assertion that Hooker insisted 'on a 'real presence' in the Eucharist which is nevertheless not to be explained in a corporal or substantial sense' is somewhat misleading, though in some sense true. As long as it is recognized that Hooker is a *Receptionist*, and actually denies our capacity to *say anything whatever* about a presence *in* the elements, the conclusion is not misleading. 'Real presence' usually refers to something more. Parris goes on to say: 'This third way [the Anglican *via media*], which refused to conform either to Zurich on the one hand or to Rome on the other, has remained to this day the most characteristic position of distinctively Anglican teaching.' J. R. Parris, 'Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist,' *Scottish Journal of Theology* 16 (1969): 164. This statement is seriously misleading. As we shall see, Hooker's '*Via media*' on the presence of Christ, would almost certainly enclose the contemporary English Calvinists, including most of the active separatists. In fact, after 1548, the view had been shared by Zurich too. Hooker

even call it the 'real presence', is to be looked for not in the elements, but in the worthy recipient: 'The reall presence of Christes most blessed bodie and bloode is not… to be sought for in the sacrament, but in *the worthie receiver* of the sacrament.'[70] The argument Hooker uses for this view refers back to a dispute about consecration that had taken place long before the sixteenth century, but which provided an argument for the Reformers: in the synoptic gospel versions of the institution of the eucharist at the Last Supper, Christ said 'take eat' before he said 'this is my body.' This suggested that the words 'this is my body' were to be construed as words of administration, not words of institution, and that Christ's words (*pace* Luther) should not be interpreted as indicating that Christ's body was present *in* the bread, but rather in the person as an effect of the eating of the bread.[71] At times, Hooker distinguishes 'real' from 'mystical': that the priest makes the 'real body' of Christ to be present in the elements of the eucharist is the Roman Catholic view, whereas his view is that God uses the elements as a means to make the 'mystical body.'[72] But at other times, he insists that in some sense, real and mystical are both accurate descriptions of the *manner* of the 'imparting' of Christ's whole person, human body and soul, and divine nature.[73]

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goes beyond Calvin principally in his account of the manner of the participation of Christ, not in his account of the *presence* of Christ in, or *effect* of, the eucharist.

[70] *Lawes* V.67.6; 2:334.30–32.

[71] Cranmer had offered a 'theory' of consecration, as the action of the minister in setting aside bread and wine for sacred use, particularly using Christ's words. From 1552–1559, the words, 'the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ…,' which are a third person version of Christ's words, 'this is my Body…' were not part of the words used at Administration at all. This suggests that Cranmer did not adopt this view of the words of 'institution.' Hooker apparently did not offer any account of consecration at all, but had he followed this argument for Receptionism from the synoptic accounts of the Last Supper to its logical conclusion, he might have provided the account of consecration later offered by Bishop Morton: consecration by giving thanks or blessing. See Richard Buxton, *Eucharist and Institution Narrative* (Great Wakering: Mayhew-McCrimmon, 1976), 112, 116.

[72] See *ACL* 4:46.1–3: 'Whereas popish doctrine doth hold that priests by wordes of consecration make the reall, my whole discorse is to show that God by the sacrament maketh the mysticall body of Christ.'

[73] 'These holie mysteries received in due manner doe instrumentallie… imparte unto us even in true and reall though mysticall maner the very person of our Lord him selfe whole perfect and intire.' *Lawes* V.67.8; 2:336.24–29. The passage is a description of the view of the 'Sacramentaries,' but it is clear that Hooker is both attempting to vindicate the view, and defending it as his own.

The elements are tokens *Christ* uses, *really to impart* himself in these 'heavenly mysteries.'[74]

But all are agreed on the *positive* assertion of Receptionism. For all parties to the disputes of the sixteenth century agree 'that the *soule of man* is the receptacle of Christes presence.' Some (and here Hooker includes himself and the Church of England) add a restrictive condition, holding that Christ is present 'whole' (that is, both God and man, and both human soul and body) *only* within the receiver; while others go further and assert a further presence of the body and blood 'externallye' seated *in* the consecrated elements themselves. This further assertion both the Roman adherents of transubstantiation and the Lutheran adherents of consubstantiation share.[75]

Hooker repeats the earlier Protestant comparison of baptism and the eucharist to show that it is as mistaken to see a presence *in* the elements of the eucharist as it would be to argue, as no one did, for a presence *in* the water of baptism: none of the disputing positions would speak of a *real presence* in the water, though the Church of England recognized that grace is conveyed in the sacrament.[76] In fact, Hooker insists, against the authors of *A Christian Letter*, that grace is conveyed in baptism, and that it must be, in some way, 'in' the sacrament, that is *by the means or instrument of* the administration of the sacrament, although not by virtue of the sacramental elements or the minister in themselves.[77]

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[74] Hooker defends the use of the Lord's Prayer, repeated by the people after the minister after communion, 'when together we have all receyved those heavenlie mysteries wherein Christ imparteth him selfe unto us and giveth visible testification of our blessed communion with him.' *Lawes* V.36.3; 2:148.15–18.

[75] *Lawes* V.67.2; 2:331.23–29.

[76] *Lawes* V.67.6; 2:334–335.

[77] 'What warrant have you of present grace in the verie work wrought of Baptisme?' *ACL* 18; 4:51.21–22. 'Warrant sufficient I hope for present grace in the sacrament. As for *in the very work wrought* they are not my wordes but yours. What mean you by this your glose? Doth it not show that in my speech there is lesse then you looked for? And therfore to draw it somewhat neerer to your own construction you help it with a word or two but so botchd that one peece will not hold with another. Had you placed ex opere operato where you use in opere operato, it might have stood you in more stead and yeat the labor all one. But in and ex make no great ods I suppose in your theologicall dictionary.' 51.23–53.5.

Hooker's manuscript note chides the authors for not distinguishing '*in*' from '*ex*,' hinting that '*in*' would have a tolerable sense, whereas '*ex*' would not. His earlier criticisms of the Roman view would indicate that the error involved is in assuming that the minister offers the grace by what he does, whereas the perspicuous explanation of the efficacy of the sacrament is to explain that God uses the minister's actions and the elements really to convey the grace.

As far as the *ministration* of the sacraments is concerned, Hooker calls them 'moral instruments.' They are 'moral,' in the first place, as part of human *duty*, since they are commanded in the dominical institution of them: 'morale, as beinge a dutie which men performe towardes God.' As Hooker explains it, this duty includes both the outward action and the inward religious affection to God, making the ministration an *opus operantis* and not a mere *opus operatum*, from the point of view of the minister. The sacraments are, of course, 'mysticall' as well, 'if wee respect what God doth thereby intende to worke.'[78] That is, the sacraments are *moral* and not *physical* instruments: their *use*, by worthy receivers, that is, by those who approach with respect, claims the conditional promise on God's part. They are thus the only *ordinary* means of God's grace.[79]

Thus the sacraments *in use* (as contrasted with the elements apart from the use) are inevitably effective in the worthy receiver, really conveying the grace they signify, and not merely 'remembering' or resembling it. Thus, sacraments are not only human actions, something we do, but something God does:

> For we all admire and honor the holy sacramentes, not respectinge so much the service which we doe unto God in receivinge them, as the *dignitie of that sacred and secret guift* which we thereby receive from God. . . . Sacramentes . . . consist altogether in relation to some such guift or grace supernaturall as only God can bestow.[80]

Because sacraments are something God does, through the agency of human ministers and human receivers, and through the instruments of material elements, it is absurd and annoying to hold that 'Sacramentes are not effectuall to salvation, except men be instructed by *preaching before* they be made partakers of them.'[81] For although Hooker has a clear notion that the grace is not conveyed automatically in the sacraments, since the human recipient may exercise 'contempt,' that is, put up an obstacle to the grace God offers, yet the sacraments are the principal and ordinary way such grace is conveyed: 'For all receyve not the grace

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The removal of the phrase 'of the woorke wrought' from Article 25 in the Elizabethan revision may have rested on some similar sense that the phrase had a valid use. The original version criticized the phrase as unscriptural, and obscure, and as leading to 'superstition,' presumably to a magical and Pelagian view of the sacraments.

[78] *Lawes* V.62.15; 2:280–282.

[79] *Lawes* V.57.5; 2:247.5–22.

[80] *Lawes* V.50.2; 2:207.27–208.2.

[81] *Lawes* V.22.17; 2:104.17–19.

of God which receive the sacramentes of his grace. Neither is it *ordinarilie* his will to bestowe the grace of sacramentes on anie, but by the sacramentes.'[82] This is a direct denial of one of Cranmer's principal themes, that the sacraments are occasions of grace, but that there are many equivalent occasions that are not sacraments. Hooker nonetheless adopts Cranmer's vocabulary of 'virtue, force and efficacy,' and is prepared to use of the *participation of Christ* in the sacraments and of effective grace available elsewhere. In the list of seven propositions all who dispute about the sacraments agree upon, Hooker's third is, 'that what *merit force or virtue soever there is in his sacrificed bodie and blood*, we freely fullie and whollie have it by [the sacrament of the eucharist].'[83] This seems to be a reference to the imputation of Christ's merit to those who worthily receive the sacraments: there is a forgiveness of sins and reconciliation with God, like that of justification. Hooker, nevertheless, does not restrict this vocabulary of 'force' and 'virtue' to the sacraments. Indeed, Christ is present in force and efficacy in everyone simply because of the taking of humanity in the Incarnation.[84]

The 'Virtualism' Cranmer defended as a view of the sacramental presence of Christ, Hooker sees as universal in application, and certainly not bound to the sacraments, although it may be 'applied' by the sacraments. Indeed, there are many sorts of spiritual 'virtue, force and efficacy.' Church buildings[85] and ordered common prayer[86] have such vital efficacy, which seems to involve little else than 'moving by efficient causality,' by stimulating dormant human spiritual capacities. Medicine thus has a natural 'vertue,'[87] as does the rhetorical effect of preaching, which, as the Puritans insist, has a 'force and virtue'[88] and 'a vigor and vitall efficacie.'[89]

Thus, for Cranmer, Christ's presence in the eucharist is a presence of 'force and virtue,' in the sense that the *merits* of Christ's saving death,

[82] *Lawes* V.57.4; 2:246.30–33.
[83] *Lawes* V.67.7; 2:336.5–7.
[84] *Lawes* V.55.9; 2:234.10–20.
[85] *Lawes* V.16.2; 2:61.5–9.
[86] *Lawes* V.25.1; 2:113.19–26.
[87] *Lawes* V.22.20; 2:108.20–23.
[88] *Lawes* V.22.19; 2:106.28.
[89] *Lawes* V.22.19; 2:108.4. Compare also the (privative) use of the phrase 'by force and vertue' in Hooker's denial that the hypostatic union *effects* an alteration in the human nature assumed by the Word: 'neither are the *properties of mans nature* in the person of Christ by force and vertue of the same conjunction so much altered, as not to staie within those limites which our substance is bordered withall.' V.54.5; 2:223.24–27.

which he accomplished in his body now glorified and in heaven, are available to faith, since faith justifies, and in justification Christ's merits are imputed to us, but this is a presence of force and virtue that could be anywhere, 'wherever' faith finds it to apply it. Hooker agrees, so far as the ubiquity of this 'force and virtue' is concerned, but disagrees as to the mode. For Hooker, this imputation is not the special nature of the 'virtue, force and efficacy' of Christ's body in the sacraments. For Hooker, the 'virtue, force, and efficacy' of the sacraments is a *real relation*, a connection in some sort of causal sequence, not simply the external 'imputation' of the 'virtue or merit' gained by Christ's body as a sacrifice.[90]

The basis for the conferring of any sort of grace on the human race is now the Incarnation of the Word who, taking flesh, assumed a human soul and a human body. Hooker spends considerable time dealing with the graces conferred on Christ's human nature, in order to identify Lutheran errors on the one hand, and to provide the Christological underpinning for the sacraments on the other. The natural properties of divinity 'be not communicable to mans nature, [but] the supernaturall guiftes graces and effectes thereof are.'[91] This echoes Hooker's Christology as we have seen it: in the hypostatic union, the grace of unction gives the glorified body '*vital efficacy*,'[92] though not ubiquity.[93]

Any discussion of the 'presence' of Christ presupposes, for Hooker, a discussion of how Christ is 'present' anywhere. This begins with the hypostatic union, by which God is in Christ, a 'medicine to cure the whole world.' But this medicine would be useless without being received; Christ's incarnation and passion are available to one's good only if one is a *partaker of Christ*, and only if Christ is *present*. Therefore, Christ must be 'in us.' In the first place, Christ is present *as God*, but not as man, to all things. This is Cranmer's view of the presence. But Hooker goes far beyond this mode of presence. Christ's human body has only local presence; neither the grace of unction nor the grace of unity changed this.[94]

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[90] Thus, for Hooker, the participation of Christ goes beyond Cranmer's type of 'Virtualism,' the participation in the 'virtue' and benefits of the Passion of Christ, who is 'present' in his divinity, by faith; Hooker's version of *Virtualism* is a participation of the *substance* of the risen humanity of Christ, the 'Dynamic Receptionism' of Bucer and Calvin. See Cyril Richardson, *Zwingli and Cranmer*, 20–23.

[91] *Lawes* V.54.5; 2:223.31–32.

[92] *Lawes* V.54.6–9; 2:224–226.

[93] *Lawes* V.55.4, 5; 2:222–224.

[94] See *Lawes* V.54.7–9; 2:225–226.

Christ's soul and body are now locally present in heaven only. Nevertheless, Christ's (undivided) Person *is present* everywhere by force of the deity with which the soul and body are united, and by co-operation, the humanity of Christ is present in that Christ exercises a universal government. Because of the conjunction with deity, Christ's human body has no limit in the effect of its sacrifice. This is the basis of the 'presence of force and efficacy' of Christ everywhere, not just in the sacraments. On the surface, this sounds, of course, very much like Cranmer, but is quite different, in that the link is the Incarnation, not the power of divinity to justify the faithful.[95] And, while Cranmer clearly affirmed the Incarnation, he made no connection between the doctrine and the partaking of Christ in the eucharist, for which he had a different interpretation. He would thus fall under Hooker's criticism of 'too cold' an interpretation of the relation between Christ and those who partake of him.[96]

If the incarnation is the basis of our partaking of the humanity of Christ, it is not the whole story. For there are 'degrees' of such partaking, and this must mean that we 'really participate' Christ by an impartation, and not just the imputation of the merits of his body's sacrifice. The key word here for Hooker is 'participation': 'Participation is that mutuall inward hold which Christ hath of us and wee of him, in such sort that ech possesseth other by waie of speciall interest propertie and inherent copulation.'[97] The notion of participation informs the whole Christological and sacramental section of the *Lawes* and is related to that of *causality*, as Hooker understood it. The effect participates the cause because the effect is 'in' the cause or source. Thus the Son and Father 'participate' each other.[98] The Son is in the Father by Being, but also

[95] *Lawes* V.55.1–9; 2:227–234.

[96] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:239.13–19. Cranmer had written, 'Where you say that Christ uniteth Himself to us as man, when he giveth His body in the Sacrament to such as worthily receive it, if you will speak as Cyril and other old authors used to do, Christ did unite himself to us as man at His incarnation.' *Writings and Disputations*, 170. See Editor's Preface 46 (Keble 1:xciii, n. 3) for further quotations from Cranmer. John Booty has argued for Hooker's debt to Cranmer, *FLE* 6(1):220–2.

[97] *Lawes* V.56.1; 2:234.29–31. Yet this 'mutual participation' is not a blending 'even as *reallie* and *materiallie* and *naturallie* as wax melted and blended with wax into one lump. . . . No *Christ is in us . . . not according to that natural substance which visiblie was seen on earth*: but *according to that intellectuall comprehension which the* mind *is capable of*.' *Pride* 5:326.30–327.15. In *Pride*, the real connection is downplayed in favour of reducing the significance of the natural.

[98] *Lawes* V.56.2; 2:235–236.

by Love.[99] But, through creation, God as Trinity and the creatures coinhere, since 'all thinges are . . . pertakers of God.'[100] But saving efficacy is also a form of participation.[101] Salvation is by actually participating in the church, in an actual adoption taking us beyond election, which is not sufficient itself for salvation.[102] In this adoption, we receive the 'quickening Spirit' of Christ.[103] Christ, as human flesh, is the 'vine' whereby our bodies, as branches, are quickened.[104] This quickening involves no 'mixture of bodily substance,' but a mystical participation of our flesh and Christ's. Christ 'imparteth himself by degrees' the participation in Christ being the real effects in us. All participate in Christ through creation and providence, but not all do so in salvation; and those who participate in saving grace, do so in varying degrees.[105]

This is obviously a long way from Cranmer's account, even from the residual element of incarnational doctrine in Cranmer's theology of baptism.[106] But Hooker interprets this view as one that all parties (except Zwingli and Oecolampadius) shared. Thus the first of the seven points of agreement, deals with the agreement that grace is imparted in the sacraments:

> This sacrament is a true and a reall participation of Christ, who thereby imparteth him selfe even his whole intire Person *as a mysticall head* unto everie soule that receiveth him, and that everie such receiver doth thereby incorporate or unite him selfe unto Christ as *a mysticall member* of him.[107]

The 'Sacramentaries'[108] might be thought to include both the Calvinists and the Zwinglians, as well as Hooker himself, and Hooker suggests that the Zwinglians may have been misinterpreted. But he does clearly distinguish his own from some supposed Zwinglian views.[109]

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[99] *Lawes* V.56.3; 2:236.
[100] *Lawes* V.56.5; 2:236.26–27.
[101] *Lawes* V.56.6; 2:237–238.
[102] *Lawes* V.56.7; 2:238–240.
[103] *Lawes* V.56.8; 2:240.
[104] *Lawes* V.56.9; 2:240–241.
[105] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:241–243.
[106] Richardson, 42ff, 51ff.
[107] *Lawes* V.67.7; 2:335.33–336.1.
[108] *Lawes* V.67.8; 2:336.24–29.
[109] J. R. Parris is wrong to conclude that Hooker linked Zwingli himself and the Calvinists under the name 'Sacramentaries,' and treated their views on the eucharist as identical. J. R. Parris, 155. As we shall see, Hooker distinguishes Zwingli (and Oecolampadius) from the 'Sacramentaries,' who include Calvinists and himself. In fact, the late Zwinglians had come to agree with the Calvinists, in the *Consensus Tigurinus* of

Thus Zwingli and Oecolampadius remain outside the 'consensus,' because of a tendency to treat the sacrament as 'a shadow, destitute, empty and void of Christ.' Within the consensus, however, there is, Hooker believes, general agreement, which he states using his own terminology of 'real participation'.[110] Without being further 'opened,' Calvin himself might be a clear adherent to the view of the participation in Christ, as he certainly was the exponent of the view that the elements were instruments used by God.[111]

Calvin's most distinctive account of the presence of Christ in the eucharist has recently been most usefully given the label 'symbolic instrumentalism.'[112] As was noted with surprise by earlier commentators, Hooker follows Calvin in this account and even uses Calvin's vocabulary.[113] Hooker thus owes a debt to Calvin in treating participation as a causal connection. Hooker accounts for Paul's 'realism,' in calling the bread and cup 'body' and 'blood'—a favourite text for the realists in the sixteenth century—not by emphasizing symbolism, but with a causal account. Paul calls them this because they are causally connected with our participation in Christ's body and blood:

> The bread and cup are his bodie and blood because they are causes instrumentall upon the receipt whereof the *participation* of his bodie and bloode ensueth. For that which produceth any certaine effect is not vainely nor improperlie said to be that verie effect whereunto it tendeth.[114]

Thus Hooker restates Calvin's Instrumentalism in terms of a metaphysical account of cause and effect. In describing the 'force of the sacraments,' which is tantamount to his account of the 'presence' of Christ in the eucharist, Hooker describes 'how they are effectual,' that is 'how they make us partakers of Christ.' Grace, he claims, is the end for which the sacraments were instituted; the matter of the sacrament, accordingly, 'signifieth, figureth and representeth their end,' that is, grace. The particular grace of the sacraments, as opposed to the wide

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1549, but Zwingli was by that time long dead. Thus Hooker could, without contradiction, agree with the Zwinglians and disagree with Zwingli.

[110] *Lawes* V.67.2; 2:331.20–24.

[111] *Inst.* IV.17.11; LCC 2:1372.

[112] B. A. Gerrish, *Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 166–167. It should also be noted that Hooker also illustrates the earlier, and less adventurous view of Zwingli and Bullinger, labelled 'symbolic parallelism' by Gerrish, but this cannot be taken as his preferred account. See *Dublin* 17; 4:119.2–5.

[113] Paget, *Fifth Book*, 180–182.

[114] *Lawes* V.67.5; 2:334.17–21.

variety of graces and participations available through other instruments, is 'that which worketh salvation,' and for that reason, is relevant only in this life. 'Sacraments be the powerful instruments of God to eternal life.' That is, the sacraments are the instrumental, formal and final causes of the grace they signify and effect. Then Hooker offers an analogy:

> For as our naturall life consisteth in the union of the bodie with the soule; so our life supernaturall in the union of the soule with God. And for as much as there is no union of God with man without that meane betwene both which is both, it seemeth requisite that wee first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the sacramentes doe serve to make us pertakers of Christ.[115]

This passage from the introduction to the discussion of the sacraments indicates in advance the theological structure that is involved. This structure would take Hooker beyond Cranmer, boldly to embrace the Calvinist revolution in eucharistic theology in England, but embedded in his theology of the Incarnation. For this 'participation in Christ' would involve more than 'the benefits of his passion,' more than the bare justification of the earlier English Reformation, obtained by the imputation of Christ's merits on account of our faith. Through the instruments of the elements of the eucharist, sanctifying grace is actually given, and the human being comes to share more and more, the glorified human life of Christ, until sacraments shall pass away, in the glorification of the world to come.[116]

Cranmer had left the Church of England a liturgy that spoke boldly of 'dwelling in Christ' even as 'he may evermore dwell in us,' and of 'our sinful bodies being cleansed by his body,' but his account of this indwelling fell far short of his liturgical words. One of the best approaches he could make to the account was the so-called 'Ratramnianism' of the two-level feeding: of the human body by the bread

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[115] *Lawes* V.50.3; 2:208.20–209.2. Thornton recognized, and then criticized Hooker's 'theory of instrumentality.' For Thornton, who is clearly disappointed that Hooker did not offer a 'Realist' account, and did not have any developed account of the eucharistic sacrifice, 'piety is no substitute for theological clarity,' and Hooker failed to draw the eucharistic implications of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Lionel Thornton, *Richard Hooker* (London: SPCK, 1924), 87ff. Undoubtedly, Thornton is correct about the account of the eucharistic sacrifice, but Hooker is (relatively) clear in the development of his account of the presence of Christ, and *in the context of the Elizabethan Church of England*, did indeed offer a cogent account, based on a current consensus. Further, it was an account that began with a thorough study of the Incarnation and grace, in Book V, chapters 50 to 57.

[116] *Lawes* V.67.5; 2:334.22–30.

and wine, of the soul by the faith that brings justification, 'the benefits of Christ's passion.'[117] But for Hooker, this is a shallow view. Nutrition, the feeding of the body, is a significant enterprise, a stage on the ladder of being, with its proper analogies with other stages. To speak, however, of any bodily feeding as having a bearing on the reception of Christ in the eucharist, except by a proportion, is simply foolish: Hooker is totally indifferent to any 'two-level' feeding whatsoever: 'The manner of theire [sacraments'] necessitie to life supernaturall is not in all respectes as foode unto naturall life, because they conteine *in them selves* no vitall force or efficacie.'[118]

This remark is, of course, directed against those who did find the grace of Christ contained in the elements. But it shows both utter indifference to one of Cranmer's favourite accounts, and undermines the whole theme of 'resemblance,' defended by Augustine's Letter to Boniface, upon which Cranmer's symbolist account was based. And Cranmer's Articles had clearly distinguished themselves from what must have been taken to be the inadequate side of Zwingli's account, that they are bare signs, or signs adopted by Christians to show others their profession, or to 'teach'.[119]

Hence Hooker can give the formularies a much richer sense than Cranmer could. Cranmer had very little sense of any imparted grace at all. He did come to the conclusion that God used the occasion of pious reception of communion to strengthen his gift of faith in the souls of the justified person, but God might choose any such occasion. God both imputes Christ's merits to justify, and demands the obedient reception of the sacraments in those so justified, and as well imparts sanctifying grace, such that the faithful recipient grows in that process of sanctification that leads to glorification. Hooker agrees, on the one hand, with Cranmer, that the signs are efficacious because of what God does, but, on the other hand, offers a far richer picture of what God does in granting grace, and limits the occasion much more to the sacraments than Cranmer would.

The authors of *A Christian Letter* taxed Hooker on this passage, and demanded to know 'where finde you that God *ordained the Sacramentes* to

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[117] Cranmer, *Writings and Disputations*, 15. See J. W. Bakhuizen van den Brink, 'Ratramn's Eucharistic Doctrine and its Influence in Sixteenth-Century England,' in G. J. Cumming (ed.), *Studies in Church History* ii (London: Nelson, 1965), 54–77.

[118] *Lawes* V.57.4; 2:246.25–28.

[119] *Lawes* V.57.3; 2:245.31–246.2.

tell us *when God giveth grace*?' Hooker defends his position on the basis of Cranmer's words in the Articles and St. Augustine.[120] And Hooker takes for granted that he speaks for a consensus in the Church of England, a consensus that has grown through debate through thirty or forty years. Significantly enough, this would place the beginning of the debate during the first decade of Elizabeth's reign, that is, it would exclude Cranmer from the debate![121]

The second part of the *Dublin Fragments* gives an account of 'the nature and number of the sacraments.' This section is less clearly directed as an answer to objections of *A Christian Letter* than the sections that precede and follow it. Although Hooker had been attacked in *A Christian Letter* for things he had written on the sacraments, particularly of their necessity, and that they did not follow but, in children, preceded faith (section 14), and for his apparent tolerance of Transubstantiation (section 17), the *Dublin Fragments* do not refer directly to these attacks, but rather seem to criticize Roman Catholic doctrines.[122] However, the *Fragments* may fit into the controversy precisely in relation to distinguishing Hooker's view from the Roman Catholic one. For Hooker, in declaring that the Church of England held a consensus on the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament, had seemed to the authors of *A Christian Letter* to adopt Roman Catholic views. In his response to *A Christian Letter*, and in Book VI of the *Lawes*, Hooker took the opportunity to distinguish his views from those of the Roman Catholics.

In Book VI, the treatise on Absolution, there is a passage that defends the Church of England from Cardinal Bellarmine's accusation that it accepted a Protestant view of the sacraments as 'naked, empty and uneffectual signs.' In this passage, sacraments are held to have the 'power of infallible signification,' because God unfailingly gives in them 'grace effectuall to sanctife'.[123] Thomas was wrong, the treatise continues, to see sacraments as signs which cause what they signify. He held that

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[120] *ACL* 14; 4:39.25–34.

[121] 'You speake of sacraments as if by the space of these thirty or fourty yeeres you had lived in some cave of the earth and never heard in what points the Church doth either varie or agree concerning them.' 4:38.11–14.

[122] Keble questioned the relationship of the section to the controversy around *ACL*, Editor's Preface 9 (Keble 1:xxvi). John Booty has recently suggested that this section was previously written, but notes that it is consonant with *Lawes* V.67 in that it avoids any attempt to define and overdefine, in that it emphasizes the mystery of Christ's presence, and in that it focuses the attention on the change in the faithful receiver, not on the elements. See *FLE* 4:xxvff, xlff.

[123] *Lawes* VI.6.10; 3:85.9–27.

they are instrumental causes of a preparation for grace, 'whereupon immediately from God doth ensue the grace that justifieth' [that is, that sanctifies]. Thomas erred in holding that in some inappropriate sense of 'cause,' sacraments cause what they signify, but Thomas recognized that sanctifying grace came from God and not from the sacraments. Hooker, as we have seen, had treated 'signification' as a real and causal relationship, in fact, as a relationship of instrumental, formal and final causation, but not as a productive or efficient cause. The treatise goes on to condemn a contemporary Thomist extension of Thomas' view so that grace itself becomes an immediate effect of the outward sign. The point this treatise makes in distinguishing the Roman Catholic from the correct view of sacramental grace is that sacraments have no vital force in themselves; rather, it is God who conveys grace through them. This is precisely what Hooker had contended as the view of the Church of England in Book V of the *Lawes*.[124]

The Church of England, adopting and developing the account of Calvin, accepts, with the Roman Catholics, that grace is conferred in the sacraments; it differs in construing the elements as moral instruments, not 'physical instruments' or causes, that is, in insisting that it is God that gives the grace, not the sacraments. This view, clearly enunciated in Book V of the *Lawes*, and directly contrasted with the Roman Catholic view in the treatise on Confession that now comprises Book VI, is precisely the point that Hooker takes up again in the *Dublin Fragments*. He seeks to put a distance between himself and what he takes to be the Roman Catholic view, possibly since the authors of *A Christian Letter* have accused him of un-Protestant views on the conferring of grace in the sacraments. Grace is conferred in the sacraments, and that is the witness of the Church of England, he replies, but it is not any 'meritorious habit,' or 'inherent quality' derived 'from the very sign itself as the true coefficient with God.' It is the will of God, the giver, not the efficacy of the sign itself, to which the grace is attributed. Peter Lombard had led the way in defining sacraments as 'signs which cause grace.' Thomas had supported the view but softened this dictum by defining the grace as a 'preparative quality in the soul.' Contemporary disciples of Thomas recklessly go further.[125]

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[124] *Lawes* V.57.4; 2:246.27–32. See also the view that baptism is not a *cause* of grace, but an *instrument or means* whereby we receive grace, V.60.2; 2:254–255.

[125] *Dublin* 18; 4:120.3–6.

Hooker then goes on to quote from recently published works of Roman Catholics that seem to report the view Hooker attributes to them. In making the signs causes of the grace they convey, such Romans Catholics simply create more obscurity: for they attempt to express what they admit they cannot understand. The fact that Hooker refers to material published only in the last decade of the sixteenth century, and that the marginal title in the manuscript refers to '*Modus quo Sacramenta conferunt gratiam*' suggests that this portion of the fragment was not previously written, but also belongs to the controversy about *A Christian Letter*, with which it is contemporary. The paragraph thus becomes an elucidation of Hooker's marginal note in *A Christian Letter*, recalling the authors of *A Christian Letter* to the consensus, shared with Calvin, and developed over thirty or forty years in the Church of England, on the 'manner in which the sacraments confer grace' and distinguishing this from erroneous and obscure Roman Catholic views.[126]

To return to Hooker's 'positive view of the presence of Christ' in the eucharist, we must consider that, in fact, Hooker has opted for one of the cases. After 'classic' Zwinglianism was discarded, in part because it was superseded by the work of Calvin and Melanchthon, there remained three basic accounts of the presence of Christ, the Romanist view of transubstantiation, the Lutheran view of consubstantiation, and the 'Sacramentarian view,' which Hooker does not otherwise name, but which since it identifies the presence of Christ as 'in' the worthy receiver, might accurately be called Receptionism.[127] Hooker's view was defended by showing that the other two positions were either clearly wrong, or at least lacked any shred of support in Scripture. The Sacramentarians held so much,[128] and Scripture teaches

[126] J. R. Parris' claim that, in rejecting the simple Zwinglian account, Hooker was 'defining his position over against the Puritans' is supported neither by the text, nor by the situation. Parris, 153. A few radicals, like Robert Johnson, were, perhaps, old-fashioned Cranmerian Zwinglians. Most were, like Hooker, some sort of Calvinist Receptionists. That this is so is clear from the complaints *and from the silence* of the authors of *ACL*.

[127] Darwell Stone, following Francis Paget, held that Hooker deliberately concealed his own views concerning the presence of Christ in order to produce a consensus. Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909) ii, 239. Stone's view was, in a way, in lineal descent from that of Keble but, as we have seen, it is as untenable as Keble's was. J. R. Parris correctly shows that, while Hooker has at least two 'tones of voice' on the question of the presence, one when he argues the *truth* of his own particular view, and another when he is 'primarily *irenic* in intent,' Paget and Stone have seriously misinterpreted Hooker. Parris, 159, 162.

[128] *Lawes* V.67.8; 2:336.

no more; Scripture gives no support for the view, shared by the adherents of transubstantiation and of consubstantiation, that there is a 'literall corporall and orall manducation of the verie substance of [Christ's] flesh and blood.'[129] Hooker must, in fact, show that the other positions are wrong or unsupported if he is to defend his minimalism. This is his point in the marginal note in *A Christian Letter*, where he was accused of being soft on transubstantiation.[130]

Hooker does more, however. He argues that those who support consubstantiation base their theology on the ubiquity of Christ's humanity, which he had already shown was based on an error.[131] And those who support transubstantiation do so by inventing a miraculous power of God, following 'upon the words of consecration.' But neither Scripture nor the witness of antiquity supports the view of transubstantiation.[132] Thus Hooker does commit himself to the Receptionism of the 'Sacramentaries,' which alone is defensible. As we have seen, he develops this view in its 'dynamic' form, following Calvin and the Calvinists. God inevitably offers participation in the glorified body of Christ, that is, sanctifying grace, to those who worthily receive, without contempt, the elements. This view advances the case far beyond what Cranmer could have accepted or even understood. It is clear that it represented a near consensus in the English church by the end of Elizabeth's reign. This point is significant. *A Christian Letter* does not question Hooker's view of the presence. On rather specious grounds, it suggests he does not condemn transubstantiation sufficiently. It also worries a little about the vividness of Hooker's account of the inevitability of God's grace. Hooker, however, does recognize that grace is not conferred if the recipient does not come in humility. And this whole section of the *Lawes* presumes a near uniformity in the Church of England on the interpretation of the significance of the eucharist, and a disagreement only about certain ceremonials. Hooker offers not one contrary opinion in his doctrinal sections on the eucharist, whereas the revealing initials

[129] *Lawes* V.67.9; 2:336.31–32.

[130] *ACL* 17; 4:46.6–11; 4:47.18–22.

[131] *Lawes* V.67.10; 2:337. See V.54.9; 2:226 and V.55.4, 5; 2:228–230 for the Christological errors of Lutheranism.

[132] *Lawes* V.67.12; 2:340–343. Hooker does vividly re-invent the language of transubstantiation by observing, in one place, that the transubstantiation is of us: '*the effect [of the sacrament] is in us a reall transmutation of our soules and boodies* from sinne to righteousnes, from death and corruption to immortalitie and life.' V.67.7; 2:336.7–9. See also V.67.11; 2:338.13–340.1.

'T.C.' appear very frequently in the chapters following, where disputed ceremonies are discussed.[133]

V. Hooker's Minimalism

Hooker repeatedly argues for what he takes to be the agreed consensus on the mode of the presence of Christ in the eucharist, among all but a few extreme Zwinglians. And he argues for it as the *highest* common denominator between three groups, Sacramentarians, Lutherans and Roman Catholics. This minimalist posture—to stand by the common elements of divergent positions—was an old theme in the Reformation.[134] And, indeed, there were many attempts to reconcile various opposing positions on the presence of Christ in the eucharist, both including the Roman Catholics, as at the meetings at Augsburg in 1530 and at Ratisbon [Regensburg] in 1541, and excluding them, as at the Colloquies at Marburg between Lutherans and Zwinglians. Indeed, the position of Bucer and Calvin might very conveniently be seen as an attempt to bridge the differences between Zwingli and Luther. The title 'Sacramentary' had been attached, as a term of abuse, to the view of Zwingli and others by Luther, and later to the Calvinist and Zwinglian positions together, by the Lutheran Westphal, in 1552. The Zwinglians tended to accommodate their account more and more to the Calvinist, so that divisions softened between them. Hooker repudiated, as had Calvin, the supposed Zwinglian view that the eucharist was 'a

[133] *Lawes* V.68; 2:344–359. This study thus agrees, in most respects, with those who have identified in Hooker a *Receptionism* rather than a realist account. But this Receptionism is of the 'Dynamic' kind, like the *Instrumentalism* of the Calvinists, and unlike the simpler Receptionism of Cranmer, that affirmed the action of God, but denied the relevance of the elements as instruments. We have also seen the sense in which Hooker offers an account of *Virtualism*, but again this is defined in terms of *participation* of the glorified humanity of Christ, not in terms of Cranmer's 'reception' of the benefits of the Passion, that is, remission of sins. See C. W. Dugmore, *Eucharistic Doctrine in England from Hooker to Waterland* (London: SPCK, 1942), 14ff, where Hooker is seen as a 'precursor of the 'central churchmen"; W.H. Griffith Thomas, *The Principles of Theology* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930), 388ff, where Hooker is seen as both a Receptionist and a Virtualist; Richard F. Buxton, *Eucharist and Institution Narrative*, 94–95, where Hooker is called a 'real receptionist.'

[134] In a rare quotation from any of the pre-Elizabethan English divines, Hooker cites John Frith on this point against the authors of *ACL* (see *FLE* 4:46.13–14). Frith was reported to have said 'I will not hold it [*real presence*] as an article of faith, but that you may without danger or damnation either believe it or think the contrary.' See Bayne, 377, n. 9.

shadowe, destitute emptie and voide of Christe,'[135] and he was not the first to suggest that later Zwinglians, the Sacramentarians, might not have said what was attributed to them by their Lutheran and Roman detractors; for an examination of their writings and the Marburg Articles of 1524 would show that they affirmed more than that the sacrament is a bare sign or figure, and that the eucharistic gift was more than the imputation of the merits of Christ's body and blood, that is, the views of Cranmer's generation.[136]

Hooker invites the whole Christian world, in effect, to an eirenicon on the disputed question of the mode of Christ's presence in the eucharist. And he puts his point most vividly in the mind of the worthy communicant.[137] The Christian is not to be like the people of Capernaum in *John* 6 but rather like the disciples in *John* 20: 'the one because they enjoyed not disputed, the other disputed not because they enjoyed.'[138] This minimalism is related to the attitude of *tolerance* advocated elsewhere in Hooker's program: for Hooker, '*zeale* hath drowned charitie.'[139] Suspense of judgement and the exercise of charity are recommended in matters of controversy.[140] In the Preface to the *Lawes*, Hooker had exhorted the separatists to peace and agreement.[141]

This minimalism, or apparent tolerance of opposing views, has often been treated as a significant and distinctive mark of Anglicanism.[142] And indeed, some have seen this, and not his theory of *real participation*, as Hooker's 'positive view of the presence of Christ' in the eucharist, that is the view that one is to refrain from making a judgement—to

[135] *Lawes* V.67.2; 2:331.19.
[136] *Lawes* V.67.8; 2:336.
[137] *Lawes* V.67.12; 2:342.31–343.5.
[138] *Lawes* V.67.3; 2:333.8–9.
[139] *Lawes* IV.1.1; 1:272.31.
[140] Compare the position of Erasmus in *De Libero Arbitrio* (1524). Hooker believed that the Elizabethan settlement, though a moderate Reformation, had brought peace and prosperity, unlike the more extreme movements. He concluded, 'it may be, that suspence of judgement and exercise of charitie were safer and seemelier for Christian men, than the whot pursute of these controversies, wherein they that are most fervent to dispute, bee not alwayes the most able to determine. But who are on his side, and who against him, our Lorde in his good time shall reveale.' *Lawes* IV.14.6; 1:343.3–8.
[141] *Lawes* Pref.9.1, 3; 1:51.24–53.15.
[142] D. R. G. Owen, 'Is there an Anglican Theology?' in M. Darrol Bryant, *The Future of Anglican Theology* (Toronto, 1984), 8ff. See also the opinion of Stephen Sykes: 'The historic Anglican position is acceptance of the institution of episcopacy and of the two gospel sacraments, but *toleration of disagreement on their interpretation*; and it needs to be said this toleration is *in itself* a highly significant ecclesiological matter.' S. W. Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (London: Mowbrays, 1978), 85.

enjoy the presence of Christ in oneself as receiver and not argue about it.[143] The view would become a point of apology for the Church of England in the succeeding generation and thereafter: that the Church of England defended what all the contending parties agreed about.[144] We have seen that Hooker had another 'positive doctrine' on the presence, and a clear one, but his minimalism is an important additional feature of his account.

VI. Conclusion

Some time ago, the claim was made that 'anglicanism' 'came to exist [in the Elizabethan church] largely because Hooker invented it.'[145] Although the author of this claim has since reflected that this was 'an unwonted and no doubt unwise experiment in sound bite history',[146] the claim is not false, and does not mislead if it is clearly understood that Hooker carefully remained faithful to the received doctrinal standards of the Church of England. Hooker's clear adoption of Cyrilline Christology repeated the dominant theory of the High Middle Ages, incidentally but accidentally allied him with Martin Luther, and set up his eucharistic theology in a special way. Later Anglicanism usually followed him in this model.

In sacramental theology, it was Hooker and not his opponents who spoke most cogently in defence of the authorized baptismal rite, though with a theology that was at marked variance to the theory of the rite's authors. In addressing the topic that had torn the Reformation apart sixty years earlier, Hooker sided clearly and intelligently with the party of the 'Sacramentaries' as fully developed in the *symbolic instrumentalism* of John Calvin.

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[143] '[Book V, chapter 67] is among the deepest and noblest parts of Hooker's work; it is pathetic to think how strenuously and earnestly he must have laboured for accuracy and balance in it, and how often a single sentence is recalled, as warrant for *ranking him with the disputants on one side of the very debate he wrote to deprecate*.' Paget, *Fifth Book*, 172

[144] 'All sides agree in the faith of the Church of England, That in the most Blessed Sacrament the worthy receiver is, by his faith, made spiritually partaker of the 'true and real Body and Blood of Christ, truly and really,' and of all the benefits of His passion.' William Laud, *Conference with Fisher*, 35 in *Works* (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1849) ii, 320f.

[145] Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?* (London, 1988), 227.

[146] Peter Lake, "The 'Anglican Moment" Richard Hooker and the Ideological Watershed of the 1590s', in S. Platten (ed.) *Anglicanism and the Western Christian Tradition* (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2003), 90.

None of this was Hooker's invention. His novelty, if that word is useful, was to be shown only in his resistance to the growing sense that preaching was adequate for Christian assemblies and that the eucharist did not make its unique contribution to the sanctification of all. His doctrinal conservatism was bound to disappoint later members of the Church of England who called themselves 'Anglican', as Hooker had not. Through its exposition in terms of Hooker's unique emphasis on the theory of *participation*, however, the theology most advantageous to what became 'Anglican' in the centuries to follow would be presented, without departing from the doctrinal standards, or the sacramental rites and practices, of the age in which he lived.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

ORDERS OF MINISTRY

Corneliu C. Simuţ

A Definition of Ministry

Richard Hooker begins the exposition of his doctrine of orders with a fundamental definition of Christian ministry.[1] He works from the assumption that all things pertaining to Christian ministry have a firm anchor in the very being of God.[2] This means that nobody can either claim or possess orders by his own proper power; rather they are obtainable exclusively by means of an external power, which is evidently the external work of God.[3] Moreover, Christian ministry cannot be conveyed in any which way, but only in a manner in accordance with certain regulations. Hooker is concerned to establish the exclusive character of the orders of Christian ministry by showing that a God perfect in all things appoints them. This is a clear indication that Christian ministry is essentially good and strongly rooted in the revelation of God because all human beings benefit from the light of God's truth.[4] It is equally important for Hooker to explain that Christian ministry is fundamentally soteriological because initiated by God's mercy and God's authority. Those who work in Christian ministry are foremost ministers of God,

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[1] Pastoral ministry was very important for Hooker. His early works are actually sermons offering details about the doctrine of salvation. See for details Corneliu C. Simuţ, *The Doctrine of Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 1.

[2] Hooker believed in a divinely appointed ministry. See L. S. Thornton, *Richard Hooker: A Study of his Theology* (London: SPCK, 1924), 91, and Simuţ, *The Doctrine of Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker*, 17.

[3] More details about the external work of God can be found in W. J. Torrance Kirby, *The Theology of Richard Hooker in the Context of The Magisterial Reformation*, in *Studies in Reformed Theology and History* 5 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary Press, 2000), 27–28.

[4] Christian ministry has authority because it is part of revelation, which is a divinely guided process. See Egil Grislis, 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Hooker,' in W. Speed Hill (ed.), *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of his Works* [*SRH*] (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972), 190.

not of men, and they must always be accountable to God himself and his spiritual authority, an authority exercised by Christ in the church without any mediation.[5] In other words, the ministers of the church are servants of God, not mediators between God and humanity. The ministry of God is spiritually oriented because it has to do with the souls of men and women. Hooker underlines that God's ministry is spiritual because God alone is the father of all spirits and Jesus Christ has purchased the souls of human beings.[6]

For Hooker, Christian ministry is dependent on God in all respects for the simple reason that Christ himself, who is the Lord of the church, commanded his ministers to feed the church, preach the Word of God, baptize and forgive sins in the name of God, and administer the Eucharist in remembrance of Christ.[7] Hooker is very clear about the fact that these are not human instructions but divine commands. This is another indication of the soteriological essence of God's ministry. Hooker highlights that the ministry of God is utterly concerned with the salvation of man, and thus depends upon the dialectics of humanity and divinity. Actually, Christian ministry originates in God's salvation and it is concerned with man's transfer from darkness to glory and from earth to heaven. It is important to observe, however, that Christian ministry does not only involve man's upward movement from the reality of history to the reality of God but also God's downward movement from his divine existence to the historical life of humanity.[8]

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[5] See also W. J. Torrance Kirby, 'The Paradigm of Chalcedonian Christology in Richard Hooker's Discourse on Grace and the Church,' *Churchman* 114.1 (2000): 39.

[6] *Lawes* V.77.1; 2:424.8–29.

[7] For details about Hooker's doctrine of the Eucharist, see Egil Grislis, 'Reflections on Richard Hooker's Understanding of the Eucharist,' in W. J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation* [*RHER*] (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 207–223. See also John E. Booty, 'Hooker's Understanding of the Presence of Christ in the Eucharist,' in John E. Booty (ed.), *The Divine Drama in History and Liturgy: Essays Presented to Horton Davies on his Retirement from Princeton University* (Allison Park: Pickwick Publications, 1984), 131–148; J. R. Parris, 'Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist,' *Scottish Journal of Theology* 16 (1963): 151–165; and Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, vol. I–II (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), 239–247. According to Hooker, the Eucharist should not be over-emphasized to the detriment of preaching. See *Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith*, A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1981), 102.

[8] For more information about Hooker's idea of humanity as historical beings, see Rowan Williams, 'Hooker: Philosopher, Anglican, Contemporary,' in Arthur Stephen McGrade (ed.), *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1997), 375.

This clearly means that there is a continuing interaction between the transcendent God and natural order.[9] Thus, salvation and Christian ministry are both God's initiative. Only God can bestow the power of salvation and the power of Christian ministry. Hooker explains that Christ grants the power of Christian ministry directly for the benefit of the church. Nevertheless, for Hooker the power of Christian ministry is not for everybody but only for some people who are set apart from the rest of the membership of the visible church, consecrated for the service of God as a special order. Thus, in the church there are two categories of people: laity and clergy. At this point, Hooker does not say anything about laity but he makes clear that clergy is the order of God, which has—directly from God—the spiritual power to do the holy things of God or the affairs of God.[10]

Because Christian ministry is a special power given to special people, it follows that Christian ministry is a special calling which requires a special responsibility from the clergy. Thus, the members of the clergy may not give up the ministry of God whenever they feel like or use it for personal purposes of any kind. They cannot walk away from the ministry and then come again at their own convenience; they must stick to it, behave responsibly and show a constant attitude of daily consecration towards all the aspects of Christian ministry. This indicates that the power of Christian ministry gives the clergy a certain status before God. From this perspective, once consecrated for the service of God they belong to God forever because no human being has the power to break what God himself has done. This, however, is only from the divine perspective. Hooker is very realistic about the actuality of human nature, a condition not avoidable by the members of the clergy. Regardless of how special they are as God's special order, the members of the clergy share the same corrupt human nature with everybody else, and so they are capable of committing grave sins affecting their ministry. This effectively compromises their ministry and they must never be admitted back into service. Hooker does not give many details about the precise circumstances leading to the removal of clergy from ministry. However, he does mention heresy and the lack of constancy

[9] Bruce Kaye, 'Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity*,' *The Journal of Religious History* 21.1 (1997): 95.

[10] *Lawes* V.77.1, 2; 2:424.30–425.30.

in professing the Christian faith[11] as a disgrace to a vocation in the service of God. The application of church discipline to the members of the clergy who have failed in their task must be undertaken with utmost care. Each case must be addressed individually because the same degree of severity cannot be applied to everybody. It is necessary to hold clemency and rigour in balance. Too much rigour can lead to unjust decisions while too much clemency can make discipline futile. Eventually though, discipline must be applied so that the person involved is drawn back to the church, not helped to grow more obstinate in sin. Readmission of the sinful clergy into the church and reconciliation with the church must be done only after a full confession of sins and they do not mean reestablishment into the service of God.[12]

The Role of the Holy Spirit in Ministry

Hooker's doctrine of the orders of Christian ministry is thoroughly pneumatological. Those consecrated for the ministry of God receive the Holy Spirit and his spiritual gifts.[13] Hooker denies that these spiritual gifts involve extraordinary abilities to work miracles, speak in tongues or cure illnesses. On the contrary, he views them as conferring authority and power to the clergy who minister for the church. Thus, Christian orders are not to be taken lightly because they originate in the being of God as they are given by Christ himself in the Spirit for the special service of God. Thus, Hooker does not only emphasize the pneumatological dimension of Christian orders but also their Trinitarian essence.[14] The members of the clergy have the authority of the Holy

[11] The outward profession of faith must be accompanied by an inward process of sanctification. See W. J. Torrance Kirby, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 73. Moreover, profession of faith is a sign of the visible church. See W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, *Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker* (London: The Athlone Press, 1980), 178–179.

[12] *Lawes* V.77.2–4; 2:425.31–427.17.

[13] The power of the Holy Spirit for ministry is given only to those who benefited from the power of the Holy Spirit for salvation, are part of the body of Christ, the church, and the restoration of the image of God in them has already begun. See Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology. A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 194.

[14] Hooker will identify the orders of Christian ministry a bit later but one cannot overlook the resemblance, perhaps unintentional, between the threefold organization of Christian orders (apostles—to be replaced by bishops, presbyters and deacons) and the existence of God as Holy Trinity. For details about Hooker's doctrine of the

Spirit, which is also the authority of Christ and God the Father. Hooker explains that this divine authority shows itself practically in the 'power of the keys' of the kingdom of heaven. Likewise, the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven is the authority over the souls of men and women only in the sense that the clergy receive delegated authority to give men the graces of God. Hooker warns that the members of the clergy must not be confounded with Christ himself. The clergy do not perform the work of God; they only serve God. Thus, the power of the keys is a delegated authority; it does not originate in the clergy but in Christ who delegates the clergy to serve the church.[15]

Hooker knows that serving God in the church is not an easy task, so the members of the clergy need the assistance of God through the spiritual gifts of the Holy Spirit. These gifts are given as a free donation based on the grace of God. This is a constant reminder for the clergy that no matter how heavy the burden of serving God in the church really is, God will always support those who work for him faithfully. The idea of faithfulness is vital here because it links directly to the reality of God's presence in the clergy through the Holy Spirit and, by extension, in the whole church as the congregation of the faithful.[16] Hooker is convinced that the person of the Holy Spirit is actively present in every member of the clergy who ministers for God faithfully. The presence of the Spirit is there to offer guidance and strength to the clergy in all respects but also to support them by assigning authority to their actions. In other words, the ministry does not pertain properly the clergy but rather belongs to God. What Hooker wants to say here is that all the aspects of Christian ministry and all the deeds of the clergy are the very work of God. It is God who works through the clergy, and not the other way around. This makes Christian ministry the office with the highest authority on earth, so the members of the clergy are subject to nobody but God himself in the exercise of their spiritual ministry.[17]

Trinity, see W. J. Torrance Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 48–49, and Edmund Newey, 'The Form of Reason: Participation in the Work of Richard Hooker, Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth and Jeremy Taylor,' *Modern Theology* 18.1 (2002): 6.

[15] *Lawes* V.77.5–7; 2:427.18–429.24.

[16] See also Kirby, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy*, 70.

[17] *Lawes* V.77.8; 2:429.25–430.26.

The Way to Enter Ministry

If God himself is the final authority and he calls people in the service of Christian ministry, how can one enter the order of clergy? Any man who wants to be part of the clergy must listen to the voice of God calling him,[18] then he must desire to serve God in ministry, and finally he must have the public recognition of the church for service. The church, however, cannot accept somebody as clergyman on its own right but it needs to recognize his spiritual gifts and desires for ministry in the name of its Lord. So it is the Lord acting through the church who calls, ordains and confirms individual ministers in the orders of Christian ministry for His service. Nobody can assume ecclesiastical dignities and spiritual offices unless called by God. One's calling to ministry, however, must be visibly checked by the church so that all who wish to be ordained for invalid reasons (such as pride and worldly aspiration) should not be accepted for office. Hooker insists the achievement of this end by means of letters of information, which are meant to confirm that the candidate for ministry is suitable for the task laid before him.[19] Thus, through its representatives who wrote testimonial letters about the candidate for ministry, the church acknowledges his most sincere desire to serve God in the power of Christian ministry without ambition and a bunch of other wrong reasons:

> Power therefore of ecclesiasticall order maie be desired, the desire thereof maie be professed, they which professe them selves that waie inclined maie endeavor to bring theire desire to effect, and in all this no necessitie of evell. Is it the bringing of testimoniall letters wherein so greate obliquitie consisteth? What more simple, more plaine, more harmless, more agreeable with the law of common humanitie then that men where they are not known use for theire easier accesse the credit of such as can best give testimonie of them? Letters of anie other construction our Church discipline alloweth not, and these to allow is neither to require ambitious suinges nor to approve anie indirect or unlawfull act.[20]

In the end, however, we must understand that only Christ elects for ministry; we do not and we cannot choose him or the ministry. Every

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[18] God's calling for salvation seems to work similarly with God's calling for ministry. For details, see Corneliu C. Simuţ, *Richard Hooker and his Early Doctrine of Justification. A Study of his* Discourse of Justification (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 80.

[19] *Lawes* V.77.9; 2:430.27, V.77.12; 2:433.14.

[20] *Lawes* V.77.10; 2:432.8–18.

individual who wants to serve God in Christian ministry is chosen directly by Christ following the pattern of the election of the apostles.[21] Christ elects those whom he wants in his service irrespective of their merit, worth and suitability for the job. Actually, those chosen by Christ do not even meet the minimum of requirements in the eyes of men, so they are most unlikely to fill the position if we apply human standards to them. Christ, however, works differently and he elects persons whom he later on empowers for his ministry. What he requires from them is modesty, meekness and an earnest desire to serve him. Nevertheless, these conditions do not seem to be sufficient because Hooker highlights that they must never lead to self-contentment but always to repentance. He is aware that, from a purely human perspective, it is very difficult if not almost impossible to differentiate between ambition and modesty when it comes to one's expressed desire to serve God in Christian ministry. Actually, Hooker knows very well that, in the case of Christian ministry, both ambition and modesty have the same purpose. For instance, one person could desire to serve God out of ambition, while another one really wants to serve God with a modest heart; regardless of their specific attitudes, they both want to serve God. What eventually makes the difference between the two is their means of pursuing their goal. For Hooker, it is very hard to maintain a sound balance between ambition and modesty. Such a balance, however, is a necessity in every man's desire to serve God in the order of clergy. This is why Hooker recommends moderation in seeking the will of God for service in Christian ministry. Two extremes must be avoided in connection to one's willingness to serve God: the desire to be part of the clergy without conscience as if such an ecclesiastical dignity were deserved, and conversely the decision to avoid the spiritual office out of pride as if nobody is totally worthy to serve God this way.[22]

Essentials of Ministry

Hooker is aware that no human being is entirely worthy to qualify for being a minister of God in the church but he is keen too underline that the final decision regarding the issue of Christian ministry belongs to

[21] It seems that election for ministry works exactly like election for salvation. For details about election, see Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 178.

[22] *Lawes* V.77.13, 14; 2:433.15–435.19.

God, who chooses those whom he wants for service. From this perspective, ministry has some essential features. Thus, it is vital to see here that God's election for ministry is part of God's providence in all the minute details making up the service.[23] In order to explain the connection between God's election and providence in ministry, Hooker fosters the historical example of the ancient people of Israel.[24] The idea of divine election is evident in every aspect of their ministry to God as described in the Old Testament. Thus, Hooker notices that God only chose one tribe, that of Levi, out of the twelve and appointed it to serve him. Then, God chose Aaron and his sons for one task and the rest of the tribe for another task. Aaron and his successors as high priests and ministers in the Temple exemplify this notion of God's election. God chose them to attend every Sabbath and celebration day. They were also chosen to reconcile both themselves and the people with God, to confess the sins of the people, to place the sins upon a scapegoat and take them out of the camp, to purge the temple from uncleanness, to enter behind the veil, to stand before the mercy seat, and to consult the Oracle of God. These were the specific duties of the high priests, yet chose and instituted with a view to the right performance of the divine service. Likewise, God chose the remaining Levites to do other tasks at the temple such as minister every morning and evening, prepare the table of the Lord every Sabbath, make sure that pure incense is burned in remembrance of God's mercy taking care of them in every aspect of their lives, and in performing the sacrifice ritual daily. Then, Hooker explains other details of divine ministry with reference to the election of the prophets, who were called by God to offer instruction, and later on of Scribes, whose task it was to interpret and expound the law of God. None of these details was identified in vain, because each one of them is there in order to show that God's election and providence are tightly connected in ministry. In other words, divine ministry is not a random reality but rather something which has always been in God's plan for humanity. Moreover, ministry is not to be performed in accordance with what men think but with all the instructions of God, which are given in carefully thought details. The last but certainly not least important observation is the fact that a clear order of hierarchy

[23] The same is true with reference to the election for salvation. See Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology*, 241.

[24] In Hooker, the providence of God is actively manifested in history. See Simuţ, *Richard Hooker and his Early Doctrine of Justification*, 89.

was designed for divine ministry. Thus, the high priests preside over the priests, the prophets and the interpreters of the law.[25]

The Orders of Ministry

The next step for Hooker is to talk about the orders of Christian ministry, which are divided into laity and clergy, as subject to God's providence.[26] He specifically mentions that the clergy are composed of presbyters and deacons. Hooker is very careful here to make sure that the word 'priest' is not used to designate the leaders of the people of God. He prefers the word 'presbyter' instead of 'priest' because the priest is one who offers sacrifices whereas the minister of the Gospel has no such office.[27] For Hooker, the question of nomenclature is clear: because sacrifice is not part of the ministry of the church, the word 'priest' must not be used in connection to Christian service.[28] Furthermore, it is appropriate to use the word 'presbyter' instead of the word 'priest,' because the designation 'presbyter' alone can claim the support of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Hooker explains that a 'presbyter' is a 'fatherly guide', and as we are the sons of God, it is even natural to use the word 'presbyter' in order to designate the leaders of God's family. He also stresses that the New Testament never uses the word 'priests' to refer to 'presbyters' and that this is not just a human coincidence but divine truth. Hooker's argument here is strongly pneumatological because he insists that the Holy Spirit spoke in the New Testament and, if the New Testament does not mention 'presbyters' as 'priests', then it is surely the will of God that his ministers should be called 'presbyters', not 'priests'. So, the 'presbyters' are the fatherly guides of God's family, because ordinary Christians are the sons of God due to their ministry and they protect their souls from whatever errors which

[25] *Lawes* V.78.1, 2; 2:435.22–437.6.

[26] There is in Hooker a close connection between the providence of God and the development of ecclesiastical order. See Kaye, 'Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity*,' 85.

[27] See also Simuţ, *Richard Hooker and his Early Doctrine of Justification*, 71; Simuţ, *The Doctrine of Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker*, 183; Charles H. George and Katharine George, *The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation 1570–1640* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 323.

[28] *Lawes* V.78.2; 2:437.7–438.22.

could put their souls in danger.[29] This means that presbyters received the power of spiritual procreation directly from '*our Savior Jesus Christ*' and their duty is to exercise pastoral care over the children of God.[30] In Hooker's words:

> Although in truth the word *Presbyter* doth seeme more fitt, and in proprietie of speech more agreeable then *Priest* with the drift of the whole gospell of Jesus Christ. For what are they that imbrace the gospel but '*sonnes*' of God? what are Churches but his families? Seeing therefor wee receive the adoption and state of sonnes by theire ministerie whome God hath chosen out for that purpose, seinge also that when wee are the sonnes of God, our continuance is still under theire care which were our progenitors, what better title could there be given them then the reverende name of *presbyters* or fatherlie guides? The holy Ghost throughout the bodie of the nue testament making so much mention of them doth not any where call them Priestes…*A presbyter* according to the proper meaning of the nue testament *is he unto whome our Savior Christ hath communicated the power of spirituall procreation*.[31]

Hooker makes a parallel between the twelve patriarchs of Israel and the twelve apostles of the church. Thus, the twelve patriarchs are the fathers of Israel, the old Jerusalem by natural birth, while the twelve apostles are the fathers of the church, the new Jerusalem by heavenly birth. At this point, Hooker leaves aside his discussion of the exemplar of the ministry of the Old Testament and begins to explain the ministry of the church proper. According to Hooker, the church had two kinds of presbyters during the time of the apostles: superior presbyters and inferior presbyters. This is because the twelve apostles used the word 'presbyter' both for themselves and for other leaders of the early church. There was a difference, however, between the apostles and these other leaders. The apostles were superior presbyters because they had received the fullness of spiritual power by direct revelation from Christ himself. The remaining leaders were inferior presbyters because of their appointment to care for the people of God, which was constantly growing in numbers, owing to the fact that the original twelve apostles were insufficient to such a tremendous task. So, the first presbyters—i.e.

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[29] Kenneth A. Locke, 'Equal Ministries: Richard Hooker and Non-episcopal Ordinations,' *Anvil* 14.3 (1997): 179.

[30] Deborah Shuger, "'Societie Supernaturall': The Imagined Community of Hooker's *Lawes*," in Arthur Stephen McGrade (ed.), *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1997), 324.

[31] *Lawes* V.78.3; 2:439.14–29.

the apostles—were originally elected directly by Christ while he was still on earth in order to provide for the spiritual welfare of the people of God by preaching the Gospel,[32] praying, and baptizing. The presbyters, however, proved not to be sufficient for the increasing demands of the ministry after the Lord's ascension to heaven, and so they in turn elected deacons as recorded in the *Acts of the Apostles*. Hooker does not forget to highlight that there is a fundamental difference between presbyters and deacons: the former were elected directly by Christ before his ascension, while the latter were elected by the apostles after his ascension. While this distinction seems to be important for Hooker, he nevertheless admits that the duty of deacons is fundamentally important for the church. Deacons were initially elected to assist the apostles in ministering effectively to the people in the sense of taking care of the goods of the church and providing for the poor, nonetheless they gradually began to assist the presbyters in their more spiritual duties. Thus, deacons were soon involved in preaching the Gospel because the presbyters were not able to do this job properly owing to the increasing number of people who joined the church. So, for Hooker, all the members of the clergy, presbyters and deacons, must be involved in serving the church by preaching the Gospel.[33]

The Necessity of Ordination in Ministry

The clergy, however, must be ordained for ministry in order to function properly and lawfully because the ordination conveys power and authority to ministers directly from God.[34] In order to explain the necessity of ordination, Hooker resorts again to the historical situation of the early church when the apostles were joined by seventy presbyters and then by seven deacons to assist both. This means that the apostles as superior presbyters, and the seventy presbyters as inferior presbyters, constituted the officers of the church, while the seven deacons were

[32] See also Brian Vickers, 'Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker's *Lawes*,' in Arthur Stephen McGrade (ed.), *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1997), 101.

[33] *Lawes* V.78.3–5; 2:439.30–441.33. See also J. Robert Wright, 'Richard Hooker and the Doctrine of Cumulative or Sequential Orders,' *Sewanee Theological Review* 36.2 (1993): 250.

[34] See Stephen Sykes, 'Richard Hooker and the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood,' *Sewanee Theological Review* 36.2 (1993): 210.

the under officers. Once again, Hooker emphasizes that deacons were admitted to preach the Gospel and in addition that they had responsibility for their work at serving tables and with the poor. Thus, for Hooker, the church has always had only two categories of clergy: presbyters (the apostles as superior presbyters and then the ordained presbyters as inferior presbyters, but presbyters nevertheless) and deacons. Moreover, he is convinced that every ecclesiastical title employed by Scripture to designate ministers—such as evangelists, prophets and teachers—is to be interpreted as referring to the general category of presbyters. Hooker explains that, according the practice described in the New Testament, the prophets of the early church were not ordained as presbyters; nevertheless, they received the special gift of preaching Scriptures and foretelling the things to come. Consequently, they could not function as presbyters of the church unless ordained to do so. If ordination was to be granted to some, those chosen for service in the church could only be ordained as presbyters due to their capacity to expound Scriptures, which has full authority over the church.[35] By this reasoning, in the church prophets can only be presbyters. The same is true of evangelists. According to Hooker, evangelists are very important presbyters originally sent by the apostles to preach Christ and his Gospel in foreign lands to people who had never heard it before. He interprets other ministerial titles in Scripture—pastors and teachers for instance—as referring to presbyters. Thus, Hooker insists that all these church titles—evangelists, prophets, pastors and teachers—point to the office of presbyters. It seems that the titles of evangelists, prophets, pastors and teachers reveal specific ministries of the church based on particular spiritual gifts, so that one person may have either some or all of them, but that person is undoubtedly a presbyter.[36]

It is evident for Hooker that these four categories of Christian service are all manifestations of divine grace, so they must work for the benefit of the body of Christ, which is the church.[37] Thus, only people saved by God's grace can be ministers in the church because there is no membership in the body of Christ without participation in Christ

[35] For details concerning the authority of Scripture in Hooker see Nigel Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason: Reformed Theologian of the Church of England?* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1997), 92–93, and Nigel Atkinson, 'Hooker's Theological Method and Modern Anglicanism,' *Churchman* 114.1 (2000): 49.

[36] *Lawes* V.78.5–8; 2:441.29–444.21.

[37] See also Vickers, 'Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker's *Lawes*,' 141.

by grace.[38] All four categories of service, however, constitute the same single office of presbyters even if the apostles as presbyters were distinct from prophets, pastors and teachers, also reckoned as presbyters. So, all were presbyters although different types of presbyters. The apostles were the most important, and then came the prophets, pastors and teachers. Hooker explains that the apostles were presbyters of first degree because they received the full revelation of God's truth directly from Christ. The prophets were presbyters of second degree because they new only some of the things revealed to apostles, while teachers were presbyters of third degree because all of their knowledge came by hearing but God nevertheless enabled them to give instruction in the church. Hooker also lists other spiritual gifts, but he reiterates the idea that all the gifts of the Holy Ghost need to be set into practice by the church in order to achieve the welfare of the body of Christ. For instance, some teachers could also be evangelists; but neither the teachers nor the evangelists had their knowledge directly from God by direct revelation as the prophets. This, however, is irrelevant because all of them, teachers, evangelists and prophets had their specific roles in the church for all had a vocation to preach the Gospel for the spiritual edification of the church. They are all important; not because of their authority and power received by ordination but due to their election for Christian ministry by the Holy Spirit. So for Hooker, the most important aspect of Christian ministry is one's election by God through the Spirit, followed by his conversion to Christian faith and then by his ordination given to him by the church who chose him.[39]

To conclude, as far as Hooker is concerned, there are three degrees of power in the ecclesiastical order: first apostles (succeeded later on by bishops),[40] secondly presbyters, and thirdly deacons, but only two categories of ministers: presbyters (which include the apostles and bishops)[41] and deacons. It is crucial to notice here that Hooker distinguishes among the services, the offices, and the orders of the church. The laity

38 For details, see Kirby, Theology of Richard Hooker, 55, and Kirby, 'The Paradigm of Chalcedonian Christology in Richard Hooker's Discourse on Grace and the Church,' 36.

39 *Lawes* V.78.8, 9; 2:444.22–445.30.

40 See Sykes, 'Richard Hooker and the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood,' 210, and Kaye, 'Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity*,' 91.

41 See also Wright, 'Richard Hooker and the Doctrine of Cumulative or Sequential Orders,' 246.

may perform some of the services and offices while only the clergy can exercise the power of order. What really matters here is the fact that, in Hooker's doctrine of the orders, there is enough room for both clergy and laity to be actively involved in Christian ministry.[42] He emphasizes that even women have a very important role to play in the service of God for the church, especially in taking care of the sick, preparing the dead for burial and assisting other women at baptism.[43] For Hooker it is only natural that women cannot participate ecclesiastical orders but they can and, indeed, must perform services in the church. Concerning the orders of the church, however, Hooker lists only three: apostles, presbyters and deacons. With reference to the Church of England of his days, he replaces the apostles with bishops,[44] followed by presbyters and deacons. Consequently, the clergy of the reformed Church of England have a threefold organization in the orders of bishops, presbyters and deacons. While the laity can perform some ecclesiastical offices and services, the clergy may perform these as well.[45]

The Compulsoriness of Supporting Ministry

If both clergy and laity must get actively involved in Christian ministry, it means that every single member of the church must somehow contribute to the work of God. Hooker introduces his teaching on the believer's financial contribution to the church by plainly saying that covetousness is idolatry, so believers must not honour themselves but God. For Hooker, this implies a certain financial implication on part of believers. Honouring God, however, does not only mean believers

[42] As part of the church, lay people must be involved in activities going beyond the services of the church. So they can perform 'para-liturgical' activities which frequently bridge the church with the community in which it lives. See *Believing in the Church*, 104.

[43] For details about Richard Hooker's doctrine of baptism, see John K. Stafford, 'Grace, Sin, and Nature: Richard Hooker's Theology of Baptism,' in *RHER*, 185–206, and Kenneth Stevenson, *The Mystery of Baptism in the Anglican Tradition* (Harrisburg: Morehouse Publishing, 1998), 37–53.

[44] It seems that for Hooker the church elected bishops to serve the church and continue the work of the apostles, not to replace the apostles. This is why episcopacy can be abolished at any time if bishops are proud, tyrannical and unwilling to reform themselves and the church. See for details Cargill Thompson, *Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker*, 181. In other words, church government is open to change. Cf. Egil Grislis, 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker,' in *SRH*, 170.

[45] *Lawes* V.78.10–12; 2:446.10–447.26.

have to give money to the church, which might be interpreted as an action of the body which has nothing to do with the soul, but also participate with their whole being, which involves the soul, in honouring God.[46] Thus, every believer must support the church financially because we belong to God with our entire existence, body and soul, life and wealth. Hooker is very clear about the fact that nobody can rightfully honour God if one cannot give to God his or her property which belongs to God anyway. To honour God with our own wealth is to admit that everything we possess comes from God. Hooker warns that it is not enough for a man to spend this wealth legally and honourably; the man who belongs to God, namely the Christian believer, must give to God a part of his wealth as open acknowledgement of God's sovereign dominion over his creation. The world and its wealth as distributed to human beings do not belong to men and women but to God. Consequently, we must not desire the things of the world too much or exclusively for ourselves but we must learn to give the back to God, who is their rightful owner. If the world was created then it plainly means that God is the owner of the world. Whatever exists in the world belongs to God, not to us. It follows then that we must give our wealth to God not only to prove that we acknowledge his dominion over his creation but also to give testimony of our love for God. This gift should be accompanied nonetheless by our sincere desire to support Christian ministry, which in part depends on our wealth. Hooker does not give any details about the results of the believers' financial contribution to support the ministry but he does allude to the building of churches.[47]

Hooker does not say precisely how much we should give to God, or which part of our wealth we should direct to support the church. What he does is appeal to history, so he describes what the people of Israel did in order that their first temple should be erected. As the first temple was a magnificent building, it is clear that the people's contribution was significant, to say the least. Then, after their return from the Babylonian captivity, they set up to work for the building of the second temple. This

[46] For further details about Hooker's idea of participation, see Charles W. Irish, "'Participation in God Himselfe': Law, the Mediation of Christ, and Sacramental Participation in the Thought of Richard Hooker," in *RHER*, 165–184; John E. Booty, 'The Spirituality of Participation in Richard Hooker,' *Sewanee Theological Review* 38.1 (1994): 9–20; Newey, 'The Form of Reason,' 1–26; Kirby, *Theology of Richard Hooker*, 47–48, and John E. Booty, 'Hooker and Anglicanism,' in *SRH*, 233.

[47] *Lawes* V.79.1–4; 2:448.13–450.29.

time, however, the Jews were not so well off but they did what they could so the temple was eventually completed. It is not difficult to suppose that these contributions were at least constant if not significant but they did support the construction of the temple. What really counts for Hooker at this point is the fact that every believer must give something to God in order to support his ministry. Some might contribute more or much more than others; the important thing is that everybody must contribute somehow. Thus, the church must benefit from our financial resources and it should ideally have enough to support Christian ministry all the time. Actually, what seems to be more important for Hooker is not the amount of the believers' financial contribution to the church but their constancy in giving; it may be money or it may as well be anything else but it has to be something and it has to go to the church constantly. Even if Hooker does not say that Christians should donate huge parts of their wealth to the church he does say that the church has always possessed lands, so it is not illogical to argue that donation of lands is acceptable as a contribution to Christian ministry.[48]

The Role of Tithes in Ministry

Another way of supporting the ministry of God is by tithes.[49] Hooker offers the examples of Abraham, who gave tithes to Melchisedek, and Jacob, who vowed to give tithes to God. There are at least two fundamental attitudes which should characterize Christians with reference to tithes. First, tithes are to be made voluntarily and secondly; Christians should firmly make up their minds about contributing tithes to the church. In other words, although tithes must be given as a result of the believer's free choice, they are not optional. It is right for Christians to give tithes on their own accord because whatever they have is from God, and it is right from God to claim them from his people because whatever they possess was given by him; either way, it seems that for Hooker tithes should be a means to support the church on a constant basis. He also mentions that the law of Moses required one tenth of everybody's fortune be given to God and although Hooker does say anything else, it is nevertheless clear that the law of Christ should

[48] *Lawes* V.79.5–6; 2:450.30–453.5.

[49] See also Patrick Carter, 'Clerical Polemic in Defence of Ministers' Maintenance during the English Reformation,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 49.2 (1998): 255.

prompt us even more to support God's ministry. Again, the amount is not important as long as something is given to facilitate the ministry. On the other hand, however, every believer should give proportionally to his or her general wealth. This is to say that the poor will give less while the rich will give more but they both must give according to whatever they possess. Hooker underlines that both the poor and the rich should know that they give to the God from whom all good comes, so they both should give sincerely and be convinced that their gift is sanctified and God's blessing is there for them if given as such. It is crucial to realize that God does not ask for our money because he needs them; he does not want our money for his benefit but for ours. We must give from our wealth to God because we must learn to convince ourselves that this is right and develop a sincere attitude to supporting God's ministry. Likewise, we must give to God in order to trust him and have faith that he will bless us in return. As weird as it may appear, Hooker infers that giving money to God is a way to strengthen our eschatological perspective because we learn to trust God for our future, and we learn to use our temporal things for eternal purposes.[50]

The Property of Believers as Property of God in Ministry

Regardless of how important money can be for Christian ministry, Hooker suggests that the best way for believers to support the church is by giving things from nature which are available to everybody as personal property and do not have dubious origins. Nature is God's blessing for us because we fully benefit from it in sustaining our bodies. Hooker wants to say that, as the author of nature is God,[51] we should in turn give some of the things of nature back to God in order to support the body of Christ. If the things of nature are part of nature and the body of Christ is a proof of God's grace, then it can be argued that—in a sense—nature is perfected by grace to serve a higher purpose.[52] All

[50] *Lawes* V.79.7–10; 2:453.6–455.28.

[51] See Kirby, *Theology of Richard Hooker*, 33.

[52] See *Lawes* III.8.6; 1:223.26–29. For details about Hooker's view on the perfection of nature by grace, see John Gascoigne, 'Church and State Unified: Hooker's Rationale for the English Post-Reformation Order,' *The Journal of Religious History* 21.1 (1997): 27; Newey, 'The Form of Reason,' 7, and W. David Neelands, 'Hooker on Reason, Scripture and "Tradition",' in *RHC*, 76. At the end of the day, the reality of fallen nature does not imply the abolition of the nature's natural properties. See

Christians should know that although they had possessed the things they want to give to God, once they consecrated them for the church they are no longer part of their wealth. Thus the property of believers becomes the property of God in ministry. Hooker explains that if our fortune cannot legally be taken away from us without our consent, then the same should be applicable to God. What has once been given to God remains his property forever unless God himself should decide otherwise. So, whatever we give to God cannot be reclaimed because it belongs already to God in its entirety. Having such a strong conviction about the fact that our property is rightfully God's, that we must give at least some of it back to God and know for sure that it is no longer ours seems to be a matter of morality. This is why nobody can ever advance any claims over the things given to God, irrespective of what they are: gifts, churches, tithes or lands. They fully belong to God and must therefore be set to use for the service of God. In this sense, all donations are sacred or holy, namely they are set apart for God and his ministry as a sign of our desire to honour him for all the things given by him for our benefit.[53] Hooker is convinced that it is only natural that the property of men and the property of God should be thus clearly distinguished. This is why he writes that even the laws of the state recognize this state of affairs:

> Whereupon the lawes imperiall doe likewise devide all things in such sort that they make some to belong by right of nature indifferently unto every man, some to bee the certaine goods and possessions of common-weales, some to appertaine unto severall corporations or companies of men, some to be privately mens owne in particular, and some to bee separated quite from all men, which last branch compriseth things sacred and holy, because thereof God alone is owner.[54]

A possible implication of the above-mentioned considerations is that even human laws grant the right of every person to own goods for this physical welfare. Hooker, however, wants to go beyond the laws of men to the laws of God as the final criterion in all respects. In other words, if even the laws of men require them to set aside their substance for divine service, what can one say about the laws of God? For Hooker, the answer is obvious: what belongs to man is actually God's, so man

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Kirby, 'The Paradigm of Chalcedonian Christology in Richard Hooker's Discourse on Grace and the Church,' 25.

[53] *Lawes* V.79.10–13; 2:456.4–457.24.

[54] *Lawes* V.79.14; 2:458.5–12.

must give from his wealth to God; actually, he must return to God at least a part of what he owns,[55] which is a token of his belief in God's sovereign dominion over the entire creation. The laws of men recognize this truth; the laws of God even more so. Consequently, men must not put their trust in mere earthly goods, but in God alone. It is advisable, according to Hooker, to follow the example of the early martyrs who were ready not only to give their properties to God but also their lives.[56]

Giving physical goods to God in sincerity is nevertheless a proof of spiritual maturity and good morality because if one gives to God what he deserves anyway, he is true to himself. Contrariwise, those who want to keep earthly goods for their own use instead of giving them to God do nothing but deceive themselves. Hooker knows that people of this sort are many and the church will never see a penny from them. Some are too greedy to give up anything at all, while others are simply too incompetent to be able to administer their wealth responsibly. Likewise, some are too slothful to work for themselves so they steal, while others are too lazy to work or do anything at all so they turn into beggars. Wise men, however, will surely learn from these bad examples and will do their best to acknowledge the mercy of God towards them and act accordingly. Hooker's spiritual lesson for Christian believers is evident: they must not be greedy, irresponsible, lazy or deceitful because to be like this is to be quite ignorant about God's mercy. On the contrary, Christians must be moderate, responsible, hard working and sincere as this is the only way to acknowledge that their existence is entirely dependent on the mercy of God.[57]

Such an attitude will certainly appear preposterous to many, and Hooker is well aware of this. He openly acknowledges that some people will overemphasize the spiritual side of the Christian religion by claiming that we must give ourselves to God, not our goods. Thus, some will contend, more or less earnestly, that giving early goods to the church is not a spiritual deed but a profane act; even worse, it is an unfortunate mistake waiting to be corrected. This is why he warns that some will attempt to persuade everybody that

[55] Carter, 'Clerical Polemic in Defence of Ministers' Maintenance,' 255.
[56] *Lawes* V.79.14; 2:458.13–459.5.
[57] *Lawes* V.79.16; 2:460.25–461.20.

> …the very best service which men of power can doe to Christ is without anie more ceremonie to sweepe all and to leave the church as bare as it was first borne; that fulnes of bread having made the children of the household wanton, it is without anie scruple to be take awaie from them and thrown to dogges; that they which laid the prices of theire landes as offerings at thapostles feete did but sow the seedes of superstition; that they which endowed Churches with lands poisoned religion; that tithes and oblations are now in the sight of God as the sacrificed blood of goates, that if wee give him our hartes and affections our goodes are better bestowed otherwise…in a worde that to give unto God is error, reformation of error to take from the Church that which the blindnes of former ages did unwiselie give.[58]

Hooker helps us understand once more that giving back to God what we received from him is profoundly spiritual because our gifts belong to God anyway and are given for his service in the church.

Ministry beyond Parish Churches

As far as the church and Christian ministry are concerned, Hooker explains two aspects. First, while Christian ministry is the act of the church as a whole, someone qualified to lead the church must coordinate to this end. Such a person is the minister of God, who must be ordained for the service of God otherwise he lacks to power and authority to administer the holy things of the church. The minister needs ordination, which comes directly from God, because the church is not just a human or 'politique' society but also the fellowship of the saints, a 'societie supernaturall'.[59] In addition to his ordination, the minister of God must be given a local 'portion of the Church' so that he should be able to exercise his office, then he must be made aware of what his duty consists of, and also given a certain maintenance for the work he needs to perform. Secondly, in order that ministry should be effective the church must be divided into precincts. This would also secure a good distribution of the clergy in all the churches. For a better understanding of this idea, Hooker resorts to his well-developed sense of history,[60] so he shows that the Christian religion began in

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[58] *Lawes* V.79.17; 2:462.14–29.

[59] Kirby, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy*, 74. See also Cargill Thompson, *Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker*, 180.

[60] Hooker's sensitivity to history is also acknowledged by Sykes, 'Richard Hooker and the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood,' 211.

cities that quickly became appropriate places for the rapid establishment and expansion of many local congregations. As churches were part of cities, Hooker assumes that cities had their own clergy who consisted of presbyters and deacons ordained by the apostles or by the evangelists as delegates of the apostles. In the beginning of its history, the church had not yet divided into any of its later historical forms but existed predominantly as a community of believers in one city.[61] Later on, in the first seven centuries, churches began to organize in such a way so that every city had its own church. This is why, Hooker explains, the ordination of ecclesiastical officers was made for a particular city; which also meant that it was for the particular church in that city. Thus, the idea of ecclesiastical community became increasingly local, until the notion of 'parish' designated a certain church in a certain place, not necessarily a city. Hooker does not seem to be very happy with this ecclesiastical development because it reportedly led to a mistaken understanding of the duties of ministers. In other words, many Christian ministers thought that their duties confined them to their assigned parish churches. Hooker deems this an error and argues against binding clergymen exclusively to the limits of their parishes. Furthermore, he claims that it is illogical and wrong that a shepherd should always have his own flock once ordained mainly because this situation, if made universally binding, presents a very serious pastoral problem; this, in turn, connects directly to the necessity of spreading the Gospel everywhere on this earth.[62]

Ministry for the Entire World

If the clergy are always bound to their parishes, then it becomes impossible to evangelize the world because no member of the clergy, who is obviously ordained and has a certain parish, is lawfully able to minister for a newly established church. The people of pagan nations who do not know Christ cannot organize into parish churches because they do not have the slightest idea about what the church is lest one should say they know anything about ecclesiastical organization. So it is logical that clergymen should not be tied to the service of certain

[61] For details about Hooker's idea of community, see Shuger, "'Societie Supernaturall'," 320.

[62] *Lawes* V.80.1–3; 2:463.11–465.1.

parish churches but to the service of the universal church of Christ otherwise they cannot serve in any other church beyond the boundaries of their own parishes. As for Hooker, he is convinced that there is no binding precept that forces the church to ordain its ministers to certain parishes. The error of ordaining ministers for parish churches, he writes, appeared in Rome in the first years of the second century. It is difficult to say whether at this point Hooker actually criticizes the Roman-Catholic Church of the sixteenth century or he just affirms what happened in the second century; either way, however, he is not happy with the idea that clergymen should always be bound to certain parishes. Fortunately, though, there have been people who understood that being involved in Christian ministry does not necessarily mean working in parish churches only but also giving ecclesiastical and theological instruction to those who were to be part of the clergy. This is how universities were established and one can easily see that Hooker very much approved this historical reality.[63]

The existence of universities gives Hooker another chance to criticize the idea that clergymen be attached exclusively to certain parishes. If this were applied everywhere in Europe, then the very activity of universities as well as their foundation as centres of education (including theological instruction) would be futile. Hooker does not elaborate on this because what he meant was actually very simple and obvious. If clergymen are to be always connected to their parishes, then it would be impossible for them to go to university as students after ordination or to teach other clergy in the university. By the very nature of their calling, presbyters and deacons are to give biblical and theological instruction, so it is utterly preposterous to compel them to restrain their work to certain churches only. Their calling is for the general benefit of humanity because they teach both Christians and non-Christians. For this reason, presbyters and deacons are not consecrated by virtue of their ordination to certain particular places but rather to certain functions and their functions cannot be restricted to any place at all. It is relevant to notice here too that, for Hooker, the imposed restriction of the clergy's ministry to parishes is not only a pastoral problem but also an ecclesiological and dogmatic issue. It is very likely that Hooker could admit that the body of Christ on earth is comprised of the totality of parish churches but Christian ministry should not be restricted to

[63] *Lawes* V.80.3; 2:465.2–V.80.5; 2:466.8.

them; otherwise, the church would not be able to spread the Gospel in pagan regions. The ministry of the church must go beyond all parish churches because the nature of the church is to spread the knowledge of Christ all over the earth and embrace all nations. It is clear then why clergymen cannot be compelled to stay only within the limits of their parishes.[64]

The Validity of Ordination beyond Parish Churches

The fact that forcing the clergy to remain within their own parishes can lead to deficient evangelism is not the only problem. If it were compulsory for all clergymen to work only in their parishes, then some would have to be discharged from their ordination in case they wanted to work for the church of Christ in other parishes or places. If this were true, Hooker contends, it would mean that ordination is not valid for the entire life of the clergy but only for a shorter or longer period in accordance with the necessities of the person at issue or certain parishes, not with the necessities of the universal church of Christ. Christian ministry is for the entire church of Christ, not only for certain local churches; so the persons who are to be received in the ministry by ordination must be consecrated to work of the universal church, not only for the specific needs of some parish churches. The conclusion for Hooker is more than evident: the nature of Christian ministry, which is to serve the whole church of Christ everywhere on earth and in any necessary situation,[65] must be clearly delineated from its use and exercise, which can involve—among many other things—working in parish churches. Likewise, those who want to serve the church as members of the clergy must be ordained for life even if they later on choose not to exercise their ecclesiastical power in parish churches. The reason for their ordination for life is simple: their consecration by ordination is to God and his church, not to certain local churches. In addition, of course, Christian ministry presupposes active involvement beyond the limits of parish churches; for instance in universities as previously mentioned. Moreover, ordination has nothing to do with the placing of ministers in parish churches but with their making as servants of God for the

[64] *Lawes* V.80.5, 6; 2:466.8–28.

[65] For details about the connection between servant-hood and ministry, see Wright, 'Hooker and the Doctrine of Cumulative or Sequential Orders,' 251.

church, so they should not be discharged from their ministerial duties if they leave a parish church in order to work elsewhere. If anything as such happens, it could be the result of at least two main reasons: first, God may have called the minister to another parish church or institution; or secondly, the person has financial problems so he needs to change his work in order to sustain himself. Concerning the second reason, Hooker criticizes the idea that ordination cannot be performed unless the person involved has a title, or a proof of exclusive possession showing he is able to live by himself. This can refer either to specific congregational support, or to other means of maintenance. In apostolic times, however, the church did not consist of certain parishes, but of groups of believers ministered to by the apostles and deacons. Therefore, performance of ordination depended on one's calling to ministry and no upon the candidate's financial situation. Hooker writes that it is certainly wise and advisable that the candidates for ministry should make sure they find a source of financial benefit in order not to impoverish their parish churches, and to avoid a life of extreme poverty but ordination has nothing intrinsically to do with money. Moreover, candidates for ministry might be supported directly by the bishop responsible for their ordination, and in such a case their ordination could be celebrated without a specific title:[66]

> Into these absurdities and follies [ordination with a title, n.a.] they slide by misconceiving the true purpose of certaine canons which in deed have forbidden t ordeine a minister without a title, not that simplie it is unlawfull so to ordeine, but because it might grow to an inconvenience if the Church did not somewhat restraine that libertie. For seeing they which ave onec received ordination cannot againe retourne into the world, it behoveth them which ordeine to foresee how such shall be afterwardes able to live, least theire povertie and destitution should redound to the disgrace and discredit of theire calling. Which evell prevented, those verie lawes which in that respect forbid, doe expreslie admit ordinations to be made at large and without title, namelie if the partie so ordained have of his owne for the sustenance of this life, or if the Bishop which giveth him orders will find him competent allowance till some place of ministration from whence his maintenance may arise be provided for him, or if anie other fit and sufficient meanes be had against the daunger before mentioned.[67]

[66] *Lawes* V.80.6–9; 2:466.29–469.11.
[67] *Lawes* V.80.10; 2:469.11–27.

Hooker knows very well that the vast majority of the ministers of the church have never had an easy life, nor is the prospect of the near or remote future overly optimistic. He openly admits that there were times when ministers were able to make a living only because their churches decided to support them or, when the financial situation of their churches was poor, they had to find another means to live. Likewise, there were times when one could be appointed minister of a church only with the consent of the wealthiest landowner of the region with the support of the local bishop. Hooker offers these examples in order to show that the financial situation of those called for ministry should never be a reason for the rejection of their ordination. This is to say that a decision regarding ordination for ministry is according to other criteria not characteristic of the social power of the candidate, but rather of his spiritual life.

The Portrait of God's Minister

All those who want to enter the ministry of the church must be able to feed the souls of men and women. This means that they must be worthy of the task set before them by God, so they must be prepared to serve with integrity, virtue and knowledge. In the end, what counts the most for one's ordination in Christian ministry is the fact that he must be a virtuous person. That he might be lacking in terms of knowledge is not a fundamental problem for Hooker. Knowledge can be found in many ways but virtue is far more important and absolutely necessary for the service of God. A life full of vices and wickedness must be avoided at all costs, so that those who enter the ministry of God should be able to live and teach virtuously. This observation is important in the light of Hooker's general view of Christian ministry. As was previously shown, the clergy and laity alike perform the ministry of the church. While clergy may benefit from rigorous theological instruction so that they have the knowledge to lead the church, it is very likely that most of the laity will never have the theological knowledge of the clergy. Both, however, must be actively involved in ministry so what is actually required of both is not primarily knowledge but virtue. Thus, for Hooker, knowledge is desirable in Christian ministry but virtue is absolutely compulsory.[68]

[68] *Lawes* V.80.11–13; 2:470.1–472.9.

When it comes to defining what a minister must not be, Hooker lists three aspects. First, the minister must not be ignorant of the things pertaining to his spiritual calling, which means that he must be able to give instruction of all sorts in spiritual things to everybody in the church. Secondly, the minister must not be constantly absent from the various aspects of his practical ministry, so he must be always constantly involved in the pastoral life of his ecclesiastical community. Thirdly, he must not be greedy after promotions in his pastoral office, because he might harm the public good of the community he is supposed to serve. So he must do the service of God in his community with utmost humility and having in mind what is best for all people. It is important to notice that Hooker is very concerned about the practical life of the minister in his community. How should a minister of God live in the community he serves? First, he must live as a learned man; the best possible situation for a member of the clergy is to be well educated in order to be able to teach, convince, and speak the Word of God adequately because Scripture is God's teaching for his people.[69] So, he must constantly pursue knowledge in order to be able to lead the people of God and also serve them for their utmost benefit because he has the authority to teach them from Scripture.[70] Secondly, the minister must be a shepherd for his spiritual flock and keep it removed from all possible dangers coming easily upon the members of the church. As a pastor of his congregation, the minister must always be a vigilant watchman doing his best to defend his own from the attack of the enemy. Likewise, the pastor must be able to talk to his people and instruct them spiritually in private so that their problems may be solved competently. Thus, the minister must live in such a way that people should look for his advice in spiritual matters. At this point, Hooker underlines that the minister of God must live a holy life so that he is able to be a leader, feeder and supervisor of his church. He must not seek unjust gain but only the gain of the people to whom he ministers. It is crucial for every member of the clergy not to forget that he is the minister of the Gospel of Christ, so he must take the knowledge of Christ and impart it to his church. Thus, he is in charge of the souls of the people who live in his community; consequently, Hooker emphasizes again that he

[69] See also Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason*, 95–96.

[70] Concerning the authority of the clergy to teach from Scripture, see Locke, 'Equal Ministries,' 175.

must not be ignorant but educated and well trained in the knowledge of spiritual things.[71]

Good education, however, is not enough; it must be accompanied by faithfulness. This means that the minister must be always willing and ready to seek the good of his people. He must never forget that the ministry of God is full of pain and hard work but this is exactly what his heavenly calling entails. When he faces serious problems in his ministry, he must remember the promises we made when he was ordained for the ministry. In this sense, he must be able to remind himself that the ministry which he performs is not his own but the ministry of God. If he realizes this, he will know that he must perform the ministry of God with care and fear. He must never be lazy or negligent, so he must never give anybody any chance to speak bad things about him. Hooker explains that the minister must lead a good life in the midst of his community because the result of his ministry is life both for himself and for his people. The pastor ministers in his church so that the people of God should have life and if he does this, it is clear that he also shares in the fruits of his labour. In spite of the fact that Christian ministry entails both hard work and constant effort the minister must nonetheless seek to fulfil his task with joy. He must always be happy when he labours for God because God entrusted him with a part of the church of Christ so made him an overseer of the people of God directly by the Holy Spirit of God. Thus, if he is indeed an overseer of the church, he must work and live in the midst of his people so that he should be there whenever his service may be needed.[72]

The Competence of God's Minister

For Hooker, it is very important that the minister should never loose sight of the fact that he is part of the church of God and is ordained by the church of God to serve the church of God.[73] It is the duty of the church of God to ordain ministers who are fully qualified to do the things needed in the church. This means that, as the church is the body of Christ indwelled by the Holy Spirit, so God ordains the minister for

[71] *Lawes* V.81.1, 2; 2:472.12–473.27.
[72] *Lawes* V.81.2; 2:473.28–475.15.
[73] Robert K. Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 134.

the church.[74] It is here that Hooker resumes once again the idea that the minister must be well educated and competent for his task. In order to do his job in good conditions, he will have to live in the midst of his community and not accept many ecclesiastical offices. Concerning the education of ministers, Hooker warns that their training should be appropriate for their spiritual task, rather than for things which do not pertain to their service. In other words, the church should not concern itself with ordaining men who have very high academic credentials. In saying this, Hooker does not want to encourage intellectual laziness; he only expresses a realistic perspective on what the church really needs concerning the education of ministers. Although Hooker does not explicitly say this, one can easily suppose what he means. Thus, he first wants to say that people with very high academic training are few anyway; secondly, it is very likely that fewer of them will ever want to join Christian ministry, and thirdly, it is almost sure that even fewer of them will have heard God calling them to the ministry. If the church wants to ordain only people with exquisite academic qualifications, then it may be the case that the church will lack ministers. To be sure, Hooker does not advocate the ordination of uneducated people; what he wants to affirm here is the necessity that the church should be realistic about the level of training needed for a minister of God and for the duties of his ecclesiastical office. In other words, the church should not generally seek to ordain highly educated people (if persons of such qualifications wish to be ordained and prove called by God for ministry that would of course be fine) but people of moderate education who are able to fulfil the demands of God's ministry.[75]

Regarding the practical aspects of ministry, the members of the clergy must have been educated enough to be able to teach the church which are the doctrines of Scripture and, based on these teachings, how to distinguish between good and evil.[76] They can help the church keep the balance between good and evil because of God's beneficial presence in the community of saints.[77] Likewise, the minister must be trained in such a way that he is fit to lead the church in public prayer,

[74] Locke, 'Equal Ministries,' 177.
[75] *Lawes* V.81.5; 2:479.2–29.
[76] For details about Hooker's understanding of the use of Scripture in a pastoral sense, see Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason*, 100–101.
[77] See also Kaye, 'Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity*,' 86.

administer the sacraments,[78] celebrate marriage, visit the sick, bury the dead, give instruction by reading Scripture in public and, if capable, also by preaching.[79] All these things constituting the worship of the church must always (and necessarily) be done for the benefit and edification of the church.[80] Hooker even goes as far as saying that, if confronted with two evils, we must always choose the lesser of the two because we must always seek public utility and obey necessity. In other words, if the church does not have a well-educated man to ordain for ministry but only a person of very low instruction, then the church must look to its best interest, viz. what is publicly good and necessary. Thus, the church must realize it faces two evils: it does not have a highly trained person for office and the only candidate is poorly educated. On the other hand, the church needs to understand that its members require divine ministry, so it will have to choose the lesser evil and ordain the poorly educated fellow. Once ordained, he will have to be able to supply the church with its basic ecclesiastical necessities such as supervise the people, support them spiritually, administer baptism[81] and the Eucharist[82] and make sure they live in the body of Christ[83] according to Scripture. It is important to notice that he will have to do all these things even if he is not so good at preaching the Word of God as others might have been if available for ordination.[84]

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[78] For a brief but comprehensive presentation of Hooker's doctrine of sacraments, see Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist*, 110–111. Other contributions to Hooker's sacramental theology include William O. Gregg, 'Sacramental Theology in Hooker's *Laws*: A Structural Perspective,' *Anglican Theological Review* 73.2 (1991): 155–176; Parris, 'Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist,' 151–165, and William P. Haugaard, 'Richard Hooker: Evidences of an Ecumenical Vision from a Twentieth-Century Perspective,' *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 24.3 (1987): 427–439.

[79] For details about Hooker's view on the importance of the reading of Scripture in public, see Locke, 'Equal Ministries,' 181. The reading of Scripture in the church should part of the worship of God and must be understood doxologically. See *Believing in the Church*, 89.

[80] Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England*, 131–132.

[81] Hooker makes a special reference here to the baptism of children, see *Lawes* V.81.5; 2:481.8. For details about the baptism of children in Hooker, see Stevenson, *The Mystery of Baptism in the Anglican Tradition*, 46.

[82] This does not mean that Hooker's concept of ministry is sacramental, as suggested by J. S. Marshall, who wants to demonstrate Hooker's continuity with Roman Catholicism. For details, see J. S. Marshall, *Hooker and the Anglican Tradition: An Historical and Theological Study of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1963), and Simuţ, *The Doctrine of Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker*, 32.

[83] For Hooker's connection between baptism and Eucharist in the body of Christ, see Stevenson, *The Mystery of Baptism*, 53.

[84] *Lawes* V.81.5; 2:480.1–481.14.

The Work of God's Minister within the Church

Whoever is ordained, though, will have to stay and work among the members of the believing community. Ideally, he must do this on a permanent basis, although in reality, of course, some exceptions are necessarily permitted. For instance, the time spent by the minister in university should be considered as time spent for the benefit of the church. If the minister wants to deepen his knowledge of spiritual things and decides to go to the university, then it will be necessary for the church to support him because he intends to pursue his studies for the benefit of the people of God. Or, if the minister is hired by a certain member of the nobility, that is also to be considered profitable for the church and the minister should be given permission to accept the new offer if it is for the good of the church. In such approved cases, when the minister is absent from the community which he serves, the church is not left without a pastor and the salvation of men is not neglected because the leave of the minister is for the greater benefit of the church, especially after his return to a parish. Regardless whether he leaves the church for some years in order to complete his theological training or not, the ministry must be able to offer public teaching and instruction to the whole church, and to lead the church in public worship.[85] Hooker knows that some people in the parish who are not ministers might be intellectually more advanced that the minister himself. What happens in such a case? What is the difference between the minister and such people? Hooker is convinced that the difference doest not reside in the correctness of their preaching of the Word of God because both the minister and the people in the parish must spread the teachings of Scripture in a correct manner. The reason for this is simple: Scripture is the Word of God and is sufficient to salvation.[86] This is a clear affirmation of the *sola scriptura* principle in all matters pertaining to the Christian faith,[87] including the ministry.[88] What makes the difference between the

[85] Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England*, 132.
[86] Grislis, 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Hooker,' 186.
[87] *Lawes* I.14.1; 1:124.27–126.13. For details about the *sola scriptura*, see Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason*, passim, and Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist*, 26.
[88] *Lawes* V.81.6; 2:481.17–483.10.

minister and the people in the church is ordination, given by God with the special gift of teaching the church by means of sermons:[89]

> Wee saie as much of the minister of God, *publiquely to teache and instruct the church is necessarie in everie ecclesiasticall minister, but abilitie to teach by sermons is a grace which God doth bestow on them whome he maketh sufficient for the commendable discharge of theire dutye*. That therefore wherein a minister differeth from other Christian men is not as some have childishlie imagined the *sound preaching of the word of God*, but as they are lawfullie and trulie governors to whome authoritie of regiment is given in the commonwelth according to the order which politie hath set, so canonicall ordination in the church of Christ is that which maketh a lawfull minister *as touchinge the validitie of anie act which apperteineth to that vocation*.[90]

Thus, the minister of God has the duty to preach the Word of God to his church for the edification of all the members of the congregation because Scripture is the only means by which God chose to reveal his plan of salvation.

Hooker's Conclusions

At the end of his exposition of the doctrine of the orders of Christian ministry, Hooker has six concluding recommendations for the welfare of the church. First, those who have the right to ordain ministers, namely bishops, should always make sure they honour Christ by their decisions to ordain people for ministry, so that they in no way damage the church but rightly serve her. Secondly, ministers must always be vigilant and pay heed at their own lives lest they should look for illegal financial profit and consequently injure the church; they must constantly be attentive not to betray for illicit gain the people whom Christ redeemed with blood. Thirdly, promotions to higher ecclesiastical offices should be made carefully and always based on merit, lest those who deserve promotion be kept in their former position while those who do not qualify for higher responsibilities should be improperly promoted. Unmerited promotion can lead to quarrels and those who entertain such a state of affairs 'plant a thorne where a vine ought to grow.' Fourthly, those who have the power to promote people to

[89] Sermons seem to be more important for Hooker than the public reading of Scripture. See also Vickers, 'Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker's *Lawes*,' 105.

[90] *Lawes* V.81.12; 2:490.7–18.

higher offices must take good care when they select the candidates for promotion lest they should favour persons driven by greed and ambition. Likewise, although Hooker does not say this in plain words, ministers must not be led by greed and ambition when they seek higher responsibilities in the church. Fifthly, those who are in charge of the universities must always grant degrees based on the academic merits of the ministers a who want to complete their education. The universities should award cademic degrees, Hooker warns, not out of kindness, but rather on the ground of academic competence. Thus, ministers of the church must never attempt to obtain academic degrees by questionable means. They must always accept a degree only if they have worked hard for it and if they prove to have sufficient knowledge to deserve that particular degree. Those who do otherwise will suffer God's severe punishment for the damage they caused the church which supported them. Sixthly, the work of ministers must be honoured accordingly. If some ministers work more than others, the former must be rewarded in accordance with their toil for the church while the letter should also get what is right for their results. No minister should ever try to obtain advantages of any sort by fraud; if he does so, even human justice will eventually punish him. Again, Hooker does not say anything else at this point, but he means that while ministers should observe the law of men, they must nevertheless primarily fear the law of God and be subject to it at all costs. Hooker concludes his account of the orders of ministry by urging the church to stay vigilant all the time and to reform itself voluntarily[91] whenever needed so that abuses of any kind should not be favoured.[92]

[91] Williams, 'Hooker: Philosopher, Anglican, Contemporary,' 382.
[92] *Lawes* V.81.16, 17; 2:495.20–498.19.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

JURISDICTION AND THE KEYS

Dean Kernan

In Book VI (1648), Hooker promises he will now deal with the 'weightiest and last remaines' of the controversy between conformists and presbyterians, '*Jurisdiction, Dignitie*, and *Dominion Ecclesiasticall*,' keyed to Books VI through VIII respectively.[1] Discounting the importance of disputes over ceremonies, he zeroes in on the heart of the reformers' programme—their proposed new 'discipline' which implied both judging and ruling, since 'they verie well knew, how little their labours soe farre forth bestowed, would avayle them in the end, without a clayme of Jurisdiction to upholde the fabrique which they had erected.'[2] In Book VI, along with denying the reformers' platform of layelders, Hooker grapples with the theological, legal and political aspects of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, since the reformers not only sought ecclesiastical change but also directly challenged the English church's power to enforce conformity by its courts, laws and legal processes.[3] He thus has two targets—Roman and presbyterian disciplinary claims—and a positive aim as well, to provide a more robust theological, social and legal foundation for the English church's involvement in the regulation of common life.

While working on the last Books, Hooker noted a series of linked definitions of jurisdiction: it is 'the power to commaund and judge according to law,' therefore spiritual jurisdiction is the power to command and judge in spiritual affairs according to spiritual laws. Hooker notes that jurisdiction in its narrow sense refers to the judgement of private and civil cases, which is only a subset of full public power, or

[1] *Lawes* VI.1.1; 3:2; squibs not reproduced.

[2] *Lawes* VI.1.2; 3:2. P. Stanwood, ed. intro., *FLE* 3:xxvi, notes that the matters addressed in Books VI–VIII can be considered linked aspects of jurisdiction.

[3] See Lee Gibbs, 'Book VI,' *FLE* 6 Pt. 1:249–308, for Book VI's change from the 1593 draft (hereafter *1593*) commented on by Edwin Sandys and George Cranmer that was likely only a point by point rejection of the presbyterian forms of discipline, to an expanded Book VI that would a detailed discussion of law.

imperium. Those who have the power to command and judge must have the authority to punish; there is no jurisdiction without a 'proportionate power of coercion.'[4] In Book V, Hooker defines jurisdiction as a 'a yoke which lawe hath imposed on the neckes of men' that we endure for the good of others, our own particular appetites, inclinations or will notwithstanding. Its legitimate exercise requires someone with the power and authority to judge given to him under the law.[5] In Book VI, he notes that 'ruling the Church of God' and 'receiving accusations' evidently refer to 'jurisdiction.'[6] For a church to exercise spiritual jurisdiction then, it must have officers who can exercise a publicly authorised power to command and judge according to spiritual laws including some power to punish those whose particular appetites and inclinations led them to oppose its publicly established laws.

Hooker uses the terms order, jurisdiction and the power of the 'keys'—among the most freighted words in the Catholic church's lexicon—to explicate the power of the church and its ministers.[7] Conventionally, the power of order can be understood as the grant of spiritual power held by all ministers that set them apart from the laity and enables them to perform the acts of ministry. The power of jurisdiction is more complicated—not all ministers hold this power, and it can be delegated to others as it was to lay court officials. Both powers were bound up in the grant of the power of the "keys" to the church which Hooker first introduces in Book V, noting that he will deal with 'the power of theire [ministers'] jurisdiction over mens persons' in the subsequent Books.[8] The 'keys' are 'an holie and a Ghostlie authoritie . . . over the soules of men' that consists of a power to 'remitt and reteine sinnes' promised to the Apostles. When ministers "preach, pray, baptize, communicate,' or 'condemne, give absolution, or whatsoever,' as 'as disposers of Gods misteries, our wordes, judgements, actes and dedes, are not oures but the holie Ghostes.'[9] For expository reasons

[4] Hooker, *Autograph Notes* (hereafter *AN*), fol. 70r *FLE* 3:466–8, citation is from Justinian, *Digest* 1.21.5.1 (1590) col. 34, see *FLE* 6 Part 2:1058, for translation and identification. The *FLE* editors suggest this folio of notes on jurisdiction was collected for the topics of the last books.

[5] *Lawes* V.62.16; 2:282–3.

[6] *Lawes* VI.2.1; 3:4, discussed below.

[7] Hooker introduces the terms 'order,' 'jurisdiction,' and 'Dominion Ecclesiasticall' in the 1593 Preface, see *Lawes* Pref. 7.6; 1:35–6 (italics not reproduced), noting Book VI and VII deal with jurisdiction.

[8] *Lawes* V.77.2; 2:425.

[9] *Lawes* V.77.8; 2:430.

Hooker has separated his discussion of 'order' and 'jurisdiction'—the constituent parts of the 'keys'—taking up one aspect of jurisdiction in Book VI (pastoral practice and the need for discipline), and a second in Book VII ('ruling' the church by bishops).

Only a handful of scriptural proof-texts underwrote the claims of spiritual jurisdiction held by the church and the most important of them Hooker has introduced. The direct commission from Jesus to the Apostles of the power to remit and retain sins defines the unique spiritual mission of the church, as recorded by the Apostle John, where Christ after the Resurrection, declares 'my Father hath sent me, even so send I you,' and then adds 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.'[10] This promise of a power to 'remit' or 'retain' sin was understood to empower the priesthood to judge sinfulness or guilt in such a fashion that God's reconciliation would rely on the pronouncements of absolution of his ministers, subject to the individual's sufficient penitence and faith.[11] This formed the central justification for the penitential structure of the unreformed church.[12] This grant of spiritual authority did not specify who would hold such power.

The Roman church, on the basis on their interpretation of a 'promise' to Peter of a unique authority among the Apostles, recorded by Matthew 16:18–19: 'And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it,' claimed to have acquired full power and responsibility for matters regarding the worship of God and the care of souls.[13] The

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[10] John 20:2–3, *AV*; *Lawes* V.77.5; 2:427.

[11] See Thomas Tentler, *Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. 294ff. Protestant polemics aside, Tentler has convincingly shown that all parties, while they might see a role for the priest to change 'attrition' (an incomplete form of sorrow) to 'contrition' to ensure the efficacy of the absolution, and while they used the first person form '*ego te absolvo*,' they wavered between a stress on the 'magic' involved in the process by the priest speaking the words (who was understood to be summoning God's grace) and a 'pelagianianism' of works required of the penitent for the process to be effective. While both views of penance—'priestcraft' and 'works righteousness'—were attacked by Protestants, in fact these two criticisms of the penitential process are incompatible with each other.

[12] See Oscar D. Watkins, *A History of Penance*, 2 vols., (New York: Burt Franklin, 1961) 1:3–26, who gives the Greek and English, but not Latin texts for the three key texts—John 20:23, Matthew 16:19 and Matthew 18:18.

[13] *AV*. See Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), hereafter Tierney, *Foundations*, 15–36, for the role of John 20:23, Matthew 16:19 and Matthew 18:18 in Papal claims and the cycle of interpretation around those

passage continues: 'And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'[14] This second clause was often interpreted to imply that Peter would in future exercise a unique power of the 'keys,' for which the promise of the power to 'remit and retain' later given by Christ, as recorded in John 20:22–3 was the confirmation.[15] The power of 'binding and loosing' of sinners was linked with the power to remit and retain sins, and assumed to be a power held by the church—the institutional locus of Christ's promise. These three passages, along with the reiterated claim of 'binding and loosing' of Matthew 18:18 were linked together by the Roman church to argue that they alone held the power of the 'keys' that descended from Peter's unique grant, making the Roman church the monopoly providers of the spiritual good of 'remitting' sin, or absolution, as well as the holders of a power to discipline offenders.[16] Spiritual care, implied by Christ's exhortation, as recorded by John 21:15–17, to 'Feed my lambs…Feed my sheep…Feed my sheep' was also interpreted to buttress claims that the Roman church held virtually unlimited powers over Christ's flock including coercive powers.[17] The

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claims. These passages are cited consistently in the document collection, Brian Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State 1050–1300* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), hereafter *CCS*. See Tierney, *Foundations*, 25 note, for the constant reference to this second passage in the *Decretum*, and the differing interpretations of 'petram,' or 'rock,' as Peter himself, Christ, Peter's unshakeable faith, or the articles of faith which Peter articulated. For the reformers generally the 'rock' was sound doctrine.

[14] *AV*. Several additional verses from Matthew were often also cited to demonstrate the magnitude of the power that was Christ's which had been given to Peter and now held by the pope, e.g., Matt. 11:27: 'All things are delivered unto me of my Father…' and Christ's claim, recorded by Matt. 28:18: 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth.'

[15] See *Lawes* V.77.7; 2:429, citing John 20:23, noting this fulfils the promise of the 'keys.'

[16] See, for a discussion of Matt. 16:18 in later papal thought, see Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963): 530–7.

[17] *AV*. See, e.g., F. Suárez, *A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith Against the Errors of the Anglican Sect* (Coimbra, 1613), III.10.10, reprinted and translated in H. Davis, ed., and W. Gwladys, trans., *Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, S.J.: De Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore, 1612; Defensio Fidei Catholicae, et Apostolicae Adversus Anglicanae Sectae Errores, 1613; De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, et Charitate, 1621* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 692: 'his admonition [John 21:17] is not limited, and accordingly, since the term 'feed' (*pascendum*) embraces even coercive power, which must reside in every pastor, the said power is not restricted to the imposition of censures, but the said power remains to be shaped through prudence into some [appropriate] form of punishment or coercion. For every shepherd has power to coerce his sheep.' This passage was

Roman church's claim to hold these powers in a unique fashion was also given eschatological significance. The phrase 'gates of hell'—interpreted variously as heresy or sin—could not or would not prevail against the Roman church.[18] A strong countervailing argument was that although Peter was the first-mentioned, the power of the keys was given generally to the Apostles, and this power of the 'keys' descended from them and inhered in the church as a whole and was not controlled by Rome, a view endorsed by the English reformers.[19]

The fourth important passage on which the unreformed church's penitential structure was based were further verses from Matt. 18:17–18:

> And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell *it* unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

The phrase 'let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican' was traditionally interpreted to be the severing of the bond between an errant person and the church, exercised as a the act of 'excommunication,' where they would no longer participate in the church or take communion until they repented. The claim of a power to 'bind and loose' was understood to refer to the order of the visible church, and the means by which the penitent was included or excluded from it. In its most basic sense, it relied on the minister's judgments about the degree of error, or degree of repentance felt by the individual, and the future tense suggests that judgments by the minister would subsequently be ratified by God. As glossed by the canonists, John 20:22–23 was understood to be the confirmation of this 'promise' by Jesus to ratify the judgements of the church. From the primacy of Peter the Roman church claimed to be the locus of this power and to control its exercise,

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often linked with Ezek. 34:16: 'I will feed them with judgement' and also Ezek. 34:17: 'Behold, I judge between cattle and cattle, between the rams and the he goats,' thereby establishing a linkage between 'feeding' and a responsibility for judgement, reinforcing the jurisdictional and legal force of the 'power of the keys.'

[18] Tierney, *Foundations*, 25–6.

[19] For apostolic equality see, e.g. Thomas Bilson, *True Difference betweene Christian subiection and unchristian rebellion*…(Oxford, 1585) STC 3071, 66–7: "The rest of the Apostles were the selfsame that Peter was, endewed with the like fellowship of honor and power," citing Cyprian.

although generally the power to 'bind and loose' was understood to be held by all ministers.[20]

The 'keys' were transformed in the course of a long cycle of commentary and struggle into a juridical claim—the so-called *claves iuris* that complemented the Roman church's responsibility for spiritual care.[21] The theology of the Roman church was shaped the fact that Christian faith itself had been explained in terms of the Roman law by jurists 'of considerable calibre,' and the same juristic cast of mind influenced Jerome's Vulgate translation of the Bible.[22] By the sixteenth century, it had become customary to divide the power of the 'keys' into the power of order (*potestas ordinis*) and the power of jurisdiction (*potestas jurisdictionis*) much as Hooker has done, with the former understood to be the sacerdotal power held by all ministers that made the sacraments efficacious, and the latter understood to be the 'administrative, judicial, legislative (and therefore magisterial) power over the church, the 'mystical body of Christ.' The power of jurisdiction was further divided into the jurisdiction exercised in the interior forum of the confessional concerned with the willing, and a 'public' coercive jurisdiction exercised in the exterior forum (*jurisdictionis in foro exteriori et publice*) claimed to be 'instituted by Christ "with the purpose of compelling the faithful to live in accord with the evangelical laws"—and whose competencies included the power to "punish sins, confer benefices, promulgate laws (*constitutiones*), excommunicate, degrade, confer indulgences" in addition to other powers.[23] In the unreformed church, the power to 'bind and

[20] See F. Suárez, *A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith*, III.23.6, in *Selections*, 688–9: 'our position [regarding the papal power to judge kings] is confirmed by the power of binding and loosing, which was granted especially to Peter; for the power to bind and loose includes also coercive and punitive power.' Suarez then cites Matt. 16.19; 18:17, and then 18:18, and finishes: 'Accordingly, the church has always understood from this passage [*locum hunc*, referring to the series] (though Calvin and his followers distort its meanings, as they distort that of other passages, there resides in her pastors [*esse in Pastoribus*] the power to coerce—through the censure of excommunication, at least, which is a spiritual penalty.' Suarez then cites apostolic practice which confirms this power to have been first exercised by the Apostle Paul against heretics.

[21] See William Allen, *A True, Sincere, and Modest Defence of English Catholics* (1584), R. Kingdon, ed., (Folger/Cornell: Ithaca, 1965), 153–4, for a near-contemporaneous recitation of the scriptural proof texts to support the Roman church's claim that Peter alone holds the power of the keys.

[22] W. Ullmann, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introduction to the Sources of Medieval Political Ideas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975), intro. and 119–20.

[23] This summary follows Francis Oakley, 'Christian Obedience and Authority, 1520–1550,' in J. H. Burns and M. Goldie, eds., *Cambridge History of Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), hereafter *CHPT*, 162–3; internal

loose' or procedure for inclusion and exclusion from the church was discharged in the *forum internum* of the confessional that dealt with the believer's conscience. Sacramental practice was formalized subsequent to the changes of the thirteenth century and increasingly conceived of in legal and institutional terms. This included an increased emphasis on the sacrament of the Eucharist in the life of the believer, frequent confession as a necessary practise (rather than something done before death), as well as broader conception of discipline including the determination, correction and punishment of sin (*peccati*, also *crimen*) in the confessional mediated by a priest, who judged the extent of the offence and calculated the necessary penance and satisfaction before granting absolution.[24] These practices embodied a legalistic view of man's relation with God and were the pastoral expression of the power of the 'keys.' Punishment involved controlling access to the sacraments through various degrees of excommunication, and control over the means by which the penitent could be restored to the body of the church including the claimed power of judging the sinner's 'debt' requiring satisfaction before absolution could be granted by the priest. So far as Hooker was concerned (in line with most reformers), from this claimed power to judge satisfaction sprang the notions of surplus merit held by the Roman church that could be applied to souls in purgatory, and 'by this posterne gate, commeth in the whole Mart of Papall indulgences, a gaine inestimable unto him, to others a spoyle; a skorne both to God and man.'[25]

The parallel development for what came to be known as the *forum externum*, or church courts emerged in part to answer the need for a means whereby matters requiring determination of fact and the extent of harm to others could be effected and in part for the exercise of the 'coercive' power claimed for the keys based on the associated meaning of *crimen* as 'offence' rather than 'sin.' Church courts were set up to arbitrate matters such as trespass against parties, breach of oaths and promises—since these were made before God, or to judge appropriate

quotations are from Jacques Almain. The exact meaning of the 'keys' seems to vary with the author; often the power of order was referred to as a separate 'key,' as was jurisdiction, see for example Aquinas, *Sup. Sum.* 19.3, cited *FLE* 6 Part 2:275.

[24] This summary follows Berman, *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 173ff., whose clarity on the historical and institutional roots of the canon law is refreshing, although not all of his conclusions are generally accepted. See also Tentler, *Sin and Confession*.

[25] *Lawes* VI.5.9; 3:69.

'restitution' to make injured parties whole.[26] While these courts (like the confessional) originated from the church's obligation for care of souls, juristic claims based on powers of judgment through courts and the canon law increasingly took on an institutional life of their own, as canonists creatively borrowed from the civil law and expanded their reach.[27] Church courts increasingly functioned with little direct reference to the church's claim of a unique responsibility for the health of men's souls. For example, public reconciliation that required an excommunicate be given 'absolution' in the church court as an 'act of jurisdiction' which could be performed by laymen was increasingly considered apart from absolution in the inner forum, that could only be performed by a priest as an act of both order and jurisdiction.[28]

The ubiquity and importance of the canon law for understanding the Roman church's development cannot be overemphasized. The Roman church's claim to hold the power of the 'keys,' their division of this jurisdiction as applying to 'internal' and 'external' *fora*, and the terms of the exercise of that power respectively in confessional and church court were defined, discussed and developed in the canon law.[29] 'Canons' or rules of behaviour initially arose from the need for the early church to maintain order and discipline its members, and from these humble beginnings, successive collections of conciliar and provincial determinations were assembled, taught and disseminated throughout the western church. Papal pronouncements or decretals became an additional source of authoritative law for the church, serving to regulate matters of faith and even spiritual and temporal relations.[30] Canon law became the administrative law of the church, and the means to express

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[26] On the creative extension it took to apply the canon law to promises or oaths, see E. W. Kemp, *An Introduction to canon law in the Church of England* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), 22–4.

[27] R. H. Helmholz, *The Spirit of the Classical Canon Law* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 5: the canon law 'stood on its own as a body of law and as an independent discipline . . . separate and distinct from both theology and Roman law.'

[28] F. D. Logan, *Excommunication and the Secular Arm in Medieval England* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1968), 138, cited *FLE* 6 Part 1:274.

[29] See now James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law* (London and New York: Longman, 1995), the best short summary in English. For an earlier sketch, see R. C. Mortimer, *Western Canon Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953); for an outline and bibliography of key sources of the law, see Constant Van De Wiel, *History of Canon Law* (Louvain: Peter's Press, 1991). See also Helmholz, *The Spirit of the Classical Canon Law* for thematic coverage as well as works noted above by Ullmann and Harold Berman.

[30] Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics*, 95–6.

the most extreme claims of papal jurisdiction. Its involvement in shoring up and justifying papal governmental claims together with its insular professional outlook obscured its theological roots, contributing to the overwhelming feeling of the reformers that this system of law served only to justify worldly papal power, thereby sullying the message of the Gospels.[31] We need to see canon law's connections to sacramental theology and pastoral care to understand the force of Hooker's arguments in Book VI.

The claim of monopoly control of the keys by the Roman church made the pope the supreme legislative and judicial authority, having the power to make laws (and dispense from them) including the power to remit sin. By extension, he held the power and authority to declare what constitutes true doctrine and an obligatory rule of faith, often termed the 'key' of knowledge. The need to preserve the institutional church required the development of a means for the determination and maintenance of true doctrine first addressed in councils that set boundaries for heresy and schism. This laid the foundations for one of the persistent debates regarding the superiority of council over pope, especially as the latter claimed to be the sole possessor of the 'key' of knowledge and thus able to single-handedly determine matters of faith. As the Petrine claims to hold the 'keys' were strengthened, control of the office of bishop became a priority. Since all powers had been given first to Peter, his successor the pope at least ought to control their election; barring that he could control their confirmation and their powers of administration (*administratio*).[32] In high papal claims, all power was thought to flow through Peter's successors and was only delegated to other bishops.[33] In contrast, as Benson notes, every medieval bishop potentially was 'a successor of the Apostles and a prince of the Church, possessing both sacramental and jurisdictional powers,' and a tension was thus created between an 'episcopalist' view and a 'papalist' view

[31] See Eugenio Corecco, Francesco Turvasi, transl., *The Theology of the Canon Law: A Methodological Question* [*Théologie de Droit Canon*] (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1992), chap. 3 and especially 77ff., outlining the protestant refusal to grant any 'salvic worth' to canon law, seeing it instead as only 'worldly and positivist.'

[32] See R. W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 157–9.

[33] See W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages*, 3rd Ed., (London: Methuen & Co., 1970), 435n, citing Grosseteste that bishops receive their power from Christ '*per domine papae mediationem*;' likewise, Augustinus Triumphus, '*Omnem potestatem, tam spiritualem quam temporalum, a christos in praelatos et principes saeculares derivatem esse mediante Petro* . . .'

as to the source of their powers.[34] However acquired, the bishops discharged their power of jurisdiction in their own courts—and these episcopal or 'ordinary' courts became the court of first instance in a hierarchy of courts with the Roman curia at its apex. While in principle bishops were bound in obedience to the papacy, bishops—like the national churches themselves—often owed fealty to particular kings or emperors. The bishop-elect's sacramental powers were confirmed by the papacy, while the grant of their 'temporals' such as property were often under the control of the monarch or local prince (as was the case in England) creating a third tension between the high claims of the papacy and local rulers over the control of 'their' churches.

Jurisdiction claimed by the unreformed church under the rubric of the power of the 'keys' was thus the organizing notion for the economy of salvation for the individual believer, underwrote church courts that dealt with a range of theological as well as social concerns and helped to define and regulate the respective powers of the church's hierarchy. Claims for the power of jurisdiction bound up in the power of the 'keys' were later extended to encompass public or governmental power for the church over any matters over which they wished to concern themselves.[35] Popes could involve themselves in any issue of governance 'by reason of sin' (*per ratione peccati*), ultimately claiming that a 'fullness' of power (*plenitudo potestatis*) had been granted to the church with the grant of the 'keys.'[36] The unreformed church did temper these claims somewhat. Although the church claimed jurisdiction over a large portion

[34] Robert L. Benson, *The Bishop Elect: A Study in Medieval Ecclesiastical Office* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 3. See also *idem*, 23–35 on early theories of episcopal election.

[35] See D. R. Kelley, *The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 76, the confluence of claims of authority received from God, patristic authority, and apostolic succession lodged in the papacy's 'Fatherhood.' As claims of 'cure' implied 'a social dimension to spiritual office' so too papal claims of supremacy 'implied a political dimension, which episcopal jurisdiction over sin would vastly enlarge. Retrospectively, the justification for this secular initiative was based on interpretation of the so-called "power of the keys".'

[36] See Charles G. Herbermann *et al.*, eds., *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Encyclopedia Press, 1913–1922), s.v., St. Boniface: 'the pope had full authority in temporal matters *ratione peccati*, i.e., in as far as the morality of human acts was concerned. He went on, however, to say that in temporal jurisdiction one must distinguish the right (*de jure*) and its use and execution (*usus et executio*). The former belonged to the pope as Vicar of Christ and of Peter; to deny it was to deny an article of faith, *i.e.*, that Christ judges the living and the dead.' The claim that the pope had jurisdiction in temporal matters *ratione peccati* had its definitive statement in Innocent III's decretal *Novit* (1204), translated in Tierney, *CCS*, 134–5.

of public behaviour, one limit to the powers claimed stemmed from the desire to avoid responsibility for capital and corporeal penalties, while needing for a means to enforce its punishments for lapses. The temporal 'sword' of the state usually provided the means, buttressing the spiritual 'sword' held by the church. The guiding text was Luke 22:38: 'And they said, Lord, behold, here *are* two swords. And he said unto them, It is enough.' From this passage the complementarity of the 'two swords' of the church and prince, a commonplace of medieval thought was derived. So powerful was this metaphor it is only mildly surprising to see Hooker dusting it off for its usefulness in encapsulating his view of the respective powers of church and state.[37] Church and state each had defined areas of jurisdiction but they also served to support each other—there was interdependence between secular and sacred.[38] While in principle acknowledging the complementarity of the 'two swords' for governing conduct, the church implicitly and often explicitly declaimed the superiority of spiritual power.[39] The pope claimed headship of the *corpus* (corporation) of all Christians, itself a juristic concept borrowed from Roman law. When joined with the increasing administrative and arbitrational demands as heads of the visible church, popes increasingly functioned as the final arbiters of *justitia* within the *respublica christiana.* In the highest of papal claims, all jurisdiction was claimed by the Roman church, and only lent to secular authorities for mundane ends, just as all power was only 'lent' to other bishops.[40] Claiming a scripturally sanctioned primacy in spiritual and ecclesiastical affairs, backed by an impressive organizational structure and their own canon law, by the thirteenth century the papacy exercised its power throughout Western

[37] On Hooker's use of the 'two swords' model, see 'Constitutionalism Late Medieval and Early Modern—*Lex Facit Regem*: Hooker's Use of Bracton,' *Acta Conventus Neolatini Bononiensis.* Vol. 37. (Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1985), 116–123.

[38] See Brian Tierney, *Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*, for the mutual influence of papal (and episcopalist) thought on monarchical (and baronial) claims.

[39] See J. A. Watt's proviso in 'Spiritual and temporal powers,' in J. H. Burns, ed., *Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350–1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Reprint, 1991), hereafter *CHMPT*: 367–8: 'The papacy accepted a principle of dualism but it was so fundamentally conditioned by another axiom, the superiority of the spiritual power, that it was in effect replaced by a unitary view of the two powers.'

[40] For the medieval background for papal claims, see also I. S. Robinson, 'Church and Papacy,' K. Pennington, 'Law, legislative authority and theories of government, 1150–1300,' and J. P. Canning, 'Law, Sovereignty and corporation theory, 1300–1450,' in Burns, ed., *CHMPT*, 252–305, 424–453 and 454–76 respectively.

Europe challenged by secular claimants only at the margins.[41] A shared commitment to the rule of law in a 'federal' system that included common and/or civil law together with the canon law made the medieval accommodation between church and state possible—both granted 'a supremely important place to the rule of law and the due process of its execution expressed in terms of jurisdiction.'[42] Rejection of papal jurisdictional claims together with the canon law irrevocably changed this accommodation.

Sixteenth-century reformers beginning with Martin Luther attacked the juristic theology of the confessional and thus the whole Roman economy of salvation. Luther's 'genius' was to attack the Roman Catholic church not at its weakest, but at its strongest point—the sacramental system.[43] He, like Wyclif and Hus before him began his public attack on the old church by questioning indulgences according to which 'surplus merit' accumulated by the church could be applied to souls in purgatory—the most recent extension of Roman church's claim to hold the power of the 'keys' and the power to remit and retain sins. Luther's earlier theological breakthrough regarding justification, however, had already led him to question the efficacy of sacramental penance. From the scrutiny of penance, the reformers began to question the whole economy of salvation in the Roman church, in which the threat of purgatory, accumulation of surplus merit and the sale of indulgences played key roles. Luther's attack on the Roman church began from within a shared set of theological and political assumptions, and ended by undermining the church's claim to ecclesiological and governmental power in ways undreamed of by earlier critics who had

[41] As Berman, *Law and Revolution*, has summarized, see the various strands of the juridical theology and canon law of the Roman church coalesced in the thirteenth century. See also Benson, *The Bishop Elect*, esp. 16: 'Between the mid-eleventh and the mid-fourteenth century, the structure and government of the Church were decisively transformed, rationalized and centralized.' On the thirteenth century achievement of the classical institutional and governmental structure of the papacy, see Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages*, who provides the most detailed account of the development of papal monarchical claims, together with his *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages*. Some caution must be used with Ullmann, especially with his later overly-schematic 'ascending' and 'descending' dichotomy and the interpretative errors this leads him to; see Francis Oakley, 'Celestial Hierarchies Revisited: Walter Ullmann's Vision of Medieval Politics,' *Past and Present* 60 (1973): 3–48.

[42] R. E. Head, *Royal Supremacy and State Trials of Bishops 1558–1725* (London: SPCK, 1962), 1.

[43] See F. Oakley, *The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 318, note.

called for reform of a worldly church or correction of erring bishops. By undercutting the Roman church's jurisdictional claims, reformers provided ammunition for attacks on its governmental claims, allowing reformers and *politiques* to work in concert for a time.[44] Competing theories emerged regarding the nature of the church and sacraments, leading to doctrinal fragmentation; rejection of the need for hierarchy and governmental apparatus followed. Church courts and especially the canon law—what Luther termed 'piece of tyranny, avarice and worldly pomp rather than law'—were seen as mainstays of a corrupt church. The symbolism of Luther burning the books of the Roman canon law still echoed in the Cosin-Morice exchange of the 1590s.[45] Prior to the reformation the idea of a church unreflectively presupposed a penitential and jurisdictional structure including its own courts and law which functioned with a degree of independence from secular authorities. Subsequent to it, defining the powers held by the church, however conceived, was not only a problem of theology and church government, but also a problem in defining the margin between secular and sacred.[46] One immediate result was an expansion of secular authority at the expense of the church.[47]

Doctrinal histories often obscure the tentative steps Reformation thinkers like Luther made towards a full theory of a church after demolishing the claims of Rome, or miss the similar initial lack of clarity on the part of Calvin, and they are often uninterested in the questions of the accommodation made by the new churches to their political

[44] See Oakley, *Western Church*, 157, one suspects 'the truly important ecclesiological disagreements of the era centered less on the specifically magisterial power of the church than upon its jurisdictional power in general.'

[45] Luther, 'An Appeal to the Ruling Class,' in John Dillenberger, ed., *Martin Luther: Selections* (New York: Anchor, 1961), 421. See, for their reaction, James Morice, *A Brief Treatise of Oathes exacted by Ordinaries and Ecclesiasticall Iudges*…([?Middleburg], 1593) STC 18106, 52, and Richard Cosin, *An Apologie for Sundrie Proceedings by Jurisdiction Ecclesiastical*…(London, 1593) STC 5821, Third Part (sep. pag.), 130, who responds that Luther's actions 'either did, or was meant, or yet could abrogate the continvall vse of a great part thereof in *Germanie* euen vntill this day.'

[46] The essential background is provided by Quentin Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought* 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) especially Vol. 2. On Luther, see 2:12: 'Luther is clearly committed to repudiating the idea that the Church possesses jurisdictional powers, and thus has the authority to direct and regulate Christian life.'; and 2:14–5: 'Luther's theological premises not only committed him to attacking the jurisdictional powers of the Church, but also to filling the power-vacuum this created by mounting a corresponding defence of the secular authorities.'

[47] For an encapsulation of this view, see especially Oakley, 'Christian Obedience and Authority, 1520–1550.'

circumstances.[48] Modern scholarly divisions make these connections harder to see.[49] In one voice the unreformed church's claim to hold the 'keys' defined the essential nature of the church but in another it was a claim of public authority, defining the boundaries between secular and sacred responsibilities for governing conduct. Reformers not only struggled with working out their doctrinal positions, they also faced the issues of institutionalizing new churches, maintaining conformity, disciplining their members and preserving the continuity of their churches under a variety of governmental forms. The spiritual mission of the church directly commissioned by Christ for maintaining the health of men's souls was never disputed, nor initially was the need for uniformity.[50] The rejection of the unreformed church's economy of penance based on the *sola fides sola gratia* formulation of the reformers did not diminish the desire for control of untoward behaviour, or need for the mechanisms and laws to do so. Often disputants returned to the same biblical texts regarding the power of the 'keys' and the power to 'bind and loose,' while disagreeing with the unreformed church about their essential meaning.[51] While church courts and canon law were viewed as corruptions of the Roman church to be sloughed off in pursuit of a purified church, much of the traditional canon law concerns were reincorporated into new civic codes in Germany and elsewhere to address moral crimes, a process Harold Berman rightly terms a legal 'revolution.'[52] The creation of 'superintendents' in Germany who filled the

[48] For a short summary, especially on Calvin inheriting the contradictions of Luther's political views, see Haro Höpfl, *The Christian Polity of John Calvin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 22ff. On Calvin's early views of the power of the keys see *idem*, 41–2.

[49] See E. Cameron, *European Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 199: 'the two main kinds of reformation history—the theological and the socio-political—have mostly been written in separate compartments.'

[50] See J. H. Burns, 'Introduction,' *CHPT*, 2–3.

[51] As early as 1520, in his *Pagan Servitude of the Church*, Luther denied that the power of the 'keys' implied authority to decree law, see *Selections*, 305, where Luther condemns the word play equating Peter and *petrus*, and the idea that Peter had received any special powers. He returned to this problem later, see first, M. Luther, *The Keys* (1530), in Conrad Bergendoff, ed., *Church and Ministry II*, Helmut T. Lehmann, general ed., *Luther's Works*, vol. 40, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 19–), 321–78, and second, *Against the Roman Papacy an Institution of the Devil* (1545), in Eric Gritsch ed., *Church and Ministry III, idem*, vol. 41, 305.

[52] See H. Berman, *Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition* (Harvard: Belknap/Harvard, 2003), 62–3: 'Rarely mentioned in contemporary scholarly literature is that fundamental changes were made in law in the sixteenth century, in Germany and elsewhere, by persons whose ideas and inter-

administrative role of bishop, but who held no special spiritual powers answered the need for maintaining the church's administrative structure. An alternative outcome was the Christianized state of Calvin's Geneva, grafting a relatively autonomous presbyterian church onto a pre-existing civic government.[53] A consistory replaced church courts, and the civic government, effectively under the control 'elders' of the church (who replaced the bishops), was responsible for 'discipline.' Hooker insists this was a contingent result of Calvin's accommodation to his political circumstances, not a Biblically prescribed form of church governance.[54] While it is hard to speak of a 'typical' path of 'reformation,' in the English case 'reformation' occurred at the instigation of the monarch, and its first steps were taken in a series of parliamentary statutes that separated the English church from Rome and established the monarch's supremacy over the church.[55] The sixteenth century English reformers had to articulate their demands for reform within the political constraints of the common law state and could not express their desire to create a 'godly commonwealth' by tying it with revolutionary political movement.[56] Any subsequent demand for reform, including issues of 'discipline' necessarily involved the parliament, monarch and church.

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ests, both religious and political, were under the strong influence of Protestant beliefs. Indeed, the impression is usually left that any connection between law and religion that may have existed in the 'Middle Ages' quickly evaporated in the sixteenth century not only in Germany but in other Protestant countries of Europe as well.' See also John Witte, Jr., *Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[53] Höpfl, *Christian Polity*, 57, notes the compactness of Geneva's 'political space' (following Sheldon Wolin), and thus the relative ease of doing so; on the attractiveness of the new doctrines to the German and Swiss cities, see S. Ozment, *Reformation in the Cities: The Appeal of Protestantism to Sixteenth-Century Germany and Switzerland* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975). See also Bernd Moeller, *Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays*, edited and translated H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr., (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972). For a consideration of the incipient 'republicanism' of the reformers, see Hans Baron, 'Calvinist Republicanism and its Historical Roots,' *Church History* Vol. 18 (1939): 30–42, as well as his 'Religion and Politics in the German Imperial Cities during the Reformation,' Parts 1 and 2, *English Historical Review* 52 (1937), 405–427 and 614–633 respectively.

[54] *Lawes* Pref.2.1–10; 1:3–12.

[55] See C. Haigh, *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 12–21 for discussion of the various English 'reformations' including the political.

[56] See Donald R. Kelley, "Elizabethan Political Thought," in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 47–79.

Hooker unlike Luther or Calvin returns to the wellspring of the church's spiritual mission understood to be given by the promise of the 'keys,' using the time-honoured distinction between the power or of order and the power of jurisdiction they implied. Jurisdiction as claimed by the Roman church had encompassed spiritual and governmental claims including underwriting papal primacy. On the one hand, the English church had separated from Rome, rejecting its claim to uniquely hold and control the keys, and to some degree embraced 'reformed' doctrine. On the other, its essentially medieval structure remained relatively unchanged, as did many of its responsibilities, although the submission of the clergy, the erection of the royal supremacy over the church and the creation of a 'Church of England' left unanswered many questions about the source and extent of the church's powers and responsibilities. Crudely, if the royal supremacy ended papal jurisdiction as a governmental power by creating an English church with the monarch as its head, what remained of the church's jurisdictional claims? A minimalist reading of the powers retained by the English episcopacy was possible, that they were analogous to Lutheran superintendents with no special powers. Their courts could be seen only to fulfil a functional need to police moral offences not unlike the civic courts in the German cities. The church's powers could be thought to stem only from a grant of power from the monarch, and under the control of statute. As Hooker noted, the essence of jurisdiction is the power to command and judge according to law, while spiritual jurisdiction should be understood as doing so according to spiritual law. But what remained of these laws in England?

Book VI and the Problem of Discipline

The bulk of Hooker's published Book VI is a reasoned discussion of need for the need for repentance and subsequent restoration of the errant individual to the community of believers, a process for which the judgment of the minister is crucial. Repentance is an unexpected starting point, given the Reformation attacks on the sacrament of penance and confession, but it is an astute starting point for Hooker to ground ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England.[57] This pastoral need, presupposed

[57] John Keble, Hooker's great nineteenth century editor rejected significant portions of the published Book VI (1648) as a separate 'Tract on Penance.'

by the church's responsibility for 'care of souls' underpins the church's involvement in discipline, regulation of morals and adjudication of social problems. Hooker suggests pastoral practice creates the need for a neutral forum for the determination of facts for certain kinds of offences not easily judged by a minister. He also argues for the importance of restitution directed to those harmed by an errant individual as a necessary component of the process of satisfaction. From these pastoral roots (and with his claim of unequal powers for the ministry in place in Book V), Hooker likely would have then proceeded in a finished Book VI to defend the existing church courts (and canonico-civil law in use in those courts) as theologically sound (descending from powers that inhered in the church and the office of bishop), as an appropriate means to police certain sorts of offences that derived from the church's mission and as a politically justifiable expression of a power sharing justified by custom and history that together with the common law worked to maintain civil peace and order. Sadly, Book VI is the least complete of the last Books, so the extent and significance of Hooker's arguments regarding jurisdiction have to be in part imputed.

The basis for postulating a more comprehensive finished Book VI is twofold. First, notes made by George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys survive (hereafter *C&S*) on a now-lost 1593 draft of Book VI (hereafter *1593*). On the basis of these notes, we know Hooker's 1593 draft was a reasoned rejection of the presbyterian platform. In their notes they exhort Hooker to deepen his discussion and engage directly with the disciplinarian proposals for consistories by defending the existing church courts and elucidating the differences between common and church law competencies. Second, Hooker's extensive *Autograph Notes* (*AN*) demonstrate he had begun this exploration. With his own theologically grounded argument for church jurisdiction based on the need for repentance in place, and its necessary expression through courts and law developed, Hooker likely would have then turned to a systematic refutation of the proposed presbyterian model for their 'discipline.'[58]

[58] For the first clear discussion of the relationship between *1593* and *1648*, and their connection via the matter of repentance, see O. Loyer, *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker* (Paris: Librarie Honoré Champion) 2 vols., 1:63–78; 2:609–10, 721–23, and the nearly-contemporaneous work of A. S. McGrade, 'Repentance and Spiritual Power: Book VI of Richard Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 29 (1978), 163–178. Loyer especially recognized the unity of Book VI, the significance of the canon law heritage and the fact that Hooker's discussion of penance was integral to his argument.

Hooker's finished Book VI likely would have had three main sections: first, a general introduction to the problem of jurisdiction and second, a discussion of the inner penitential forum—with these two sections likely appearing much as they do in *1648*. The third section—for which we have no finished text—likely would have been a discussion of the 'external forum,' comprised of two main subsections—the first justifying and explicating the current church courts and canon law as a theologically appropriate and politically acceptable mechanism for ensuring the proper treatment and return of errant members to the sacramental community (likely following a series of headings Hooker made in the *AN*) and a second subsection refuting the alternative disciplinarian platform of the reformers (likely following the order of topics from *1593*). According to the calculations of the *FLE* editors a finished Book in this form would likely have been about three times as long as what was printed as Book VI in 1648.[59] Had a completed Book VI appeared, it would have been a unique contribution to debates over the church's powers. Instead, we must read *1648* with an eye as to how Hooker likely would have developed his full argument.

After his short exordium, Hooker in *1648* reiterates the distinction between the power of order (that he has already discussed), and the no less necessary second power in the church 'which wee call the power of Jurisdiction' he proposes to take up in Book VI. The first, order, relies on Jesus's exhortation to preach, baptize and '*Doe this in remembrance of mee*,' while the second, jurisdiction, relies on the Apostle's speech regarding 'ruling the Church of God' and of 'receiving accusations.'[60]

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[59] Length estimate is by A. S. McGrade, 'Three Last Books and Autograph Notes,' *FLE* 6 Pt. 1:238–9. The notes on church courts would add about 17 pages of finished text. For a plausible outline for Book VI, see Lee Gibbs, 'Book VI,' *FLE* 6 Part 1:253–4, who builds on Rudolph Almasy, 'Richard Hooker's Book VI: A Reconstruction,' *Huntington Library Quarterly* 42 (1979), 117–39. Almasy in turn argues that the arrangement of topics of *1593* appears to have been fairly conventional for the conformists' refutations of the 'discipline.' John Keble first constructed a topical outline for *1593* from Cranmer and Sandys's notes, reproduced *FLE* 3:xxxiii.

[60] *Lawes* VI.2.1; 3:4. Each aspect of the power of order is keyed to a biblical text; Mark 16:15; Mat. 28:19; and I. Cor. 11:24. His definitions of jurisdiction are keyed to Acts 20:28: 'Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood' (also paraphrased by Hooker at V.81.2; 2:473, as 'supervisors') and 1 Tim. 5:19: 'Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses.' This passage echoes *Lawes* V.77.1; 2:424–5, where Hooker makes a rhetorical claim for the exalted and heavenly nature of the power of the ministry, except here in Book VI, Hooker does not include the traditional claim for the power

Strikingly, Hooker then quotes pseudo-Ignatius, who states that bishops are *imago dei* in ruling and the image of Christ 'in administring holy things.'[61] Although the remark remains undeveloped, by implication, bishops alone hold the jurisdictional power of 'ruling,' and they are also an 'image of Christ' in administering 'holy things,' implying their power to ordain other ministers. These are precisely the argument for the superiority of bishops with which he begins Book VII.[62] Hooker then points to the 'manifest difference' between the power of 'Ecclesiasticall order, and the power of Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall.'[63] While the power of order refers to the power to perform acts of ministry and is presumed to be held equally by all ministers, jurisdiction refers to the power of judgement according to law which is neither held equally by all, nor is its exercise confined to willing participants. The church has been given a spiritual power by Christ for the good of men's souls and its expression can be pastoral, disciplinary or coercive, that is, exercised as a 'meane to keepe them in the part which leadeth unto endles felicitie,' as a 'bridle' to restrain them, or as a 'forcible help to reclaime them' if they stray. Hooker then adds the proviso (as in other places in the *Lawes*), that although the power that infuses churches is unchanging, the authority of the church and its power of jurisdiction is expressed through laws which the church has the right to 'varie, alter chaunge,' depending on time, place, and problems.[64] Regardless of the particular form it assumes, Hooker is clear that the jurisdiction held

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of the 'keys,' or the power of 'binding and loosing.' In Book VI, this receives separate treatment, see below.

[61] The terseness of this passage and indeed the whole paragraph confirms the published Book VI's unfinished state. On bishops as *imago dei* in ruling, Hooker is citing Ignatius, *Epistola ad Smyrnaeos*, from what is now known to be an non-authorial interpolation, but not known to be so before the seventeenth century, see J. H. Srawley, *The Epistles of St. Ignatius* (London: SPCK, 1900), 10–11. Hooker accepted the letter as genuine, and cites it again, Book VII.6.8; 3:175, and echoes it at VII.16.8; 3:249. Whitgift, *WW*, 2:304, cites the same passage, while Cranmer suggested Hooker should elaborate exactly this point in 1593, see Cranmer, *C&S*; *FLE* 3:127. See J. W. McGarvey, *Church Government* (St. Louis: Christian Publishing Company, 1892), 202–3, for the critical importance of the Ignatian epistles as virtually the only authority from the early part of the second century arguing for the superior powers of bishops.

[62] See *Lawes* VII.6.1; 3:170.

[63] *Lawes* VI.2.1; 3:4.

[64] *Lawes* VI.2.2; 3:5; see, similarly, *Lawes* V.10.1; 2:46, which is Hooker's summary of his preceding four propositions regarding the law-making power of the church. On the reformers' desire to claim that while their discipline was given by the Word, they also retained a similar right to modify laws, see *Lawes* III.11.13; 1:260–1.

by the church includes pastoral, disciplinary and, if necessary coercive responsibilities.

Hooker gives his first full definition of the power of jurisdiction by considering its 'end,' which is to provide for 'the health and safety of mens soules, by bringing them to see and repent their grievous offences committed against God.' To this he adds the social dimension of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: it is responsible 'to reforme all injuries, offered with the breach of Christian love, and charitie towards their brethren, in matters of Ecclesiasticall cognizance.' Penitence can be a 'private' duty for the individual but also a duty of 'externall discipline' which involves the church. Hooker then parses repentance: it is the appeasement of 'whome we offend by sinne.' Since all sin is an offence against God what is crucial is the 'secret repentance of the heart' which restores us in God's sight, unless either something in the act of sin, or some quality of the sinner requires something more. Hooker terms the first part of this process—a secret and inward change that relies on the mysterious inward workings of God's grace—the 'virtue' of repentance. This 'virtue,' or inward change of heart and submission in God's sight, is a necessary part of worship attained by devotion and prayer. That this inward change can only be a result of grace freely given to those who have an active faith places him squarely in the reformed tradition.[65] Yet if the sin is a 'crime injurious,' the inward change must also content other men and in some cases this necessitates a 'more exemplarie and open satisfaction.' Hooker terms this the 'discipline' of repentance, which involves ameliorating harm to others. For the church to fully discharge its responsibility for the care of souls, the 'offices' of repentance also demand the participation of those shunning as well as seeking adjudication, in other words includes the willing *and* others 'altogether against their wills.'[66] Hooker's claim that church jurisdiction includes responsibility for these sorts of offences and his extension of this jurisdiction to include the unwilling clearly signals his departure from Calvin.

Calvin, like everyone who wrote on the issue of church structure and jurisdiction also returned in the final edition of his *Institutes* to the

[65] See e.g. Calvin, *Institutes* III.iii.1; LCC I:593, first agreeing with Bucer that 'repentance' not only 'follows' faith, but is 'born of faith,' but then taking exception with Luther and Bucer respectively: 'There are some, however, who suppose that repentance precedes faith, rather than flows from it, or is produced by it as fruit from a tree.'

[66] *Lawes* VI.3.1; 3:7.

key passages cited above, Matthew 18:16–19 (the command to 'tell it to the church' and finishing with the power to 'bind and loose') as well as the additional texts of Matthew 16:19 (the grant of the 'keys') and John 20:23 (the power to 'remit and retain' sins).[67] Rather than reading these passages together as reinforcing aspects of the church's jurisdiction as the Roman church had done, Calvin insists that the latter two refer only to 'general doctrinal authority,' and 'the command concerning forgiving and retaining sins and that promise made to Peter concerning binding and loosing ought to be referred solely to the ministry of the Word,' or the power of 'preaching the gospel.'[68] Only the first passage refers to jurisdiction narrowly understood—that is, admonition and correction—which requires 'investigation of the cause, some court of judgment and order of procedure,' whose form is prefigured by the Jewish Sanhedrin of the Old Testament.[69] Calvin, in earlier comments scoffed at the Roman church's tendency to read these passages together as mutually reinforcing aspects of the 'keys': 'These madmen . . . indiscriminately try to establish now confession, now excommunication, now jurisdiction, now the right to frame laws, and now indulgences. Indeed they cite the first passage [Matt. 16:18] to establish the primacy of the papal see.'[70] Calvin denied the hierarchy of claims of jurisdiction made by the unreformed church that ranged from spiritual correction (and indeed the homology between court and confessional), through the claimed right to make laws that ended with claims of papal primacy. Calvin argues that the church

[67] See Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.2; LCC II:1211 ff, a chapter added in 1559, but much of the material is heavily rewritten survivals from earlier editions.

[68] Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.1; 1212; 1213. explicating Matthew 16:19, which in a traditional fashion he connects with the promise of John 20:23, and claims Matt. 28:19 provides further evidence that this essentially pastoral and preaching mission, given by the power of the 'keys,' was entrusted to all of the Apostles. For the pastoral power assigned to this 'key' see also *Institutes* IV.i.22; LCC II:1035.

[69] See Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.1, 1212; Matthew 18:15–18 does not refer to the 'general doctrinal authority' of John 28 and Matthew 16, but in fact refers to a power of the 'keys' for 'admonition and correction' expressed in the 'jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin' that will in future be transferred to 'Christ's flock.' For a discussion of the presbyterian use of the Sanhedrin as a model and Hooker's response in *1593*, see Almasy, 'Book VI,' 127–36.

[70] Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.2; LCC II:1214, this comment survives from earlier edition. Calvin has already made the negative argument against the claim that Matt. 16:19 could possibly refer to the papal primacy at *Institutes* IV.vi.4; LCC II:1105 and again emphasized the keys' pastoral function.

> does not have the right of the sword to punish and compel, not the authority to force; not imprisonment, nor the other punishments which the magistrate commonly inflicts. Then, it is not a question of punishing a sinner against his will, but of *the sinner professing his repentance in a voluntary chastisement*.[71]

'Tell it to the church' of Matt. 18:17 thus becomes for Calvin a literal and voluntary public disclosure in front of the whole congregation, while Matt. 16:19 anchors the other judicial aspect of jurisdiction prefigured by the OT Sanhedrin (as noted), whose penalties are limited to separation (exclusion from the sacraments, analogous to minor excommunication), excommunication proper, or expulsion from the church for those not brought to repentance, and finally execration, or anathema a full separation from the body of the faithful. *In extremis*, what is at issue between Hooker and Calvin is the question of who holds 'coactive' or coercive power? Calvin follows Marsilius of Padua in claiming that the church cannot legitimately hold any coactive or coercive power as part of its jurisdiction.[72] Calvin, like his English 'puritan' followers, argues for an autonomous sphere in which the church interprets God's word, while blithely assuming the state is obligated to support 'true' religion (and thus conformity) and further that the magistrate will support the judgment of the church as a matter of course by providing penalties—imprisonment, expulsion or other punishments for errant members of the congregation.[73]

While Calvin acknowledges the church has power to make laws or ordinances for itself, he rejects the Roman model of ecclesiastical courts and extensive canon law, and indeed denies that the church has responsibility for the whole range of problems traditionally addressed by those courts.[74] In contrast, Hooker's treatment of the power of

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[71] See Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.3; LCC II:1215, emph. added; see also his comparison between civil and ecclesiastical power.

[72] See George Carleton, *Jurisdiction Regall, Episcopall, Papall. Wherein is Declared how the Pope hath intruded Upon the Jurisdiction of Temporall Princes*…(London: John Norton, 1610) STC 4637 for a good summary. Carleton claims 'external coactive jurisdiction,' or the power to punish for spiritual offences is given to magistrates by everyone except 'papists.'

[73] See Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.16; LCC II:1229: 'the church does not have the power to coerce, and ought not to seek it (I am speaking of civil coercion), it is the duty of godly kings and princes to sustain religion by laws, edicts, and judgments.'

[74] See Calvin, *Institutes* IV.xi.7; LCC II:1219, and his dismissal that the traditional arrangement of bishops exercising 'ordinary' jurisdiction through their courts, especially if the power is delegated to lay officials, can be meaningfully termed 'spiritual jurisdiction' in a manner echoed by Stoughton, see note 102 below.

the 'keys' attempts to save what he takes to be the true exercise of spiritual jurisdiction (which includes some power within the church for discipline and punishment as well as some measure of power over the unwilling) while uncoupling this from high papal claims—especially of their soteriology that made the actions of the priest a requirement for absolution and repentance as well as those of high politics and law. Hooker argues for a more expansive view of the church's responsibilities including taking cognizance of the believers' actions in cases of injury to others, recognizing and addressing that harm before repentance could be said to have been effected for example, and to hear cases, apply law and even assess penalties in courts as a legitimate part of the 'care of souls'—that is, to apply medicine for souls (*medicinae animae* not *poena*)—to 'heal' and restore offenders to the community of believers, even in the case of the hated *ex officio* oath.[75] Hooker's reworked version of a traditional view of church's jurisdiction underpins Book VI and indeed all of the last Books.

Hooker continues to parse repentance, following the traditional formula of the unreformed church—contrition, confession, satisfaction and absolution. In discussing absolution, Hooker supplies a second definition of the 'keys':

> Our Lord and Saviour in the 16th of St Matthewes Ghospell giveth his Apostles regiment in generall, over Gods Church. For they that have the keyes of the Kingdome of heaven are thereby signified to be stewards of the house of God, under whome they guide, command, judge and correct his family. The soules of men are Gods treasure, committed to the trust and fidelity of such, as must render a strict account for the verie least which is under their custodie. God hath not invested them with power to make a revenew thereof, butt to use it for the good of them, whome *Jesus Christ* hath most deerely bought.[76]

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[75] See Hooker, *AN* 77v *FLE* 3:480, and his discussion of the *ex officio* oath: 'it is for the good of our selves to confesse even against our selves.' Lee Gibbs, 'Book VI' *FLE* 6 Part 1:278, notes Hooker's 'repeated tendency to expound repentance in terms of a medical cure for a disease points to the primacy of the therapeutic over the punitive,' citing Lawes VI.3.1, VI.4.1, and VI.4.5. For a similar claim, see [R. Cosin], 'Schedule' in Strype, *Life of Whitgift* (Oxford, 1822) Bk. IV Append. 2, 3:235 [original is LPL MS 2004 fol. 65v]; 'penances enjoyned by the ordinary are not taken to be *poenae*, but *medicinae*,' repeated and reiterated, Cosin, *Apologie* (1593) Pt. 2, 78. See Tentler, *Sin and Confession*, 280, and generally, 271–80, who notes that the traditional idea of church jurisdiction incorporated the idea that penalties could be directed to both body and soul.

[76] *Lawes* VI.4.1; 3:14; keyed to Matt. 16:19; 'Most deerely bought' echoes Acts 20:28. The comment regarding 'revenew' suggests Hooker's recognition of the strength

Hooker notes this power of the 'keys' given to the Apostles entailed 'regiment' or governmental power over the church, and the competencies include guiding, commanding, judging and correcting members of the church, amplifying Book V's brief mention of them, but as yet, not discussing who inherits their power over the church. By returning to the traditional understanding of the 'keys' as granting jurisdiction, Hooker opposes the English reformers (and a number of his contemporaries) who followed Calvin in viewing the grant of the 'keys' as solely referring 'the ministry of the Word.' So too the Geneva Bible claimed that the power of the 'keys' referred only to preaching, not to any sort of judicial power.[77] Hooker does however stress that the power held is paternal (not authoritarian), fiduciary, and the exercise of the keys is part of the church's, and indeed the ministers' pastoral responsibility.

Along with the pastoral imperative to 'guide,' Hooker includes the power command as well as to 'judge and correct,' which was at the heart of the controversy between conformist and reformer. Hooker continues his expansive definition of the 'keys' held by the Apostles:

> And because their office herein consisteth of sundry functions, some belonging to doctrine, some to discipline, all conteyned in the name of the keyes: they have for matters of discipline as well litigious as criminall, their Courts and Consistories erected by the heavenly authority of his most sacred voyce, whoe hath said, s*Dic Ecclesiae*: Tell the Church.

Hooker's claim that 'tell the church' implies both litigious and criminal actions undertaken in 'Courts and Consistories' confirms Hooker is justifying a model of church discipline starkly opposed to the reformers, who (again following Calvin), understood 'Tell the Church' as a literal public declaration of wrongdoing in front of the congregation, and subsequent review undertaken by a council of elders. Hooker then enumerates the church's power to excommunicate:

> Against rebellious and contumacious persons, which refuse to obey their sentence, armed they are with power to eject such out of the Church, to deprive them of the honors, rights and priviledges of Christian men,

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of the reformers' criticisms regarding high fees in the bishops' courts, or it may be a commonplace directed at Rome.

[77] [W. Whittingham and A. Gilby, eds. and transl.], *The Bible and Holy Scripture*… [Geneva Bible] (Edinburgh, 1579) STC 2125, 10, squib Matt. 16:19: 'The preachers of the Gospel open the gates of heaven with the worde of God, which is the right keye: so that where this word is not purely taught, there is neither key nor authoritie.'

> to make them as heathens and publicans, with whome society was hatefull.[78]

Whatever is done by the church in 'orderly and lawful proceeding' is ratified by God, as promised in Matthew 18:18, that 'grand original warrant' first held by the Apostles 'and others following them successively.' Those most directly 'following' the Apostles at least in England are bishops, as Hooker noted in Book V and develops in Book VII. The 'end' or purpose of the church's jurisdiction is to heal consciences, cure sin, reclaim sinners and 'make them by repentance just.'[79]

All ministers to a degree share in the power of the 'keys'—not just the bishops. Hooker returns to a early patristic understanding where the power to 'bind and loose' was held by all ministers, where the claim of the keys were not yet overshadowed by high papal claims. In discussing private confession, Hooker states all ministers:

> equally have the same power to withhold that sacred mysticall foode, from notorious evill livers, from such as have any way wronged their neighbors, and from parties betweene whome there doth open hatred and malice appeare; till the first sort have reformed their wicked life; the second, recompensed them unto whome they were injurious; and the last, condescended unto some course of Christian reconciliation, whereupon their mutuall accord may ensue.[80]

All ministers thus have the power to withhold the sacraments as a means of ensuring repentance, the penalty of minor excommunication—a graphic example of the equal exercise of jurisdiction in judging by ministers. Hooker rejects the idea of a council of lay-elders as the only means to perform excommunication (as Calvin and the English disciplinarians had argued), while upholding its necessity as a means of discipline against Erastus.[81] Hooker's stress on the importance of participation and sacramental community in Book V is given teeth—errant individuals properly can be excluded from its benefits. For the first and last case—the reform of a 'wicked life' or where 'open hatred' exists between parties—the minister's judgment of when to exercise minor excommunication or what constitutes repentance straightforwardly relies

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[78] *Lawes* VI.4.1; 3:14, squib s Matt. 18:17.
[79] *Lawes* VI.4.1; 3:15; squib t Matt. 18:18.
[80] *Lawes* VI.4.15; 3:48–9.
[81] See *Lawes* Pref.2.9; 1:11: '*they have, as to me seemeth, devided very equally the truth betweene them; Beza most truely mainteyning the necessitie of excommunication, Erastus as truely the non-necessitie of layelders to be ministers thereof.*'

on the minister's own judgement or 'conscience' and discretion. In the second case, however, when injury to others must be 'recompensed,' or if the offender claims the support of law for his actions, the minister should not absolve. What is then needed is the collection of facts and a neutral determination of the matter. The accused must confess, or if need be '*convicted in some publick, secular, or Ecclesiastical court.*'[82] This latter case is one of several key points in Hooker's treatment of repentance that would have provided an anchor for his planned defence of the existing church courts, although he seems to allow for 'mixed' (spiritual and mundane) cases as well as some customary matters to be heard in common law courts, as they were in England.[83]

Hooker's discussion of satisfaction introduces a second anchor for court process based on the need to 'content' others—the need for restitution, or making 'whole' the injured party. Again Hooker begins from its pastoral and theological roots. Satisfaction is 'a worcke which Justice requireth to be done for contentment of persons injuried.' The desire for satisfaction results from the working of repentance within us.[84] Offences against others sometimes require that

> particular men be satisfyed, or else repentance to bee utterly voide and of none effect. For if eyther through open rapine or cloaked fraud, if through injurious or unconscionable dealings, a man have wittingly wronged others to enrich himselfe: the first thing evermore in this case required (habilitiee serving:) is restitution.

Even though it is an impossibility for us to 'satisfy' God (and instead we must rely on grace freely given), we sometimes must attempt to satisfy other men. Such offences are not discharged until 'recompense and restitution to man accompanie the poenitent confession wee have made to Almightie God.'[85] Here Hooker states in pastoral terms what had

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[82] *Lawes* VI.4.15; 3:49; quotation in italics is taken from Beatus Rheanus (1485–1547), *Admonitio ad lectorem de quisbusdam Tertulliani dogmatibus* in Tertullian, *Opera* (1521), identification given in *FLE* 6 Part 2:854; 856.

[83] Hooker is possibly making allowance for both Germany and Geneva by not claiming that such determinations must be made in a church court.

[84] *Lawes* VI.5.2; 3:53.

[85] *Lawes* VI.5.7; 3:61; Hooker cites Levit. 6:2 and then discusses Num. 5:8, regarding trespass, robbery and violence, although he then qualifies the OT example somewhat, see *Lawes* VI.5.7; 3:63: 'wee hold not Christian people tyed unto Jewish orders for the manner of restitution, butt surely restitution wee must hold necessarie, as well in our own repentance as theirs, for sinnes of willfull oppression and wrong.' Hooker cites Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 4. dist. 15 to the effect that penance is feigned, if what can be given back is not.

been one of the most fertile strains in canon law proceedings where the civil law doctrine of *restitutio*—of making an injured party 'whole'—is made a precondition of whether absolution could be effected. This led to a whole class of canonical legal procedures and remedies.[86] Hooker then takes up the cudgels against Rome, arguing that their doctrine of 'Sacramentall satisfaction' not only alters what ought to be the logical progression from repentance, followed by satisfaction, and only then by absolution, but by placing all the weight on the actions of the priest and church their doctrine of statisfaction leads to the 'Mart of Papall Indulgences' already noted.

A third anchor for the legal side of the church's jurisdiction begins from Hooker's understanding of priests acting as 'judges' that Christ's promise in John 20:23 to 'remit' implies and the metaphor of the 'keys' presupposes (which Hooker has so far assumed), whereby the minister's exercise of the power to absolve presupposes that their judgments will be ratified in heaven. Yet the reformed understanding of grace freely given cuts against these presumed powers of the minister.[87] Hooker, in this very rough part of *1648*, recaps the differences between the reformed and Roman understanding of repentance and condemns the Roman claim that the essence of the exercise of the 'keys' is the priest's power to absolve. Once again, Hooker begins from a pastoral perspective: 'Sinne is not helped butt by being assecured of pardon,' but the question is, what assurance can we have when absolution is pronounced by men? Rome, by magnifying this 'Priestly act,' as Hooker terms the pronouncement of absolution, and claiming that 'noe man which sinneth after Baptisme, can be reconciled unto God butt by their sentence,' is guilty of the height of presumption. Hooker agrees that Christ's promise of John 20:23 'did ordaine judges over sinfull soules, give them authoritie to absolve from sinne and promise to ratifye in heaven,' yet (as with all jurisdiction) absolution must 'proceede in due order' and not 'extend itself beyond due bounds,' limits which Rome has failed to observe by claiming that the actions of their priests are a prerequisite for God's pardon.[88] While this division is not thoroughly developed, some of what follows helps us understand what ought to be jurisdiction's 'due order' and 'due bounds.' The act of absolution

[86] On this doctrine, see Helmholz, *Spirit of the Classical Canon Law*, 88–115.

[87] See *Lawes* VI.5.2; 3:54: 'Wherefore all sinne is remitted in the only faith of Christs passion.'

[88] *Lawes* VI.6.1; 3:69; VI.6.2; 3:71; VI.6.3; 3:71–2.

does not cause inward change which can only result from God's grace, confirming God's pardon to us. True repentance requires 'inward sinceritie' and change of conscience on the part of the sinner, but it must be 'joined with fitt and convenient offices . . . discernd by them whome God hath appointed Judges in this Court.' Hooker condemns Rome for claiming that the absolution of a priest is necessary for repentance, yet his own use of 'court' and 'offices' suggest the need for public actions even for matters involving the 'internal' forum. The minister's sentence of absolution for voluntary penitents, while not controlling Christ's forgiveness, is especially beneficial for 'weake, timorous and fearfull mindes,' both in declaring us free from the guilt connected to the act (confirming the actions of God's grace), and, importantly for Hooker (and the stress he has placed on sacramental community), signifying our full restoration to the fellowship of the church.[89] Pronouncement of absolution by the minister thus has pastoral efficacy.

Hooker's final ingress for court process, or the 'external forum' begins from his assumption that church jurisdiction can be directed at unwilling offenders. Since the church also has responsibility to correct those who must 'be brought to amendment by Ecclesiastical Censure,' in exercising this latter type of spiritual jurisdiction the minister 'doth *more* then declare and signifye what God hath wrought. (emphasis added)'[90] Here Hooker confirms his earlier hints that the church's jurisdiction can be directed at both the willing and unwilling, and includes the power to correct—and, if necessary, punish—offenders to encourage them to amend their lives. Although Hooker begins with another characteristic division, that this power has 'by error beene oppugned' and also has been 'depraved through abuse,' what follows does not immediately address jurisdiction directed at the unwilling.[91] He appears to pick up the thread at VI.6.8, where he distinguishes three parts in sin: the act (which is transitory), the pollution of the soul that remains, and the 'punishment whereunto they are made subject that have committed it.' Sin is 'everie deede, worde, and thought against the Lawe of God.' Our corrupt nature presupposed, as Hooker notes, we have a 'disposition unto wickedness' that makes sin likely, and although the act is transitory its effects persist, making further sin likely. Both because of the

[89] *Lawes* VI.6.5; 3:74.
[90] *Lawes* VI.6.5; 3:75–6.
[91] *Lawes* VI.6.6; 3:76.

act and this 'blott' that persists, there 'ariseth a present debt to endure what punishment soever; and obligation in the chaines whereof sinners by the justice of Almightie God continue bound until repentance loose them.' Hooker thus restates the time-honoured justification of the church's responsibility to exercise wide powers of jurisdiction, *per ratione peccati*, or 'by reason of sin.' As such, the church should correct even the 'unwilling' and can impose penalties that are *more* than those wrought by God. The church has the power to 'bindeth by the Censures of her own Discipline' and the 'loosing' that takes place upon evidence of repentance is from the church's own censures or punishments, not God's. This is a much diminished claim from that of Rome, who had claimed that God ratifies the actions of the church.[92] With this inconclusive discussion, the published *1648* ends. Despite its many rough patches, Hooker argues that our need for repentance creates a special theological and social responsibility for the church and its exercise of the 'keys.' Ultimately, this is what underwrites the church's jurisdiction. Pastoral experience created the need for the neutrality of 'canon' or ecclesiastical law and church courts to deal with a range of matters some of which were at base spiritual, and which in some cases needed to determine the appropriate restitution before the penitent should be free to rejoin the community. Hooker also introduces a claim for the necessity of the church's power over the 'unwilling,' and arguably would have dealt with this more fully had Book VI been completed.

A fully realized Book VI likely would have then transitioned to deal with the status of the laws and courts of the English church. In this second part, Hooker would have faced the unenviable task of trying to make sense of the legal heritage of the English church. Unfortunately only the *Autograph Notes* survive to suggest the extent of Hooker's argument. He would need to have built on the premises of *1648*, and answer critics of ecclesiastical jurisdiction—religious and secular. The break

[92] *Lawes* VI.6.8; 3:80–3.This paragraph may well have been Hooker's lead-in for what was likely to have been his next main topic, the problem of jurisdiction directed at the unwilling which in turn would have served as a proper bridge to his discussion of church laws and courts. Most of what follows the division of 'by error beene oppugned' and 'depraved through abuse,' could have been incorporated under his previous division of 'due bounds' and 'due order,' since much of it deals with the question of Roman claims regarding the power of the priest in absolving, challenging their assertion that absolution reaches a sacrament and then addressing 'psychological' aspect of the penitent's need for, and reaction to, absolution, all of which Hooker has already covered. In the absence of alternate manuscripts, this can only be speculative.

with Rome and erection of the supremacy ended papal jurisdiction in England. Papal appeals ended, the teaching of canon law ceased, and any laws that were 'repugnant' or prejudicial to the monarch were no longer valid.[93] Despite arguments made especially by Christopher St. German at the time of the break with Rome to severely limit the purview of the ecclesiastical courts to only a few responsibilities, the English church remained responsible for more or less the same range of matters as the pre-Reformation church that had originated from the church's claim to exercise the 'keys'.[94] As reformers denied the theological premises that had underwritten the extensive jurisdictional claims of the pre-Reformation church, and as the English church began to incorporate reformed tenets, on what basis did those responsibilities continue? The best that could be said by reformers about the ordinary or bishops' courts for example was that they continued as a theologically indifferent choice of the monarch. The less than straightforward path of reform in England, including the reversals under Queen Mary, resulted in persistence of older forms of religion alongside the new; so too the church courts survived and even flourished as the century progressed.

Further complicating matters, subsequent to the Submission of the Clergy of 1532 and its confirming act two years later, no one knew exactly which laws still applied. Henry VIII's failure to complete a planned reform of canon law before his death, and a similar failure under Edward left the puzzle of what laws were in effect and the

[93] Subsequent to the Act of Submission (1534:25 H. VIII c.19), the King's writ was required before Convocation could assemble, as was the King's assent to any new 'canons, constitutions, ordinance provincial, or other' before they are put into use. It called for a Commission of 32 to review existing ecclesiastical law, subsequently that no 'canons, constitution or ordinance shall be made or put into execution' that is 'contraiant or repugnant' to the royal prerogative, or 'customs, laws or statutes' of the realm. It ended the right to papal appeals which resulted in the creation of the High Court of Delegates. While often seen as the end of independence of the church and an end to their law-making responsibilities, in fact it only placed Convocation on the same footing as parliament.

[94] For Christopher St. German, see John Guy 'The Henrician Age,' in J. G. A. Pocock, Gordon Schochet and Lois Schwoerer, eds., *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Folger Institute in Association with Cambridge University Press, 1993), 24–26, for a précis of Guy's considerable work on St. German, and works there cited. St. German denied papal jurisdiction, and wished to trim matters of spiritual cognizance to the bone, but did not embrace 'reformed' religion. On the continuity of court practice, but with an acknowledgement of the ebb and flow in their in the sixteenth century; see Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 28–41.

extent of the church's responsibility unclarified.[95] In the early part of Elizabeth's reign, when the proposed Edwardian canon law revisions were published as the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum* (1571), reform of the ecclesiastical laws was again blocked, likely because canon law reform was inseparable from other unacceptable reformist demands.[96] These successive failures to codify and clarify the canon law ensured that English church courts discharged their large responsibilities using a mixture of civil law procedure (since canon law teaching had been abolished under Henry VIII), unclarified remnants of the canon law (minus any laws that referred to papal supremacy, papal appeals, or were 'repugnant'), newly generated 'laws' like Archbishop Parker's 'Advertisements' for regulation of the church and, finally, new statutory provisions regarding conformity that applied to the wider population. No wholesale rejection of the canon law took place, nor were the former canon law concerns systematically incorporated into new civic codes as in Germany. The ecclesiastical courts were hedged in by threats of prohibition (which stopped actions in an ecclesiastical court that properly belonged to the common law courts) and *praemunire* (the charge that actions in an ecclesiastical court impinged on the royal prerogative) from the common lawyers when it was thought they had overreached. Yet despite a certain amount of uncertainty and lack of conceptual clarity, the confident assertions of an earlier generation of historians that ecclesiastical jurisdiction was in decline because it was costly, inefficient, and moribund must be rejected, and the continued vitality and increasing professionalism of the church courts as the sixteenth century progressed must be acknowledged.[97] The church courts continued to be responsible for a vast array of matters—correction,

[95] On the ongoing and finally abortive project for reform of the English canon law after 1532 and the first clear discussion of the differences between the Henrician proposals as compared to those drafted under Edward, see now Gerald Bray, *Tudor Church Reform: The Henrician Canons of 1535 and the* Reformatio Legum Ecclasticarum (Boydell, 2000), and sources there cited.

[96] See T. S. Freeman, 'Thomas Norton, John Foxe and the Parliament of 1571,' *Parliamentary History* 26 (1997): 131–47, for a revised account of how the 1571 *Reformatio* came to be printed and introduced in parliament, supplemented by Bray, *Tudor Church Reforms*, lxxvi–xcix.

[97] See P. Collinson, *Religion of Protestants*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 62, for the rejection of earlier claims of decline. See also Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 28–54, for a textured account of the ebb and flow of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction after the break with Rome, while noting the real gain in self-confidence and professionalism as the sixteenth century progressed.

adjudication, acting as courts of record (and verification) and finally, responsibilities for licensing. The corrective function was of course to enforce conformity and purely spiritual matters including contracts of marriage but also included a bewildering and very wide-reaching array of moral offences (hence their nickname of 'bawdy courts'), while the adjudicative function included those sorts of matters involving issues between parties like defamation that Hooker has taken care to justify as originating from pastoral responsibilities and thus ought to be part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Adjudication included the matters of testaments and (partially) wills that were verified and recorded by the ecclesiastical courts, and they were responsible as well for the licensing of clergy, schoolteachers and midwives.[98]

Despite the continuity of ecclesiastical court responsibilities, critics condemned the courts' existence, deploying a rich anti-papal and anti-clerical language against them. Instituting the alternative 'discipline' of the reformers would mean bishops would no longer excommunicate alone, or be responsible for 'ordinary' courts, nor would the hated laws of the pope continue to be used. More pragmatically, common lawyers, even when only motivated by what Houlbrooke has termed 'pedantic opportunism and professional rivalry' presumed they had control over the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Helmholz has recently identified five commonly held opinions among common lawyers regarding common law control over the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and notes that most of these claims would have been rejected outright by the civilians staffing the church's courts.[99] Even if the church's legal responsibilities only continued by the monarch's choice, if (as the common lawyers tended to argue) all powers the church held were under statute and common law, then church courts should at the very least meet the procedural

[98] K. B. Outhwaite, *The Rise and Fall of the English Ecclesiastical Courts, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5ff., an excellent guide to the procedural aspects and complexities of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England. See also Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 1–2, who lists for the 'civil' side of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: (1) all questions regarding the formation and annulment of marriage,' (2) proving of last wills and testaments; (3) defamation; (4) jurisdiction over sworn oaths (and perjury) and (5) all matters of tithes. For the *ex officio* or criminal side against the laity, he lists: (1) moral offences, like fornication; (2) deviations from the teachings of the church, including blasphemy, and (3) offences against a church, such as disturbances within church yards. Finally, the courts handled matters regulating the clergy, usually *ex officio* such as simony (holding of more than one living).

[99] For the five points that would be resisted by the civilians. See Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 172–3.

standards of the common law. Whitgift's conformity campaign, begun in 1584, because of its use of the *ex officio* oath was condemned by reformers and common lawyers alike.[100] By 1587, Anthony Cope (together with five other members) introduced his 'Bill and Book' in parliament, calling for the establishment of the 'Geneva discipline' joined with the hitherto unimaginable demand to make 'utterly void and of none effect' all existing laws, statutes, customs, ordinances, which defined worship, ceremonies and government in the English church demonstrating the two sides of the attack on ecclesiastical jurisdiction.[101]

A combination of opportunism, rivalry and anticlericalism is strikingly evident in attacks on the ecclesiastical jurisdiction after 1584. The metaphor of the 'Spanish Inquisition' that begins with Robert Beale's first collection of criticisms of Whitgift's conformity campaign encapsulates all that was deemed wrong with it—in short it was 'papist,' arbitrary and illegal under the common law.[102] Stoughton's *Abstract* of 1584 cleverly marshalled canon law precedents to condemn exceptions allowed by the English church for matters such as clerical non-residence—even if such canons had never been 'received' in England or were considered to be no longer in force. He goes on to argue (in the manner of St. German)

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[100] Ralph Houlbrooke, *Church Courts and the People During the English Reformation 1520–1570* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 20; 267–8, who notes Cosin in particular was responding to 'a most dangerous alliance' of Puritans and common lawyers who were attacking the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. J. D. Eusden, *Puritans, Lawyers, And Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958) similarly argues for an alliance of 'Puritans' and common lawyers. Cosin, *Apologie* (1593) seems to as well, see sig. a2v, where he distinguishes those who have been drawn into the controversy from a sense of 'commiseration,' from the hard core reformers, whom he accuses of 'pursuing a more politike course' in challenging 'diuers receiued proceedings in Courts Ecclesiasticall, as not iustifiable by law,' claiming that they are 'dealt with and oppressed contrary to law.' The groups may not resolve so distinctly, since James Morice, William Stoughton, Nicholas Fuller and Robert Beale all seem sympathetic to the reformers' cause, as well as raising principled legal objection to the enforcement campaign.

[101] The bill is reproduced in A. Peel, ed., *A Seconde Parte of a Register, Being a Calendar of Manuscripts under that title…* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915) 2:215 and discussed in J. E. Neale, *Elizabeth and her Parliaments* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965), 2:149, noting: "*Tabula rasa*; stark revolution. Its like was never seen before in the English Parliament." See also P. Collinson, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 307: 'The bill which Cope and his friends had in hand was perhaps the most immoderate measure ever to come before the House of Commons.'

[102] Whitgift's summary of Beale's tract is reprinted in Strype, *Whitgift*, III.5, 1:284–7. Beale's draft letter to Burghley, using 'Spanish Inquisition' to describe the campaign is BL Add. MS 48039, fols. 49v–50r, followed by Beale's tract in draft. The phrase echoes in Burghley's subsequent correspondence.

that the church's courts should not be considered 'ecclesiastical' in any deep sense, since neither the matters they deal with are spiritual, nor are they actually run by clerics. Instead they are run by 'doctors of the Ciuill lawe, meere lay men (as they call them) and no whit beneficed, by priuiledge of Cleargie, exercise all iurisdiction reputed Ecclesiasticall in their consistories, and by the ordinaunces of the Realme, are made competent and lawfull Iudges in these Courtes.' Stoughton's answer is that the church courts should be taken from the bishops, purged of their 'papist' canon law and refounded as royal ecclesiastical courts using civil law procedure.[103] Beale and Morice (together with others) criticized the High Commission for failing to meet common law procedural standards, condemned Whitgift's use of the oath *ex officio* and denied the church's claims to hold any independent jurisdiction at all. As Morice argues, 'may we not safelie conclude that the Bishops and Ordinaries in these dayes usurping power and jurisdiction in the like sort and manner [as Cardinal Wolsey] (although not in the same particulars) by colour of Antichristian decrees, or practizing those popishe Cannons, the verie head of that hellishe *Cerebus* of Rome?'[104] An often overlooked axiom of 'conformist' defence in the 1590s—of which we should see Hooker's Book VI as a part—was to shore up and defend the church's jurisdiction including its courts and laws against accusations of 'illegality' by both the law of God and the common law. Richard Cosin's 'official' *Apologie for Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall* which appeared during the 1593 parliament met one part of this need, answering those who 'lately called into question diuerese proceedings Ecclesiasticall, both for the matter, and for the circumstances, or the maner, that they are *contrairie to the lawes of this Realme*.'[105]

In fact, the complexity of the effect of the break with Rome on the intertwined jurisdictions is quite staggering, ranging from the meta-legal (the source and extent of the church's jurisdiction under the supremacy), the historical (continuity of the pre-existing body of church laws, privileges, immunities, and exceptions), the professional (the abolition of canon law teaching and the subsequent control of

[103] See [?W. Stoughton], *An Abstract of Certain Acts of Parliament*…(London, 1584) STC 10394, for his attack on the substance of the matters heard by the ecclesiastical courts reminiscent of Christopher St. German, 228ff., for his criticism of delegated powers to laymen, see 236; and for his proposal for refoundation of the courts as effectively secular courts under the queen, see 235–8.

[104] Morice, *Brief Treatise*, 52.

[105] Cosin, *Apologie* (1593), sig. A2–A2v, emphasis added. This 1593 "Generall Preface" repeats verbatim the Preface of the 1591 edition.

ecclesiastical jurisdiction by civilians) and the procedural—not to mention the direct challenges to the church's jurisdiction from would-be reformers and common law critics. Cases like that of Robert Cawdrey challenged the 'legality' of the church's own courts and laws as judged by the standard of the common law, but also exposed some of this complexity. Robert Cawdrey, a Rutland clergyman was first suspended after refusing the *ex officio* oath, then deprived of his clerical living. He subsequently sued in common law for trespass against the new holder of his living, in a case that has been termed the 'Roe v. Wade' of the period.[106] Cawdrey's case raised the obvious question—did the church have the power to discipline its officers, first by requiring subscription and, second, did it have the power to suspend when someone refused to swear? His suspension and dismissal would have been previously considered a church matter. However the grounds for dismissal—failure to take the oath *ex officio* for further questioning (after first refusing to swear *ex officio* to Whitgift's articles)—was a matter of dispute, in part because of challenges to the oath procedure itself, in part because of the contents of the articles that recalcitrants were being asked to swear to and finally because statutory provisions made dismissal only possible after a second offence.[107] There was a compelling need for the church to answer both reformed and common law criticisms of its legal machinery by clarifying what laws were in force (and for what reasons) and to systematically defend the church's responsibilities. By the 1590s other works by civilians appeared in addition to Cosin's that had begun to do so.[108]

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[106] So John Guy, 'Elizabethan Establishment,' 132, has claimed. While the historical significance of Cawdrey's case is undeniable, publicly it did not seem to have the sort of resonance the metaphor implies at least as far as court practice, see Charles Gray, 'Prohibitions and the privilege against self-incrimination,' in Delloyd Guth and John W. McKenna, eds. *Tudor Rule and Revolution: Essays for G. R. Elton from His American Friends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 354.

[107] For Cawdrey's case, see the discussion in R. G. Usher, *The Rise and Fall of the High Commission* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 136–46, noting that the Cawdrey's charge of trespass against the new incumbent in his living stood or fell on the validity of his deprivation, and that in turn stood or fell on the question of whether the church must strictly follow the provisions supplied by statute. The case was handled by James Morice, and as Guy notes, because of its significance involved Cecil, Lord Burghley as well. See also G. R. Elton, *The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 225–6 and 231–2, an excerpt of Edward Coke's *Fifth Report*. Elton terms the case 'a matter which beyond question was purely spiritual.'

[108] For example, Henry Swinburne, *A Briefe Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes*… (London, 1590) STC 23547. Shortly after Hooker's death, Thomas Ridley, *A vievv of*

Hooker's teleological inclination led him to claim in *1648* that church jurisdiction resulted from the power of the 'keys' and the promise of spiritual jurisdiction for the care of souls they implied. Although he notes in the introduction to Book V that others have mounted defences of the church's jurisdiction—the most notable of which was Cosin's *Apologie* (which he cites in the *AN*), Hooker still needed to justify and explain the mechanics of the exercise of jurisdiction in the English church as the expression of the pastoral needs he has identified in *1648*.[109] Hooker was likely pushed in the direction of completeness by his interlocutors George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys, whose notes on *1593* survive. Both urged Hooker to justify and explain not only the reasons underlying the church's claim of jurisdiction over certain matters but also to elucidate how the intertwined jurisdictions worked in England. As Cranmer notes in his comments on *1593*, 'for my owne part I do not conceave wherein the distinction lyeth betweene causes spirituall and temporall, although yt be manifest that a distinction there is betweene them.' This sentiment is seconded by Sandys, who questions why, for instance, are legitimization and bastardy considered spiritual causes, or why 'matters Testamentarie' which is the greatest point of all other. Wherein the nature and difference of causes *meerely* ecclesiasticall and *mixt* is to be opened. These points are at this day verie strongly impugned.'[110] To answer these sorts of questions, Hooker needed to deal with the English reception of papal law, provincial ecclesiastical law in writers like Lyndwood, the customary basis of some of the English church's responsibilities, and the division in England of that whole class of actions that lay in that 'debatable land which is neither very spiritual or very temporal,' in Maitland's memorable description.[111]

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the ciuile and ecclesiastical lawe, and wherein the practise of them is streitned, and may be relieued within this land…(London, 1607) STC 21054 appeared. Generally, for the increased confidence of the civilians, see Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 50 and note.

[109] Hooker, *Lawes* V.Ded.3; 2:2; and see his cite to Cosin, *Apologie* (1593) in his *Autograph Notes*, fol. 77v; 3:481. As Stanwood *FLE* 3: xxi, noted, the latter helps to date these notes to a period after 1593.

[110] Cranmer, 'Notes on *1593*,' p. 16, *FLE* 3:111, adding that they seem to be distinguished more by law and custom than on the basis of matter; Sandys, 'Notes on *1593*,' p. 3 *FLE* 3:130, which Sandys cross-references to his extended discussion, p. 16 *FLE* 3:133, where he outlines a typology of 'meerely' civil or ecclesiastical causes, and those that are 'mixt.'

[111] Maitland, 'Church, State and Decretals,' in *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England* (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 56.

The question of which parts of the canon law were still considered to be in force in England quickly taxed the limits of scholarly understanding. As Cosin remarked of the canon law in general, 'for the varietie of them, no one mans life is possible to haue experience of, and therefore mans wit not able to forecast or prouide for.'[112] Structure was equally problematic—what should be the organizational structure of a 'new' code of church law, once the organic and discursive structure of the pre-Reformation Roman canon law was abandoned and once doctrinal innovation uncoupled the homology between confessional and church court? Such structure seems to be lacking in the *Reformatio*—it is as if the 'committee' thought they would only include the parts that mattered, providing little in the way of overarching justification for what is included and excluded. Thirdly, the problems included not just variety and organization, but the uniqueness of the English church's responsibilities. The English church courts had acquired a series of customary responsibilities, and like the common law itself these did not lend themselves easily to codification or rewriting.[113] Generally, although the *Reformatio* reflects Cranmer's reformed and minimalist view of the church's jurisdictional powers, it assumes that the church courts would continue much as before. For example, although the English church's responsibility for testaments was of ancient origin, this was also an exception to general canonical practise.[114] While such exceptions needed defending, Cranmer had simply included it as part of the church's responsibilities in the *Reformatio*. Finally, there was a need for conceptual clarity in reconciling the conflicting claims as to what responsibilities the church still held and where authority over the church lay.

Although Hooker's pastoral starting point of the need for repentance based on the church's exercise of the power of the 'keys' is absent in Cosin's lawyerly discussion, when Hooker turns to discussing how that jurisdiction is expressed in England in several key respects he follows Cosin's lead.[115] In his *Ecclesiae anglicanae politea in tabula digesta*, Cosin

[112] See [Richard Cosin], *An Answere to the first and principal Treatise of a Certain Factious Libel…called an Abstract…*(London, 1584) STC 5815, sig. A4, italics not reproduced. He may be referring to the earlier reform attempts in England.

[113] Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 1–27, outlines this complexity, both in the *communis opinio* of the canon law and in its adaptation in the particular case of England.

[114] See Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law*, 7, and sources there cited. See Sandys's comment, that this is the 'greatest' point of current controversy, note 110 above.

[115] Cosin, *Apologie* (1593), explicitly limits his work to exclude the theological disputes over jurisdiction, concentrating, sig. A2v, on criticisms of the 'matter' heard in the

begins with the statute that re-established the monarch's supremacy (1 Elizabeth c. 1), and his first table shows a modified triumvirate of the Roman law—Persons, Possessions and Constitutions—and traces under 'Persons' the monarch's power of 'administration' (*administratio*), divided into ecclesiastical causes in which she has generally 'supreme majesty' by 1 Elizabeth c. 1 (as second under God) and particularly by which she has powers 'conceded' (like annates and first fruit and tenths) and other powers 'restored.' Those 'restored' powers are further divided into customary powers (*usitata*), including rights of patronage for benefices, and the more important branch of non-customary powers which resulted from the resumption of 'usurped' papal authority. From this beginning Cosin follows the terms of the statute to develop his outline, tracing the source of the High Commission's powers to the delegation of some portion of the monarch's restored powers to the church.[116] Similarly, we find Hooker in his *Autograph Notes* stating 'All jurisdiction within this realme is nowe annexed to the Imperiall Crown.' He states that the supreme magistrate has the power 'to uphold by way of dependencie the Ordinarie jurisdiction wherewith law investeth ecclesiasticall judges,' and by 'waie of commission' to grant 'such authoritie' as enumerated in the statute, while also denying that monarch would (or even could) exercise such powers personally. 'Waie of dependencie' I think implies *control* of the exercise of 'ordinary' jurisdiction (since Hooker again states that the power held by the church does not derive from the hands of men), while the monarch's power to 'commission' was of course the source of the 'High Commission'—the bane of the

courts, and of the 'manner' (procedure) it is exercised. Guy, 'Elizabethan Establishment,' in Guy, ed., *Reign of Elizabeth*, 136, claims Cosin presents an ''imperial' vision of the ecclesiastical polity' and further argues, 148, that Cosin was 'refuted obliquely' in Hooker's Book VIII. Guy adopts the parliament-men's view of the limits on the powers given to the church by the supremacy, terms Cosin's argument for the powers inhering in the crown to control the church as 'absolutist,' and concludes Cosin's view is diametrically opposed to a 'mixed polity' view of the settlement. He fails to see that although Hooker does in fact defend a 'mixed polity' in Book VIII, Hooker's strong claims in Book VI and VII regarding the extent of the church's jurisdiction and powers of the episcopacy place him much closer to Cosin than Guy's stark opposition would suggest.

[116] See Cosin, *Ecclesiae anglicanae politea in tabula digesta* (London: I. Norton, 1604) STC 5824. Table 1 gives the initial division of 1 Eliz. c. 1 conceding or restoring ('*quae Statuto primum conceduntur . . . restituunter*') powers to the monarch. This tract was composed *c.* 1588–9, but not published until the next reign. Cosin, *Apologie* does not include this outline of the supremacy from his *Tabula* (although it informs it); he draws most of his discussion from Tables VI–VIII when writing the *Apologie*.

presbyterians and the common lawyers.[117] While Cosin derives much of the jurisdictional powers of the church from the supremacy in the *Ecclesiae*, he like Hooker seems to acknowledge that the bishops' 'ordinary' jurisdiction is received directly, noting in the *Apologie* that only three groups wield ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England, Judge delegates (for appeals), Commissioners—both who wield delegated powers from the monarch—and '*those who deal in ordinarie iurisdiction*,' who by implication exercise powers that are not delegated.[118] The remainder of Hooker's draft paragraph denying sacerdotal powers to the monarch squares with what the Queen herself had written.[119]

The most developed section in the *Autograph Notes* relating to Book VI shows Hooker sketching a structure that will allow him to elucidate the structure of laws, courts and spiritual punishments that are the English expression of the pastoral and practical needs he has carefully anchored in *1648*. Hooker can be seen working up four headings in the *Autograph Notes* dealing with ecclesiastical jurisdiction—(1) 'What causes particularly are spiritual?' (2) 'The forme and maner of proceding in ecclesiasticall causes'; (3) 'The punishments necessary in spirituall processe'; and (4) The 'care which justice hath alwayes had to uphold the same.'[120] The first of Hooker's four headings addresses Cranmer and Sandys's questions regarding the troubling division of spiritual and temporal causes directly, tackling the erastian, *politique* as well as the presbyterian criticisms of current practices. In the *Autograph Notes*, we see Hooker developing a typology for the problem of intertwined jurisdictions, and noting evidence to distinguish between 'merely' (or

[117] *Lawes* V.77.1; 2:424: God has 'ordeined' some to ministry, or to have responsibility for the 'execution of requisite partes and offices therein prescribed,' and flatly states (with Romans 13 in mind) that while secular rulers have their power from God and are ministers 'by way of subordination,' ministers of God have their power 'not from the hand of men.' See also *Lawes* VI.2.2; 3:4, the spiritual power of the church 'neyther can be challenged by right of nature, nor could by humane authoritie bee instituted.'

[118] Cosin, *Apologie* (1593), sig. A2v. One can see this conceptual possibility in the *Tabula*, Tab. 2, in which Cosin has the bishops holding a power of governance (*administratio*) that does stem from their delegated powers from the monarch.

[119] Hooker, *Notes* 70r; 3:468–9. For a discussion of the settlement, and the claim that the Queen assumed the *potestas jurisdictionis* and not *ordinis*, including references to the Queen's own notes on the Thirty-nine Articles in which she clearly denies that she held sacerdotal powers, see Leo Solt, *Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509–1640* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 76–8 and notes cited.

[120] These headings appear first as a list, see *Notes* 77r; 3:472 where they are embedded in a section that relates to the content of the first topic; subsequently these four appear as folio headings as Hooker successively expands them.

purely) spiritual causes, spiritual causes established by custom (like testaments), spiritual causes handled by the ecclesiastical courts because of 'affinitie and neere connection' to other matters handled by them and finally those 'mixt' causes which may be heard by one jurisdiction or the other, depending on the matter.[121] Hooker, as he had been urged to by Cranmer and Sandys (and as Cosin had done), needed to fight the common lawyers on their own turf, showing that custom had established a portion of the church's responsibilities.[122] Even disputed areas of the church's jurisdiction were anchored by custom, history and law, and should not be dismissed *en masse*.

Cosin began his *Apologie* by answering those critics who argued that the church's jurisdiction should be limited to only testamentary and matrimonial matters, or that only those church laws which had been specifically authorised by the monarch remained in effect. As Cosin argues, the 1534 Act of Submission's provisions about repugnancy applied to new law—'old,' or pre-existing law was presumed to be in effect (except for those parts of the canon law that impinged on the supremacy, were 'repugnant' or dealt with appeals to the Pope)—until the review of the Commission called for was completed. In the absence of this review particular laws that are not 'repugnant' or 'prejudicial' to the supremacy remain in effect and do not require specific authorization by the monarch, contrary to the arguments of the common lawyers.[123]

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[121] After the listing of these four headings, the first section, *Notes* 77r; 3:472–4, lists a number of causes that are purely spiritual, such as heresy. This is followed by a listing of customary matters under church control, *Notes* 77r; 3:475, and the section finishes, *Notes* 77r; 3:476–7, with notes regarding matters that are mixed (or disputed), including a key statement that legitimacy of matrimony is the sole province of the ecclesiastical judges. The *FLE* editors have proposed that someone who was more conversant with the canon law may have helped Hooker extract these canon law materials, see *FLE* 6 Part 2:1062. Hooker begins to work some of this material into something approaching finished texts for: (1) spiritual causes established by custom, and (2) those established by 'affinitie and neere connection,' see *Notes* 78r; 3:486–7, and these continue through *Notes* 78v; 3:489. What appear to be introductory paragraphs for two subsequent topics are each given a separate folio at 81r and 82r respectively, *FLE* 3:489–90, the first is mixed matters that could conceivably be handled by either jurisdiction, and, the second is mixed matters where their 'weightier respects' should ensure that they are heard in ecclesiastical courts, such as 'usurie, simonie, heretofore generally breach of faith and…perjurie.'

[122] Morice, *Brief Treatise*, 53; notes the conditions necessary for a proper defence, for 'any forreine made lawe allowable within this Realme, there must concurre Toleration by the Kinge, voluntarie acceptance by his people, and a large time of vsage.' Morice rejects the idea that the ecclesiastical laws in England meet these conditions.

[123] Cosin, *Apologie* (1593), A2v; where he notes this tends to the taking away of the whole of the 'ordinarie' jurisdiction; see also *Tabula*, Tab. XVI.

Again from the *Autograph Notes*, we can see Hooker approaching a similar conclusion. One example will have to suffice—that of testaments. Hooker provides a robust and textured justification for the church courts' responsibilities for probate and publication of testaments that was absent in the *Reformatio*. Although testaments 'doe by prescription appertein to the Lord, and be confest a thing not proper unto spirituall law Courtes by the ancient lawes and Canons of the Church,' even if Henry VII's justices thought it not a matter of long continuance, at least from the time of Henry V, the ecclesiastical courts 'held it by the Custome of this land, which Custome even then was sufficient to justifie their right and title therunto.' Execution of wills and testaments has a 'Canonicall warrant of old.' Authority to punish 'wilfull hinderers of execution' has had the grant of the King to further it, and 'the like prescription of time and custome to give it countenance.' The church's right to administrations (the last branch of ecclesiastical power dealing with wills), was confirmed by 'the ancient consent of the k. [king] and peeres…as part of the Churches right and libertie,' and Hooker concludes the Church's authority in testamentary matters has always 'proceded with publique consent of the realme,' on 'most reasonable' grounds.[124] Hooker, like Cosin considers many of the church's privileges, responsibilities and powers to have continued uninterrupted despite the break with Rome, since they have been established by custom and statute, even in the case of testaments which was not usually included in the church's jurisdiction under canon law.

Under the second heading in the *Autograph Notes* of 'forme and maner,' we can see Hooker working through the court process itself, beginning from the civil law triumvirate of judge, plaintiff and accused, with the 'end' of ecclesiastical proceeding being the 'cure' of the faults of men, and thus Hooker shows concern about the character of the judge who is 'phisitian.' One of the few developed paragraphs justifies the use of the *ex officio* oath, noting that blanket criticisms of the oath are more likely 'evasions of the guiltie' than legitimate criticism of 'this usuall and long accustomed practice of Courtes.'[125] The third section, 'the

[124] Hooker, *Notes*, 78r; 3:486, squibs and cancellations not reproduced. Hooker cites as evidence among others William Lyndwood, *Provinciales* and Christopher St. German, *Doctor and Student*, as well as the relevant statutes. His citations are identified and discussed, *FLE* 6 Part 2:1077.

[125] Hooker, *Notes*, 77v; 3:480. Following this, he cites Cosin, as noted, arguing that proceeding *ex officio* shows 'farre more plainly the care of soules then to proceede at the instance of anie adverse partie.'

punishments necessary in spirituall processe,' would have built on the theological and the social grounds for church's involvement in the regulation of common life he has already developed in *1648*. The highest of ecclesiastical censures is of course excommunication, and Hooker notes the various degrees of it.

Hooker's fourth topic from his initial headings is the 'care which justice hath alwaies had to uphold ecclesiasticall jurisdiction and courts.' Expanding on this topic meant clarifying the relation between the ecclesiastical and common law jurisdictions: both were 'ordained for the common good.'[126] Hooker notes the key statutes that had allowed for the medieval accommodation of the 'two swords' in the exercise of jurisdiction, prohibitions, *praemunire* and consultations that allowed for cooperation between the jurisdictions on troubling cases. He also shows some concern to clarify the relationship between the church's penalties and the civil consequences that result from 'contempt,' which triggers the writ *de excommunicato capiendo* that would force excommunicates to appear before the Justices of the Peace. Some of these notes, such as his enumeration of the hierarchy of the church courts and his description of church court process likely would have served as background for a more textured account of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Importantly, Hooker shows concern regarding those court officials who launch cases for monetary gain without respect for 'either conscience or common honestie,' showing his willingness to take seriously criticism of current ecclesiastical court practises, especially regarding high fees and corrupt officials.[127] For his final topic, Hooker likely would have developed and extended the line of argument suggested by Cosin—that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and its laws were not merely a foreign 'papist' transplant, but were constitutive of the English state, and that 'justice' or 'legality' were not solely the province of the common lawyers. As Cosin asks:

> Are not *Ecclesiastical* persons nowe part of the *Queenes* people? Are not the *Liberties* and *Franchises*, that be giuen and confirmed vnto them, by the *goodness of the Princes*, for holding plea in genuine matters, the *vsages of this Realme*? Are not the received Lawes, which lawfully they may practise, termed *Ecclesiasticall Lawes of this Realme*, no less than *temporall* be?[128]

[126] Hooker, *Notes* 77r; 3:483.
[127] Hooker, *Notes* 77r; 3:484–5.
[128] Cosin, *Apologie* (1593), Part. 3 (sep pag.), 87.

The church's jurisdictional responsibilities could be defended precisely the way that the common lawyers justified and defended their own statutes, laws and practises.[129] In Book VIII, Hooker supports Cosin's view—the English church's jurisdiction is anchored in custom and history, and is no less constitutive of the governance of the realm than the common law, emphatically denying for example than the supremacy had given the monarch the power to unilaterally 'refound' the church's courts as Stoughton claimed the monarch could and should do.[130] Just as the monarch was bound to maintain the common law courts and respect common law, she was bound by a similar 'ancient constitution' that anchored the laws and courts of the church, despite the break with Rome and despite the claims by the common lawyers that statute and common law trumped the church's own jurisdiction.[131] While some portion of Hooker's collection in the *Autograph Notes* grapples with technical issues in coming to terms with the inheritance of spiritual, temporal and 'mixed' matters, when read together with his claim regarding the power of the 'keys,' and his subsequent extensions of his argument in Books VII and VIII, it is clear that Hooker is concerned to maintain a relative degree of autonomy for the exercise of spiritual jurisdiction in England.

For the probable third major section of a finished Book VI, Hooker would have directly challenged the specifics of the alternative 'discipline'

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[129] See Cosin, 'Schedule,' in Strype, *Whitgift*, Book 4 Appendix 2, 136, which finishes with the phrase 'These are undoubted grounds in the law ecclesiasticall; accordinge to which the proceedings in al the ecclesiastical courts in this Realm have bene used *time out of mind*.' (Styrpe's capitalization not reproduced); see also, Cosin, *Apologie*, Third Part, 130, in justifying the use of oaths: 'Let him [Morice] therefore *understand*; that, all those things there required (viz. *sufferance*, *consent* and *custome*) to make the *Canons* establishing such *oaths* to be accounted the *customed and ancient lawes of the Realme, originally established as lawes of the same*; doe in these oaths aptly concurre…' Common lawyers based their idea of the requirement for explicit consent for any law put into use on the wording of the final clause of the Act of Supremacy.

[130] See *Lawes* VIII.3.3 [2.17]; 3:347–8: '*Kings* have dominion to exercise in Ecclesiasticall causes but according to the lawes of the *Church*. Whither it be therefore the nature of the *Courts* or the forme of pleas, or the kind of governours or the order of proceedinges in whatoever spirituall businesses for the received lawes and liberties of the *Church*, the *King* hath supreme authoritie and power but against them none.' Arguably this is the most resonant statement in the *Lawes* confirming the church's jurisdiction.

[131] For the common law notion of the 'ancient constitution,' see J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and The Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century. A Reissue with Retrospect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); see his discussion, 259–60, for the view that this sort of justification may have emerged earlier in writings about the English church. For Cosin's statement regarding custom, see note 129 above.

proposed by the reformers. For this topic, we can only speculate that his coverage would have followed the presentation of materials from *1593* (shaped itself by the topics first mooted in the Cartwright-Whitgift exchanges), although we have only the evidence provided by Cranmer and Sandys's notes as to the likely topics.[132] Having established in Book V that the ministry is a group set apart, and they only hold the powers of order and jurisdiction granted by the 'keys,' Hooker would have emphatically denied that laymen could exercise spiritual jurisdiction in the manner implied by the reformers' 'consistories.'[133] Just as clearly, he would have argued (as other defenders had) that their claimed autonomous presbyteries did not recognize the fact of the supremacy.[134] In addition Hooker likely would have incorporated *1593*'s rejection of the Jewish Sanhedrin as a means to enforce discipline about which Sandys had urged him to provide a more complete discussion. Hooker would have provided as well a more thorough examination of the biblical and patristic evidence usually cited by the presbyterians for their proposed discipline.

The significance of Book VI has not often been recognized, partly because of its incomplete state, but also because of its subject matter. Hooker's theological premises regarding the church's mission presupposed by the power of the 'keys,' his extended discussion of the necessity for repentance on the part of the believer before absolution (including satisfaction to the community or individuals as a sign of true repentance) and the need for discipline by inclusion and exclusion from the sacramental community provides the theological and pastoral grounding for ecclesiastical jurisdiction missing in Cosin's technical discussion of the English church's laws and courts. Hooker answers in part why the canon law and courts—the 'external forum'—should continue in their responsibilities despite the break with Rome, and despite the reformed insights regarding grace, making explicit the theological and pastoral roots from which they emerged. Although Hooker's justification of the exercise of the power of 'keys' in traditional 'catholic' terms (especially its claimed power over willing and unwilling participants) would be

[132] See Almasy, 'Book VI: A Reconstruction,' and outline, note 59 above.

[133] Hooker had prepared the ground for this with his discussion of the ministry that is 'set apart' and can be seen in the *Notes* 70v; 3:471, making notes regarding 'Exceptions against layelders.'

[134] See, e.g., Richard Bancroft, *A sermon preached at Paules Crosse*…(London: I. Jackson for Gregory Seton, 1588), 69–71.

offensive to reformers, he clearly relies on a reformed perspective about the true nature of inward repentance (what Hooker terms its 'virtue') according to the *sola fides, sola gratia* formulation of the reformation. In formulating his distinctive argument for the church's possession of jurisdictional powers, he appears to be actually engaged in 'relocating the English church as the midpoint between Rome and Geneva,' less as a rhetorical ploy, and more as a distinctive assimilation of reformed doctrine to earlier notions of church disciplinary practice.[135] The perspicacity of his outline in the *Autograph Notes* to describe the accommodation of the two jurisdictions (and especially the church's courts and laws) makes the absence of his finished Book VI feel like an even greater loss. As yet, Hooker has not dealt with the division of powers between minister and bishop, who held jurisdiction over other ministers and whose 'ordinary' courts were the instance courts for the offences for which Hooker has provided theological grounding.

[135] Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 159–60.



The cauſes of the continuance of theſe Contentions concerning Church-Government.

COntention ariſeth, either through errour in mens judgements, or elſe diſorder in their affections.

When contention doth grow by errour in judgement; it ceaſeth not till men by inſtruction come to ſee wherein they erre, and what it is that did deceive them. Without this, there is neither policy nor puniſhment that can eſtabliſh peace in the Church.

The *Moſcovian* Emperour, being weary of the infinite ſtrifes and contentions amongſt Preachers, and by their occaſion amongſt others, forbad preaching utterly throughout all his Dominions; and in ſtead thereof commanded certain Sermons of the Greeke and Latine Fathers to bee tranſlated, and them to be read in publique aſſemblies, without adding a word

The Causes of the Continuance of These Contentions Concerning Church-Government: Out of the Fragments of Richard Hooker. Preamble to *A Summarie View of the Government Both of the Old and New Testament*. Oxford: Leon Lichfield, 1641.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

EPISCOPACY

A. S. McGrade

Most of what has been written about Hooker on episcopacy concerns his position on the origin of the bishop's office. This will be addressed in some detail, but there are also other, 'non-foundational' aspects of Hooker's account deserving of attention: first, what I shall refer to as his sociology of episcopacy; second, his biting critique of bishops in his own time, the golden age of Elizabeth I; and third, most especially, his idea of what it takes to be a good bishop.[1] With regard to each of these topics—origins, sociology, bishops' faults, and the episcopal ideal—I shall make bold to suggest the possible ecumenical significance of Hooker's position. Before getting down to any of these matters, however, I need to put Hooker's treatment of episcopacy in context: the context of his own work and of the situation of English bishops at the end of the sixteenth century.

Hooker's great defence of the worship and governance of the Church of England, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, the first substantial treatise written in English in the fields of theology, philosophy, and political theory, consists of a preface and eight books. Vindication of the authority and honour of bishops occupies the seventh book. The discussion of episcopacy thus comes after a great many other matters have been treated. Some of these are profound questions of first principles. Others are, or may seem to be, much less deep. I refer here to the multifarious issues about worship and ministry fought out against Puritan complaints in Book V. Logically, then, Hooker intends us to understand what he has to say about bishops in relation to his earlier exposition of first principles and the religion of the Book of Common Prayer.

Hooker's placement of his book on bishops in the latter part of his overall argument had the unintended consequence of consigning it

[1] First published as 'Richard Hooker on Episcopacy and Bishops, Good and Bad,' *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 2.2 (2002): 28–43.

to sixty-two years of oblivion. The last three books of the *Lawes* were published posthumously—and Book VII last of all, in 1662, at the Restoration. Not surprisingly, this delay in publication, an uncertain manuscript tradition, and rumours that Hooker's papers had been vandalized at his death led to questions about the authenticity of the three last books as we have them. On this matter, I shall only say that in preparing annotations and an introduction for Book VII for the Folger Library edition of Hooker's works I have concluded, in agreement with Paul Stanwood, the text editor of the three last books, that Book VII as we have it is indeed Hooker's. The style is polished and the substance well ordered, complete, and, as I see it, thoroughly coherent with the parts of the *Lawes* published in Hooker's lifetime.[2] It is a great and enduring misfortune that the delay in publication deprived the English church of his counsel at a time when the status of bishops was, and was to remain throughout the Civil War period, a bitterly contentious issue. This brings me to the second context for understanding Hooker on bishops: the situation of episcopacy in England when he wrote.

The Status of Bishops in England at the End of the Sixteenth Century

When Hooker began work on the *Lawes* in the late 1580s, episcopacy in England had endured a long period of economic and social decline, practical weakness, and theological attack. Late medieval English bishops were very rich. On the eve of the Reformation they were peers of the realm in wealth as well as social and political status. Accordingly, episcopal lands, manors, and other endowments were second only to monastic holdings as prey in the lay expropriation of the church. By 1600 bishops were reduced in wealth to the level of the gentry.[3]

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[2] The present paper is largely based on my work on Book VII for the Folger edition: W. S. Hill, general ed., *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, 7 vols. (vols. 1–5: Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977–90; vol. 6: Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1993; vol. 7: Tempe, Ariz.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1998). References to Hooker's *Lawes* will be by book, chapter, and section, with volume, page, and line references (when needed) to the Folger edition as *FLE*. My work on *Lawes* VII is at 6:309–36 and 895–984.

[3] F. Heal, *Of Prelates and Princes: A Study of the Economic and Social Position of the Tudor Episcopate* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1980), 72, 244.

Bishops' social status was affected by the nature as well as the extent of their economic misfortunes. The great loss of episcopal manors in the sixteenth century was also a loss of local standing. The loss of London town houses while lay magnates were building apace contributed to a diminished influence at court and in the councils of state. While finding it hard to perform the offices of charity, hospitality, and patronage traditionally expected of them, bishops were despised in some quarters precisely for the exalted station such duties presupposed. 'We are the scum of the earth,' wrote one bishop in 1573.[4]

Further obstacles to effective functioning were the tensions and uncertainties that followed from increased royal control of the church. At her accession Elizabeth tried to persuade several bishops who had held sees under the Roman obedience to continue in office under the new religious settlement. Almost to a man, they accepted deprivation rather than serve a church in which all ecclesiastical jurisdiction was annexed to the crown. As a result, most early Elizabethan bishops lacked both administrative experience and a strong sense of authority. Their dependence on the Queen also made them objects of reformist attack for royal policies to which some of them were personally opposed, although they could not safely object to them. Their power was also circumscribed by the complex dual legal system of ecclesiastical and common law. Continuing religious dissent sapped the moral authority of existing church courts (Hooker's patron Archbishop Whitgift pronounced their coercive procedures 'a carcasse without a soul'), and the secular courts encroached upon their jurisdiction with considerable determination.[5]

There were also demands for independence by the lower clergy. Hooker believed that a desire to wrest power from bishops and give it to the lower clergy was behind the many complaints about the public religious duties prescribed in the Prayer Book.[6] His view of the situation was rather narrowly political and conspiratorial, but an educated body of clerics, some of whose professors, leaders, and continental theological

[4] '*Excrementum mundi*.' Edwin Sandys, writing as bishop of London, as quoted in Patrick Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society 1559–1625* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 41.

[5] R. Houlbrooke, *Church Courts and the People during the English Reformation, 1520–1570* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 266–72; Whitgift's assessment at 272. R. H. Helmholz, *Roman Canon Law in Reformation England* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1990), 28–54.

[6] *Lawes* VI.1.1–2; 3:2.16–3.8.

models taught that inequality of pastors violated divine law, had some of the qualities of a revolutionary class.

Article 35 of the *Thirty-Nine Articles* of Religion passed by Convocation in 1563 ratified episcopal governance of the English church by endorsing the Ordinal, which stated as historical fact that the threefold ministry of bishops, priests, and deacons had continued from apostolic times. Neither the article nor the Ordinal, however, affirmed any further basis for episcopacy. In corresponding with continental theologians, Elizabeth's bishops presented their office somewhat diffidently, as not forbidden in the word of God and maintained in England by decision of the Christian ruler. Hence they could hardly have been scandalized if the queen had taken up the practice from her brother's reign of stipulating in letters of appointment that bishops served at the pleasure of the crown, or if she had converted their office to that of a modestly remunerated ecclesiastical superintendent on the model of Sweden and Denmark in the 1520s and '30s.[7]

Even this, however, would have been unacceptable to the more ardent Puritans writing from the 1570s onwards. There is no need to go through this considerable anti-episcopal literature here or to review the attempts to reply to it before Hooker. Suffice it to say that in the last third of the sixteenth century bishops personally, and the episcopal office itself, were the primary objects of increasingly bitter reformist complaint. An intelligent and energetic party of clergy and laymen in the Church of England were convinced that the monarchic episcopate was an anti-Christian corruption, an importation of pomp and lordship that urgently needed to be replaced by Christ's own discipline, in which no minister had permanent authority over another.

The Origin and Basis of Episcopal Authority

I turn now to Hooker's response to this perilous situation, beginning with the question of origins. The focus on this question in Hooker studies is due partly to its importance and partly to uncertainty about Hooker's position. He declares at one point that we should not fear to be 'bold and peremptory' in saying that 'if any thing in the Churches Government, surely the first institution of Bishops was from Heaven,

[7] Heal, *Of Prelates and Princes*, 126–27, 17–19.

was even of God, the Holy Ghost was the Author of it.'[8] A. J. Mason doubtless had this passage in mind when he wrote in 1914 that for Hooker 'All doubt of the divine origin of episcopacy is over.' In the same vein and surely in view of the same passage, A. L. Peck referred in 1958 to 'Hooker's explicit statement of his belief in the divine origin of episcopacy.' Other passages suggest, however, that the 'if' at the beginning of this passage should be given significant weight. It has also been suggested that 'Whether episcopate is apostolic in origin or not,' it is for Hooker 'subject to the over-riding legislative power of the Church.'[9]

My own view is that in Book VII Hooker made a clear, strong case for episcopacy as divinely instituted or approved, historically well tested, yet not immutably fixed as the only possible legitimate form of church government—a complex position which, however, rests firmly on principles elaborated earlier in the *Lawes*.

Near the beginning of Book VII, Hooker defines a bishop, for purposes of his following discussion as:

> A Minister of God, unto whom with permanent continuance, there is given not onely power of administring the Word and Sacraments, which power other Presbyters have; but also a further power to ordain Ecclesiastical persons, and a power of Cheifty in Government over Presbyters as well as Lay men, a power to be by way of jurisdiction a Pastor even to Pastors themselves.[10]

In the context of Elizabethan debate about episcopacy, this definition was distinctive in two respects: first, it allowed Hooker to describe the apostles, whose authority in the primitive church was acknowledged on all sides, as themselves bishops and not merely the predecessors of bishops. Second, it allowed him to set aside as nonessential 'variable accidents' the wealth and territorial extent of modern bishoprics, matters which were of great importance to his opponents. In Hooker's distinctive terminology, the apostles were bishops 'at large.' The jurisdiction of later bishops had a definite local compass—they were, as he

[8] *Lawes* VII.5.10; 3:170.17–20.

[9] A. J. Mason, *The Church of England and Episcopacy* (Cambridge, 1914), 54. A. L. Peck, *Anglicanism and Episcopacy* (London: The Faith Press, 1958), 16. B. D. Till, 'Episcopacy in the Works of the Elizabethan and Caroline Divines,' in K. M. Carey, ed., *The Historic Episcopate and the Fullness of the Church* (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1954), 63–83; 70–71.

[10] *Lawes* VII.2.2; 3:152.19–25.

put it, bishops 'with restraint.' Many sixteenth-century parishes were larger than some bishoprics in the early church, and many early bishops were poorer than lower clergy of later times. Hooker speaks to these differences later on, but he holds that the essential issue of episcopal authority is independent of such circumstances. The essential question is whether Christ's church is 'lawfully' governed when some ministers of the word and sacraments have 'permanent superiority and ruling power' over others.

Hooker's account of the apostles' government of the church accordingly depicts that government as itself episcopal (in the sense defined) and as the historic source of later episcopal authority. Evidence that the apostles themselves eventually came to exercise their governing power 'with restraint'—that is, within distinct geographical areas—merges with patristic testimonies to the succession of later diocesan bishops from the apostles, the historic episcopate.

The heart of Hooker's legitimising of the authority of later bishops is chapter 5 of Book VII, entitled '*The time and cause of instituting every where Bishops with restraint*.' As to time, Hooker accepts that collegial, presbyterian governance of local congregations under the general authority of the apostles was the norm for an indefinite period in the primitive church. However, he also accepts the great body of patristic testimony that monarchical episcopal authority was established 'every where' by the end of the apostolic age.

What was the cause or reason for this change? How or by whose authority did it occur? Following St Jerome, Hooker takes Paul's prophecy to the presbyters of Ephesus that there would be schism within their own ranks as indicating the general reason for bestowing permanent episcopal power on some one person in each church.[11] He offers more than one account of how this practice may have been universally adopted. Either the apostles decided on such a change by themselves or they decided in consultation with the whole Church. Either the decision was prompted by special divine inspiration beforehand, or it must be considered to have had divine approbation afterwards, 'being established by them on whom the Holy Ghost was powred in so abundant measure for the ordering of Christs Church.'

Which of these alternatives did Hooker consider most likely? As between special divine inspiration beforehand or tacit divine approval

[11] Acts 20:30.

afterwards, he argues at the end of chapter 5 for special divine inspiration. For proof he points to the apostles' repeated unwillingness to undertake less important things without special inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It was 'by divine instinct,' then, that this order of 'Regiment by Bishops' began. The argument concludes with the strong but not quite categorical affirmation of episcopacy's divine origin that I quoted earlier.

The 'if' at the beginning of that affirmation—'if any thing in the Churches Government, surely the first institution of Bishops was from Heaven . . . the Holy Ghost was the Author of it'—is perhaps meant to leave room for Hooker's other alternative: human establishment of episcopacy as we know it, with divine approval following. Even without the 'if,' however, Hooker's affirmation does not purport to show that episcopal governance is divinely ordained *as immutable*. A divine origin for the bishop's office does not in principle preclude doing away with it. In Book VII Hooker argues for the possible legitimacy of constitutional change in the Church in a sympathetic exegesis of a passage from St Jerome which bases episcopal authority on the Church's custom.[12]

Jerome had said bishops ought to know 'that custom, rather then the truth of any Ordinance of the Lords maketh them greater then the rest.' Hooker interprets him to mean that, although bishops may truly claim that their authority has descended from the apostles themselves, yet 'they must acknowledge that the Church hath power by universal consent upon urgent cause to take it away, if thereunto she be constrained through the proud, tyrannical, and unreformable dealings of her Bishops.'

How is it that the church has such power? For Hooker the answer lies in the principle that forms of government, even divinely instituted forms, are matters of 'positive,' not natural, law. If we imagine ourselves in an original situation with no government, it can be seen as a rational necessity, a matter of natural law, that we need some form of government. There seems, however, to be room for choice in determining what particular form of government to have. A decision needs to be laid down or 'posited,' not simply discovered by rational reflection on the nature of things, and without such 'positive' action no particular

[12] *Lawes* VII.5.8; 3:166.16–168.35. For other treatments of this frequently cited passage from Jerome's *Commentarii in epistolam ad Titum* (*PL* 26:563), see my commentary note on this passage at *FLE* 6:910–11.

regime can claim authority. Now there is no doubt in Hooker's mind that ultimate power of decision in all matters rests with God. Nor does he doubt that if God directed some positive-legal decision to remain in force forever, it would be forever binding. Nor, finally, does he doubt that the inauguration of monarchic episcopacy as the church's form of government was divinely approved. Indeed, in Hooker's opinion this decision was made in the early church 'by divine instinct,' at the direct prompting of the Holy Spirit. Yet he does not find in Scripture or elsewhere a divine command that episcopal governance remain in force forever.

The conclusion Hooker draws from all of this is that 'the whole body of the Church, hath power to alter with general consent and upon necessary occasions, even the positive laws of the Apostles, if there be no commandment to the contrary, and it manifestly appears to her, that change of times have clearly taken away the very reason of Gods first institution.' Thus, for Hooker, bishops are amply entitled to the authority they have traditionally exercised in the church, yet they may not exercise power as they themselves please. The enduring authority of the episcopate has depended essentially upon the fact that the Church 'hath found it good and requisite to be so governed.'

I observed earlier that Hooker intends us to read Book VII in the light of principles elaborated in earlier books of the *Lawes*. The earlier books are relevant in a number of ways to the points we have been considering. The distinction between natural and positive law, which Hooker takes as understood in Book VII and which I have tried to convey in a few sentences, is expounded and applied at some length in the earlier books to issues of divine and human authority in matters of church polity. Both the point that 'nature' does not dictate a single form of government but 'leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrarie' and the term 'positive law' appear in the account Hooker gives in Book I of the formation of human societies.[13] He devotes most of a later chapter in the same book to discussion '*Of lawes positive conteined in scripture* [and] *the mutabilitie of certaine of them*,'[14] and this theme is developed in still more detail in the last two chapters of Book III. Here Hooker argues in detail for the Church's power to alter even divinely commanded laws, but with the same two provisos he will later state in Book VII:

[13] *Lawes* I.10.4–11.
[14] *Lawes* I.15.

the laws in question must be positive laws, and there must be no divine commandment to the contrary, that is, no commandment forbidding alteration.

The earlier books also point to an understanding of what Hooker meant by 'the whole church' and 'general consent' when he said in Book VII that 'the whole church' has power 'with general consent upon urgent cause' to alter even the divinely instigated or sanctioned laws of the apostles. Alan Cromartie has recently argued that Hooker's conception of an international law or *ius gentium* governing the universal church entails that, so far as episcopacy in the Church of England is concerned, 'it could never be legitimate wilfully to replace the existing order.'[15] Certainly, Hooker's language in Book VII, allowing non-episcopal ordination in extraordinary circumstances, 'when the exigence of necessity doth constrain to leave the usual ways of the Church,' provides no support for particular churches to abandon episcopacy deliberately, for to speak of necessity and constraint implies (as Hooker makes explicit) that the 'usual ways' are ones 'which otherwise we would willingly keep.'[16] Hooker's discussion in *Lawes* I of an international law for the church leads him to a fervent wish for the renewed use of general councils.[17] Here, it would seem, is where the general consent of the whole Church might be given, 'upon urgent cause,' to an act so momentous as alteration of the church's basic institutional structure.

This, very briefly, is what Hooker had to say about the origin and basis of a bishop's authority. What does it say to us? In particular, what may be the significance of Hooker's position for ecumenism? In addressing this question we should begin by recognizing that Hooker's position *is* a position, not failure to take a position. This can be difficult to grasp, for his view is neither a simple affirmation nor a flat rejection of any of the views we may tend to regard as the only ones available. His presentation of episcopal origins in Book VII does not rely entirely on a presumed scriptural warrant for bishops or on patristic tradition or on the presumed benefits of episcopal governance, although Scripture, tradition, and problem-solving reasons are all involved. And if we

[15] A. Cromartie, 'Theology and Politics in Richard Hooker's Thought,' *History of Political Thought* 21 (2000), 41–66; discussion of *Lawes* I.10.12–14 at 58–61, quoted statement at 60.

[16] *Lawes* VII.14.11; 3:227. On Hooker's countenancing of exceptions to generally valid rules, see Alison Joyce's University of Birmingham 2000 PhD thesis in theology, *Ethics and Anglicanism: A Study in Richard Hooker*.

[17] *Lawes* I.10.14; 1:109.23–110.16.

understand his position in *Lawes* VII in relation to principles laid out in earlier books, it becomes even harder to enrol him in any of the usual ecclesiological schools.

Still, although each element in Hooker's treatment of episcopacy is carefully worked out and combined with the others, so that he does have a genuine position, that position might strike some participants in ecumenical dialogue as a *shifty* one, as hardly better than no position at all. It seems to me more accurate to characterize Hooker's position on the episcopal office as resilient, able to change emphasis as the weight of discussion puts pressure on one part of the position or another. Hooker's account of episcopal authority in Book VII depends on scriptural exegesis and the history of the primitive and patristic church, and he attends to reasons or 'causes' for having bishops throughout that account. His treatment of basic principles earlier in the *Lawes* involves a similar mix of Scripture, history, and an understanding of the reasons for church practices or institutions. Taken together, these various elements yield a very strong endorsement of episcopal governance. The merit I want to claim for Hooker's position here—the virtue of resilience—is that no one component must bear all the weight. This means that Hooker, were he with us now, would be comparatively unthreatened by criticism of one or another part of his position in ecumenical dialogue and could thus enter into such dialogue with a genuine openness that might be welcomed by other participants.

Here are some particular questions a reading of Hooker might raise for discussion with representatives of other traditions. Is his conception of the apostles as 'bishops at large' viable? How do Hooker's assumption of a presbyterian period in the apostolic age and Jerome's account of the institution of monarchic episcopacy hold up in the light of scholarship today? How do Hooker's references to particular extraordinary experiences of divine 'instinct' or instigation compare with discernment of divine inspiration as seen today? What weight should now be given to the universal acceptance of episcopacy in the patristic period, including the comparisons (which Hooker cites) of bishops with the high priests of the Old Testament, with Christ, or with God? How should we stand today on the legitimacy of altering a divine institution if the original reason for it seemed no longer to exist? I think Hooker could agree with the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral's inclusion of the historic episcopate in 'the deposit of Faith and Order committed by Christ and his Apostles to the Church' but would question, with regard to order, whether the committal was necessarily 'unto the end

of the world, and therefore incapable of surrender or compromise.' If alteration of the basic structure of the Church's ordained ministry should seem conceivably legitimate, even in principle, what body would have authority to make such an alteration? These are some of the main headings for discussion of episcopal authority suggested by a reading of Hooker, and he offers material under each heading that might serve as starting point for dialogue without requiring that the same points emerge unaltered at the end of the conversation. If we followed Hooker, we might well be as committed to episcopacy at the end as at the beginning of dialogue, but we would be susceptible to becoming a different kind of episcopalian, if that seemed right, which could be all to the good.

The Sociology of Episcopacy

I turn now from Hooker's position on the origin and continuing basis of episcopal authority, the central concern of the first part of Book VII of the *Lawes*, to the three non-foundational topics mentioned earlier. After vindicating the authority of bishops in the first sixteen chapters of the book, Hooker moves on to the 'honours' accorded bishops in the English church. As we have seen, one component of Hooker's account of episcopal authority is functional or rational. Bishops were instituted, not because of any intrinsic appeal of hierarchy, but because of problems for which one minister's having significant power over the other ministers in a church was an intelligible solution. Although present, this rational or functional thread was not paramount in the earlier chapters of Book VII, but it dominates Hooker's defence of episcopal honours in the later chapters, beginning with the very definition of 'honour' with which he began.

Hooker draws his definition from Aristotle, according to whom 'An honor is the sign of a reputation for being a benefactor.'[18] This functional conception of honour as recognition of benefits conferred contrasts sharply with another idea prevalent when Hooker wrote: that honour is due primarily to birth and lineage. On Hooker's Aristotelian

[18] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Bk 1, chap. 5 (1361a8). Hooker: 'Honor is no where due, saving onely unto such as have in them that whereby they are found, or at the least presumed voluntarily beneficial unto them of whom they are honored.' *Lawes* VII.17.2; 3:251.13–16.

conception, a defence of honours requires showing that the party receiving them benefits the party rendering them. This is the line Hooker takes. The honours at stake are partly symbolic (such as title, place, and ornament), partly material (endowment with lands and livings), but all are understood as visible acknowledgments by society that episcopacy benefits it. Accordingly, Hooker begins his defence with a consideration of 'what good doth publiquely grow from the Prelacy.' He argues first that the beneficial character of episcopacy must be acknowledged because of its kinship with the divinely appointed government of Moses and Aaron in the Old Testament and apostolic governance in the early church.[19] Still arguing at a rather general level, he proposes that 'chief governors,' even when they may appear to do very little, are of great benefit in keeping others at their tasks.[20] But then, to make the benefits of prelacy 'palpably manifest,' he embarks on a survey of 'particular instances.' It is not a detailed survey by modern standards and at times sounds odd to modern ears, but it shows a regard for social realities which is characteristic of Hooker and quite rare among his controversialist contemporaries. It is this that I have dubbed Hooker's 'sociology of episcopacy'.

Here, briefly, are six particular benefits of episcopacy that Hooker proposes in chapter 18 of Book VII. First, the country's reputation abroad will benefit more from the attractiveness or beauty of its Christian ministry if some ministers are elevated in office. 'Fame and reputation groweth,' Hooker writes, 'especially by the vertue, not of common ordinary persons, but of them which are in each estate most eminent, by occasion of their higher place and calling.'[21]

The same reasoning applies to time as well as space. A society is most commended to posterity by the 'successions, doings, sufferings, and affairs of Prelates,' for these are likely to be recorded. Such guidance as we receive from history or can give to later generations owes more to prelates than to their inferiors.[22]

Third, and closer to home, Hooker points out that when rulers *ought* to consult clerics, either with regard to their own consciences or for counsel on affairs of state involving religion, they are more likely to do so when 'honorable Personages Ecclesiastical' are available. '[N]o judi-

[19] *Lawes* VII.18.3.
[20] *Lawes* VII.18.4–6.
[21] *Lawes* VII.18.7; 3:258.10–259.3.
[22] *Lawes* VII.18.8.

cious man will ever make any question or doubt, but that fit and direct it is, for the highest and chiefest order in Gods Clergy, to be employed before others, about so near and necessary Offices as the sacred estate of the greatest on earth doth require.' Barring the presence of prophets directly authorized by God, as in the Old Testament, rulers need clergy 'whose greater and higher callings do somewhat more proportion them unto that ample conceit and spirit, wherewith the minde of so powerable persons are possessed.'[23]

The fourth particular benefit of prelacy extends the third to the whole power structure of society. The chief human means for upholding kingdoms are, Hooker avers, wisdom and valour. The English nobility consists of men who have excelled in one or both of these, their descendants, or those who possess, 'howsoever,' positions in which they *should* be eminent in political wisdom or martial valour. Yet 'because they are by the state of Nobility great, but not thereby made inclinable to good things,' nobles sometimes prove malicious, headstrong, cruel, treacherous, void of piety, and capable of the most enormous crimes. For this extremely serious problem,

> what help could there ever have been invented more Divine, then the sorting of the Clergy into such degrees, that the chiefest of the Prelacy being matched in a kinde of equal yoke, as it were, with the higher, the next with the lower degree of Nobility, the reverend Authority of the one, might be to the other as a courteous bridle, a mean to keep them lovingly in aw that are exorbitant, and to correct such excesses in them, as whereunto their courage, state and dignity maketh them over prone?

It is of utmost benefit, then, that nobility and prelacy be 'twined together.'[24]

A fifth benefit of bishops is their capacity for settling impartially such grievances as may arise between lower clergy and their congregations. Hooker brushes aside the Puritan proposal that synods could serve this purpose as an 'odd imagination'.[25]

The sixth benefit Hooker claims for prelacy is enjoyed by the lower clergy

> by having such in Authority over them, as are of the self same Profession, Society and Body with them; . . . such as know by their own experience,

[23] *Lawes* VII.18.9.
[24] *Lawes* VII.18.10.
[25] *Lawes* VII.18.11.

> the manifold intolerable contempts and indignities which faithful Pastors, intermingled with the multitude, are constrained every day to suffer . . . unless their Superiors, taking their causes even to heart, be by a kinde of sympathy drawn to relieve and aid them in their vertuous proceedings, no less effectually, then loving Parents their dear children.[26]

These six benefits, taken together, present episcopacy as an important tempering and harmonizing institution, and thus Hooker refers to prelacy as 'the temperature of excesses in all estates, the glew and soder of the Publique weal, the ligament which tieth and connecteth the limbs of this Body Politique each to other.' Because it is thus 'unto all sorts so beneficial, [it] ought accordingly to receive honor at the hands of all.'[27]

In the final chapter of Book VII Hooker adds three benefits of having a *wealthy* episcopate. The public good of church and commonwealth requires bishops to be wealthy because the higher the office, the more expenditure will be expected; because qualified individuals will be reluctant to assume the heavy burdens of the office without significant financial inducement; and because only well endowed sees will serve as an adequate reward for learning. 'What shall become of that Commonwealth or Church in the end,' Hooker asks, 'which hath not the eye of Learning to beautifie, guide, and direct it? . . . And . . . what shall become of [the] courage to follow learning, which hath already so much failed through the . . . diminution of her chiefest rewards, Bishopricks?' The result will be nothing less than 'Paganism, and extreme Barbarity.'[28]

The chief ecumenical significance of Hooker's consideration of the social benefits of episcopacy may lie in directing attention to the question of how well the institution fits our own society. The quick answer some will offer is that the fit is very poor. After all, equality is our watchword today, and episcopacy is irredeemably in-egalitarian. Being 'twined' with 'lords temporal' may be the last thing English bishops need to be useful in a modern society. Indeed, the titular remains of this twining may seem a hindrance rather than a source of respect for bishops today.

I am inclined to agree that some of the benefits of episcopacy on Hooker's list may not be available today, but surely a blanket distinction between modern egalitarianism and episcopal hierarchy is too simple.

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[26] *Lawes* VII.18.12; 3:263.7–19.
[27] *Lawes* VII.18.12; 3:263.20–31.
[28] *Lawes* VII.24.18–19.

Modern society has no lack of 'powerable persons,' although they are more likely to be plutocrats, media executives, celebrities, and political leaders than aristocrats. While I do not have a formula for pairing off church leaders with these contemporary power-holders, there seems to be a related social point to *having* church leaders—that is, individuals with sufficient standing, and sufficiently stable standing, to match up with the currently powerful as well as possible—for I venture to suggest that the 'high ones' in our society are typically no more spiritually inclined of themselves than the lords temporal with whom Hooker was concerned. It is good that there *are* bishoprics of Liverpool and Oxford, so that the current incumbents' recent sound criticisms of television and the lottery could get media coverage.[29]

Partly because of our contemporary ideological egalitarianism, we live in a celebrity-oriented culture today. Hooker's first two points in favour of bishops thus seem to apply quite well in present circumstances, the points, namely, that bishops' deeds are more likely to be celebrated both in their own time and afterwards than the equally meritorious actions of other clergy or other Christians.

Perhaps the point that sounds strangest today, particularly to someone accustomed to the American system of episcopal election, is Hooker's contention that bishoprics must be well endowed to serve as suitable rewards for learning. But is there really no connection worth thinking about between episcopacy and learning? Looking at this question from the standpoint of bishops, one might urge that even in a culture as anti-intellectual as ours, learning is a valuable credential in some situations. We listen to distinguished scientists because we believe them to know what they are talking about, even, unfortunately, when they do not, as with Professor Dawkins on moral theology. Looking at the relation between learning and episcopacy from an academic standpoint, we might ask whether theological scholarship need always suffer *qua* scholarship if it is pursued in such a way as to qualify the scholar for church leadership.

In whatever way Hooker's particular points about the appropriateness of bishops relate to us, they can at least encourage our attention

[29] '"The bishop is a nerd", and quite right too.' Paul Vallely, in the Faith and Reason column of *The Independent*, 26 August 2000, comments on 3 recent instances of bishops speaking out on moral issues of public concern. 'It is useful that bishops are reminding us that there are absolute values against which we must measure our rationalist relativism.'

to social factors. Even those who hold that episcopacy is an immutable divine imperative may do well to consider how different social structures affect episcopal functioning, if only to see how episcopacy might better affect society. It would surely not be a bad thing if 'prelacy' could now serve as 'the temperature of excesses in all estates, the glew and soder of the Publique weal, the ligament which tieth and connecteth the limbs of this Body Politique each to other.'

Hooker's Critique of the Elizabethan Episcopate

I come now to my second non-foundational topic: Hooker's critique of the bishops of his own church, his catalogue of 'those sores which are in the kinde of their heavenly function, most apt to breed, and which being not in time cured, may procure at the length that which God of his infinite mercy avert.'[30] This sharp review occupies the first half of the last and longest chapter of Book VII. There are thirteen points of censure. As Patrick Collinson, best known for his sympathetic exposition of Puritan attacks on the Elizabethan establishment, observes, 'no other apologist for the Elizabethan *status quo* chose to be as critical as Hooker of the institution he was supposed to be defending.'[31] Hooker does not name names, but his language is at times scathing. He says that some bishops are so unskilled in governing when they come into their sees that they are like physicians learning medicine 'by killing of the sick.'[32] Some are rash and careless enough to ordain anyone with a friend who says two or three words in his favour. As a result, the church is burdened with many 'silly creatures,' whose notorious 'baseness and insufficiency' brings the whole order of priesthood into contempt.[33] When 'conscienceless and wicked Patrons' nominate unworthy candidates for benefices in their gift, the unwillingness of bishops even to state their judgment of the candidates emboldens such patrons, of whom there are 'swarms' in the English church, to present 'any refuse,' since they find bishops so compliant.[34] Bishops sometimes grant benefices and church offices in their own gift 'corruptly.' Hooker will not, he says, go

[30] *Lawes* VII.24.2; 3:290.30–291.7.
[31] Patrick Collinson, 'Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment,' in *RHC*, 149–81; 171.
[32] *Lawes* VII.24.5; 3:293.31.
[33] *Lawes* VII.24.7; 3:294.32–295.2.
[34] *Lawes* VII.24.7; 3:295.4–15.

so far as to suspect simony, but bishops' personally motivated bestowal of prebendaries, offices of jurisdiction, and other dignities attached to cathedrals leads to the 'foul abuse' that any one man should be loaded with so many such grants.[35] When bishops' parochial visitations are made for the sake of gain, it is no wonder that 'the baseness of the end' makes the process itself 'loathsom.'[36] There are 'palpable and gross corruptions' in episcopal courts as a result of granting offices there to men 'who seek nothing but their own gain.'[37] Bishops themselves are lacking in kindness and courtesy but also in severity, when that is needed. '[W]hat with ill usage of their power amongst the meaner, and what with disusage amongst the higher sort, they are in the eyes of both sorts as Bees that have lost their sting.'[38]

What can such a caustic critique contribute to ecumenism today? Loyal episcopalians might be inclined to think not much. We know, surely, that bishops are human and imperfect, so what is the special significance of Hooker's spelling this out with regard to the Elizabethan hierarchy? In response, I would ask whether it is always clear to non-episcopalians that we are properly sensitive to the human failings of our bishops. Remember Professor Collinson's observation of how unusual Hooker's critique was, coming from a defender of the establishment. To be sure, Anglicans are not in the habit of beatifying or canonizing, much less idolizing, bishops; but is there today an Anglican assessment of actual episcopal performance comparable to Hooker's, if not in the severity of its charges then in *readiness* to be severe if appropriate? I do not know the answer, but I suggest that institutional self-criticism could be a positive factor in our ecumenism.

The Good Bishop

I come finally to Hooker's picture of what a bishop ought to be, or rather, the image he would have drawn if he had undertaken this as a separate task. Actually his view of episcopal virtues is found in the midst of his indictment of episcopal faults. Sometimes we can specify what he would regard as good qualities in a bishop simply by negating

[35] *Lawes* VII.24.8.
[36] *Lawes* VII.24.9.
[37] *Lawes* VII.24.10.
[38] *Lawes* VII.24.11; 3:297.13–20.

what he points out as bad. Thus, he would presumably hold that good bishops are careful in ordaining, speak their mind about candidates' poor qualifications even when a patron's nomination cannot legally be rejected, are conscientious in bestowing livings within their power, and so on.

With regard, however, to some points in Hooker's indictment, it is easier to see what he is for than what exactly he is against. Learning administration by doing it badly is a serious but somewhat vague fault. The content here comes from the assertion that in former times 'Bishops were wont to be men of great learning in the Laws both Civil and of the Church; and while they were so, the wisest men in the land for Counsel and Government were Bishops.'[39] Here the suggestion of positive qualifications is more specific, if less colourful, than the description of a fault.

In some cases, Hooker's mention of faults seems to be more nearly a plea for special virtue. He is unhappy with bishops who 'regard not' the clergy under them. The unhappiness is driven by his perception that everyone else is 'ready to malign, despise, and every way oppress' parish clergy. In this situation, if they 'finde nothing but disdain in Bishops,' 'men having wit, courage and stomack' in the priesthood will be apt to side with the enemies of episcopacy.[40] Here, I think, Hooker is calling for strong positive support of the clergy, not simply for the avoidance of egregious snubs.

He is especially urgent for virtue in two other cases. One is his plea that bishops exhibit 'a fatherly affection towards the flock of Christ.' 'A Bishop,' he writes, 'in whom there did plainly appear the marks and tokens of a fatherly affection towards them that are under his charge, what good might he do ten thousand ways more then any man knows how to set down? But the souls of men are not loved, that which Christ shed his blood for, is not esteemed precious. This is the very root, the fountain of all negligence in Church-Government.'[41]

The last fault in Hooker's indictment of the Elizabethan episcopate is 'neglect of the true and requisite means whereby their authority should be upheld.'[42] The neglect Hooker refers to is neglect of the *virtues* especially suitable to bishops. Esteem for a bishop, according

[39] *Lawes* VII.24.5; 3:293.32–34.
[40] *Lawes* VII.24.11; 3:297.3–12.
[41] *Lawes* VII.24.12.
[42] *Lawes* VII.24.7; 3:294.22–23.

to Hooker 'doth grow from the excellency of vertues suitable unto his place. Unto the place of a Bishop those high Divine Vertues are judged suitable, which vertues being not easily found in other sorts of great men, do make him appear so much the greater in whom they are found.'[43] What are these virtues? 'Devotion, and the feeling sense of Religion.' These, Hooker observes, 'are not usual in the noblest, wisest, and chiefest Personages of State,' for 'their wits are so much imployed another way, and their mindes so seldom conversant in heavenly things.' But if such personages see bishops excelling in these virtues in which they themselves are deficient, 'it frameth … their hearts to a stooping kinde of disposition, clean opposite to contempt.'[44] The claim is not that bishops must exhibit devotion and a feeling sense of religion in order to have authority but in order to maintain it.

What are we to understand here by 'devotion and a feeling sense of religion'? More than one reading is possible here. Hooker's moral seriousness and the biblical texture of his prose would support an evangelical idea of devoutness. His account in *Lawes* V.50 and following chapters of sacramental participation in Christ would ground an intense liturgically centred piety. Neither of these is excluded by the amplification Hooker actually gives in Book VII, which echoes his description in Book I of a 'law *cœlestiall* and heavenly' clearly beheld and unswervingly observed by the angels.[45] He ascribes the source and character of the episcopal virtues which are to humble the world's high and mighty to a kind of divine possession that gives even ordinary actions a 'high and heavenly' form. Where there are bishops, Hooker writes, 'the powers and faculties of whose souls God hath possest, those very actions the kind whereof is common unto them with other men, have notwithstanding in them a more high and heavenly form.' This is an effect of the 'celestial impression, which deep meditation of holy things, and as it were conversation with God leaves in their mindes.' Accordingly, Hooker's advice to bishops who want to be esteemed as they ought is that, as far as human frailty permits, they must frame themselves to the pattern according to which the seven bishops of Asia are named at the beginning of Revelation: 'shine they must as Angels of God in the midst of perverse men.'[46]

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[43] *Lawes* VII.24.15; 3:299.1–5.
[44] *Lawes* VII.24.15; 3:299.7–13.
[45] *Lawes* I.3.1; 1:63.18–20; also *Lawes* I.4.
[46] *Lawes* VII.24.15; 3:299.14–25.

Hooker goes on to offer more down-to-earth advice for preserving the esteem on which episcopal authority effectively depends. Bishops should consider that snares are constantly laid for them and be always careful of their reputations. They should avoid 'absurdity,' even in words. 'Wise sentences' 'should be the proper mark and character of Bishops speeches.' They must not exhibit 'base servility and dejection of minde' or be grasping. They must not be cold in works of piety and charity or show contempt for learning. They must order their families in such a way that 'no grievous, offensive deformity' is evident in them.[47]

What might be the ecumenical significance of these brief but forceful expressions of an Episcopal ideal? Some of Hooker's requirements for a good bishop do not fit current attitudes easily. What a bishop may put forward as fatherly affection towards the flock of Christ could be resisted as paternalism. Bishops attempting to control their families so that 'no grievous, offensive deformity be therein noted' will run up against the rightful independence of spouses and children. Still, we should not ignore the fact that some of our bishops *have* families. Acknowledging that they have responsibilities towards them, if not the power over them of an Elizabethan paterfamilias, might contribute to the human reality of ecumenical conversations, especially those with churches whose bishops are on principle celibate.

The first episcopal virtue I drew from Hooker's bill of faults was 'skill in governing,' not only competence in church administration, but also wisdom in civic or political affairs, a skill, as Hooker saw it, based on great learning in the law. Many priests today have come into the ordained ministry after careers as lawyers or executives. I do not know how many of them go on to become bishops, but Hooker would evidently not regard their previous occupations as disqualifications for the office. (He might be less sure about the episcopal utility of one California bishop's previous occupation as a defensive lineman in American football, although analogies with some aspects of a bishop's role do spring to mind.) According to Hooker, however, the most important characteristic for a bishop and the most effective means of upholding episcopal authority is an 'angelic' character, a radiance of mind deriving from 'deep meditation of holy things and as it were conversation with God.' To some it will seem unreal to expect anyone

[47] *Lawes* VII.24.15; 3:299.25–300.19.

to shine as an angel of God in this day and age, but 'shine they must' Hooker says of bishops.

If we take seriously both competence in governing, and manifestly exceptional personal holiness as requirements for a good bishop, we may find relatively few individuals who measure up, especially if we add, as Hooker clearly would wish us to do, a high intellectual standard. I submit that the difficulty of finding such individuals is an argument for, not against, episcopacy. For when such individuals are found, there should be an office in which their virtues can operate most effectively. To put the argument from a different angle, I suspect that '*fatherly*' affection towards the flock of Christ and support of other clergy will not seem paternalistic or authoritarian if its source is a genuine spirituality, but spirituality with significant institutional standing will ordinarily do more good for the Church than that same quality working in a more restricted institutional role or no role at all.

Such an argument is unlikely to convince those who doubt the value of episcopacy. Indeed, Hooker would not rest the case for episcopal governance on the prospect of finding a saint with good executive training and astute judgment in public affairs to head every diocese. At the end of his sharp review of bishops' faults, just after demanding that bishops 'must' shine as the angels of God, Hooker asks us to accept the rarity of true virtue as a fact of life, and not to be bitter about it. So we ought not to be bitter when bishops shine less brightly than they should. Hooker believes nonetheless that the ideal, at least, must be preserved. Are there ecumenical conversations, perhaps with the Orthodox, in which it would be appropriate to emphasize that the bishop as spiritual icon is the heartfelt ideal of at least one leading Anglican theologian?

Intramural Conclusion

In suggesting that Hooker's treatment of episcopacy might be of value for ecumenism, I have been taking Hooker to represent Anglicanism and have been imagining ecumenism as a dialogue between Hooker's Anglicanism and other Christian bodies, episcopal and non-episcopal. Hooker, of course, does not represent all Anglicanism. No theologian past or present does. Indeed, there are enough differences among Anglicans to require a kind of intra-Anglican ecumenism. I recommend Hooker as a resource for such intramural dialogue as well as for

discussion with other churches. In this connection it is worth noting that, in contrast with his exposition of worship in Book V of the *Lawes*, Hooker's account of episcopacy has not been absorbed into Anglican tradition. As I mentioned at the beginning, Book VII was not published in Hooker's lifetime. By the time it came into public view after the Civil War, English episcopacy had gone on its way without benefit of Hooker's treatise. Deprived of immediate effect, however, it is that much more freshly available now, to Anglicans and to the broader Church.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

ROYAL SUPREMACY

Daniel Eppley

In Book VIII of the *Lawes* Hooker answers opposition to the Royal Supremacy stemming from indictments brought against it by Roman Catholics as well as English presbyterians. Both opponents of the Elizabethan church agreed on the necessity of an institutionally autonomous church led by a divinely grounded spiritual authority, and consequently both argued that '*unto no Civill Prince or Governour there may be given such power of Ecclesiastical Dominion as by the Lawes of this Land belongeth unto the Supreme Regent thereof*.'[1] Hooker's response falls into three sections; first, he addresses general issues regarding the nature of the church, the meaning of dominion, and the manner in which dominion over the church is held by the English crown (chapters 1–3). These considerations are followed by a chapter addressing theological concerns that arise from '*the title of Headship which we give to the kings of England in relation unto the church*.'[2] The book as we have it concludes with consideration of particular powers and prerogatives included in royal dominion over the church (chapters 5–9).

The Royal Supremacy and the Nature of the Church

In the first chapter of Book VIII Hooker lays the groundwork for what he will present as the basis of the Prince's authorization to lead the English church—viz. the fact that such authority is 'by the lawes of this Realme annexed unto the *Crowne*.'[3] He begins by answering objections based on the claim

> that [by assuming leadership of the church] kings, being meer lay persons,…exceed the lawfull boundes of their calling. Which thinge to

[1] *Lawes* VIII.title; 3:315.3–7.
[2] *Lawes* VIII.contents; 3:315.15–16.
[3] *Lawes* VIII.1.2; 3:317.19–21.

> the ende that they may perswade, [opponents of royal supremacy] first make a necessarie separation perpetuall and personall between the *Church* and *Commonwealth*. Secondly they so tie all kinde of power *Ecclesiasticall* unto the *Church* as if it were in every degree their only right, which are by proper spirituall function termed *Church-Governours* and might not to *Christian Princes* any wise appertaine.[4]

Treatment of the second claim Hooker defers until later chapters; in the first chapter he considers the supposed necessity of a perpetual personal distinction between church and commonwealth. Certainly such a distinction is important in religiously diverse communities,[5] but in a nation in which all are Christian it seems to Hooker nonsensical.

> [T]he name of a *Church* importeth only a *Societie* of men first united into some publique forme of regiment and secondly distinguished from other *Societies*, by the exercise of *Christian* religion.... [S]eing there is not any man of the *Church* of *England*, but the same man is also a member of the *Commonwealth*, nor any man a member of the *Commonwealth* which is not also of the *Church* of *England*, therefore as in a figure *triangular* the base doth differ from the sides thereof, and yet one and the self same line, is both a base and also a side; a side simplie, a base if it chance to be the bottome and underlie the rest: So albeit properties and actions of one kinde doe cause the name of a Commonwealth, qualities and functions of an other sort the name of a *Church* to be given unto a multitude, yet one and the self same multitude may in such sort be both and is so with us, that no person appertayning to the one can be denied to be also of the other.[6]

Hooker does not intend to abolish the distinction between church and commonwealth, but he denies the necessity of a perpetual personal separation of the membership of the two bodies. 'For the truth is that the *Church* and the *Commonwealth* are names which import thinges really different;' a 'commonwealth' is a community living under a particular political structure and a 'church' a community embracing the true religion. The differences, however, are accidental 'and such accidentes as may and should alwayes lovingly dwell together in one subject.'[7] The terms 'schoolmaster' and 'physician,' are descriptions of accidentally distinct persons, yet such that 'there is no impediment but both may be one man.' The names 'commonwealth' and 'church,' 'thoughe always

[4] *Lawes* VIII.1.2; 3:317.21–318.2.
[5] *Lawes* VIII.1.3; 3:320.14–29, VIII.1.4; 3:322.27–323.23.
[6] *Lawes* VIII.1.2; 3:319.6–27.
[7] *Lawes* VIII.1.5; 3:325.1–4.

implying that difference of accidentes which hath been sett downe, yet doe not alwayes implie different subjectes also. When we oppose the *Church* therefore and the *Commonwealth* in a *Christian Societie*, we meane by the *Commonwealth* that societie with relation unto all the publique affayres thereof, only the matter of true religion exepted. By the *Church*, the same societie with only reference unto the matter of true religion without any other affaires besides.'[8] Just as there is nothing odd about a schoolmaster prescribing medicine if that schoolmaster also happens to be a physician, so there is nothing odd about a commonwealth ordering ecclesiastical affairs if that commonwealth also happens to be a church. Similarly, just as a person can be highly successful as a schoolmaster but only moderately successful as a physician, or vice versa, or highly successful at both, 'When that societie which is both a *Church* and a *Commonwealth* doth flourish in those thinges which belong unto it as a *Commonwealth*, we then say the *Commonwealth* doth flourish; when in those thinges which concerne it as a *Church*, the *Church* doth flourish; when in both, then the *Church* and *Commonwealth* flourish together.'[9]

A key point of controversy between Hooker and the presbyterians is his assertion that for all practical purposes every English subject is also a Christian. Hooker defends this claim by clarifying that when he says all people in England confess the true religion, 'We heare meane true religion in grosse, and not according to every particuler for they which in some particuler pointes of religion doe swarve from the truth, may neverthelesse most truly, if we compare them to men of an heathenish religion, be saide to hold and professe that religion which is true.'[10] To defend his remarkably inclusive definition of church membership Hooker relies on the distinction between the visible church and the invisible (or 'mystical') church, emphasizing that inclusion within the latter cannot serve as a standard for inclusion within the former.[11] In

[8] *Lawes* VIII.1.5; 3:325.16–326.10.

[9] *Lawes* VIII.1.5; 3:326.10–15.

[10] *Lawes* VIII.1.2; 3:318.21–26.

[11] See *Lawes* III.1; 1:194.17–206.31. The distinction between the visible and invisible churches must not be drawn too sharply; Hooker envisions an important relationship between the visible church and the inward operations of grace in Christians. William Haugaard argues that Hooker's preference of the term 'mystical' over 'invisible' reflects this relationship. *FLE* 6(1): 170–173. See also David Neelands, 'Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and Invisible Church,' in *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed. (2003), 99–110; Debora Shuger, "Societie Supernaturall': The Imagined Community of Hooker's *Lawes*,' in *Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community*, A. S. McGrade, ed. (1997), 320–324. While it must not be absolutized, the

contrast to puritan efforts to establish a community of saints by making it a condition of membership in the visible church that people display signs of holiness validating their membership in the invisible church, Hooker emphasizes that it is impossible for mortals to discern who is a member of the mystical church. Consequently, speculation regarding membership in the mystical church cannot be used to define or structure the visible church, and the only thing 'which cutteth of[f] *cleane* from the visible Church of Christ is plaine Apostasie, *direct* deniall, utter rejection of the whole Christian faith as farre as the same is professedlie different from infidelitie.'[12]

It might seem that the differing effects of the penalties imposed by church and commonwealth would threaten the personal equivalence of the two communities, but as presented by Hooker this is not the case. Civil penalties such as execution or banishment exclude a person from the visible church as well as from the commonwealth. Lesser civil penalties 'reach only unto our dealing with publique affayres from which what should lett, but that men may be excluded and thereunto restored againe without diminishing or augmenting the number of persons in whom either *Church* or *Commonwealth* consisteth.'[13] What, however, of excommunication? Does it not compromise the personal identification of church with commonwealth? It does not, despite the fact that excommunication 'cutteth of[f] indeed from the *Church*, and yet not from the *Commonwealth*.'[14] As Hooker clarifies, excommunication does not exclude one from the church in the sense of denying one's Christian identity, but rather bars one from '*Communion* in those thinges, which belonge to the sayd body as it is the *Church*.'[15] This understanding of excommunication as barring from full participation in public worship but not excluding one from being counted a Christian is articulated in

distinction between the visible church and the mystical church in Hooker's thought is real and important in his defence of the Elizabethan church.

[12] *Lawes* V.68.6; 2:352.5–8. Regarding how Hooker's views on the relationship between the visible and invisible churches compare to puritan views, see Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (1988), 34–35, 40–41, 160–161, 177–182. Regarding the depth of sin and alienation from God into which an individual might fall and nevertheless be rightly counted a member of the visible church, see *Lawes* III.1.7–8; 1:198.4–199.25. Regarding the impossibility for mortals of discerning membership in the mystical church, see III.1.2; 1:194.27–195.22.

[13] *Lawes* VIII.1.6; 3:328.11–17.

[14] *Lawes* VIII.1.6; 3:328.27–28.

[15] *Lawes* VIII.1.6; 3:329.5–6.

Lawes III.1. 'As for the act of excommunication it neither shutteth out from the misticall [church] nor cleane from the visible [church], but onely from fellowship with the visible in holy dueties.'[16]

The personal identity of church and commonwealth expounded in the first chapter forms the foundation on which Hooker erects the Royal Supremacy. A brief second chapter defines what precisely is being claimed for the prince under the name of 'dominion' over the church. The supremacy of the English crown is not absolute, being subordinate to God, the laws of the realm, and the community as a whole,[17] but it does entail 'in causes Ecclesiasticall that ruling authoritie, which neither any forrein state nor yet any part of that politique bodie at home wherein the same is established, can lawfully overrule.'[18] 'When therfor Christian Kings are said to have spirituall dominion or supreeme power in Ecclesiasticall affaires and causes, the meaning is, that within their own precinctes and territories they have authoritie and power to command even in matters of *Christian Religion*, and that there is no higher, nor greater, that can in those causes overcommand them, where they are placed to raigne as *Kings*.'[19]

The Basis of Royal Ecclesiastical Dominion

Hooker turns in VIII.3 to outline the basis of the ecclesiastical dominion that he claims for the prince in VIII.2. Authorization of a prince to lead the church can be considered from two perspectives. First is the question of the extent of royal power; i.e., is it right that dominion over the church be part of the royal office? Second is the question of the appointment of the prince; i.e. by what authority does (in Hooker's context) Elizabeth Tudor and not some other person exercise the powers of an English prince? The answer to both of these questions that dominated defences of royal supremacy in Tudor England was based on the model of theocratic kingship: 'God appoints the king to rule over his subjects and to care for their souls as well as their temporal existence.'[20] Hooker's contemporary Thomas Bilson exemplifies this perspective in his 1585 tract defending the English church against Roman

[16] *Lawes* III.1.13; 1:205.4–6.
[17] *Lawes* VIII.2.1; 3:332.15–28.
[18] *Lawes* VIII.2.1; 3:333.9–12.
[19] *Lawes* VIII.2.1; 3:332.9–15.
[20] McGrade, *FLE* 6(1): 342.

Catholic opposition. Regarding direct divine involvement in determining who should fill the royal office, Bilson asserts that princes are 'Gods annointed . . . in consideration of their power, which is ordayned: of the sword, which is authorized: of their Persons, which are elected by GOD and endued with the giftes of his spirite for the better guyding of his people.'[21] Bilson also affirms that God, in scripture, ordains that royal authority should extend over the church. 'If you deny that this is the Princes charge to see the law of God fully executed, his Sonne rightly serued, his spouse safely nourced, his house timely filled, his enemies duely punished, you must counteruaile that which *Moses* prescribed, *Dauid* required, *Esay* prophesied, *Paul* witnessed, & Christ commaunded.'[22] When challenged that the '[divine] charge [to order religious affairs] concerned none but the kings of *Israell* & *Iudah*,' Bilson responds by rejecting the claim that Old Testament precedents do not apply to sixteenth century princes. '[D]id . . . the comming of Christ abolish the vocation of princes? I tro not. Then . . . both the same precept of God to them stil dureth, & also the like power to force their subiects to serue God & Christ his son, standeth in as ful strength vnder the gospel as euer it did vnder the law.'[23]

Hooker takes a very different approach to justifying royal supremacy over the English church. In contrast to theocratic justifications of royal authority, he argues that no particular institutional structure is divinely mandated for the church and consequently the distribution of ecclesiastical authority is left to the discretion of each church. 'As for supreme power in Ecclesiasticall affayres, the word of God doth no where appoint, that all kinges should have it, neither that any should not have it. For which cause it seemeth to stand altogether by humane right, that unto *Christian Kings* there is such dominion given.'[24] As a human society, the English church/commonwealth has the same rights as any other society, including the right to appoint its own leader unless God has seen fit to appoint one directly. For Hooker a basic principle of human society that 'seemeth almost out of doubt and controversie' is 'that every independent multitude before any certaine forme of regiment established hath under *Gods* supreme authoritie full dominion over

[21] Thomas Bilson, *The Trve Difference betweene Christian Svbiection and Vnchristian Rebellion* (1585; reprint, 1972), 498; see also 425.
[22] Bilson, *Trve Difference*, 133.
[23] Bilson, *Trve Difference*, 130.
[24] *Lawes* VIII.3.1; 3:335.5–9.

it self, even as a man not tied with the bond of subjection as yet unto any other hath over himself the like power.'[25] Such multitudes may have political orders imposed on them by God directly (as in ancient Israel) or indirectly through conquest (inasmuch as God 'giveth victorie in the day of warr'); otherwise communities are 'left free by God to make choise of their owne governoure.'[26]

The ecclesiastical supremacy of the English prince is of the third type—bestowed willingly by the community; English Christians 'are in no subjection but such as willingly themselves have condescended unto for their own most behoof and securitie.'[27] The community is the source of Elizabeth's authorization to fill the office of prince and is responsible for defining the extent of royal authority as including supremacy over the church. The prince's supremacy over the English church is 'indeed universall dominion, but with dependence upon that whole entier body over the severall partes wherof he hath dominion.'[28] This constitutional understanding of the authority of the crown would seem to poise Hooker to institute procedures to ensure that (1) only persons approved by the community attain supremacy over the English church and (2) unfit rulers can be removed from office by the community.[29] Yet

[25] *Lawes* VIII.3.1; 3:334.3–7.

[26] *Lawes* VIII.3.1; 3:334.13–28. Because all authority is from God either directly or indirectly, by whatever means a ruler comes to hold lawful dominion over a nation, 'we must acknowledg both their lawfull choise to be approoved of God, and themselfs for *Godes Livetenantes* and confesse their power his.' VIII.3.1; 3:335.2–4.

[27] *Lawes* VIII.3.2; 3:336.22–25. For Hooker consent, broadly defined, is the basis of all legitimate dominion and legislative authority both civil and ecclesiastical; 'in all societies companies and corporations what severally each shalbe bound unto it must be withall their assentes ratified. Against all equitie it were that a man should suffer detriment at the handes of men for not observing that which he never did either by himself or by others mediatly or immediatly agree unto.' *Lawes* VIII.6.7; 3:393.12–17. The principle is spelled out in *Lawes* I.10.4; 1:98.23–100.15, I.10.8; 1:102.18–103.27, and references to it appear throughout *Lawes* VIII (especially VIII.3, VIII.6, and VIII.8). This principle applies in circumstances (like Hooker's England) in which God has not established dominion directly and to aspects of life for which God has not prescribed laws in scripture or natural law. See above (note 26), below (note 76), and *Lawes* I.10.8; 1:102.24–31.

[28] *Lawes* VIII.3.2; 3:336.26–28.

[29] Other sixteenth century theorists used principles similar to Hooker's to argue for elective monarchy, resistance, and deposition. See Arthur Monahan, 'Richard Hooker: Counter-Reformation Political Thinker,' in *RHC*, ed. McGrade, 210; J. P. Sommerville, 'Richard Hooker, Hadrian Saravia, and the Advent of the Divine Right of Kings,' *History of Political Thought* 4.2 (1983), 231–236; W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The Philosopher of the "Politic Society": Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker,' in *Studies in Richard Hooker*, W. Speed Hill, ed. (1972), 43–47.

Hooker does not. Regarding (1), in realms such as England in which the community has established a hereditary monarchy, the lawful heir comes to power upon the death of the predecessor automatically, without the need of any formal sanction by the community. Rather, 'the cause of [the inheritor's] dependencie [on the consent of the community] is in that first originall conveyance, when power was derived by the whole unto one to passe from him into them, whom out of him nature by lawfull birth should produce and no naturall or legall inhabilitie make uncapable.'[30] Regarding (2), Hooker asks 'May then a bodie politique at all times withdrawe in whole or in part that influence of dominion which passeth from it, if inconvenience doth growe thereby?' He responds in the negative. 'It must be presumed that supreme governours will not in such case oppose them selves and be stiff in deteyning that, the use whereof is with publique detriment. But surely without their consent I see not how the body should be able by any just meanes to helpe it self, saving when *Dominion* doth escheate.'[31]

Given Hooker's purposes in the *Lawes*, it is hardly surprising that he short-circuits attempts to parlay the communal basis of royal authority into a starting point for questioning the Queen's authority or justifying disobedience and resistance. What seems to stand in need of explanation is the fact that he makes so much of the role of the community in the establishment of the prince in the first place, especially in an ideological context in which theocratic arguments are readily available. It has been argued persuasively that Hooker's constitutionalism is in part an attempt to secure the church against royal absolutism, underwriting his vision of a royal authority limited by the rule of law, not only divine and natural law, but also English church laws.[32] Without denying the importance of this aspect of Hooker's constitutionalism, the current assessment will highlight the important role constitutionalism plays in his defence of obedience to the crown and order in the church, defending the church against precisely the types of threats that Hooker portrays presbyterian agitators as posing. Considered as anti-

[30] *Lawes* VIII.3.2; 3:338.28–339.4. This is an application of one aspect of Hooker's broad understanding of the 'consent' that constitutes a valid human authority. 'And to be commanded we do consent, when that societie whereof we are parte hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universall agreement.' *Lawes* I.10.8; 1:103.18–21.

[31] *Lawes* VIII.3.2; 3:339.20–27.

[32] McGrade *FLE* 6(1): 244–246, 358–359, 364–375; Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?* 201–212.

presbyterian polemic, Hooker's appeal to the English community as the basis of royal authority has at least two advantages over the theocratic understanding of royal supremacy favoured by other supporters of the established church.

First consider Hooker's claim that royal dominion over the church is authorized by the community, not directly by God. If the extent of royal authority were understood to be defined by God directly, then it would seem natural that the source to consult in order to determine whether the prince should exercise dominion over the church would be scripture (as Bilson does). To acknowledge, however, that scripture defines the extent of royal authority is to invite readers to search scripture to determine the divinely ordained limits of royal power. This, of course, is precisely what presbyterians were already doing, that is to say arguing that in scripture God mandates presbyterianism, not royal dominion, in the church. By basing royal authority over the church on the consent of the English community, Hooker can argue that the laws and traditions of the realm are the loci of authority that subjects should consult to determine whether royal dominion over the English church is legitimate. In direct contrast to Bilson, Hooker asserts that biblical models and ordinances concerning royal authority were intended by God to apply only to ancient Israel, not Elizabethan England.[33] Unlike kings authorized by God directly,

> Touching *Kīngs* which were first instituted by agreement and composition made with them over whom they raigne how farr their power may lawfully extende, the articles of compact between them must shewe not the articles only of compact at the first begining…, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntarie manner condescended unto whither by expresse consent, whereof positive lawes are witnesses, or else by silent allowance famously notified through custome reaching beyonde the memorie of man.[34]

In addition to identifying the community, not God directly, as responsible for defining the extent of royal authority, Hooker also identifies the community, not God directly, as responsible for determining who is authorized to exercise the powers of the prince. In so doing he again closes off avenues that could potentially be exploited to legitimate

[33] *Lawes* VIII.6.13; 3:407.7–12. Hooker appeals to biblical examples to show that royal supremacy is a legitimate form of church polity but not the only legitimate form. VIII.1.7; 3:330.3–8 and VIII.3.5; 3:350.11–24.

[34] *Lawes* VIII.3.3; 3:340.8–17.

resistance to the crown. Acknowledgement that God appoints the ruler directly in a manner akin to the divine appointment of Old Testament kings fosters a focus on the direct involvement of God in ecclesiastical and political affairs that Hooker is loathe to accept because it leaves the door open to fanatics who believe themselves authorized by a supposed direct divine commission to execute God's will in England. On this point comparison to Bilson is particularly revealing. Responding to Roman Catholic arguments intended to demonstrate that kings may be deposed by papal authority and that subjects should rise up to remove their king from office at the pope's instigation, Bilson considers the example of Jehu. As related in 2 Kings 9, Jehu was a magistrate who, being authorized by word from a prophet, slew his prince at God's command. Bilson says of Jehu's regicide, 'Being expresly commanded thereto by God himselfe, [Jehu] did but his dutie. For God may take and giue Kingdomes as hee will, though man may not.' 'Now,' Bilson challenges his fictional papist interlocutor, 'view your argument. God may giue kingdomes to whom he will, and appoint the subiect to be the reuenger of this masters sinne; *ergo* the Pope may do the like.' While the example of Jehu does not authorize papal deposition of princes, it leads Bilson to concede far more than Hooker is willing to concede. 'That annointed and lawfully created Kings may be chased from the gouernment; the example of *Jehu* will iustifie: if you adde these two prouisoes, that the warrant be special from Gods own mouth, & the fact be done by the Magistrate whom God hath authorized to take the sword.'[35] Because Bilson views the English monarchy as resting on a basis essentially the same as that of the ancient Israelite kings, he is led to concede that, like the Israelite kings, English princes are subject to deposition when God directly commands that they be deposed. The agent of deposition could be any disgruntled magistrate and the person authorizing him any 'prophet' who discerns God's call to do so (including, presumably, the magistrate himself). Claiming a directly divine authorization for the prince opens the door to claims that just as God is directly involved in determining who should serve as prince, so God can intervene to authorize the prince's removal. By contrast, Hooker's identification of the community as authorized to order the affairs of the English state-church replaces direct divine mandate with communal mandate. When, as was the case in England, that mandate

[35] Bilson, *Trve Difference*, 333–334.

had been established irrevocably (except with the prince's acquiescence), there was no constitutional basis for deposition and no reason to expect an extraordinary divine commission to depose the prince.

This is not to say that Hooker's opponents were in fact using their personal perceptions of God's will to call for Elizabeth's deposition, but as presented by Hooker presbyterian arguments tended toward legitimating the deposition of any church official, including the prince, who fails to execute his or her office in a so-called 'godly' manner. Presbyterians already had, Hooker points out, claimed that other properly authorized church officials should be removed from power solely because they were judged to be ungodly.

> And concerning [princes'] supreme power for making lawes for all persons in all causes to be guided by, it is not be lett passe that the head enemies of this *Headship* [i.e. presbyterians] are constrained to acknowledg the *King* endowed even with this very power so that he may and ought to exercise the same, taking order for the *Church* and her affairs of what nature or kinde soever in case of necessitie as when there is no lawfull ministry which they interpret then to be (and this surely is a pointe very markable) whensoever the ministrie is wicked. A wicked ministrie no lawfull ministrie? and in such sorte no lawfull ministrie that what doth belonge to them as ministers by right of their calling the same is annihilated in respect of their bad qualitie? Their wickednes in it self a deprivation of right to deale in the affaires of the *Church*, and a warrant for others to deale in them which are held to be of a cleane other societie the members wherof have been before so peremptorily for ever excluded from power of dealing with the affaires of the *Church*? They which have once throwly learned this lesson will quickly be capable perhapps of an other equivalent unto it. For if the wickednes of the ministrie transferre their right unto the *King*, in case the *King* be as wicked as they to whom shall the right descend? There is no remedie, all must come by devolution at the length even as the familie of *Brown* will have it unto the godly amongst the people; for confusion to the wise and to the greate the poor and the simple, some Knipperdoling with his retinue must take the worke of the *Lord* in hand and the making of *Church* lawes must prove to be their right in the ende.[36]

The reference to Knipperdoling recalls readers to Münster[37] and the Preface to the *Lawes* in which Hooker dwells on the absurdities and atrocities that can ensue when direct divine involvement in the affairs

[36] *Lawes* VIII.6.14; 3:408.24–409.24.

[37] Bernhard Knipperdoling was a leading figure in the Anabaptist takeover of Münster in the 1530s.

of a Christian community is overemphasized to the detriment of the objectively verifiable structures through which God typically guides the church.[38] Certainly God leads the church, but God does so in ways that safeguard against radicals mistaking their own fantasies or the promptings of '*that evill Spirit which is even in his illusions strong*'[39] for the will of God. Presbyterians identify church authorities (explicitly clergy and implicitly princes) as being authorized to lead the church only if they measure up to a standard theoretically defined by God but in practice all too likely to be defined and enforced by misguided fanatics. By contrast Hooker argues that the only human agent through which God regulates the church's royal head is the church as a whole speaking through parliament (including the crown) with the convocation. From this perspective Hooker's rejection of theocratic arguments in favour of constitutionalism is a means of defending royal authority against the types of dangers he has presented Presbyterianism as posing since the beginning of the *Lawes*.

This is not to deny that part of Hooker's motivation in emphasizing the role of the community in establishing the prince is to promote a constitutionally limited understanding of royal power. His intention to safeguard the prince's ecclesiastical authority against presbyterian threats dovetails with his interest in vesting the authority thus safeguarded with the crown in parliament rather than the crown *solus*. Confirming his interest in ensuring that the authority he defends does not degenerate into tyranny Hooker explicitly notes that because the community cannot withdraw authority from the prince once granted, it is necessary that royal authority be limited.[40] The best form of royal power is

> that which in dealing is tyed unto the soundest perfectest and most indifferent rule; which rule is the law. I meane not only the law of nature and of *God* but very nationall or municipall law consonant therunto.... In which respect I cannot choose but commend highly their wisdome by whom the foundations of this Commonwealth have been layd, wherein though no manner person or cause be unsubject to the *Kings* power, yet so is the power of the *King* over all and in all limited that unto all his proceedinges the law it self is a rule.[41]

[38] *Lawes* Pref.8.6–14; 1:42.15–51.22.
[39] *Lawes* Pref.3.10; 1:18.4–8.
[40] *Lawes* VIII.3.2; 3:339.27–29.
[41] *Lawes* VIII.3.3; 3:341.22–25, VIII.3.3; 3:342.14–19.

This limit applies to royal authority as head of the church as well as the commonwealth:

> Wherefore not without good consideration the very lawe it self hath provided that Judges Ecclesiasticall appointed under the *Kings* commission shall not adjudg for heresie any thinge but that which heretofore hath been so adjudged by the authoritie of the *Canonicall* scriptures, or by the first foure generall Councells or by some other generall Councell wherin the same hath been declared heresie by the expresse wordes of the said *Canonicall Scriptures* or such as herafter shalbe termed heresie by the high Court of *Parlament* of this Realme with the assent of the *Clergie* in the *Convocation*.[42]

The Prince as Head of the Church[43]

Having outlined the nature and basis of the English royal supremacy, Hooker turns in VIII.4 to address theological objections against the '*title of Headship which we give to the kings of England in relation unto the church*.'[44] Hooker could easily have avoided confrontation on this point by simply not defending the Queen as 'Head of the Church.' Indeed, rather than this more provocative title, the title of 'Governor of the Church' was preferred by the Queen herself, and the oath authorized by parliament required that Elizabeth be recognized as 'supreme Governour of this Realme… in all Spirituall or Ecclesiasticall Thinges or Causes.'[45] Nevertheless, Hooker determines to defend royal 'headship' of the church, remarking that what is really at issue is not the title but the authority associated with it.[46]

Presbyterian criticisms of royal headship over the church centre on claims that it is a usurpation of authority that rightly belongs to Christ. Hooker argues that this is not the case because the Queen's headship over the church differs from Christ's in clearly understood ways. First, they differ in terms of order; Christ holds the headship in subordination to none 'wheras the power which others have is subordinated unto

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[42] *Lawes* VIII.3.3; 3:348.9–18. As reflected in this passage, Hooker also held that the determinations of valid general councils were to be respected by the English church's royal leader.

[43] For in-depth discussion of the topics in this section see W. J. Torrance Kirby, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (1990), ch. 4.

[44] *Lawes* VIII.4.title; 3:356.19–20.

[45] 1 Eliz. c.1.ix.

[46] *Lawes* VIII.4.12; 3:380.6–14.

his.'[47] Presbyterians, however, reject this distinction. Citing Cartwright, Hooker presents the objection against this distinction as based on the claim that '*Christ* hath a two-fold superioritie, a superioritie over his *Church*, and a superioritie over *Kingdomes*.'

> Of the *Church* he is *Head* and governour only as the sonne of man, *Head* and governour over *Kingdomes* only as the sonne of God. In the *Church* as man he hath Officers under him, which Officers are *Ecclesiasticall* persons. As for the Civill Magistrate his office belongeth unto *Kingdomes* and Commonwealthes, neither is he therein an under or subordinate *Head* of *Christ* considering that his authoritie commeth from God simplie and immediately even as our *Saviour Christs* doth.[48]

Consequently, a church cannot have a human head in the same way that a kingdom can because Christ 'as the sonne of man' fulfils this role in the church. Christ in the church occupies much the same position as the Prince in the realm; in each case the 'head' is directly subordinate to God and responsible for ordering all inferiors within his domain. Thus while royal headship in a commonwealth is divinely ordained, in the church it impinges upon the authority of Christ.

In response Hooker argues that the objection rests on premises entailing (1) a repudiation of the orthodox Trinitarian understanding of the relationship between God the Father and Christ and (2) a Nestorian Christology inappropriately separating Christ's human and divine natures. First, Hooker points out, 'That which the Father doth work as *Lord* and *King* over all he worketh not without but by the sonne who through coeternall generation receiveth of the Father that power which the Father hath of himself.' He then asks,

> In what Evangelist, Apostle or Prophett is it found, that *Christ Supreme Governour of the Church* should be so unequall to himself as he is supreme Governour of *Kingdomes*?…Surely if *Christ* as *God and man have ordayned certaine meanes for the gathering and keeping of his Church*, seing this doth belonge to the goverment of his *Church* it must in reason follow I think that as *God* and *man* he worketh in *Church* regiment, and consequently hath no more therein any superiour then in the goverment of Commonwealths.… Wherfore unlesse it can be proved that all the workes of our Saviours goverment in the Church are done by the meer and only force of his humane nature, there is no remedie but to acknowledg it a

[47] *Lawes* VIII.4.5; 3:361.8–13.
[48] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:363.9–22.

> manifest errour that *Christ* in the goverment of the world is equall unto the Father but not in the goverment of the *Church*.[49]

The presbyterians' error is 'a misconceipt that *Christ* as mediatour being inferiour unto his Father doth as Mediatour all workes of regiment over the *Church*, when in truth goverment doth belong to his *Kingly* office, *mediatorship* to his priestly.'[50] Christ, the consubstantial word of God made man, is the divine agent of the creation and governance of all aspects of existence, including the church.[51] Thus it is erroneous to deny that Christ as God governs the church and a similar error to 'hold that civill authoritie is from God but not mediately through *Christ* nor with any subordination unto *Christ*.'[52] The difference in order between the manner in which Christ reigns over kingdoms and over the church posited by Cartwright misconstrues the relationship between the first and second Persons of the Trinity and assumes a heretical separation of Christ's human and divine natures. When Christ's nature and relationship to the Father are rightly construed, it is clear that the distinction of order between Christ's headship over the church and the Queen's headship over the church is valid.

A second presbyterian objection against royal headship of the church centres on a denial that it is fitting for each national or regional church to have a head whose authority is spatially (and temporally) limited. '[T]he reason,' the objection runs, 'why *Head Magistrates* appoint others for such severall places is because they cannot be present every where to performe the office of an Head. But Christ is never from his bodie nor from any part of it and therefore needeth not to substitute any which may be Heads some over one Church and some over an other.'[53] In response Hooker argues that presbyterians inappropriately undermine the distinction between Christ's invisible governance of the church and outward governance of the church by others. Although Christ is indeed 'spiritually alwayes united unto every part of his body which is the *Church*: . . . from every *Church* heer visible, *Christ* touching visible and corporall presence is removed as farr as heaven from earth is distant.'[54]

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[49] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:364.8–11, VIII.4.6; 3:366.10–24, VIII.4.6; 3:367.1–6.
[50] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:368.1–5.
[51] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:364.5–366.3.
[52] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:368.11–13.
[53] *Lawes* VIII.4.7; 3:370.2–7.
[54] *Lawes* VIII.4.7; 3:370.18–23.

Christ reigns invisibly over the church,[55] but this does not serve to order the external regiment of each visible church. At the same time,

> Visible goverment is a thing necessarie for the *Church*. And it doth not appeare how the exercise of visible goverment over such multitudes every where dispersed throughout the world should consist without sundrie visible governours . . . wherfore notwithstanding that perpetuall conjunction by vertue wherof our Saviour remayneth alwayes spiritually united unto the partes of his mysticall body; *Heads* indued with supreme power extending unto a certaine compasse are for the exercise of visible regiment not unnecessarie.[56]

The distinction between the visible and the mystical also underwrites Hooker's response to the final presbyterian objection against royal ecclesiastical headship considered in VIII.4. Hooker argues that '*Christ* is *Head* as being the fountaine of life and ghostly nutriment, the welspring of spirituall blessinges powred into the body of the *Church*,' while magistrates are '*Heads* as being his principall instrumentes for the *Churches* outward goverment.'[57] In contrast to this Hooker presents presbyterians as conflating the spiritual and external regiments of the church. Presbyterians claim that the 'externall power of regiment over the *Church* is only in relation unto the *Word* the *Sacraments* and *Discipline* administred by such as *Christ* hath appointed therunto, and the exercise of this power is also his spirituall goverment. Therefore [they argue] we doe but vaynly imagine a visible and externall power in the *Church* differing from [Christ's] spirituall power.'[58]

In response Hooker calls for clarity in the use of terms and supplies some by distinguishing different manners in which Christ can be said to govern spiritual things based on distinct meanings of the term 'spiritual.' Many things can rightly be called 'spiritual,' but they can be called so in different ways. Christ alone administers spiritual things in the sense that he is 'that fountaine, from whence the influence of heavenly grace distilleth and is derived into all partes whither the Word or Sacramentes or Discipline or whatsoever be the meane wherby it floweth.'[59] Power to administer the sacraments and preach the word is

[55] Christ reigns invisibly over both the mystical church and 'every *Christian politick Societie* of every visible *Church*.' *Lawes* VIII.4.7; 3:373.18–22.
[56] *Lawes* VIII.4.7; 3:370.23–371.4.
[57] *Lawes* VIII.4.8; 3:374.10–13.
[58] *Lawes* VIII.4.9; 3:376.13–22.
[59] *Lawes* VIII.4.9; 3:377.19–22.

also spiritual power and Christ's power, but not in the same sense. The latter power is '*Spirituall*, because such dueties properly concerne the *Spirit*, [and Christ's] because by him it was instituted,' yet not spiritual in the sense of being 'inwardly and invisibly exercised nor *His*, as that which *He* himselfe in person doth exercise.'[60] Inward spiritual affairs are governed by Christ directly; derivatively spiritual outward acts and orders associated with inward spiritual affairs are governed by Christ's agents in accord with Christ's institution. In keeping with this distinction Hooker argues

> that power of dominion [over the visible church]…doth also belong to the second kinde of *Spirituall regiment*, namely unto that regiment which is externall and visible, this likewise being *Spirituall* in regard of the matter about which it dealeth and being *His* in as much as *He* approveth whatsoever is done by it.… We doe not therefore vainly imagine but truly and rightly discerne a power externall and visible in the *Church* exercised by men and severed in nature from that *spirituall* power of Christes own regiment.[61]

The real issue is not whether there ought to be any human authorities overseeing the derivatively spiritual affairs of the church but rather who those human authorities ought to be. 'So that in truth the question is whither the *Magistrate* by being head in such sense as we terme him doe use or exercise any part of that authoritie, not which belongeth unto *Christ*, but which other men ought to have.'[62] That in the English church ecclesiastical dominion is rightly exercised by the prince Hooker has already argued in VIII.3; in VIII.4 he needs only to highlight that royal authority over the church is also sanctioned by God 'in as much as of him all lawfull powers are.'[63]

Discussion of the relationship between the visible and mystical churches also affords Hooker the opportunity to highlight an additional consequence of the breadth with which he defines membership in the

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[60] *Lawes* VIII.4.9; 3:377.24–28.

[61] *Lawes* VIII.4.9; 3:377.28–378.11. This identification of royal authority as reigning in the external forum and not impinging on Christ's internal dominion also limits the extent of royal authority. For example, human laws that 'appoint men what to beleeve' are not intended to regulate whether opinions are actually 'in hart assented unto,' because this 'is not in the power of any humane lawe to command.' Rather, 'As opinions are either fitt or inconvenient to be profest, so mans law hath to determine of them.' *Lawes* VIII.6.4; 3:389.25–390.14. See McGrade, *FLE* 6(1): 364.

[62] *Lawes* VIII.4.12; 3:381.15–18.

[63] *Lawes* VIII.4.6; 3:369.21–23.

visible church. We saw that in VIII.1 his broad definition of who qualifies as a Christian allows Hooker to equate church and commonwealth in England in personal terms. Here it is used to discredit attempts to deny the authority of the prince over the church on the basis of claims that the prince is not a true Christian. Certainly only a Christian magistrate can serve as head of the church in her domain,[64] but given the broad definition of 'Christian' with which Hooker operates, there is little risk of the magistrate's membership in the visible church being called into question. 'Indeed the *Heads* of those visible bodys [visible churches] which are many can be but partes inferiour in that spirituall body [the mystical church] which is but one, yea they may from this be excluded cleane who notwithstanding ought to be honoured as possessing in the other the highest roomes.'[65] Despite, or rather because of, the inability of mortals to judge with certainty whether the prince is a member of the mystical church, the prince's membership in and consequent headship of the visible church is secure as long as she claims such membership and refrains from directly denying foundational tenets of the faith such as the lordship of Christ.

Royal Ecclesiastical Prerogatives: Ecclesiastical Legislation

Having established royal ecclesiastical dominion and answered theological objections against it, Hooker proceeds to outline the powers and privileges that such dominion entails. Central to this discussion and to the coherence of the *Lawes* as a whole is the sixth chapter that addresses the power of the prince, now firmly situated in parliament,[66] to formulate ecclesiastical laws. To appreciate the importance of this chapter, the authority of the crown in parliament to legislate for the church must be viewed in the context of Hooker's understanding of the role of human laws in the church as well as his hermeneutics.[67]

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[64] *Lawes* VIII.4.7; 3:373.5–7.

[65] *Lawes* VIII.4.7; 3:372.9–12.

[66] The primary power of the prince in ecclesiastical affairs is veto power. 'Touching the supremacie of power which our *Kings* have in this case of making lawes it resteth principally in the strength of a negative voyce, which not to give them were to denie them that, without which they were but *Kings* by meer title and not in exercise of dominion.' *Lawes* VIII.6.11; 3:404.6–10.

[67] Regarding the issues discussed in this section (particularly Hooker's rationalist hermeneutic, his understanding of the role of public consensus in discerning the

A central theme of the *Lawes* is Hooker's insistence on the importance of English Christians obeying the human laws structuring their church. The divine law revealed in scripture and the law of reason outline how essential aspects of the church are to be ordered, but they also leave many aspects of church life undefined. While things not ordered by the law of reason or scripture are indifferent, that does not mean that in such matters individuals can be left to do as they please. The English church, like all visible churches, is in a certain sense 'a visible society of men;' it therefore requires and possesses 'power to make laws for its own external government.'[68] If standards of conduct are left undefined in a community, contention and confusion inevitably arise, and thus laws framed by human wisdom and enforced by human agents are necessary to maintain peace and order.[69] If the church suspended its human laws and 'did give everie man license to followe what him selfe imagineth that *Gods Spirit doth reveale* unto him, or what he supposeth that God is likelie to have revealed to some speciall person whose virtues deserve to be highlie esteemed, what other effect could hereupon ensewe, but the utter confusion of his Church[?]'[70] The presbyterian programme of removing all of the 'orders, lawes, and constitutions in the Church' devised by human authority 'would peradventure leave neither face nor memorie of Church to continue long in the world, the world especially being such as now it is.'[71] Consequently, '*God being author of peace and not of confusion in the Church, must needs be author of those mens peaceable resolutions, who concerning these things, have determined with them*

guidance of reason, his teachings on assurance, and how these relate to underwriting obedience to ecclesiastical laws) see Egil Grislis, 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker,' in *SRH*, ed. W. Speed Hill, 159–206; Egil Grislis, 'The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker,' in *RHC*, ed. McGrade, 237–249; M. E. C. Perrott, 'Richard Hooker and the Problem of Authority in the Elizabethan Church,' *JEH*, 49.1 (1998), 29–60; Daniel Eppley, 'Richard Hooker and Christopher St. German: Biblical Hermeneutics and Princely Power,' in *Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, W. J. Torrance Kirby, ed. (2003), 285–294.

[68] *Lawes* III.1.14; 1:205.19–28. Cargill Thompson, 'Philosopher of the "Politic Society",' 35, 56; see *Lawes* I.15.2; 1:131.10–16, *Lawes* VII.14.3; 3:219.23–33, *Lawes* VIII.1.2; 3:319.2–9, and VIII.3.5; 3:354.14–355.4.

[69] *Lawes* I.10.3–4; 1:98.5–99.15, *Lawes* III.10.7; 1:244.10–245.7, III.11.14; 1:261.24–30, *Lawes* VIII.2.1; 3:331.11–332.15, VIII.3.4; 3:349.2–13, VIII.6.4; 3:389.8–21; 3:390.7–14, VIII.6.5; 3:391.2–11.

[70] *Lawes* V.10.1; 2:46.18–27.

[71] *Lawes* II.7.1; 1:175.8–13.

selves to thinke and do as the Church they are of decreeth, till they see necessarie cause enforcing them to the contrarie.'[72]

So important is order in the church that to ensure it God positively wills that subjects act against their own judgments when unable to persuade church officials to alter laws they find offensive. '*[I]n litigious and controversed causes of such qualitie, the will of God is to have [dissenters] doe whatsoever the sentence of judiciall and finall decision shall determine, yea, though it seeme in their private opinion to swarve utterly from that which is right*.' Hooker makes this claim, moreover, immediately after acknowledging that

> *God was not ignorant that the Priests and Judges, whose sentence in matters of controversie he ordeined should stand, both might and oftentimes would be deceived in their judgement. Howbeit, better it was in the eye of his understanding, that sometime an erroneous sentence definitive should prevaile, till the same authoritie perceiving such oversight, might afterwardes correct or reverse it, then that strifes should have respit to growe, and not come speedily unto some ende*.[73]

To show that by obeying erring church authorities Christians do not risk divine condemnation, Hooker provides the following illustration: '*no doubt many times the [authoritative] sentence amongst the Jewes did seeme unto one part or other contending [to be incorrect], and yet in this case God did then allowe them to doe that which in their private judgement it seemed, yea and perhaps truly seemed that the [divine] lawe did disallow*.'[74] God 'allowed' what the divine law 'disallowed' for people who suspended their own judgment to act in accord with the pronouncements of their church authorities.[75]

Such claims seem, however, to be at odds with Hooker's conviction that human laws over the church are not binding if contrary to the divine law,[76] and the coherence of the *Lawes* has been called into ques-

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[72] *Lawes* Pref.6.6; 1:34.9–13.

[73] *Lawes* Pref.6.3; 1:31.16–28.

[74] *Lawes* Pref.6.3; 1:31.28–32.

[75] Hooker assumes a significant measure of divine leniency toward those who accept heretical beliefs for want of better instruction, as long as they hold to the 'foundation of faith.' See *A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and How the Foundation of Faith Is Overthrowne*, *FLE* 5:105–169, especially 5:118.2–7; 5:142.7–143.24; 5:161.16–162.21. Divine leniency is a natural corollary to Hooker's hermeneutical principles that recognize even the best guides available to humans for interpreting scripture (reason and the consensus of the church—see below) as fallible. See Eppley, 290–293; Grislis, 'Hermeneutical,' 179; Grislis, 'Assurance,' 245.

[76] If 'the positive lawes of our own Realme concerning Ecclesiasticall affayres' do 'otherwise dispose of any such thing then according to the law of reason and of God; we must both acknowledg them to be amisse and endeavour to have them reformed.' *Lawes* VIII.8.3; 3:424.2–7. 'For many inducements besides scripture may lead me to that, which if scripture be against, they all geve place, and are of no value; yet otherwise

tion on this point. Rory Fox contends that the same arguments based on the importance of peace and unity that Hooker uses to demand conformity from presbyterians to the English church can be used to demand conformity of English Christians to the decrees of Trent.[77] 'If pushed,' Fox conjectures, 'Hooker might well have justified Anglican resistance to the council of Trent by suggesting that Roman Catholics are guilty of grave theological errors.... But was not that precisely the Puritan defence against Hooker...?'[78] Crucial to Hooker's resolution of this dilemma and thus to the coherence of the *Lawes* is his conviction that the persons who formulate English church laws, the crown in parliament with the convocation, also comprise the highest authority on which subjects should rely for the interpretation of scripture. This being the case, subjects contemplating disobedience of English church laws on account of a higher responsibility to obey the law of God are obliged to inquire of the church authorities themselves how the divine law is to be interpreted.

Hooker's argument that the power to authoritatively interpret scripture belongs to the crown in parliament with the convocation can be summarized as follows. Agreeing with presbyterians that the guidance of the Holy Spirit is necessary for a proper interpretation of the Bible, Hooker stresses that the ordinary means by which the Holy Spirit leads Christians to a true understanding of the Bible is by empowering reason to achieve a valid interpretation. 'That which by right exposition buildeth up Christian faith, being misconstrued breedeth error: betweene true and false construction, the difference reason must shew.'[79] When disagreement within a community arises regarding what qualifies as a 'reasonable' interpretation, Hooker advises, the approval of the church as a whole, including especially those learned in matters of the faith, should be recognized as the most certain guide available to a reasonable interpretation of scripture.[80] With these premises the issue of who has

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are strong and effectuall to perswade.' *Lawes* II.5.7; 1:165.11–14. '[I]f indeed there have bene at any time a Church-politie so set downe, the change whereof the sacred scripture doth forbid, surely for men to alter those laws which God for perpetuitie hath established, were presumption most intollerable.' *Lawes* III.11.1; 1:247.4–8.

[77] Rory Fox, 'Richard Hooker and the Incoherence of "Ecclesiastical Polity",' *Heythrop Journal* 44 (2003), 43–59.

[78] Fox, 'Incoherence of "Ecclesiastical Polity",' 56.

[79] *Lawes* III.8.16; 1:233.18–20. See Haugaard, *FLE* 6(1): 156–157.

[80] *Lawes* I.8.2–3; 1:82.27–84.4, *Lawes* II.7.4–6; 1:177.34–183.19, *Lawes* V.7.2; 2:35.29–36.11, *Lawes* VII.15.15; 3:241.22–242.8, Grislis, 'Hermeneutical,' 178–182; Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?* 152–153.

final say in the interpretation of scripture becomes an issue of who is authorized to speak for the community of Christians in England. For Hooker, the question of who is authorized to speak on behalf of a community is equivalent to the question of who is authorized to legislate for a community inasmuch as the consent of those over whom it has authority is a crucial component of a valid human law.[81] What is at stake in Hooker's defence of the authority of the crown to legislate for the church in VIII.6 is thus not only obedience to church laws regulating *adiaphora*, but also resolution to the hermeneutical issue of how orthodoxy and orthopraxis are to be defined and what is to be considered *adiaphora*.

Central to the argument of VIII.6 is the claim that because the crown in parliament with the convocation speaks for the entire community of Christians in England it is authorized to promulgate binding church laws. Early in the discussion Hooker outlines his basic principle. Just as

> the naturall subject of power to make lawes civill is the *Commonwealth*: so we affirme that in like congruitie the true originall subject of power also to make church lawes is the whole intire body of that church for which they are made.... [N]ature it self doth abundantly authorize the *Church* to make lawes and orders for her Children that are within her. For every whole thing being naturally of greater power then is any part thereof that which a whole *Church* will appointe may be with reason exacted indifferently of any within the compasse of the same *Church* and so binde all unto strict obedience.[82]

With the arguments of VIII.1–3 in the background, Hooker restates his principle that 'It is undoubtedly a thing even naturall that all free and independent societies should them selves make their own lawes, and that this power should belong to the whole not to any certaine part of a politique body.'[83] In practice such power is exercised by the crown in parliament with the convocation speaking on behalf of the entire community. 'The *Parlament* of *England* together with the *Convocation* annexed thereunto is that wherupon the very essence of all goverment within this kingdome doth depend. It is even the bodie of the whole Realme, it consiseth of the *King* and of all that within the *Land* are

[81] See above (note 27).
[82] *Lawes* VIII.6.1; 3:386.2–17.
[83] *Lawes* VIII.6.5; 3:390.20–23. See also VIII.6.3; 3:387.10–14 and VIII.6.7; 3:393.12–394.5.

subject unto him for they all are there present either in person, or by such as they voluntarily have derived their very personall right unto.'[84] 'So that our lawes made concerning religion do take originallie their essence from the power of the whole *Realme* and *Church* of England then which nothing can be more consonant unto the lawe of nature and the will of our *Lord Jesus Christ*.'[85]

The importance of the consent of the entire community is also reflected in Hooker's argument that it is necessary for the laity to have a hand in the making of church laws lest clergy abuse this power to dominate the laity.

> [F]orasmuch as every estate doth desier to enlarge the boundes of their own liberties, is it not easie to see how injurious this [authorization of the clergy alone to legislate for the church] might prove unto men of other condition? Peace and justice are mayntained by preserving unto every order their rightes and by keeping all estates as it were in an even ballance. Which thing is no way better done then if the *King* their common parent whose care is presumed to extend most indifferently over all, doe bare the chiefest sway in the making of lawes which all must be ordered by.[86]

Certainly their training justifies a special role for the clergy in the formulation of church laws; 'Howbeit when all which the wisedome of all sortes can doe is done for devising of lawes in the *Church* it is the generall consent of all that giveth them the forme and vigor of lawes without which they could be no more unto us then the *Counseles* of *Physitions* to the sick.'[87] Lacking recognition by the entire church, clerical advice remains within the realm of private judgment that cannot *per se* bind coercively or in conscience. The authority of the entire church, not merely the clergy, to establish church laws is even recognized in practice by Roman Catholics,[88] and is not contrary to any injunction

[84] *Lawes* VIII.6.11; 3:401.22–28.
[85] *Lawes* VIII.6.11; 3:405.21–25.
[86] *Lawes* VIII.6.7; 3:394.8–16.
[87] *Lawes* VIII.6.11; 3:403.13–22. See VIII.6.12; 3:406.9–407.4.
[88] 'Did not,' Hooker asks, Philip of Spain allow Trent to be published in the low countries only with 'an expresse clause of speciall provision that the same should in no wise prejudice hurt or diminish any kinde of priviledg which the *King* or his Vassalls aforetime had enjoyed, either touching possessorie judgmentes of Ecclesiastical livinges or concerning nominations thereunto or belonging to whatsoever rightes they had else in such affayres?' A king who can bar any could bar every canon of the council from taking effect within his territories. Consequently, 'Who so alloweth the sayd act of the *Catholick King* for good and lawfull must graunt that the *Canons* even of generall *Councells*

of scripture.[89] On the contrary, Hooker cites scriptural texts including Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 to confirm that ecclesiastical laws formulated by authorities speaking on behalf of the entire church bind in conscience as well as coercively; 'lawes thus made God himself doth in such sort authorize that to despise them is to despise in them him.'[90]

Thus we see a further advantage of Hooker's constitutionalism from the perspective of anti-presbyterian polemic. Because ecclesiastical laws formulated by the crown in parliament with convocation represent the collective wisdom of the entire church, they embody the consensus of the church that Hooker identifies as the standard to which English Christians should turn to judge the rationality of a biblical interpretation. Consequently, 'That which the Church by her ecclesiasticall authoritie shall probablie thinke and define to be true or good, must in congruitie of reason overrule all other inferior judgmentes whatsoever.'[91] In light of this understanding of the role of the church authorities in the determination of truth, Hooker's claim cited above that subjects are bound to obey church laws even in defiance of their own consciences must be qualified by the explanation he appends to this teaching. '*Neither wish wee*,' he assures readers, '*that men should do any thing which in their hearts they are perswaded they ought not to doe, but this perswasion ought (we say) to be fully setled in their hearts*.'[92] Valid opposition to church laws cannot be based on '*meere probabilities only*' but rather must rest on '*reasons demonstrative*,' and

have but the force of wise mens opinions concerning that wherof they treate till they be publickly assented unto where they are to take place as lawes and that in giving such publique assent as maketh a *Christian* Kingdom subject unto those lawes the *Kings* authoritie is the chiefest.' *Lawes* VIII.6.8; 3:394.27–395.18. Roman Catholics were also willing to recognize the authority of the crown and parliament over the English church when that authority was used to return England to the papal fold during Mary's reign. VIII.6.11; 3:402.2–403.10.

[89] Hooker answers the objection that 'a part of the veritie of *Christian* religion is to hold the power of making Ecclesiasticall lawes a thing appropriated unto the Clergie in their *Synods*' by arguing that the Council of Jerusalem, the basis of claims that scripture authorizes clerical councils to legislate for the church, does not prove the authority of later clerical councils; its authority was superior to that of other councils because it was uniquely guided by the Holy Spirit. *Lawes* VIII.6.6–7; 3:391.12–393.11.

[90] *Lawes* VIII.6.9; 3:395.26–28. See VIII.6.9; 3:395.26–401.2.

[91] *Lawes* V.8.2; 2:39.11–14. Immediately preceding this passage Hooker notes that the teachings of the church are subordinate to 'what scripture doth plainelie deliver,' (2:39.8) but this hardly compromises church authority because what is at issue is how biblical passages on which the community does not agree should be interpreted. Such passages, as the controversy surrounding them shows, do not deliver their message 'plainly.'

[92] *Lawes* Pref.6.3; 1:31.22–25.

'*An argument necessary and demonstrative is such, as being proposed unto any man and understood, the mind cannot choose but inwardly assent.*'[93] Surely such an incontrovertible argument would convince the church, and thus unless an individual can produce arguments 'grounded uppon such manifest and cleare proofe, that they in whose handes it is to alter [church laws] may likewise infallibly even in hart and conscience judge [that the laws require amendment]; upon necessitie to urge alteration [of church laws] is to trouble and disturbe without necessitie.'[94] Puritan dissent is thus invalid because it is unreasonable to be fully convinced of the truth of any belief not supported by evidence strong enough to persuade the church authorities. Even if one happens to be correct on a particular point and the authorities wrong, subjectively one's conviction cannot be strong enough to warrant disobedience with such a heavy piece of counterevidence in the balance. Hooker admonishes his puritan readers that when they are unable to win over the church, speaking through its chosen representatives, to their position, '*your perswasion in this case ye are all bound for the time to suspend, and in otherwise doing, ye offend against God by troubling his Church without any just or necessary cause.*'[95]

Consideration of Hooker's hermeneutics, in conjunction with his argument in VIII.6 for the authority of the crown in parliament with the convocation to speak on behalf of and thus to legislate for the church, shows that there is a decisive difference between his claim that the decrees of Trent are, in Fox's words, 'unscriptural, unhistorical, and . . . utterly wrong,'[96] and similar accusations being made against the laws of the English church by presbyterians. The decrees of Trent, assented to by the clerical estate alone, are merely advisory and no one is bound in conscience to obey them; indeed if one sincerely thinks them erroneous, one is bound to disobey them. The laws of the English church, however, being formulated by the church as a whole enjoy the status of fully effective laws and thus are binding in conscience as scripture makes clear. The reason scripture authorizes laws formulated

[93] *Lawes* Pref.6.6; 1:33.16–20. In contrast to such demonstrative arguments, 'the error and unsufficiencie of [presbyterian] argumentes doth make . . . against them a stronge presumption, that God hath not moved theire hartes to thinke such thinges, as he hath not inabled them to prove.' *Lawes* V.10.1; 2:47.5–9.

[94] *Lawes* IV.14.2; 1:338.10–15. Hooker also acknowledges that miraculous signs would be compelling evidence that puritan efforts to change church laws enjoy divine sanction, but he clearly does not expect these to be forthcoming.

[95] *Lawes* Pref.6.6; 1:33.14–16.

[96] Fox, 'Incoherence of "Ecclesiastical Polity",' 56.

by the entire church is not far to seek in light of Hooker's teachings on how to recognize a reasonable interpretation of scripture. The decrees of Trent or any clerical coterie do not enjoy the highest level of evidence available that they are formulated in accord with reason; English ecclesiastical laws, having won the assent of not only a part, but of the entire church in England, enjoy the highest degree of evidence available of being reasonable interpretations of God's will. Furthermore, English Christians were not represented at the Council of Trent, and Trent like any other representative body can only promulgate legislation that is binding on people on whose behalf it can consent. The issue is again not only one of authority but also of evidence of rationality. English Christians who fear that the laws ordering their church are in error can call for those laws to be reviewed by the authorities; if the authorities refuse to act on calls for reform dissenters can rest assured that their interpretations of scripture are not compelling. Because, however, they did not participate in Trent, English Christians cannot have the same level of confidence regarding the rectitude of its pronouncements. Measured by Hooker's principles, laws approved by the entire English church bear the highest degree of evidence available to English Christians of being in accord with a reasonable interpretation of scripture, evidence that trumps even personal conviction and certainly trumps advice offered by the clergy of other churches.

This conception of the definition of doctrine does, however, fail to safeguard the unity of faith of the universal church. If the church authorities in England are authorized to define Christian truth for English Christians then the authorities in other churches are similarly authorized to promulgate potentially different but equally authoritative understandings of Christianity. This concern is voiced by Hooker himself; in VIII.3 he notes as an objection to the Royal Supremacy that 'it would be a cause of great dissimilitude in the exercise of *Christian* religion if every king should be over the affayres of the *Church* where he raigneth supreme ruler.'[97] Acknowledging that 'Dissimilitude in great thinges is such a thing which draweth great inconvenience after it, a thing which *Christian* religion must alwayes carefully prevent,' Hooker nevertheless asserts that variety among the churches is unavoidable in present circumstances without causing graver harm to the truth of the gospel.

[97] *Lawes* VIII.3.5; 3:355.7–9.

> And the way to prevent [dissimilitude] is not as some doe imagin the yeelding up of supreme power over all *Churches* into one only Pastors handes, but the framing of their goverment especially for matter of substance every where according to the rule of one only law to stand in no lesse force then the law of nations doth to be received in all kingdomes. . . . This shall cause uniformitie even under severall dominions without those wofull inconveniences wherunto the state of *Christendome* was subject heretofore through the tyrannie and oppression of that one universall Nimrod [the pope] who alone did all.[98]

The alternative preferable to both variety among churches and papal lordship, universal observance of laws established by a valid general council, is not available to sixteenth-century Christians because, Hooker argues, councils are abused by 'pride ambition and tyrannie . . . unto the furtherance of wicked purposes.'[99] Until such time as a true council is held, all Hooker can advise is that each church follow what it perceives to be God's will, 'and commend the just defence therof unto God, even as *Judah* did when it differed in the exercise of religion from that forme which *Israel* followed.'[100]

From the perspective of Fox's criticism, it might seem that such variety undermines unity and charity among Christians, the importance of which plays a central role in Hooker's argument that puritans must obey English church laws. Hooker, however, distinguishes between national and international Christian unity. Although each individual visible church requires a unity based on uniformity, unity among different visible churches can be maintained by agreement regarding essentials and in matters indifferent mutual charity and acceptance.[101] Furthermore, because a valid general council is unrealistic, universal uniformity in matters of belief and practice is not an attainable goal without sacrificing the method of legislating for the church sanctioned by God and having the greatest probability of formulating church laws that do not contradict God's will. Within the Church of England, however, uniformity can be attained by observing laws formulated according to the method that provides the highest level of assurance available that church laws truly are in accord with God's will. When measured by Hooker's principles, an English Christian's refusal to

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[98] *Lawes* VIII.3.5; 3:355.12–23.

[99] *Lawes* I.10.14; 1:109.17–23. See W. B. Patterson, 'Hooker on Ecumenical Relations: Conciliarism in the English Reformation,' in *RHC*, ed. McGrade, 283–303.

[100] *Lawes* VIII.3.5; 3:355.24–31.

[101] *Lawes* IV.13.2–3; 1:328.18–329.27.

recognize the validity of the decrees of Trent is neither unreasonable nor fatal to the church; presbyterian defiance of the laws governing the English church, however, is both unreasonable and potentially fatal to the English church.

Additional Royal Ecclesiastical Prerogatives

In addition to the authority to take a leading role in the formulation of ecclesiastical laws, Hooker also defends the authority of the prince to convene ecclesiastical assemblies, appoint bishops, and oversee church courts. The royal prerogative to convene clerical assemblies is based on the Queen's authority as head of the English church. Because 'the affayres of the *Church* and *Christian* religion are [in Christian nations] publick affayres, for the ordering wherof more solemne assemblies sometimes are of as great importance and use as they are for secular affayres it seemeth no lesse an act of supreme authoritie to call the one then the other.'[102]

Authority to appoint bishops Hooker claims for the prince on the basis of the prince's temporal rights as well as ecclesiastical dominion. He rejects the argument that the prince can appoint bishops because she is not 'altogether of the laitie but [partakes of] that sanctified power which God hath indued his Clergie with.' This is 'A shift vayn and needlesse' because 'we cannot say *Kings* doe make, but that they only doe place *Bishops*.'[103] The spiritual power that distinguishes a bishop from other clerics 'every *Bishop* hath by consecration,' and 'none but *Bishops* doe consecrate.' 'With consecration the *King* intermedleth not further then only by his letters to present such an elect *Bishop* as shalbe consecrated.'[104]

What the prince adds in appointing bishops are, first, the temporal assets of a particular bishopric, 'the place of his seate or throne together with the profittes preheminences [and] honours thereunto belonging.'[105] The royal prerogative 'of advancing alone unto such dignities what persons they judg most fitt for the same' is only natural inasmuch as the possessions of episcopal sees were first established by princes and

[102] *Lawes* VIII.5.1; 3:381.23–382.2.
[103] *Lawes* VIII.7.1; 3:413.11–16.
[104] *Lawes* VIII.7.1–2; 3:413.16–27.
[105] *Lawes* VIII.7.1; 3:413.16–23.

also in light of the fact that it is the prince's prerogative to 'make *Lords* temporall,' 'so the like preheminence of bestowing where pleaseth him the honour of spirituall nobilitie also cannot seeme hard, Bishops being Peers of the realme.'[106] The other aspect of episcopal office endowed on a bishop by the prince is 'the speciall portion of the Clergie and people over whom he is to exercise that Bishoplie power.'[107] This has been bestowed in various ways throughout the history of the church, including election by the people (although not without causing 'tumultes tragedies and schismes' from which royal appointment spares the English church).[108] Bestowal of such power is, however, most appropriately a royal prerogative inasmuch as bishops 'can execute safely no act of *Episcopall* authoritie on any one of the *Kings* liege people, otherwise then under him who hath soveraigntie over them all.'[109] Consequently it is fitting that in England those who hold the right to elect bishops elect only persons selected by the prince. In fact 'Their election is now but a matter of forme. It is the *Kings* meer graunt which placeth and the *Bishops* consecration which maketh *Bishops*.'[110]

The final particular royal ecclesiastical power that Hooker defends is 'the *Kings* supereminent authoritie in commanding and in the judging of causes *Ecclesiastical*.'[111] Crucial to this defence is a clarification of what power is being claimed for the prince. It is certainly not meant to claim that princes can personally prescribe how the word of God should be taught and the sacraments administered, nor that they can personally judge matters of the faith, nor excommunicate.[112] Personal fitness to judge 'cannot of *Kings* and *Princes* ordinarily be presumed in causes meerly Ecclesiasticall,'[113] but this lack of expertise 'can be no bar to that force and efficacie which their soveraign power hath over those very [ecclesiastical] *Consistories* and for which we hold without any exception that all *Courts* are the *Kings*.'[114] Rather than claiming for the prince the power to personally judge matters of the faith, ecclesiastical jurisdiction entails ensuring that the ecclesiastical laws of the realm

[106] *Lawes* VIII.7.3; 3:414.24–415.9.
[107] *Lawes* VIII.7.1; 3:413.18–20.
[108] *Lawes* VIII.7.2; 3:414.1–23, VIII.7.5–7; 3:418.1–419.22.
[109] *Lawes* VIII.7.7; 3:420.30–421.22.
[110] *Lawes* VIII.7.3; 3:415.10–27.
[111] *Lawes* VIII.8.1; 3:421.24–25.
[112] *Lawes* VIII.8.1; 3:421.25–422.11.
[113] *Lawes* VIII.8.7; 3:430.13–16.
[114] *Lawes* VIII.8.7; 3:430.7–12.

are enforced. As with other aspects of royal ecclesiastical authority, the prince's judiciary primacy ultimately rests on authorization by the community; the power to enforce and when necessary ensure the correction of judgments given in ecclesiastical courts 'was . . . by publique consent annexed unto the *Kings* royall seate and crowne.'[115]

Book VIII concludes with an abortive consideration of royal '*exemption from judiciall kinds of punishment by the clergie*.'[116] Introducing this topic Hooker states that he intends to consider both sides of the issue but not to offer a final verdict. 'The question it self we will not determine. The reasons of each opinion being opened it shalbe best for the wise to judg which of them is likeliest to be true. Our purpose being not to oppugne any save only that which *Reformers* hold and of the rest rather to enquire then to give sentence.'[117] The text and Hooker's notes suggest that his stated intention to review arguments on both sides was sincere,[118] but the chapter as we have it includes only one formal argument favouring royal exemption from ecclesiastical jurisdiction and one practical concern inclining against it. In support of 'most men's' belief that kings ought not to be above all human judgment, Hooker asks rhetorically 'In the mightie upon earth . . . what may we looke for considering the frailtie of man's nature if the world doe once hold it for a *Maxime* that *Kings* ought to live in no subjection that how greivous disorders soever they fall into, none may have coercive power over them?'[119] Nevertheless 'a number of right well learned men are perswaded' that the king ought to be under no coercive authority in this life.[120] The argument he presents 'leading men to think the highest Magistrate should not be judged of any saving God alone' is that just as physical motion requires an unmoved mover as source, so the administration of justice requires an unjudged judge 'because otherwise the course of justice should goe infinitely in a Circle, every Superiour having his Superiour without end, which cannot be; therefore a welspring it followeth there is and a supreme head of justice whereunto all are subject, but it self in subjection to none.'[121]

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[115] *Lawes* VIII.8.4; 3:424.28–29.
[116] *Lawes* VIII.9.title; 3:436.1–2.
[117] *Lawes* VIII.9.2; 3:436.28–437.5.
[118] McGrade, 'The Three Last books and Hooker's Autograph Notes,' *FLE* 6(1): 245–246.
[119] *Lawes* VIII.9.1; 3:436.6; 3:436.21–26.
[120] *Lawes* VIII.9.1; 3:436.26–28.
[121] *Lawes* VIII.9.2; 3:437.6–19.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of historical examples cited by presbyterians (and Roman Catholics) to prove royal subjection to ecclesiastical censures, particularly Ambrose excluding Theodosius from the sacrament. Hooker argues that such examples do not prove that princes ought ordinarily to be subject to church courts. First he notes that the very presentations of the stories of imperial excommunication give the impression that

> the rare and unwonted crimes of those two Emperours did cause their *Bishops* to trie, what unusuall remedie would worke in so desperate diseases[.] Which opinion is also made more probable in as much as the verie histories which have recorded them propose them for strange and admirable paternes, the *Bishops* of boldnes, the Emperours of meeknes and humilitie.… What greater argument that all which was heerin done proceeded from extraordinarie zeale on both sides, and not from a settled judiciall authoritie, which the one was knowne to have over the other by a common received order in the *Church*.[122]

Hooker also points out that the administrations of the excommunications were judicially improper on a number of points, which 'manner of proceeding doth as yet more plainly evict that these examples make lesse than nothing for proof, that *Ecclesiasticall Governours* had at that time judiciall authoritie to excommunicate *Emperours* and *Kings*.'[123]

Thus Hooker concludes that the historical examples typically cited provide no real evidence 'to prove that *Ecclesiasticall* Judges should have authoritie to call their own Soveraigne to appeare before them into their *Consistories* there to examine, to judge, and by excommunication to punish them if so be they be found culpable.'[124] When, however, excommunication is considered as 'a duetifull religious and holy refusall [on the part of clergy] to admitt Notorious transgressors in so extreme degree unto the blessed communion of Sainctes especially the mysteries of the bodie and bloud of Christ till their humbled penitent mindes be made manifest, this we graunt every king bound to abide at the handes of any Minister of God.'[125] As noted above, this form of excommunication does not infringe upon the right of the magistrate—because as yet a member of the visible church—to exercise ecclesiastical supremacy. Regarding all other forms of royal subjection to ecclesiastical censures,

[122] *Lawes* VIII.9.5; 3:443.20–31.
[123] *Lawes* VIII.9.5; 3:443.33–444.21.
[124] *Lawes* VIII.9.6; 3:444.24–27.
[125] *Lawes* VIII.9.6; 3:444.28–33.

Hooker's final word as it is passed on to us is that 'till better reason be brought to prove that *Kings* cannot lawfully be exempted from subjection unto Ecclesiasticall Courtes we must and doe affirme their sayd exemption lawfull.'[126]

Conclusion

In the Eighth Book Hooker outlines a theory of royal ecclesiastical dominion founded on principles laid out in the earlier books. Taking these previously-articulated principles as bases, he presents arguments that clarify and justify royal dominion over the church, answer puritans' theological objections against royal ecclesiastical headship, underwrite prerogatives claimed for the crown as head of the church, and provide support for his claim that the ecclesiastical laws of the realm supply an authority on which scrupulous consciences can safely rely as the standard of orthodoxy and orthopraxis. Even in the unpolished form in which it is preserved, Book VIII is a fitting capstone of Hooker's vision of the English church. It is the culmination of his call to English Christians to obey the laws of their church, a church that is 'theirs' in many senses but especially in the sense that they themselves collectively as a community of Christians have determined its polity and formulated its laws. This being the case, Hooker presents recognition of their church leaders and obedience to the laws of their church as the most reasonable and godly course for English Christians.

[126] *Lawes* VIII.9.6; 3:445.15–18.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

PRACTICAL DIVINITY

John K. Stafford

In this introductory section, we will consider some general features of Hooker's theology that bear upon the question of his attitude to 'practical divinity' before examining more closely *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*.[1] Use of this term implies Hooker entertained an anthropology that informed both the practical consequences of his theology and his view of the human condition through which theology must be done. Hooker approached such matters tangentially where the Puritans more clearly demarcated the boundaries that defined the 'godly.' Hooker's view of man[2] is naturally worked out in relation to the reformation concerns of sin, assurance, and salvation.[3] Studies in Richard Hooker frequently emphasize his defence of Prayer Book theology, the Elizabethan Settlement, and the debates with Walter Travers and Thomas Cartwright. Many such studies have evaluated Hooker's contributions to sacramental theology, biblical hermeneutics, ecclesiology, and political thought because of the role they play in the *Lawes*. Recent assessments of Hooker have suggested that despite his opposition to aspects of Puritan thought, he nonetheless stood in observable continuity with later Puritans such as William Ames (1576–1633), Richard Baxter (1615–1691), and John Owen (1616–1683), with respect to the high view each held of the role and authority of Scripture, the means of

[1] Richard Hooker, *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride*,' in *Tractates and Sermons*, vol. 5 of *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, ed. Egil Grislis and Laetitia Yeandle, gen. ed. W. Speed Hill (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), 309–61.

[2] See, for example, Egil Grislis, 'Richard Hooker's Image of Man,' in *Renaissance Papers*, ed. S. K. Heninger Jr., The South Eastern Renaissance Conference (1964): 73–84.

[3] Egil Grislis, 'The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker,' *Anglican Theological Review* 84.4 (Fall 2002): 881–96; 'The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker,' in *Richard Hooker and the Construction of the Christian Community*, ed. Arthur S. McGrade, Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies no. 165 (Tempe, AZ: SUNY, 1997), 237–49.

grace in the sacraments, and the relationship between reason and the Holy Spirit.[4] Although Hooker debated Travers and Cartwright in these matters, usually with exhaustive and close reasoning, it should not be inferred that these men were unconcerned over the present tangible needs and troubles of parishioners. Although Hooker's level of debate and controversy assumed a very high degree of literacy and learning, much of the dialogue reflects the practical concerns of common life. In this regard, Hooker's thought has received attention through Philip Secor's modern edition of *Book V* of the *Lawes*.[5] Hooker's extant sermons from the *Tractates and Sermons* suggest he had a broad range of interest. Thus, a rounded appreciation of Hooker necessitates consideration of his writings outside rhe *Lawes*. Egil Grislis[6] has pointed to Hooker's spirituality and its practical manifestation for Christian faith and life. John Stafford[7] has drawn attention to the funeral sermon delivered by Hooker at the burial of an unidentified female acquaintance, and observed the strong note of pastoral empathy Hooker integrates with his characteristic scholarly tone. Stephen Sykes[8] has also attempted to correlate Hooker and the ordination of women. There is a growing awareness that Hooker understood theology to be a work of *practical* rationality—that Christians might not grasp the full implication of their faith intellectually was not, for him, contrary to the concepts of saving faith and the assurance of salvation. In this respect, Hooker shares the same concern as his Puritan counterparts for a reformation that would bear the fruits of fraternal love and the bonds of affection. Despite his collection of Puritan errors in the *Preface*, Hooker specifically disavowed any love for rancour or hostility much preferring reconciliation. For example, Hooker wrote,

> *Far more comfort it were for us . . . to labour under the same yoke, as men that looke for the same eternall reward of their labours, to be joyned with you in bands of indis-*

[4] John K. Stafford, 'Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit' (PhD diss., University of Manitoba, 2005).

[5] Philip B. Secor, *Richard Hooker on Anglican Faith and Worship: A Modern Edition of Book V of the Laws of Ecclesistical Polity* (London: SPCK, 2003).

[6] Egil Grislis, 'The Anglican Spirituality of Richard Hooker,' *Toronto Journal of Theology* 12.1 (1996): 35–45.

[7] John K. Stafford, 'Sorrow and Solace: Richard Hooker's Remedy for Grief,' in *Volume 2: Richard Hooker and the English Reformation*, ed. W. J. Torrance Kirby, Studies in Early Modern Religious Reforms (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 131–47.

[8] Stephen W. Sykes, 'Richard Hooker and the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood,' *Sewanee Theological Review* 36 (Easter 1993): 200–14.

> *soluble love and amitie, to live as if our persons being manie our soules were but one, rather then in such dismembered sort to spend our few and wretched dayes in a tedious prosecuting of wearisome contentions:…But our trust in the almightie is,…when passions of former enmitie being allaied, we shal with ten times redoubled tokens of our unfainedlie reconciled love, shewe our selves each towards other the same which Joseph and the brethren of Joseph were at the time of their enterview in Aegypt.*[9]

Again, Hooker declares in his *Answer* to the *Supplication* that he is neither by nature nor training suited to controversy: 'I take no joye in stryvinge I have not byn nousled or trayned up in it.'[10] Yet this was an age of preaching and the publication of sermons ranged from the overtly political to calls for national and individual repentance, to the urgent desire for the personal assurance of salvation, to the implications of faith for personal piety, and open attacks on adversaries. With respect to the *Sermons* a notable feature is their close integration of theological scholarship with what Hooker perceives to be the griefs and joys that trouble and delight the human spirit. His was a reformation that attended to such matters because he considered the robust ministrations of the church to be fulfilled when it undertook 'the motherlie care of our soules.'[11] As such, Hooker can be found in debate with the Puritans over just such concerns, asserting that the Puritan concept of *pastoralia* was harsh and unyielding, tending towards fear and anxiety rather than thanksgiving for the grace and mercy of God. Similarly, Hooker took a view of human nature which was generous towards its weakness while taking account of the seriousness of sin. Humans were caught in the confusion of the 'foggie damp of original corruption'[12] from which they could not extricate themselves without divine help. As Paul Forte notes, Hooker's strength as a preacher was 'sustained by a subtle mastery of classical rhetoric, especially the figures of thought and diction. Together they work powerfully to uncover the hidden causes of spiritual despair and to instil hope in the promise of salvation.'[13] There is a recognition here of the consistent problem of establishing

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[9] Richard Hooker, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie: Preface, Books I to IV*, vol. 1 of *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, ed. Georges Edelen, gen. ed. W. Speed Hill (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977) Pref.9.3; 1:52.11–17 and Pref.9.4; 1:53.5–11.

[10] Richard Hooker, *Master Hookers Answere to the Supplication that Master Travers made to the Counsell*, in *Tractates and Sermons*, 26; *FLE* 5:256.19ff.

[11] *Lawes* V.64.5; 2:299.18ff.

[12] Richard Hooker, *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*, in *Tractates and Sermons*, *FLE* 5:71.17.

[13] Paul E. Forte, 'Richard Hooker as Preacher,' in *FLE* 5:657.

the assurance of salvation in an age when justifying faith had been rediscovered but was still thought to reside primarily in the correct expression of piety and churchmanship. So despite the final achievements of Christ in the atonement, and the mystical union between Christ and the church, the believer must still contend, from time to time, with inner conflict and uncertainty over the extent and assurance of that salvation. The "godly" took lack of assurance to imply doubt over the reality of a person's salvation, thus compounding the sense of anxiety. Hooker recognized this aspect of practical belief. He understood human variability and weakness, and chose to name it in terms of the natural order of creation as it now exists, therefore creating an extended opportunity to understand the forbearance and grace of God, and the charitable and loving ministrations of the strong towards the weak, something he accused his Puritan counterparts of neglecting. It is therefore important to read Hooker's sermons in the context of the *Lawes* themselves to get a sense of his overall attitude towards those to whom the church ministered, since they were the body of Christ. The next section considers the *Lawes* with a view to constructing a framework for appreciating Hooker's practical divinity.

Hooker's Pastoral Attitude in the *Lawes*

Before turning to the sermon which is the subject of this chapter, we need to review some key remarks that disclose the motivation for Hooker's pastoral outlook. The *Lawes*, of course, provide the main source for this but the *Sermons*, A *Christian Letter*, the *Dublin Fragments*, and Hooker's *Reply* to Travers' *Supplication* provide closer personal insight.

Hooker was a scholar by disposition and training. He was Reader (assistant professor) of Hebrew at Oxford and a fellow of Corpus Christi College.[14] Although a late choice for the Temple Church in London, his appointment by the Queen at the instigation of his patron John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, afforded the congregation opportunity to hear his highly structured and theologically thorough sermons. Paul Forte cites Thomas Fuller's account (1655)[15] of Hooker's preaching style as 'long and pithy' whose content 'had nothing but itself to garnish it.'

[14] See Lee Gibbs's account of Hooker's 'Life' above, chapter 1.

[15] Thomas Fuller, *The Church-History of Britain* (London: John Williams, 1655), 9.7.53, p. 216 cited in Forte, 'Richard Hooker as Preacher,' *FLE* 5:658.

Fuller depicts Hooker's sermons as prone to being 'unjustly censured, for perplext, tedious and obscure' by those without 'proportionable capacity.' So although on the one hand, Hooker's reputation as a rationalist and intellectual was well-deserved, it was by no means his only characteristic. Forte notes that Hooker's 'style of discourse was the expression of deeply held convictions concerning the nature of truth, the human condition, and political society.'[16]

One aspect of Hooker that is often overlooked in the literature is his interest in the practical consequences of theology for pastoral ministry. Indeed, the *Lawes* themselves provide numerous clues that Hooker did not write simply to produce polemical conversation with the Puritans. He understood that the outcome of such conversations would have serious and important results for the faith and life of those who were unable to grasp the formal intellectual parameters of such discussion. In saying this, I suggest that Hooker's rationalism must not be confused with a kind of arid, intellectualism. There is a part of Hooker's personality, so far as it can be discerned, which appears to be very empathetically disposed towards the actual trials and uncertainties of life which all people must face. Nor must his insistence on pursuing the logical outcome and implications of theological debate be seen as incompatible with a robust *pastoralia* (to distinguish it from therapeutic models of pastoral ministry common in the present day), or approaches to ministry that lack theological or biblical rigor. For Hooker himself, 'we…have no word of God but the Scripture'[17] by which the Holy Spirit might lead and guide a person into the ways of God, together with the sacraments wherein the life of the Christian is sustained through the peculiar 'participation' of the believer with Christ—in Hooker's words, our 'mysticall copulation.'[18] Hooker was not simply trying to defend a church for maximum compatibility with Elizabeth's design for reform. He was also imaginatively construing a Christian community that was larger than that conceived by the 'godly,' wherein scholar and simpleton could each find a home, and receive food for both mind and spirit in the journey to union with Christ. A number of examples illustrate this larger picture.

[16] Forte, 'Richard Hooker as Preacher,' 660.
[17] *Lawes* V.21.2; 2:84.17ff.
[18] *Lawes* V.56.10; 2:242.30 and V.54.5; 2:223.29.

In the case of infant baptism, Hooker characterized the Puritan position as being even more unyielding than the Anabaptist. For Thomas Cartwright, baptism was the public declaration of a faith decisively appropriated: 'He which is not a Christian before he came to receive baptisme cannot be made a Christian by baptisme which is only the seal of the grace of God before received.'[19] Cartwright thought Hooker was advancing an instrumental view of the sacraments, while Hooker charged Cartwright with cruelty. Even if unbaptized infants should be damned, Hooker argued, Cartwright would still urge strict adherence to the view that baptism should never take place in private, in order to obey the divine intent of the sacrament as a public rite.[20] Naturally, Cartwright rejected such an assertion. Still, the point was made. Hooker insisted that pastoral necessity (or tradition) took precedence where Scripture was silent on any given matter. For example, though Hooker did not think emergency baptism to be a true emergency, he was prepared to set aside a rational response for the sake of the supplicant's distress. The question of private baptism in such a case was secondary and Hooker responded with intense rhetorical flourish:

> …you that would spurne thus at such as in case of so dreadfull extremitie should lye prostrate before your feete, you that would turne away your face from them at the hower of theire most neede, you that would damne up your eares and harden your harte as iron against the unresistable cryes of supplicantes callinge upon you for mercy with termes of such invocation as that most dreadful perplexitie might minister if God by miracle did open the mouthes of infantes to expresse theire supposed necessitie, should first imagin your selfe in theire case and in your mouthe, and your answere out of theires.[21]

That the administration of the sacraments must forever serve the ends for which they were intended, Hooker says '… that the Church which is by office a mother unto such as crave at her handes the sacred mysterie of theire nue birth should repell them and see them dye unsatisfied of these theire ghostlie desires, rather then give them theire soules rites with omission of those thinges that serve but onlie for the more convenient and orderlie administration thereof.'[22] Hooker's pastoral motivation was never dominated by questions of propriety. He declared that 'in cases

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[19] *Lawes* V.60.3; 2:256.24.
[20] This included baptism by midwives in cases of emergency.
[21] *Lawes* V.61.4; 2:267.1–10.
[22] *Lawes* V.60.7; 2:261.13–18.

of necessitie which will not suffer delay till baptisme be administred with usuall solemnities (to speak the least) it may be tollerably given without them, rather then any man without it should be suffered to departe this life.'[23] With similar reasoning, Hooker accepts that ordinarily women may not baptize though he can envisage circumstances of necessity where they may.[24] For Hooker, the obligation of Christians to be charitable outweighs the precision of administration since 'exact obedience [nourishes] crueltie and hardnes of harte.'[25]

A second brief example relates to Hooker's defence of English burial practices.[26] The Puritan critique as Hooker saw it argued that there was no prescriptive biblical precedent for a burial office, mourning apparel, or eulogy. Mourning itself was construed to be unfitting for Christian faith. The exasperation Hooker felt at such objections was rooted in a compassionate understanding of the course of human life and the difficulties faced by those who grieved, as well as a conviction of the power of Christian community in burial as 'an outward testification of the hope which wee have touchinge the resurrection of the dead.'[27] Funerals were for the living, according to Hooker, as an opportunity once again to learn of the mercies of God, strengthen faith and further learn how to live and die well.[28] Such is the practical and pastoral turn of Hooker's mind on this matter, that he even finds it necessary to defend the value of feeding the mourners at the conclusion of a burial! 'For the comfort of them whose mindes are through naturall affection pensive in such cases no man can justlie mislike the custome which the Jewes had to ende theire burials with funeral banquets. . . .'[29]

As already mentioned, the extant funeral sermon delivered by Hooker, probably within the last five years of his life, attracts the reader both by its intellectual and theological vigour, and its sensitivity to the actual anxieties and fears occasioned by death and bereavement. The sermon is notable for its extensive use of Scripture, suggesting a congregation learned in the Bible, as well as for Hooker's creative blending of Scripture texts with his own sermonic narrative. Certainly, Hooker expresses a view of womanhood consistent with the period, but the outline and

[23] *Lawes* V.58.4; 2:251.1–4.
[24] *Lawes* V.62.1; 2:268.18ff.
[25] *Lawes* V.61.5; 2:268.14ff.
[26] *Lawes* V.75.1; 2:409.11ff.
[27] *Lawes* V.75.4; 2:412.2ff.
[28] *Lawes* V.75.3; 2:411.4–19.
[29] *Lawes* V.75.3; 2:411.19–22.

structure of the sermon betrays no mere exercise in theological erudition. Rather he discloses a deep and moving attention to those times and occasions when the human spirit frets itself. Hooker thought Puritan piety actually contributed to a person's anxiety rather than afforded the consolations of the Gospel by creating a false dichotomy between faith and reason. And indeed, Hooker was keenly aware that the Puritans themselves, notwithstanding their 'godly' dispositions, were no less beset with the same cares and anxieties of other people. We return now to Hooker's sermon, *Of the Nature of Pride* viewed as an exercise in practical divinity.

Of the Nature of Pride: The Way of Nature and the Way of Grace

It has been suggested that this sermon, based on the Geneva text of Habakkuk 2:4, may properly belong to a series of sermons preached by Hooker at the Temple Church in 1586 on Hab 1:4 and 2:4, perhaps representing Hooker's response to Travers' public challenge to his teaching, and also his rebuttal to Travers' unwillingness to submit to ecclesiastical authority.[30] Although the date and provenance cannot be absolutely demonstrated, Hooker's sermonic conclusion by appeal to 'reasonable men' matches his opening statement concerning those who 'stubbornly resist authority' and suggests a polemical context that fits the Hooker-Travers controversy. The sermon consists of five sections, indicated numerically in the *Folger* text, which are thematically linked. The following outline summarises the main thematic sections:

1. Man's core nature is revealed in the character of pride, 'obliquity,' the corruption of reason, and that 'secret itching humour of vanitie wherewith men are generally touched.'[31] The 'inexplicable mercy'[32] of God toward the penitent. Nature and grace are contrasted in the flourishing of the wicked and the persecution of the saints.
2. The results of pride are to be seen in justice denied. Human justice requires the righteous to learn how to suffer with patience.
3. The justice of God is divine chastisement to the faithful but woe to the impenitent, and not to be construed in terms of predestination.

[30] 'Textual Introduction' to *A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride, FLE* 5:299.
[31] *Pride* 5:314.31ff.
[32] *Pride* 5:313.18.

4. The suffering of the righteous and prosperity of the wicked is not a violation of distributive justice. The tension results from a loss of theological perspective.
5. The justice of God does not lead to licence but assurance. Divine mercy is not incompatible with temporal discipline and punishment.

In brief then, *Pride* takes on the task of constructing a theodicy in the face of the human challenge to divine impartiality and justice, wherein the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer—a theme recognizable throughout the Psalms, Old Testament Wisdom literature, and many cognate ancient middle-Eastern pessimistic texts dealing with the apparent arbitrariness of life. Richard Hooker takes us on a journey that gives no encouragement to a sentimental view of the human condition, nor any recourse to easy or simplistic solutions, but rather a robust theological framework within which the believer can give due regard to the resources of Christian faith.

One of the notable features that *Pride* shares with the *Remedie* is its starting point in a discussion of the human situation and its inherent nature. Early in the *Remedie*, Hooker notes that 'Our nature coveteth preservation from things hurtfull. Hurtful things being present do breed heavines, being future do cause feare.'[33] The actual experience of people, without reference to faith or confession, is the entry point that establishes the universality of the problem under discussion and Hooker's own sympathy towards it. Even in the midst of a funeral sermon, Hooker's instinct is to probe the causes of the error that leads to unworthy grief. In this he uses the example of David's expression of grief over the prosperity of Godless men in Psalm 73:3 as unwarranted 'because this grief arises from errour. We erre when we grieve at wicked mens impunitie and prosperitie, because their estate being rightly discerned they neither prosper nor goe unpunished.'[34]

Thus rational explanation replaces an appeal to emotion and sets up the sort of theological equation, so common in the *Lawes*, that reason being the hand by which the Spirit leads believers[35] moves them to contemplate the grounds of faith rather than the possibility that God has betrayed them in their grief. The greater part of the *Remedie* is taken up with the effort to correct what Hooker takes to be the Puritan charge that fear in the believer marks a loss of faith that puts at risk

[33] Richard Hooker, *A Remedie Against Sorrow and Feare, FLE* 5:368.5ff.
[34] *Remedie* 5:369.8–10.
[35] *Lawes* Pref.3.10; 1:17.22.

one's confidence in God's election. Hooker writes: '…is not feare a thing naturall and for mens preservation necessarie, implanted in us by the provident and most gratious giver of all good things.… Feare then in it selfe being meere nature cannot in it selfe bee sinne, which sinne is not nature, but thereof an accessary deprivation.'[36] Hooker never patronizes his readers by over rationalizing grief, invalidating its effects, or even suggesting that fear never leads to sin. Rather, fear is a necessary and legitimate part of human experience and was experienced by Christ himself. The order of nature is compelling for Hooker because, although it lies in the arena of sin, it is also the domain of salvation through the incarnation, where even human reason can be transformed into right reason by God's grace. Thus while divine grace is necessary to redeem us from 'the foggie damp of originall corruption,'[37] redemption takes place within its bounds, and human society and thought continues in the belief that, 'nature hath need of grace…grace hath use of nature.'[38] One may remark on the courage and integrity of Hooker in such a funeral sermon for his willingness to confront theological error as a pastoral necessity. Hooker's attitude to wrong thinking can be clearly seen in *Pride* where he moves quickly to a discussion of 'the nature of man' and how he conceives it in its dynamic relationship to authority. In the *Remedie*, error is the source of human fear. In *Pride*, Hooker's diagnosis is the same: 'Pride is not cured but by abaiting the errour which causeth the mind to swell.'[39] Pride is cured on the same basis that 'Diseases that come of fulnes emptines must remove.'[40] Therefore, the deeper the disease, the more radical the cure because Hooker thought human pride to be the fundamental and intractable transgression to which a litany of human ills[41] could be traced. In his critique of the Puritans in the Preface to the *Lawes* Hooker traced the same prideful tendencies. It is with this irony in mind that he will later level the charge of pride against those Puritans who enumerated the errors of the 'ungodly.'

It is important to see that Hooker has not invented an ethical problem with which to embarrass his imagined opponents. Calvin had

[36] *Remedie* 5:375.8–10, 22–24.
[37] *Cert.* 5:71.17.
[38] *Lawes* III.8.6; 1:223.28ff.
[39] *Pride* 5:320.31.
[40] *Pride* 5:320.30.
[41] *Pride* 5:318.30–320.10.

already identified pride as the central human attribute that needed to be subdued. He wrote:

> And so it happens that no real piety remains in the world. But as to my statement that some erroneously slip into superstition, I do not mean by this that their ingenuousness should free them from blame. For the blindness under which they labor is almost always mixed with proud vanity and obstinacy. Indeed, vanity joined with pride can be detected in the fact that, seeking God, miserable men do not rise above themselves as they should, but measure him by the yardstick of their own carnal stupidity, and neglect sound investigation.[42]

Calvin was equally forthright when he described the practical expressions of piety that resulted in the zealous condemnation of others:

> . . . overscrupulousness is born rather of pride and arrogance and false opinion of holiness than of true holiness and true zeal for it. Therefore, those who more boldly than others incite defection from the church, and are like standard-bearers, have for the most part no other reason than by their contempt of all to show they are better than the other.[43]

Thus for Calvin, pride stands at the center of human corruption and, if unchecked, destroys the Christian community by representing a false piety and zeal as thoroughly true and approved. More than fifty years later, Richard Baxter drew a similar conclusion. He associated pride with idleness, observing those who relied on the Spirit as a substitute for the exercise of reason and hard work stood to lose the assurance of their election. Idleness drew his profound disapproval.

> But if we give to reason, memory, study, books, methods, forms, etc. but their proper place in subordination to Christ and to his Spirit, they are so far from being quenchers of the Spirit, that they are necessary in their places, and such means as we must use, if ever we will expect the Spirit's help. For the Spirit is not given to a brute to make him a man, or rational; nor to a proud despiser, or idle neglecter of God's appointed means, to be instead of means; nor to be a patron of the vice of pride or idleness, which he cometh chiefly to destroy; but to bless men in their laborious use of the means which God appointed him: read but Prov. i. 20, etc. ii. iii. v. vi. viii., and you will see that knowledge must be laboured for, and instruction heard; and he that will lie idle till the Spirit move him, and will not stir up himself to seek God, or strive to enter in at the strait gate, not give any diligence to make his calling and election sure,

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[42] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, LCC vol. xx, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I.4.1.

[43] Calvin, *Inst.* IV.1.16.

> may find that the Spirit of sloth hath destroyed him, when he thought the Spirit of Christ had been saving him.[44]

In light of Richard Baxter's analysis, Hooker's assessment of his Puritan counterparts is most ironic for it is exactly upon Calvin's analysis that he accuses the Puritans when he writes:

> *Far more comfort it were for us (so small is the joy we take in these strifes) to labour under the same yoke, as men that looke for the same eternall reward of their labours, to be joyned with you in bands of indissoluble love and amitie, to live as if our persons being manie our soules were but one, rather then in such dismembered sort to spend our fewe and wretched dayes in a tedious prosecuting of wearisome contentions: the end whereof, if they have not some speedie ende, will be heavie even on both sides.* . . . The only godlines we glory in, is to find out somewhat whereby we may judge others to be ungodly. Each others faults we observe as matter of exprobation and not of griefe. By these meanes we are growne hateful in the eyes of the Heathens themselves, and (which woundeth us the more deeply) able we are not to deny but that we have deserved their hatred. With the better sort of our owne, our fame and credit is cleane lost.[45]

Hooker simply follows Calvin, and accuses the Puritans of the very things they abhorred, of 'vanity joined with pride'[46] whose origins lay in 'carnal stupidity.'[47] Such irony could scarcely be lost on his readers. The 'overscrupulousness' of which Calvin spoke was prophetic. It had found its way into Puritan thinking and action, and had resulted, in Hooker's view, in 'crueltie and hardnes of harte.'[48] Therefore the 'godly' required a much more sober estimate of *their* continued need for grace. Hooker agreed with Calvin on the central problem of human pride. He, with Calvin, found humans to be trapped by the consequences of sin and pride. They are not only 'wrapped up in sinne and made . . . the children of death'[49] but also paradoxically 'endued with so manie excellencies.'[50] Therefore he suggests any thoughtful person must conclude, like Job, 'that they had bene happier if they had never been'[51] because their 'manie excellencies' are insufficient to reverse the course

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[44] Richard Baxter, *The Practical Works of Richard Baxter*, vol. 1, reprinted from the 1846 edition published in London by George Virtue (Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 2000), I.3: 725.
[45] *Lawes* Pref.9.3; 2:52.11–31.
[46] *Inst.* I.4.1.
[47] *Inst.* I.4.1.
[48] *Lawes* V.61.5; 2:268.14ff.
[49] *Pride* 5:312.30.
[50] *Pride* 5:313.4.
[51] *Pride* 5:313.4.

of sin. Hooker used this opportunity, as St. Paul had argued in Romans, to emphasize the inability of humans to forge their own salvation, and to open the door for God's disclosure of 'a nue waie unto salvation.' Thus Hooker places in juxtaposition 'the waie of nature and the waie of grace.'[52]

Hooker placed nature and grace together not because he believed they were the same but that reason as part of man's natural endowment was necessary in order for man to comprehend his own powerlessness to save himself, and to consciously turn to God in repentance. So he distinguished, as did all the reformers, natural reason from 'right reason.' Although Hooker shows qualified confidence in reason (described, for example, by Robert Kavanagh as reason assisted and sustained by supernatural grace) it remains the case that man is wholly dependent on divine mercy and grace.[53]

When Hooker returns to his text from Habakkuk to sum up the condition of the proud, he describes the central failure as one of the human will. Ideally, 'the orderly disposition of the mind of man should be…perturbations and sensuall appetites all kept in aw by a moderate and sober will; will in all things framed by reason; reason directed by the law of god and nature.'[54] But only right reason can satisfy the 'orderly disposition of the mind.' Hooker notes that this perspective was what was lacking in Israel but seen clearly by the prophet Habakkuk in his description of the Chaldean invasion (in Habakkuk chapter 2). The tyranny and violence that came with such an invasion where 'they gather all nations for themselves, and collect all people for their own'[55] was, Hooker says, temporary and, for the invader, ultimately a defeat because of their failure to reckon with divine judgment. In so saying, Hooker establishes what the prophet graphically understood: that 'wealth is treacherous; the arrogant do not endure.'[56] The fate of the proud was therefore determined by the way their 'unreasonable cecity and blindnes trampled all lawes both of god and nature under feet.'[57] In Hooker, transgression against the law of God could never

[52] *Pride* 5:313.7.
[53] Robert V. Kavanagh, 'Reason and Nature in Hooker's *Polity*,' (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1944), 101.
[54] *Pride* 5:314.17–20.
[55] Hab 2:5.
[56] Hab 2:5.
[57] *Pride* 5:314.21ff.

be a matter of indifference and always resulted in a just response from God though the response might appear to be delayed.

True Pride and False Humility Distinguished

One of the strategies used by Hooker in *Pride* is his anticipation of the reader's objections. Hooker has determined that the just enjoy salvation not because they are perfect or devoid of pride but because their mind has been made right with God. They may indeed err, but their 'mind doth [not] swell' because they repent of their errors, and they do not wilfully oppose God. Thus their 'obliquity is not imputed'[58] as a result of God's grace and mercy. At this conclusion, Hooker asks three questions: why is even the wisest person made anxious by the pride of other people? what are the consequences of failing to cure the source of pride? how may pride be cured?[59]

To the first question regarding anxiety, Hooker asks if this is actually the correct problem. As in the case of human fear discussed in the *Remedie*, where its positive value must be understood in order to differentiate it from unholy fear, Hooker asks whether there is a kind of pride that is legitimate so that false humility can be avoided and seen for what it is. This question is now possible because he has established the true character of pride, named its contours, and recognized those who manifest it.

When Hooker stresses the place of human nature, he makes a strong distinction between human 'ability' and human 'aptness.' The created order itself, coming from the hand of God, was not at variance with divine purpose and love. The corruptions of nature, though disastrous, were not complete. The Scriptures themselves presupposed the human capacity to reason as good in itself and reason, far from being antagonistic to faith, was necessary for it. Following this logic, David Neelands[60] points to Hooker's use of the term 'aptness' to emphasize the capacity of humans to recognize and appropriate grace, a capacity which was not lost in the Fall since, 'had aptnes beene alsoe lost, it is not grace that could worke in us more than it doeth in brute creatures.'[61] Don

[58] *Pride* 5:314.3.
[59] *Pride* 5:315.
[60] W. David Neelands, 'Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and "Tradition",' in *RHC*, 87.
[61] *Dublin*, 'Grace and Free Will,' *FLE* 4:101.30–31.

Compier[62] notes that Hooker was afraid of the elitist results of Puritan conviction resulting in a church fragmented on the basis of moral discriminations developed around an orthodoxy that was predefined by a prescriptive reading of Scripture. Such a hermeneutic was taken to be an indication of Spirit-led understanding by the 'godly' and in Hooker's view, therefore, merely a witness in its own cause. Therefore Puritan goals for church government and morality, for example, could not logically be free of human bias and 'affection' any more than could Hooker's. And with the weight of tradition to call upon he categorically rejected private judgment in any matter where the wisdom of the Christian community was available. Hooker knew that although the community could err, it also had an inherent capacity to correct itself assuming it was not afflicted with pride. This being so, the church gathered could arrive at a sober and realistic appraisal of its own life. Still, Puritans, as Hooker saw them, were sceptical that anything resulting from human reason or consideration could be deemed good, and that in the fellowship of the church, authoritative precepts were to be determined by a prescriptive reading of Scripture alone, not the construal of human reason (not even in places where Scripture itself was silent).

However, Hooker thought the real problem with Puritan epistemology (alongside the accusation of hidden pride), lay in an inadequate grasp of the relationship between nature and grace. The natural order was created by God and was good. Its goodness could be seen and enjoyed and its Creator marvelled at and worshipped. Similarly, 'the guiftes of nature or of grace or whatsoever is in the world admired as a part of mans excellency adorning his body, bewtifying his mind, or externally any waie commending him in thaccompt and opinion of men'[63] was to be viewed as a varied distribution of gifts. Obviously, a varied distribution of gifts might lead to envy 'by occasion of disparagement [and] pride through mens ignorance'[64] if it is assumed that such gifts should be evenly distributed. So while the accumulation of such gifts did not inevitably lead to pride in Hooker's view, it remained a hazard. Therefore, an appropriate Christian humility was not achieved by the rejection of

[62] Don H. Compier, 'Hooker on the Authority of Scripture in Matters of Morality,' in *RHC*, 255.
[63] *Pride* 5:315.9–12.
[64] *Pride* 5:315.15ff.

'bewtie strength riches power knowledg,…praise and commendacion.'[65] Rather, these were occasions for joy and pleasure. To know oneself blessed and to take pleasure in these satisfactions did not argue for pride, but gratitude towards the Giver. Thus Hooker writes, 'What we may have and know that we have it without offence doe we then make offensive when we take joy and delight in having it?'[66] The aptness of humans to enjoy and appreciate the created order was necessary if grace itself was to be acknowledged.

Therefore, the Puritan fear of human self-aggrandizement called for acts of interior contrition and self-examination wherein pride could rooted out, and replaced with proper humility. Hooker argued that such a procedure actually had the opposite effect by imposing a kind of humility that resulted in a prideful demarcation between the 'godly' and the 'time servers.' Furthermore, as Hooker had earlier noted, one of the manifestations of pride was the apparent exaltation of stupidity. He writes:

> …there are that beare the title of wise men and Scribes and great disputers of the world, and are nothing in deede lesse then what in shew they most appeare. These being whollie addicted unto their owne wills, use their wit, their learning, and all the wisdome they have, to maintaine that which their obstinate harts are delighted with, esteeming in the phrentique error of their mindes the greatest madnes in the world to be wisdome, and the highest wisedom foolishnes.[67]

Hooker has now begun to accuse the Puritans of the very pride which they had disguised as humility. This strategic inversion of an argument, especially where truth was so deeply sought is typical of Hooker, and can be seen time and again in the *Lawes*. For example, Hooker describes in a memorable passage his view of the Puritan error that Spirit and reason were antithetical, and that faith is at its most pure where reason is absent:

> If I believe the Gospell, there needeth no reasoning about it to perswade me: If I doe not believe, it must be the spirit of God and not the reason of man that shall convert my hart unto him. By these and the like dispute an opinion hath spread it selfe verie farre in the world, as if the waye to be ripe in faith, were to be raw in wit and judgement, as if reason were an enimie unto religion, childish simplicitie the mother of ghostlie and

[65] *Pride* 5:317.2–7.
[66] *Pride* 5:315.27–29.
[67] *Lawes* III.8.9; 1:226.15–22.

> divine wisedome. The cause why such declamations prevaile so greatly, is, for that men suffer themselves in two respects to be deluded, one is that the wisedome of man being greatly debaced either in comparison with that of God, or in regard of some speciall thing exceeding the reach and compasse thereof, it seemeth to them (not marking so much) as if simplie it were condemned: another that learning, knowledge, or wisedome falsely so tearmed, usurping a name whereof they are not worthie, and being under that name controlled, their reproofe is by so much the more easily misapplied, and through equivocation wrested against those things whereunto so pretious names do properly and of right belong.[68]

To Hooker, it was not humility but a perverse form of pride for Puritans to infer that 'the waie to be ripe in faith, were to be raw in wit and judgement.' However, before leaving this aspect of the present discussion, Hooker sums up his thoughts with great insight by locating the source of such perversity in an unwarranted and exalted self-estimate of one's qualities. Inevitably, such pride can only result in actions that betray the inner personal condition:

> We must…enter some what deeper before we can come to the closet wherein this poison lieth. There is in the hart of every proud man first an errour of understanding a vain opinion whereby he thinketh his own excellency and by reason thereof his wourthines of estimation regard and honour to be greater then in truth it is. This maketh him in all his affections accordingly to raise up him selfe, and by his inward affections his outward acts are fashioned.[69]

Thus for Hooker, the root of all pride lies in 'an errour of understanding' which must 'accordingly frameth also their deeds and behaviour unlesse there be cunning to conceal it.'[70] From this conclusion Hooker makes the connection between the paradox of the Puritan's professed dislike of pomp, authority, and other forms of external religious expression, and his own observations of how Puritans *actually* behaved towards others by using the imagery of national pride in Isaiah chapters 3 and 10, and the account of Korah's rebellion in Numbers chapter 16 to make his point. In the latter case Hooker extends himself in typical rhetorical fashion, choosing his words for maximum clarity, and highlighting for obvious effect the character of Korah's anarchy in terms of 'their impatience to live in subjection their mutinous repining at lawfull

[68] *Lawes* III.8.4; 1:222.22–223.7.
[69] *Pride* 5:318.16–23.
[70] *Pride* 5:320.8ff.

authority, their gruding agenst their superiours ecclesiastical and civill; any thing concerning pride in anie sort or sect which the present face of the world doth not as a glasse represent to the view of all mens beholding.'[71] Here there can be no doubt that Hooker has the Puritans in view and he presses home, with devastating homiletical power, the point that Puritan indignation of the 'ungodly' was the result not so much of Puritan Spirit-led insight into the human condition, but of actual pride in themselves which found a home even in the elect, and which, as we noted earlier, Calvin had warned against. Therefore, Hooker answers his second question on the consequnces of failure to cure the source of pride. The Puritan grasp of Christian piety had failed, in his view, to provide a clear word of grace because it falsely dissociated reason from the order of nature to which all persons are bound until the *eschaton*. There can be hardly anything more incisive than to critique a critic using his own categories such that Puritan indignation against sin was, as Hooker saw it, the product of 'overweening in them selves'[72] with the result that it 'maketh them in all their affections to swell, how deadly their hatred, how heavy their displeasure, how unappeasable their indignation and wrath is above other mens.'[73] Pride can afflict anyone and left to itself reveals a person's true character. The rhetorical list of crimes against piety as shown in the *Lawes* describes Hooker's assessment of common human discourse:

> …how the oathes which religious hartes do tremble as they affect as principal graces of speech, what felicity they take to see the enormities of their crimes above the reach of lawes and punishments, how it delighteth them when thay are able to appall with the clowdines of their looke, how far they exceed the terms wherewith mans nature should be limited, how high they bear their heades over others, how they browbeat all men which do not receyve their sentences as oracles with mervelous applause and approbation, how they looke upon no man but with an indirect countenance nor heere any thing saving their own praises with patience, nor speak without scornfulnes and disdain; how they use their servants as if they were beasts, their inferiours as servants, their equals as inferiours, and as for superiours acknowledge none; how they admire them selves as venerable puissant wise circumspect provident every way

[71] *Pride* 5:319.6–11.
[72] *Pride* 5:319.14.
[73] *Pride* 5:319.14–16.

> great, taking all men besides them selves for ciphers poore inglorious silly creatures, needles burthens of the earth, ofscowringes, no nothing.[74]

This rather lengthy passage is worth quoting in full as a good illustration of Hooker's rhetorical style. The list of complaints can also be found more generally in the Preface to the *Lawes* though greatly condensed here. Note, however, that Hooker employs sweeping allegations to demonstrate a point for his target audience. There is ample evidence for extremism amongst the Puritans but this is possible for any group—reform in Tudor England was not stable. The Spanish Armada (1588) deeply threatened the Protestant psyche, and in an age where religious uniformity was conceived as the 'cement of society'[75] public discussion about Christian truth and assurance were never abstract—these matters affected the state of the nation. Hooker was not neutral in his convictions and certainly not above caricature, but his convictions were held with great consistency and rigor. His 'practical divinity' was the outcome of his love of order and he pursued it along the logic path of Christian rational theology, philosophically from St. Thomas Aquinas, and with a biblical hermeneutic drawn from Calvin. Hooker's analysis was simply that wrong actions resulted from wrong thinking—in this case 'pride,' depicted as the source of all human ailments—personal, social, political, and ecclesiastical.

Richard Hooker's Remedy for Pride

Hooker's first two questions were concerned to demonstrate both the origins and consequences of pride. Now, thirdly, the sermon turns to the cure and, recalling Habakkuk's complaint that the wicked go unpunished and the righteous suffer, reminds the reader that cures have two effects. The divine reply to Habakkuk speaks of judgment which Hooker notes has two parts:

> It threatneth the one sort that their swelling pride doth prognosticate their spedy ruine; the other which counted them selves the children of death it reviveth and with the hope of life laid up in store for them it causeth their brused harts to rejoyce…and such aboundance of grace consolitarie ministered unto them that they may now put of sackcloth and *anoynt theyr heades with oyl*, change their dolefull tunes into songs of

[74] *Pride* 5:319.19–320.3.
[75] Egil Grislis, 'Commentary,' *FLE* 5:619.

> cheerful melodie, shake of that over depressing heavines and resume their wonted joyes.[76]

So divine grace promises the joys of salvation, but how does a believer experience these things, how are they recognizable, and in what sense does 'the life of the just . . . hang on their faith'?[77] Hooker's reply is that, as natural life has its motive force embedded in it, so the life of the just is also internally driven by the source of spiritual life. His inquiry thus moves to 'the cause originall and beginning whereof spirituall life proceedeth: then in what maner wee do heere live The life of god: thirdly how this life shall in the world to come be perfited.'[78] Interestingly, Hooker does not immediately respond to this question Christologically but rather with a quotation from Deuteronomy 30:19, *Choose life therefore that both thou and thy seed may live* . . ., from which he infers the particularity of God's grace to Israel and thence to the global finality of Christ:

> . . . because for the world he hath suffred death to procure it eternal life; and partly for that the world being really quickned by him liveth that life which his death hath purchased. The soul which quickneth the body is in the body, and it must be in the soul which the soul of man liveth by. Except therefore Christ be trulie in you through him ye cannot be made alive.[79]

This takes Hooker to his favourite topics: how it is that Christ indwells the believer, how such indwelling can be known, what authentic assurance of salvation this indwelling promises, and through what sensible means Christ's indwelling occurs. These questions open for Hooker what has been regarded as the center of his theology, namely the union and participation of man with God. For believers, the intellect inspired by the Holy Spirit is the crucial seat of consistent action, not only the place where abstract contemplation might occur. Now, Hooker by virtue of his upbringing and training, certainly stressed the life of the mind, but even if he lingers at this point in *Pride* it is never to the exclusion of an examination of deeds done *through* the grace and power of God. To have done otherwise would have been con-

[76] *Pride* 5:324.21–325.5.
[77] *Pride* 5:325.11.
[78] *Pride* 5:325.22–25.
[79] *Pride* 5:326.5–11.

trary to his own theological method. There is no mistaking Hooker on this point:

> *Christ is in us* saith Gregory Naziazene not *κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον* but *κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον* not *according to that naturall substance which visiblie was seen on earth*: but *according to that intellectuall comprehension which the mind is capable of*. . . . That wherby thapostle therefore did forme Christ was the gospell. So that Christ was formed when Christianitie was comprehended . . . foras much as wee are not on our part heereof by our own inclination capable god hath geven unto his that spirit while teaching their harts to acknowledge and *tungues to confess Christ* the sonne of the living god.[80]

Here is the source of all encouragement according to Hooker. It is the objectivity of the incarnation, the truth of the atonement, and the giving of the Holy Spirit that stimulates faith in God. God's achievement is the work of Christ and is the source and object of Christian faith. Yet it is to be noted that Hooker did not think that mere simpleness or ignorance is in itself fatal to faith. The problem lay in 'blind vanitie'[81]—those 'that are conscienceless, that have resigned them selves over unto wantonnesse, that are greedilie set upon all uncleanes and sinne, of such it is planlie determined: They bee dead: Strangers they are from the life of God.'[82] Hooker's language is blunt: 'They bee dead.' With pastoral heart, Hooker takes us back to the text of Habakkuk:

> Sundrie are the casualties of this present world, the trials manie and fearfull which wee are subject unto. But in the midst of all, this must be the chiefest *ancre unto our souls, The just shall live*. . . . These dreadfull names of trobles, wars, invasions, the verie mention whereof doth so much terrifie, waigh them with hartes resolved in this that *the just shall live* and what are they but panicall terrours?[83]

There is at this point in *Pride* a clear ending with the benediction at the conclusion of the first section. The source of human pride and the 'cure' have been discussed in general. The impenitent and proud are judged and chastized by God through external agencies, such as law and government, but also through personal circumstance which will drive a person either to seek or to reject divine aid. The truly proud reject it. But Hooker has more to say on the matter of divine justice. It is still true that believers suffer as all humanity does, and his advice so

[80] *Pride* 5:327.9–25.
[81] *Pride* 5:327.28.
[82] *Pride* 5:327.29–328.4.
[83] *Pride* 5:329.22–30.

far in *Pride* has been that the faithful must learn the ways of patience knowing that they are joined to Christ and share in his sufferings also. Hooker maintained this view but recognized that more needed to be said. To the righteous sufferer, it may be small comfort to know that the proud and arrogant who enjoy life and liberty will do so for only a short time. But there remained the problem of suffering among the elect, and also of the delay in justice. These theological and pastoral difficulties surface frequently in Scripture and Hooker now faces them. His first response is to defend the character of God as judge. Hooker says that the wicked man does not see this and views the silence of God as implying 'some truce and respect for the time,... through fredome from present sense of evell emboldeneth him selfe taketh hart and courage hates to be reformed casteth the wourdes of God behind him runneth on his race with lost companions.'[84] Hooker acknowledges the discomfort the idea of divine judgment brings to mind: '*God will judg the world* is little cared for though Christ our Saviour and his apostles divinelie inspired describe it in never so fearfull maner.'[85] Justification for the inevitability of judgment therefore lies with the authority of Christ, not merely a prescriptive reading of the Old Testament. Hooker is as resolute as any Puritan in this: 'let impenitent malefactours make their certain reckoning: for as verilie as *god is just* his justice will show it selfe upon them soone or sine, in the greatnes of that judgment which if they feel before they fear, wo wourth them. God their judg but your lord.'[86] Nevertheless, Hooker's main concern was to describe the justice of God in ways consistent with the goodness of God. He contended that the Puritans had portrayed God primarily in harsh terms by creating a climate of fear and uncertainty, particularly through the doctrine of predestination. It should be noted that Hooker never rejected the doctrine, but thought that it was introduced in such a way that legitimate Christian assurance was weakened through fear, and that it resulted in a failure to comprehend the mystery of the means of grace. Thus, in relation to predestination, Hooker writes:

> ...by sacramentes and other sensible tokens of grace wee may boldly gather that he, whose mercie vouchafeth now to bestowe the meanes, hath also longe sithence intended us that whereunto they leade. But lett us

[84] *Pride* 5:343.17–20.
[85] *Pride* 5:343.23–25.
[86] *Pride* 5:344.1–5.

> never thinke it safe to presume of our owne last ende by bare conjecturall collections of his first intent and purpose, the meanes failing that should come betweene. Predestination bringeth not to life, without the grace of externall vocation, wherein our baptisme is implied. For as wee are not naturallie men without birth, so neither are wee Christian men in the ey of the Church of God but by new birth, not accordinge to the manifest ordinarie course of divine dispensation new borne, but by that baptisme which both declareth and maketh us Christians . . . the first apparent beginninge of life, a seal perhaps to the grace of *election* before received, but to our sanctification heere a step that hath not anie before it.[87]

Hooker held that authentic Christian faith was nurtured secretly but sensibly through the gift of the Holy Spirit, a gift that brings the assurance of justice and of mercy.

> . . . if the name of a lord do not seem sufficientlie gracious, unto whome god hath alredy imparted a Spirit that giveth them cheerfull courage boldly to call upon him as children upon their father, let them enlarge their harts and what good thing can they invent which his fatherly indulgence doth not abundantly warrant them to expect? . . . It is not with God as it is with men whose titles show rather what they should be then what they are. God will not be termed that which he is not. His name doth follow his nature. Were not his affection most fatherlie the appellation of a father would offend him.[88]

Hooker generally displays a very marked concern to link his pastoral conclusions to a proper exegetical understanding of Scripture, and this case is no different as he continues his discussion of divine justice with his eye on predestination. he concluded that (double) predestination as a definitive insight into the divine will was too fragile a concept to define God's nature to bring believers to authentic assurance:

> These not waying how opposite it is to the justice of god either actuallie to condemn or in purpose to determine condemnation without a cause thereof presupposed . . . have by misconstruction of some scripture sentences with no small hazard as well of gods honour as mens comfort over easilie bene led to define that so many were foreappointed unto endles torments onlie for that the will of god was to have them endleslie tormented.[89]

Even at this late stage in the sermon, Hooker had not fully satisfied his own argument. Once again he restated the problem of evil in terms

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[87] *Lawes* V.60.3; 2:256.10–26.
[88] *Pride* 5:344.18–345.8.
[89] *Pride* 5:346.11–17.

of the distributive justice of God.[90] The just, Hooker claimed, fret because they see the pleasures enjoyed by the wicked when their own condition seemed burdensome or fruitless. How can they continue to trust a God that permits such evident inequality? And with prophetic insight, Hooker asks rhetorically:

> What profit have they by serving thalmighty? but maketh it even a recreation and a kind of sporting exercise to try what wit can doe in devising and force in executing vile barbarous and cruell acts such as future ages maie most woonder at and the present most rue…men as long as they doe not conceyve the course of divine proceedings in justice imagin all to be out of square because the righteous are afflicted when the contrarie sort do prosper…[91]

Hooker's reply to this soliloquy is astonishingly perceptive and acute. He does not supply abstract philosophical solutions to the problem of evil and divine justice, but his solutions are no less closely reasoned. He argued that the apparent problem with distributive justice is caused by a failure of perspective. If we do not get what we believe we deserve over against the fate deserved (we think) by the wicked, does this really argue against the justice of God? Is not the liberality of God also part of the divine economy?[92] 'Doth it require that the righteous have everie desirable thing the unrighteous nothing which is naturallie good permitted them?'[93] The problem lies not with God but with man and the unformed and wrong expectations humans bring to their understanding of God. Since they share a common humanity, those who live as believers cannot fairly assume that all ills will vanish, all uncertainty be resolved, all pain and injustice be turned to light. There is absolutely no 'Success Gospel' in Hooker. Christ is the paradigm for a Christian theodicy and yet Christ suffered. So Hooker charges the just with a certain lack of charity believing all must go well with them, and badly with the wicked.

> …that which never as yeat anie man was so sensles as to imagin notwithstanding must needes be; to wit that if onlie the just be not bewtifull if they onlie be not strong if they anie be helthfull besides them, if they alone doe not see the frute of their bodies increased unto the third and fourth generation god doth deal unjustlie with them. How unjustlie

[90] *Pride* 5:350–51.
[91] *Pride* 5:350.5–9, 16–19.
[92] Cf. Matt 5:43–48.
[93] *Pride* 5:351.7–9.

> therefore with Christ our blessed Saviour and his onlie begotten sonne who being so much more righteous then angels saw creatures far beneath men in dignitie… Know we not that *god is by nature good* and gracious unto all the wourkes of his handes? Wicked men although they be their own wourkmanship as they are wicked, yeat as they are men being his handiwourk, are not we rather injurious unto them then god to us if so be we envie them all participation even in those things which they are capable of as men?[94]

The law of distributive justice is not violated simply because God acts according to his gracious nature toward all who bear his image. It remains true that:

> …god doth not deal with the righteous as with the wicked but alwaies better.… When we think otherwise the reason of our misconceipt heerin is that because all suffring is grevous… the just and unjust suffering materiallie the same kinde of griefe… imagin that they suffer simplie the same whereas in truth their suffrings formallie and even essentiallie are different. The end of god is never the same in both howsoever upon both he seemeth to lay the same burthens. But being both in the same fornace the one are as stubble the other as gold.[95]

This, it may be argued, is pastoral theology at its best and most robust—a practical divinity that takes seriously problems of faith without avoiding the necessary reasoning that provides a context for personal transformation. According to Hooker, the challenges to faith begin when we fail to understand the nature of God and when we mishandle Scripture. Such failures result in personal confusion about suffering and in excessive fear. Fear of losing one's faith during a time of suffering is an example of excessive fear for, 'such sufferings do not argue your infelicity,… men shall woonder that serving a God so able to protect you ye should be infeebled and *dy dailie* but ignorant they are how it cometh by the mightie hand of God to passe that there is even in imbecillitie strength and gain in the verie losse of your lives.'[96] Affliction, therefore, is one cure for pride. Although both the just and the unjust experience it, the results differ in that 'Affliction is the mother of hartie devotion… *is both a medicin if we sinne and a preservative if we sinne not.*'[97] The justice of God is inevitable and its apparent absence should

[94] *Pride* 5:351.9–24.
[95] *Pride* 5:351.30–352.25.
[96] *Pride* 5:353.21–26.
[97] *Pride* 5:354.9–14.

be considered a sign of divine forbearance toward the wicked rather than indifference toward the just for 'The time is not gained, divine revenge shall come upon them [the wicked] so much the heavier by how much the slower. If the vertuous doe fail in courage it is through errour and misconceipt.'[98]

In the final part of *Pride*, Hooker deals briefly with the problem of sin committed following baptism by assuring his readers once again that the best answer is to consider the nature of God's character as Father, 'most largelie and mercifullie promising unto his children which have erred and gone astraie if they return if they be pænitent full remission of all their sinnes.'[99] The chastizement of temporal punishments for correction remains possible, but Hooker was convinced that God 'acquiteth them from that great pain death and endlesse condemnation which their iniquities justlie deserved'[100] assuming penitence in the heart of the proud. Nevertheless, Hooker did accept a limited doctrine of purgatory to satisfy the need for 'such punishment being not inflicted in this world it be in the world to come endured that so to the justice of God full and perfect satisfaction maie be made.'[101] Still, given its brevity the final section in *Pride* has more the appearance of an afterthought for publication than a fully integrated piece consistent with the more paranetic tone of the sermon as a whole.

Conclusions

A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride reveals in Richard Hooker one who is both scholar and pastor. His understanding of what would now be called 'real world issues' has often been underestimated because of his scholarly reputation. Yet there is nothing in the sermon that is arid

[98] *Pride* 5:355.11–14. This conclusion is also found in *Remedie* where Hooker deals with the same problem of delayed judgment by concluding that the outward happiness of the wicked may be more apparent than real. He writes: 'They [the wicked] are oftner plagued then we are aware of. The panges they feele are not alwaies written in their foreheads. Though *wickednesse bee sugar in their mouthes*, and wantonnesse as oile to make them looke with *cheerefull countenance*, nevertheles if their harts were disclosed, perhaps their glittering estate would not greatly be envied.… The judgements of God doe not alwaies follow crimes as Thunder doth Lightning, but sometimes the space of many ages comming between.' Hooker, *Remedie* 5:370.


[99] *Pride* 5:357.1–3.

[100] *Pride* 5:357.13–15.

[101] *Pride* 5:360.26–28.

and disconnected from the lives of people struggling with the infirmities of nature and unable to sort through the conflicting notions of God's justice and the problem of pain. Hooker develops his theodicy with characteristic patience in his exposition of Habakkuk 2:4. The correct response he says, is to understand the root of human problems for until that happens the cure cannot be found, or properly applied. The sermon then proceeds to work through pride as the key source for the human experience of dysfunction and sin, divine and human chastisement and of their corollary, the difficult problem of the apparent arbitrariness of God's justice. In particular, we noted that Hooker has in mind the results of Puritan pastoral theology which he contended, gave rise to unnecessary fear and anxiety, and to a false piety that was at once too speculative, and insufficiently attentive to the intent of Scripture. In the hope that 'we shall not be thought unreasonable for witholding our assent from that which they urge upon the world with greater egernes then waight of speech,'[102] Hooker presented his sermon on *Pride* as a serious contribution to practical divinity and also as a condensed response to the Puritan manifesto for continued reform in England.

[102] *Pride* 5:361.1–3.



A
LEARNED
AND COMFORTA-
BLE SERMON OF THE
certaintie and perpetuitie of
faith in the Elect; especially
of the Prophet Habak-
kuks faith.

BY

RICHARD HOOKER, SOME-
times fellow of Corpus Christi
College in Oxford.

AC: OX

AT OXFORD,
Printed by Ioseph Barnes, and are to be
sold by John Barnes dwelling neere
Holborne Conduit. 1612.

Richard Hooker. *A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect*. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1612.

CHAPTER TWENTY

RICHARD HOOKER'S REPUTATION*

Diarmaid MacCulloch

From my undergraduate days in Cambridge, I remember a lecture by the late Sir Geoffrey Elton in which he pronounced not altogether kindly on the achievement of another giant of early modern historical writing, Professor Lawrence Stone. Elton said of Stone's *magnum opus, The Crisis of the Aristocracy* 'Lawrence Stone has written a great book. [*Pause*] A huge book. An ENORMOUS book.' In a similar fashion, Richard Hooker's many admirers, detractors and manipulators can agree on one thing: Hooker wrote a very big book. Everyone remembers that. Take, for instance, the early seventeenth century clerk of Canterbury Archdeaconry Court who compiled the index to the probate register volume which deals with Richard Hooker: when the clerk came to Hooker's name in his index, he showed an uncharacteristic spark of interest, and he commented in the margin 'he wrote an Ecclesiastical Polity.'[1]

Now we know that it was not just *an* Ecclesiastical Polity, but *the* Ecclesiastical Polity: a majestic and hallowed testimony to the character of Anglicanism and the *via media* of the Church of England. But it may give us pause to find, if we take up the formidable task of reading Hooker's works—all seven volumes of them in the latest edition,

* A version of this paper formed the first in a series of lectures sponsored by Corpus Christi College, Oxford in autumn 2000, commemorating the quatercentenary of Hooker's death, and I have to thank the President and Fellows of the College for doing me the honour of asking me to begin the series. Among the many debts incurred in writing the paper, I am extremely grateful for the generosity of the following in allowing me access to their unpublished work: Patrick Collinson, Susan Doran, Michael Brydon, Peter Lake, Jessica Martin, Peter Nockles. I must also thank Steven McGrade for his invaluable detailed comments on a draft of the paper, Peter Groves for assistance in Pusey House Library, Séan Hughes for some provocative conversations in seminars, and Conal Condren for supplying various secondary sources. My particular debt to Michael Brydon should be apparent from the footnotes, in which I have endeavoured to specify precisely where I have used his material.

[1] R. Keen, 'Inventory of Richard Hooker, 1601', *Archaeologia Cantiana* 70 (1957): 231–6, at 231. I am grateful to Dr Kenneth Fincham for alerting me to this reference.

including commentary and notes—that nowhere in any of his writings does Hooker use either the word Anglicanism or the phrase *via media*.[2] That may suggest that the legacy of Hooker is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been portrayed; indeed it may mean that Anglicanism and the *via media* are more interesting and fluid concepts than the complacent version of Anglican historiography has sometimes made them.[3] Did Hooker defend Anglicanism in his book, or did he, as Professor Peter Lake famously suggested a dozen years ago, invent Anglicanism?[4] Did he write a great book, or just a huge and enormous one? To find out who he was and what he has been understood to have intended requires an exploration of the extraordinarily varied ways in which he and his big book have been encountered over four centuries.

Hooker started his public career as a rather predictable Reformed Protestant: one among the swelling number of young clergyman whose formation in early Elizabethan Oxford fitted them to lead a Church very conscious of its place in the wider family of European Reformed Churches. Hooker's family back in Devon was precociously Protestant. His uncle John Vowell, alias Hooker, was a passionately committed historian of the Hookers' home city, Exeter, but also a cosmopolitan scholar whose higher education had included time in Cologne and Strasbourg.[5] More important still was the young Richard's debt to his patron Bishop John Jewel, first defender of the Elizabethan Protestant Settlement, veteran both of Edwardian Oxford and the Zürich of Heinrich Bullinger: in the 1590s, Richard Hooker remembered Jewel with affection and awe as 'the worthiest Divine that Christendome hath bred for the space of some hundreds of yeres'.[6] Both the elder Hooker and Jewel had sat at the feet of the great exile theologian Peter Martyr

[2] *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker.* ed. W. R. Speed Hill *et al.* (7 vols., Cambridge and Binghamton, 1977–1998).

[3] For useful citations of conventional discussion of Hooker's role, see *Richard Hooker and the construction of Christian community*, ed. A. S. McGrade (Tempe: MRTS, 1997), 221, and *RHC*, 261, and for further discussion, M. A. Brydon, 'The evolving reputation of Richard Hooker: an examination of responses to the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, 1640–1714' (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 1999), 12–15.

[4] P. Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English conformist thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 230.

[5] On John Hooker alias Vowell, see *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1558–1603*, ed. P. W. Hasler (3 vols., London: HMSO, 1982), ii.334–35, and W. T. MacCaffrey, *Exeter, 1540–1640: the growth of an English County Town* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 3, 7–8, 50, 120, 139, 144, 225, 272–74.

[6] *Lawes* II.6.4; 1:171.2–4.

Vermigli, who above all others symbolised the international links of the English Reformation: the Italian whose fate took him as mediator of Reformed religion to Strasbourg, Oxford, Zürich. Their Reformation was caught up in a war against the forces of popery, in the person of whose Bishop in Rome was to be found a prime representative of Antichrist. When Hooker can first be glimpsed on the public stage preaching some time in 1582 or 1583 as a young Oxford don on the Book of Jude, that Hooker is still recognisably part of that world. Like his mentors, he refers repeatedly to the Roman Pontiff as 'the man of sinne.'[7] Such orthodox Reformed sentiments were natural in a man who was not only the spiritual heir of John Hooker and John Jewel, but who in his Oxford career was the close associate of the great Dr John Rainolds, President of Corpus Christi College and doyen of moderate Puritans in the University.[8]

Yet something more odd and individual began emerging later in the 1580s. It is possible that Rainolds's was not the only influence to work on the young man. In its foundation, after all, Corpus had been a flagship of Catholic humanism in Oxford, and when Hooker came up as an undergraduate in 1568, it maintained its distinctive emphasis on learning Greek: he would been given more exposure to the writings of the Greek Fathers than most of his contemporaries.[9] Moreover, in the very year that he arrived, there was a major clear-out of the strongly Catholic Fellows who had continued to dominate the College after Elizabeth's accession, but even then the victory of properly Reformed Protestants in Corpus was by no means complete.[10]

We cannot know whether or how these patristic and sacramentalist elements in his environment affected Hooker. What is clear, however, is

[7] *Jude* 1; *FLE* 5.33.6–7, *Jude* 2; 5:49.9–10, and cf. also *Just*. 5; 5:112.6; cf. R. Bauckham, 'Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome in the 1580s', *J[ournal of] E[cclesiastical] H[istory]* 29 (1978): 37–50, at 37–40; A. Milton, *Catholic and Reformed: the Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant thought, 1600–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 211–12. It was not surprising that John Keble's Anglo-Catholic sensibilities were offended by the Jude sermons, and that he included them in his 1836 edition of Hooker's works with a health warning about their authenticity: *The works of that learned and judicious divine Mr. Richard Hooker*, ed. J. Keble (3 vols. in 4, Oxford: OUP, 1836), i.xlvi–xlviii.

[8] On Rainolds, see C. M. Dent, *Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford* (Oxford: OUP, 1983), index, *sub nomine*.

[9] *The History of the University of Oxford: III: the Collegiate University*, ed. J. McConica (Oxford: OUP, 1986), 21–2, 24–8, 658, 693.

[10] Dent, *Protestant Reformers*, 25–8, 43; *Collegiate University*, ed. McConica, 381, 408.

that the issue on which he first publicly struck out in his own direction was that which would preoccupy him throughout his mature literary and theological career: the nature of a church, of ecclesiastical polity. Already in *A Learned Discourse of Justification*, in many ways a mainstream piece of Reformed soteriological discussion in the tradition of Cranmer's official Homilies, there emerges the assertion that the Church of Rome, although in error, is a true Church, and that therefore members of it might well be saved.[11] It was not the first time that Reformed Protestants had recognised some shadow of the Church in popery—Hooker was careful to quote impeccably Reformed foreign divines saying just that—but normally there was a more grudging tone to the admission. Moreover, the concession tended to be treated by Reformed commentators as a logical corollary of the fact that the Pope was Antichrist: after all, Antichrist needed a true Church in which to squat and do his foul deeds. Now Hooker had bidden Antichrist goodnight, and he showed a disturbing tendency to take more interest in the visible Church than the true Church.[12]

The same theme emerged in the first public row involving Hooker: a confrontation in 1586 with his colleague at the Temple, Walter Travers, a leading representative of those clergy who would have liked to push the Church of England on its logical Reformed road towards a presbyterian polity. Travers did not choose to oppose Hooker publicly on episcopacy versus presbyterianism, but once more on the issue of the status of the Church of Rome. Richard Bauckham has shown how narrow the differences were between them on this matter, but the difference was more important than its dimensions: Travers accused Hooker of going beyond the norm in saying in a sermon at the Temple that it was possible for Romanists who had lived *and died* in the superstitions of Rome to be saved—normally the convention was that generations of papist forefathers predestined to salvation had died not positively believing in Romish error, but in simple ignorance of the truth.

It is possible that Hooker did not in fact take this fatal step outside the bounds of Elizabethan orthodoxy, but that is certainly what Travers heard him as saying. Travers was entitled to feel suspicious, because he heard Hooker as becoming unorthodox on an allied matter: the stricter

[11] *Just.* 27; 5:146–8.

[12] Cf. Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 106, 146–7, 286; A. Milton, in *The early Stuart Church, 1603–1642*, ed. K. Fincham (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1993), 206–7.

versions of predestinarian theology, as expounded by the great masters like Calvin or Peter Martyr. It is noticeable that although Hooker's patron the Archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, intervened against Travers on Hooker's behalf, he did not give decisive backing to Hooker's arguments. He might heartily dislike Puritans like Travers who did not give bishops the respect which they deserved, but he was not going to be led out of the doctrinal consensus which he shared with moderate Puritanism.[13] Thomas Fuller's celebrated dictum seventy years later, that at the Temple Hooker preached 'pure Canterbury' in the morning and Travers 'pure Geneva' in the afternoon, could thus hardly be further from the truth. Yet since being canonized by quotation in Izaak Walton's biography, this phrase of Fuller's has become an essential cliché in the construction of the Anglican Hooker.[14]

After the confrontation with Travers, we can begin to see Hooker as having a public reputation, and a slightly strange one. He was a champion of establishment who championed it in distinctly un-establishment terms: an oddity who puzzled and irritated his opponents by his stance of disinterested aloofness. He was beginning to distance himself from the community of international Reformist Protestantism represented by Rainolds, which had nurtured him in his early Oxford years. Three decades ago, Professor Cargill Thompson detected a tiny but significant instance of his rebellion against Rainolds which has not been sufficiently marked by subsequent commentators: the marginalia which accompany Hooker's well-known admission in Book VII of his *Ecclesiasticall Politie* that he had changed his mind about the origins of episcopacy. The marginal references on this passage consist of a list of authors who provided evidence for the commonplace Elizabethan stance that episcopacy was a human institution, a standpoint which Hooker commented that he 'did sometimes judge a great deal more probable than now I do'. The list is not original to Hooker, but is borrowed from a widely-circulated manuscript treatise by Rainolds which had attacked Richard Bancroft's claim (made in a famous Paul's Cross sermon of 1589) that episcopacy was of apostolic institution. In the course of that work, Rainolds gives a marginal list of authorities who witness against

[13] Bauckham, 'Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome', 41–50.

[14] T. Fuller, *The Worthies of England*, ed. J. Freeman (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), 133; I. Walton, *The lives of John Donne, Sir Henry Wotton, Richard Hooker, George Herbert and Robert Sanderson*, ed. G. Saintsbury (Oxford: OUP, 1927) [reproduction of 1675 edn. of Hooker's life], 200.

Bancroft's view. Thus only a year or two later, at the beginning of the 1590s, Hooker silently plagiarised and condensed Rainolds' list, in order to signal his dissent from his former patron: the gesture is almost a private joke in the discretion of its reference.[15]

Such a miniature literary fossil in Hooker's text is an indication of how problematically he might have been perceived by his contemporaries. In the feverishly polarized atmosphere of the early 1590s, when the bishops were waging war on churchmen who promoted presbyterianism, Hooker's clash with Travers was in any case a much more salient reason for Puritans to regard him as a marked man. So as early as 1590, we find a passing sneer at Hooker as episcopal lapdog in a polemical work by Job Throckmorton, flamboyant Puritan gentleman and probable mastermind of the scurrilously funny Puritan Martin Marprelate tracts. In the course of a discussion of the question which had divided Travers and Hooker, the fate of papists in the afterlife, Throckmorton snapped that 'in this point if either M. Hooker, M. Some, or all the reverend B[ishops] of the land do stand against us, it shall little dismaie us'—by us, he meant the godly.[16] Anthony Milton has observed that once the presbyterians were officially humiliated and routed by government action in 1591, some of the conformists who had written against them in defence of establishment returned to another form of defence, writing against Rome. Hooker, however, did not.[17] He decided to press on with the work against presbyterianism which he had probably been preparing since his troubles at the Temple had confronted him with Travers, a presbyterian sympathiser red in tooth and claw. Job Throckmorton's anonymously published *Petition to her Majestie* of 1592 is indeed quoted sarcastically in the text of the *Eccle-*

[15] W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, 'The source of Hooker's knowledge of Marsilius of Padua', *JEcclH* 25 (1974): 75–81.

[16] [J. Throckmorton], *M. Some laid open in his colors* ([La Rochelle], 1590, *RSTC* 12342), 29. C. Condren, 'The creation of Richard Hooker's public authority: rhetoric, reputation and reassessment', *J[ournal of] R[eligious] H[istory]* 21 (1997): 35–59, 38, discusses this reference but accepts the older mistaken attribution to John Greenwood: for identification, see P. Milward, *Religious controversies of the Elizabethan Age: a survey of printed sources* (Lincoln, Na., and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 85, no. 311. For Patrick Collinson's renewed doubts about the authorship of the Marprelate Tracts, see *The reign of Elizabeth I: court and culture in the last decade*, ed. J. Guy (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 157–8.

[17] Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 48. The one partial exception is the discussion of confession which now forms part of Bk. VI of the *Lawes*.

siasticall Politie, although we cannot be certain as to whether Hooker could have identified the author.[18]

Hooker's book, the first half of which appeared in 1593, was not to be merely another work of anti-presbyterian polemic: just as well, because after 1591, the struggle with presbyterianism was yesterday's news. Polemic there did remain, and despite Hooker's reputation for 'judiciousness', polemic is plain to see in his text, which sometimes drips with sarcasm. The reader can hardly fail to notice that large sections of the whole work consist of an irritable dialogue with a book published in the mid-1570s by the leading presbyterian theologian Thomas Cartwright, itself a riposte to a work by Hooker's patron Whitgift, and now answered rather belatedly.[19] The occasion of Hooker's publication was also highly partisan: the parliamentary campaign against sectary Protestants which resulted in the first Elizabethan legislation specifically directed towards Protestant rather than Roman Catholic nonconformity.[20] But the scale of Hooker's work was grander than its occasion. Its arguments combated the whole mindset which had created Presbyterianism: those arguments were placed in the framework of a philosophy of human action, motivation and discipline, analysed as an expression of God's law for his creation. Specifically Hooker said in his 1593 advertisement to the reader that these first four published books were about 'generalities', and that the 'particulars' which arose from them were to follow in the next four books.[21]

It is not my purpose to analyse Hooker's *Ecclesiasticall Politie*, rather to describe the reactions of others to it, but something must be said about it to make those reactions comprehensible.[22] Central to the argument was a careful sifting of the ways in which scripture should be used as an authority for Christian life and practice, and the ways in which it should not be. The purpose was to widen the areas which could be

[18] L. H. Carlson, *Martin Marprelate, gentleman: Master Job Throckmorton Laid Open in his Colors* (San Marino, Ca.: Huntington Library, 1981), 117–18, 377.

[19] T. Cartwright, *The second replie . . . agaynst Maister Doctor Whitgiftes second answer* (1575, *RSTC* 4714) and *The rest of the second replie . . . agaynst Master Doctor Whitgifts second answer* (1577, *RSTC* 4715).

[20] On this context, see P. Collinson, 'Richard Hooker and the construction of Christian community', in *RHC*, 149–80, at 161–70.

[21] *FLE* 1:345; cf. also 3:xxiv, n. 18.

[22] The literature on this is vast, but one of the best short guides is provided by Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 2–8. See also Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?* 145–252, and M. Perrott, 'Richard Hooker and the problem of authority in the Elizabethan Church', *JEcclH* 49 (1998): 29–60.

regarded as matters indifferent, *adiaphora*, which might therefore be considered using a variety of norms, and so were open to the authorities of church and commonwealth to regulate in the wider public interest. By meticulous definition and argument, Hooker extended these areas way beyond those which scripturally-minded Protestants would consider appropriate: notably in the field of church government. In such matters which did not affect salvation, the criteria for making decisions were as much the weight of collective past experience and the exercise of God-given reason as the commands of scripture itself. That is not the same, of course, as the common Anglican notion that Hooker created a trinitarian authority of scripture, tradition and reason as the basis of deciding doctrinal questions. Scripture for Hooker remained paramount, even if its competence was given stricter bounds.[23]

The second four books dealt, as Hooker had promised, with the practical outworkings of his principles: first in a massive Book V, the defence of aspects of English church practice attacked by Puritans, then an analysis now partly lost of church penitential discipline (Book VI), followed by a discussion of how to view episcopal authority (Book VII), and finally analysis of the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular political power (Book VIII). Of these other four books, only Book V was published in Hooker's lifetime, and the consequences of that delayed publication we will see unravelling over three centuries. Book V is a remarkable performance in its relentless defence of the exact shape of the 1559 Settlement of Religion—a settlement created by political accidents, consisting of an arbitrary snapshot of the Edwardian church as it had happened to exist in autumn 1552.[24] If some ecclesiastical practice or phenomenon survived through the 1559 Settlement, then Hooker defended it, neither more nor less. After reading Book V, one feels that if the parliamentary legislation of 1559 had prescribed that English clergy were to preach standing on their heads, then Hooker would have found a theological reason for justifying it.

It is possible to see Hooker as still standing in the Reformed Protestant camp, although a recent study by Nigel Atkinson has rather overdone this side of him.[25] Certainly, when setting out to say unconventional

[23] For incisive discussion of this point, see W. D. Neelands in *RHC*, 75–94, esp. 89.

[24] I present the case for this in my *Tudor Church Militant: Edward VI and the Protestant Reformation* (London: Allen Lane, 1999), 191–2.

[25] N. Atkinson, *Richard Hooker and the authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason: Reformed Theologian of the Church of England?* (St. Ives, 1997) is inclined to take too monolithic a

things on predestination, Hooker was extremely careful at least in his works intended for publication not to challenge Reformed orthodoxy too directly. His sacramental views were not in themselves particularly exceptional for a Reformed commentator: nearer to Calvin than to Zwingli in his sacramental outlook, he was typical of English theologians of his time in briskly dismissing Lutheran real presence views of the eucharist as much as the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation.[26] A celebrated section of Book V is a sensuous expression of eucharistic participation, yet it has an impeccably Reformed climax: a rhapsodic quotation which Hooker had borrowed from a twelfth century text edited by a French Reformed pastor.[27] What was individual, however, was what Hooker did with this generally unexceptionable discussion: he deliberately and at some length reemphasised the role of the sacraments and liturgical prayer at the expense of preaching; he felt that the sermon had been over-emphasised in the English Church. The unworthy thought may occur that his reassessment of preaching may have had something to do with the fact that notoriously he was not very good at it. Nevertheless, Hooker valued preaching enough to leave money in his will for a new pulpit in his parish church at Bishopsbourne, and one might more charitably place the origins of his attitude in a wider context: his educational formation and teaching priorities at Oxford.[28] In the later testimony of Daniel Featley in his memorial biography of John Rainolds, Hooker was considered to have made his name as a lecturer in logic, at a time when the nature of the university curriculum encouraged students to make a choice between considering logic or rhetoric a priority. Hooker's Oxford patron, Rainolds, was by contrast, the exponent of rhetorical studies as set out in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as

view of what Reformation Protestantism consisted. For instance, he takes no notice of Hooker's hostility towards Lutheran eucharistic doctrine. More nuanced treatments are W. J. Torrance Kirby, 'Richard Hooker's theory of natural law in the context of Reformation theology', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 30 (1999): 681–703, and Kirby in *RHC*, 219–36.

[26] B. D. Spinks, *Two faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology: sacraments and salvation in the thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1999), is a careful and useful analysis of the subject.

[27] *Lawes* V.67.12; 2:340–3. See Vickers, 'Public and Private Rhetoric', *RHC*, 145, and see commentary on 2:343.6–26 in *FLE* 6(2):770.

[28] Hooker's will of 26 October 1600 is pr. in *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.12–113n; cf. (1888), i.89, n. 1.

Featley also pointed out. It might not therefore be surprising that the master of logic should look down on the claims of pulpit rhetoric.[29]

Whatever its motivation, Hooker's attitude to preaching was not a popular stance to take at the time. One of the major and admirable features of his work is that he was not out to please anyone: he was an unusually wealthy clergyman who had apparently turned away from the clerical career ladder, and he seems to have written to satisfy himself. Despite his discreet questioning of Rainolds's views on episcopacy, he refused to follow fellow-conformist polemicists who increasingly emphasised divine right claims for episcopacy in order to outface divine right claims for presbyterian polity. Indeed, astonishingly, in Book III of his work, he says that it is 'altogether too late' to reintroduce episcopacy into the established Church of Scotland, hardly the sentiment of someone who believes in the universal necessity of bishops in the Church. It is not surprising that when that enthusiast for episcopal apostolicity John Keble quoted (in his 1836 editorial preface to Hooker's works) the passage in which this remark occurs, Hooker's opinion was too much for him to take, and he silently censored it out of the quotation.[30] In a similar independent fashion, when it came to secular government, Hooker did not let his anti-Puritanism take him down the road of producing arguments for divine right secular monarchy, unlike many contemporary ecclesiastical lawyers who might otherwise be congenial to him. For him government or 'dominion' might arise out of direct provision by God, but equally it might arise out of conquest, or—in a statement with major implications for future political theory—an original act of consent by the 'multitude'.[31]

It was this sheer individuality, the variety of hares started by Hooker's indefatigable quest, which was make him such a protean source for commentators in the future. Yet one person would have been pleased if she read the *Ecclesiasticall Politie*: Queen Elizabeth I. Hooker had

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[29] I am indebted to Brian Vickers for making this point about Hooker and logic; we await the published version of his Corpus Christi lecture on logic and rhetoric in Hooker. Featley's biography of Rainolds is tr. in T. Fuller, *Abel Redevivus, or the Dead yet speaking. The lives and deaths of the modern divines*, ed. W. Nichols (2 vols. London 1867): cf. ibid., ii.219.

[30] *Lawes* III.11.16; 1:264.3–15. Cf. quotation at *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i, lxxiv.

[31] *Lawes* VIII.3.1 [Keble, 2.4–2.6]; 3:333–5. On the growing commitment of civil lawyers to absolutist theories in church and state, see J. Guy, in *The reign of Elizabeth I*, ed. Guy, 126–149.

few recorded encounters with the Queen. His one known invitation to preach at Court, immediately after the publication of his Book V in 1598, was in mid-Lent, at the prompting of Archbishop Whitgift, and in view of what we know of Hooker's other ventures into the pulpit, it may have been a particularly penitential Lenten exercise for the ageing monarch.[32] Nevertheless, the accumulated vision of Hooker's work is uncannily close to what we can glean of the idiosyncratic private religious opinions of this very private woman. She too defied contemporary wisdom in her reluctance to characterise Rome as Antichrist; she too was sceptical about excessive claims for episcopacy; she too had an ambiguous attitude to preaching and valued prayer more than sermons; she too loved dignified church ceremonial. Even her views on the eucharist had veered towards Reformed formulations because of her growing irritation with German Lutheran dogmatism, and so she would have sympathised with Hooker's Calvin-like talk of mystical participation.[33]

For the time being, however, Hooker's work was a damp squib. The reading public was perhaps baffled by a work which grounded its assault on its opponents on axioms from Aristotle, Plato and the medieval scholastics, rather than getting straight down to satisfyingly direct insults. Puritanism was in any case more fun than conformist argument: one witness's later memory of the disastrous sales profile was that 'bookes of that Argument and on that parte were not saleable'.[34] In the end Hooker was forced to reduce the price of his book to try to move it along. A few friends and enemies took some notice of him. Thomas Rogers, another conformist client of the bishops, writing some time in the mid-1590s, listed Hooker among the literary enemies of the Cambridge Puritans who were his own enemies in the parishes of West Suffolk, and Rogers went on to cite Hooker elsewhere in his own

[32] P. E. McCullough, *Sermons at Court: politics and religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean preaching* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 97. Hooker's absence from Court preaching is in striking contrast to the constant presence of his close friend Lancelot Andrewes, and is remarkable considering that we know that he had preached at Paul's Cross as long ago as 1581.

[33] S. Doran, 'Elizabeth I's religion: the evidence of her letters', *JEcclH* 51 (2000): 699–720; see also MacCulloch, *Tudor Church Militant*, 185–95.

[34] C. H. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the birth of* The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (Cambridge: CUP, 1940), 134; cf. also ibid., pp. 132, 145, 149, 151, 156.

writings.[35] In 1594 or 5, Hooker's previous tormentor Job Throckmorton (in the one work published under this own name during his lifetime) borrowed a phrase from the *Lawes* about laying aside the gall of bitterness in controversy, and had some polemical fun at Hooker's expense: evidently he disliked Hooker, and was irritated by his affectation of sweet reasonableness.[36] But no wave of criticism appeared to indicate that Hooker's work was considered of great importance: in fact, only one answer to *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* was published before his death, a work entitled *A Christian Letter*.[37] Yet this attack was to prove the beginning of the long contest for the identity of Richard Hooker.

The *Christian Letter* was anonymous, but we can be reasonably certain that it was either exclusively or mainly the work of Andrew Willett. Willett was a prominent Cambridge moderate Puritan, much respected for his attacks on the Church of Rome, which unlike the works of Hooker, were major best-sellers. Willett went on to attack Hooker posthumously in works published in 1603 and 1605.[38] So the world of militant Reformation from which Hooker had emerged was now decisively and openly rejecting him. The *Christian Letter* emphasised in its title and text that its anonymous supposed multiple authors were not nonconformists but 'unfained favourers of the present state of religion': the theme of their work was that Hooker was disloyal to the Church of England. Willett pointed to specific doctrinal features of the *Ecclesiasticall Politie* which 'seeme to overthrow the foundation of Christian Religion, and of the church among us': among them a mishandling of the authority of scripture and its relationship to the use of human reason, a weaken-

[35] Chicago University Joseph Regenstein Library, MS 109, f. 21r. The MS of this short satire clearly postdates the publication of the *Lawes*, and so is later than the accompanying longer MS tract by Rogers of 1590, dealt with by J. Craig, 'The "Cambridge Boies": Thomas Rogers and the "Brethren" in Bury St. Edmunds', in *Belief and Practice in Reformation England: a tribute to Patrick Collinson*, ed. S. Wabuda and C. Litzenberger (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 153–76. For Rogers's citations of Hooker, see ibid., 174n, and T. Rogers, *The Catholic doctrine of the Church of England, an exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, ed. J. J. S. Perowne (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1854), 359.

[36] J. Throckmorton, *The defence of Iob Throkmorton, against the slaunders of Maister Sutcliffe* ([London], 1594, *RSTC* 240555), Sigs. Ciiiv–Civ; cf. Carlson, *Martin Marprelate*, 124.

[37] [?A. Willett], *A Christian Letter, of certaine English Protestantes, unfayned favourers of the present state of English Religion, authorised and professed in England: unto that Reverend and Learned man, Maister R. Hoo. . . .* (Middelburg, 1 599, *RSTC* 13721); the text with Hooker's marginalia is printed in *FLE* 4:1–80.

[38] The case for Willett's authorship is presented in *FLE* 4:xix–xxv. For Willett's later attacks, see Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 17, 20, 128. *RSTC* lists 48 separate pre-1640 edns. of Willett's works (25672–25707), to Hooker's 20 (*RSTC* 13706–13723).

ing of the doctrine of predestination, an underestimation of preaching, and a disrespect for Calvin.[39] Cruelly but effectively, the book climaxed in an attack on Hooker's peculiar method of presenting his arguments, 'so long and tedious, in a stile not usuall'; it elaborated on this in a 252-word-long sentence which was a hilarious and deliberate parody of the Hookerian period.[40]

Relentlessly, Willett claimed that the views that he was championing against Hooker were central to the Church of England. Hooker's already celebrated stylistic moderation signalled his determination to claim the middle ground in the English Church: Willett was determined to seize the same territory for himself. Willett repeatedly put himself on the side of Cranmer and the Edwardian martyrs and even of Archbishop Whitgift (to whom he had dedicated other works). Hooker was the outsider, the deviant from the Church of England's norm. To many Elizabethan readers, it would have seemed a plausible case. Willett was seeking for Hooker something like the fate which had befallen a Cambridge scholar William Barrett, only four years before: for attacking predestinarian doctrine, Barrett had been expelled from the university and not long after, he converted to Roman Catholicism. Presiding over Barrett's humiliation had been Hooker's patron Archbishop Whitgift.[41] *A Christian Letter* was thus a serious attack which could have had dire consequences. Hooker's fury is evident from his surviving manuscript notes on his copy of the *Christian Letter*, which illustrate neither moderation nor judiciousness. But he had little chance to prepare a public answer: he died at his Kentish benefice of Bishopsbourne on 2 November 1600. His friend and admirer Lancelot Andrewes, writing to another close friend only a few days later, lamented their loss, but he was also sadly conscious that most of the Church of England had no idea what it had lost.[42]

At the moment of his death, let us take stock of the man before he passes into myth. Izaak Walton would later want to picture him into a simple country parson, parallel to Walton's literary portrait of George

[39] *ACL*, titlepage; *FLE* 4:6.

[40] *ACL* 45; 4:71.9–72.17.

[41] I am indebted to Peter Lake for this point: P. Lake, 'Business as usual? The immediate reception of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*', *JEcclH* 52 (2001): 456–486, at 460. On Barrett, see H. C. Porter, *Reformation and reaction in Tudor Cambridge* (Cambridge: CUP, 1958), chs. 15–17; on his conversion, ibid., 362–3.

[42] Andrewes to Henry Parry, 7 November 1600, pr. *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836), i.115n–116n.

Herbert, but with an extra dimension: Hooker's humble country garb as described by Walton gave him touches of John the Baptist in the wilderness—the implication being that he made straight the way for the glories of the Anglican Church of Charles II's Restoration.[43] However, even Walton was forced to complicate this picture by a slightly awkward admission that Hooker was a wealthy man when he died. He left around £1100 to his daughters, and his probate inventory reveals the parsonage at Bishopsbourne stuffed with furniture and belongings worth more than £600, including the staggering sum of £300 for his library, which must have been one of the best private book collections of his day.[44] Far from Hooker being a sequestered rural clergyman, the consistent pattern of evidence finds him in London, long after he had left his post at the Temple in 1591. He spent a great deal of time at the home of his father-in-law, a prominent London merchant; his children were baptised and buried not at his country benefices, but in London or Middlesex.[45] His angry annotations to his copy of the *Christian Letter*, evidence of his preoccupations in the last year of his life, show a man still intimately involved in London life: his inside knowledge of the publishing world meant that he knew of books which were still in the press, and in the year that Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* may have been first performed in London, the death of Julius Caesar sprang into his mind as he reflected on Willett's false protestions of friendship.[46] More alarmingly, it had been while walking in the suburbs of London in the early 1590s that he had had an unfortunate though probably innocent encounter with a prostitute which had led to blackmail: it may have been the scandal arising from this murky incident which caused his abrupt resignation of the Temple Church and presentation to an obscure Wiltshire benefice, curtailing any further movement up the

[43] For relevant passages, see Walton, *Lives*, ed. Saintsbury, 166, 216. Walton's original formulations of the Baptist motif were more indirect: Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 89.

[44] Keen, 'Inventory'; cf. Walton, *Lives*, ed. Saintsbury, 229, Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 133, 136, and Hooker's will, pr. *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.112n–113n.

[45] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 124–6.

[46] *Notes* 4:70.15–17 and 4:78.4–7; see also the extended evidence of his dealings with publishers in Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 132–56. Cf. *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.xiv, cxiii. Keble, evidently wishing to protect Hooker's rural seclusion, accounted for his knowledge of current publication plans by saying that Whitgift must have told him. G. M. Young made a similar suggestion about the Julius Caesar reference: *FLE* 4:233–4. I am grateful to Brian Vickers for pointing out the possible significance of Hooker's reference to Cassius and Brutus.

ecclesiastical *cursus honorum* during his short life. Finally, it was while travelling back from London to Kent that he caught the cold which led to his death.[47]

This rather metropolitan, not to say cosmopolitan, Hooker was lost to sight after his death by the confusion and ill-will into which his family fell: bitter quarrels between his executors, his wife and daughters and his wife's second husband led to a proliferation of lawsuits over his wealth, all rediscovered sixty years ago by C. H. Sisson. The epic struggle was notorious: that most metropolitan of dramatists Ben Jonson even took the gossip about it as far as Edinburgh when he visited the poet William Drummond of Hawthornden, eighteen years after Hooker's death.[48] The result was gradually to remove the real Hooker from the scene. He received no monument until 1635; it was not put up by his family, and managed to get the date of his death wrong by three years. His daughter's gravestone of 1649 confusedly boasted that he had been Dean of Salisbury.[49] By the later 1650s, those trying to produce memoirs of him even thought that he had died unmarried, and once more got his death-date wrong. Yet meanwhile, the obscure and slightly controversial figure of Hooker was being transformed into an iconic and much-contested authority.

The process began in 1603 with an attempt to answer Willett's *Christian Letter*, entitled *A just and temperate defence*.[50] It proclaimed itself as 'published by authority', which was nothing less than the truth, because it was written by William Covell, a chaplain of the man who was about to succeed John Whitgift as Archbishop of Canterbury, Richard Bancroft. Moreover, it had been licensed for publication by a chaplain of Whitgift, one John Buckeridge, and the combination of author and licenser is a significant one. Buckeridge was a prime representative of a new element in the establishment of the English Church. He was a colleague and friend of William Laud at St. John's Oxford, though since he was an older and more senior man than Laud, it makes little sense to call him and those like him Laudians. The term 'High Church' is likewise too blunt an instrument for Buckeridge's

[47] Walton, *Lives*, ed. Saintsbury, 223. For the story of the prostitute, see *The works of Mr. Richard Hooker (that learned, godly, judicious and eloquent Divine)…with an account of his holy life and happy death*…ed. J. Gauden (London: J. Best, 1662; Wing H. 2630), 32–3.

[48] *Conversations of Ben Jonson with William Drummond of Hawthornden* (London: Gay and Bird, 1906), ed. P. Sidney, 20.

[49] Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 126.

[50] *RSTC* 5881.

new mood of sacramentalism, clericalism and distaste for the style of the earlier English Reformation: the most accurate recent description, used by Peter Lake and Anthony Milton, is 'avant-garde conformist'. That distinguishes Buckeridge and his fellows from two generations of conformists like Whitgift and Bancroft, who had not so decisively parted with the Reformed mainstream of the rest of Europe.[51]

Already, therefore, one party in the Church was reaching out to embrace Hooker: a party with a very definite agenda to move the Church on and refashion in its own mould England's worship, theology and general ecclesiastical style. That was not, of course, how Covell presented his task. He repeatedly stressed Hooker's 'temperate' or 'grave' moderation: this was essential if he was to counter Willett's effort to push Hooker to the margins of the Church. In reality, however, as Peter Lake has recently pointed out, Covell sharpened every one of the positions which Willett had attacked in Hooker, at the same time quoting extensively and generally without acknowledgement directly from the *Ecclesiasticall Politie*. Attack for Covell was the best form of defence. On the inflammatory question of the Church of Rome, for instance, he was much more explicit than Hooker had been in saying that members of the Church of Rome could live and die in that Church and be saved. He even implied that all who denied Rome to be a true church were Puritans. This was heady stuff at the time; it was an early instance of the rhetorical strategy whereby those who criticised Hooker might be labelled Puritans, and could thus be written off as having nothing to do with the Church of England. Covell indeed wrote with more sympathy about moderate Roman Catholic authors than he did about Puritans.[52] The only point where Covell beat a strategic retreat in the face of an attack by Willett on Hooker's message was on predestination. Here Covell rather unhappily asserted a fairly orthodox Reformed position, said that the whole matter was a mystery, and for once, did not assert the essential clarity of Hooker's position. The Barrett affair was too recent for comfort; it was not yet time for avant-garde conformists to show their hand on predestination.[53]

So now the avant-garde conformists were choosing those aspects of Hooker's work which eloquently and at length defended their case,

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[51] Cf. e.g. discussion in Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 8–9. On Buckeridge, see ibid., index s.v. Buckeridge, John.

[52] Lake, 'Business as usual?', 456–459; Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 240.

[53] Lake, 'Business as usual?', 475–481.

and they were using his 'moderation' to manoeuvre themselves into the rhetorical centre-ground of the Church. It was a strategy with a major long-term future. One of the earliest quotations of Hooker by a conformist writer after Covell is a passing piece of anti-Puritan abuse from Hooker's Preface to the *Lawes*; it comes from Thomas Rogers, like Covell a client of Bancroft, in 1607.[54] Only eighteen years after Hooker's death Ben Jonson, a good hater of Puritans, could tell William Drummond in Scotland that Hooker's book was authoritative in England 'for church matters'.[55] Hooker could be quarried for two themes which appealed to avant-garde conformists: his polemical role against Puritans and his conciliatory attitude to the Church of Rome. But Hooker's stance on Rome had a wider use. It became unexpectedly fashionable with the accession of James VI to the English throne. Despite the unfortunate hiccup caused by Guy Fawkes's spirited attempt to remove James and his Parliament from the scene, a major element of James's policy was a national and international ecumenicism. At home, he wanted to reconcile his Roman Catholic subjects to his rule, as he had done so successfully in Scotland; thus when the new English order of baronets was instituted in 1611, prominent Roman Catholics were among the leading beneficiaries (albeit at a price).[56] Internationally, James made overtures to Rome for the general reunion of Christendom, and he was even prepared to suggest that the Pope could be the patriarch of a reunited Church.[57] So an author who provided a sustained rhetoric of moderation on this subject was liable to find his stock suddenly rising.

Particularly unexpected was a client base which Hooker's work now developed on top of this: English Roman Catholic propagandists. Professor Conal Condren first drew our attention to the use which Catholics could make of a Church of England writer who denigrated Puritans, and who might be taken as readjusting the role of scripture in discussing questions of doctrinal authority. Hooker could be read as stressing the importance of tradition as an arbiter of doctrine. If such an author says such things, the argument ran, then the Catholic case is

[54] 1607: Rogers, *Catholic doctrine of the Church of England*, ed. Perowne, 359.

[55] *Conversations of Jonson with Drummond*, ed. Sidney, 20.

[56] P. Croft, 'The Catholic gentry, the Earl of Salisbury and the Baronets of 1611', in *Conformity and orthodoxy in the English Church, c. 1560–1660*, ed. P. Lake and M. Questier, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000), 262–81.

[57] W. B. Patterson, *King James I and the reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997).

made by the Church's opponents: this was a particularly effective line in the atmosphere created by James I's ecumenical busyness. However, if this strategy was to work, it was essential for Roman Catholics to stress the authority of Hooker's works. A precocious example of this was provided in the Parliament of 1604, when a crypto-Papist MP, John Good, got up and attacked Puritans as being no better than Protestant sectaries. This was a standard innuendo promoted in the *Ecclesiasticall Politie*, and it was grist to Good's mill to quote the book which he styled the 'absolute and unanswerable works of reverend Mr. Hooker'.[58] The move is soon after exemplified in print, first in the writings of an adroit pseudonymous Catholic writing under the name John Brereley. Brereley's 1608 *Protestant's Apology for the Roman Church* is entirely based on the technique of quoting Protestants to make Roman Catholic arguments. In using Hooker and Covell, he takes them as representative of the Church of England, punctiliously pointing out that Covell had published his work with Bancroft's authority.[59]

Brereley's writings provoked response and counter-response for half a century, and his strategy on Hooker became common in Roman Catholic polemic throughout the seventeenth century, as both Professor Condren and Dr Michael Brydon have demonstrated at length.[60] It also achieved results. For instance, Elizabeth Lady Falkland (authoress, translator, and mother of the patron of the Great Tew circle) said of her conversion to Catholicism around 1604, that the *Lawes* 'had left her hanging in the air; for having brought her so far (which she thought he did very reasonably) she saw not how, nor at what, she could stop, till she returned to the Church from whence they were come'. Equally, James II attributed his conversion primarily to reading Hooker. This

[58] Lake, 'Business as usual?', 483.

[59] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', discusses Brereley at 40–1: however, at 40, and nn. 25–27, Condren mistakes Robert Parsons's references to Richard Hooker's uncle, the chronicler John Hooker alias Vowell, as referring to Richard Hooker himself. This is impossible in the context: cf. N. D. [R. Parsons], *A treatise of three conversions of England from Paganisme to Christian Religion*…([St. Omer, F. Bellet] 1604, *RSTC* 19416), 92, 162, 169, 623. [J. Anderton], J. Brereley, *pseud.*, *The Protestants Apologie for the Roman Church* (St. Omer, 1608, *RSTC* 3604.5), 169.

[60] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 41–2; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 123–6. For an illustration of the long-term resonances of the Brereley debate through the writings of William Laud and beyond, see [T. Thorold], T. Carwell, *pseud.*, *Labyrinthus Cantuariensis: or Doctor Lawd's labyrinth* (Paris: John Billaine, 1658, Wing C.721), 93–6.

is a backhanded tribute to Hooker's authority.[61] Such Roman Catholic use of Hooker may have been the origin of the almost certainly spurious anecdote in Izaak Walton that Pope Clement VIII expressed his admiration for Hooker's writings when two leading English Catholic clergy read out extracts to him, translating into Latin as they went along.[62] In fact Hooker was never put into print in Latin and thus never gained an international audience, despite an early hint in the 1620s from William Camden that such a translation would be a good idea, and despite a complete effort from Bishop John Earle which remained in manuscript and was then lost.[63] Hooker's impact remained entirely confined within the English-speaking world.

The mischievous Roman Catholic praise of Hooker would have to be answered. One possibility would be to ignore him, and thus deny him authority, and for many Puritan-minded heirs of Andrew Willett, this was the answer. The great Puritan lecturer Samuel Ward of Ipswich conspicuously failed to include Hooker's works in the town library whose contents he masterminded for the benefit of his successors as borough lecturers.[64] The Calvinist Bishop William Bedell, the beginning of whose career was spent in Ward's world of East Anglian Puritanism, in 1630 said briskly and without hint of apology about his personal library 'Mr Hooker I have not'.[65] This was hardly surprising, since Bedell recalled on another occasion that his friend James Wadsworth, another Suffolk parson and eventual convert to Rome, had picked up anti-Calvinist

[61] On Lady Falkland, Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 123; on James II, *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.civ–cv, and J. Miller, *James II: a study in kingship* (Hove: Wayland, 1978), 57–8. Michael Brydon observes how little Hooker was used by Anglicans in the polemical battle with Roman Catholics in James II's reign, and attributes that to the success of earlier Catholic exploitation of Hooker's writings: Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 140–2.

[62] Walton, *Lives*, ed. Saintsbury, 211–12.

[63] For efforts and proposals to translate Hooker, see Walton, *Lives*, ed. Saintsbury, 213–14; *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.92n–3n; R. Eccleshall, 'Richard Hooker and the peculiarities of the English: the reception of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* in the 17th and 18th centuries', *History of Political Thought* 2.1 (Spring 1981): 63–117, at 68; H. R. Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1987), 191; *Dictionary of National Biography*, *s.v.* Earle, John; C. H. Miller, 'Seventeenth-Century Latin Translations of Two English Masterpieces: Hooker's *Polity* and Browne's *Religio Medici*', *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Abulensis: Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies Avila 4–9 August 1997* (*Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies*, ccvii, 2000), 55–72.

[64] J. Blatchly, *The Town Library of Ipswich . . . a history and catalogue* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1989), 79. Whitgift, Bridges and Saravia were also absent.

[65] Spinks, *Two faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology*, 168.

notions in youth by misreading the works of Hooker, Bancroft and Hooker's friend Hadrian Saravia, misunderstanding them as opposing Calvin's doctrine as well as Calvinist discipline.[66]

A more constructive line would be to reclaim Hooker for the mainstream and stress his Protestant arguments against Rome: find in him an acceptable champion of the Reformed Church, and range him alongside other great names of the cause. This seems to have been the agenda behind a burst of publication of Hooker's lesser works in 1612–14 by Henry Jackson, assistant to Hooker's literary executor, Dr John Spenser, Rainolds's successor as President of Corpus Christi College. Jackson provided prefaces for two of these works, printed in Oxford by the university printer. The first, prefacing Hooker's *Discourse of Justification*, spoke of the necessity of publication because 'it will free the Author from the suspition of some errours, which he hath been thought to have favoured', and Jackson darkly added the Latin proverb 'he who lacks an enemy will be crushed by his friends'.[67] The most obvious candidate for this thrust of Jackson's was Hooker's defender Covell. Notably, this work merited a second edition in 1613: interest in Hooker was evidently picking up. Jackson's second preface, to the 1614 publication of Hooker's early and notably Reformed sermons on Jude, was even more remarkable: it managed to omit any mention of Hooker by name, and concentrated on a passionate defence of that flower of Reformation martyrs, Bishop Hugh Latimer, against attacks by papists.[68] That was product placement with a vengeance.

A useful literary trope used by other forward Protestants was to take the happy coincidence of three recent members of Corpus Christi College who were all Devon men—John Jewel, John Rainolds and Richard Hooker—and treat them as a trio: that necessarily associated Hooker with two safely Protestant names. This is what was done in the memorial biography for Dr Rainolds written by his relative Daniel Featley, later to be chaplain to George Abbot, the eminent Reformed divine who became Archbishop of Canterbury: the three Corpus men

[66] Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 427.

[67] 'Cui deerat inimicus, per amicos oppressus': R. Hooker, *A learned discourse of justification, workes, and how the foundation of faith is overthrowne* (Oxford, 1612, *RSTC* 13708), Preface, sig. A2, *FLE* 5:170. John Keble commented sourly on Jackson that he was 'evidently of the Reynolds school in theology': *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) 1.xlviii.

[68] R. Hooker, *Two sermons upon part of S. Judes epistle* (Oxford, 1614, *RSTC* 13723), Preface, *FLE* 5; 5–57, *passim.*

were 'Devonienses triumviros literatos'.[69] The establishment Calvinist and Oxford divine Dr George Hakewill used the same conceit in 1627 when he dedicated his best-selling book on providence to the University of Oxford; in the main text of the same work, Hakewill was careful further to associate Hooker with the great names of the European Reformation, Zwingli and Bullinger.[70]

With Hooker thus safely reclaimed, the old-guard mainstream of the Jacobean Church could give him due praise and put him to use.[71] They tended to cite what he said on fairly minor matters, but not always. Samuel Ward of Sidney Sussex College Cambridge, a different man from the Puritan lecturer of Ipswich, but also a hero of the godly and a devout disciple of William Perkins, approved strongly of Hooker's views on the eucharist. In good Calvinist fashion, he disapproved of the general run of English Protestant sacramental discussion because it minimized the efficacy of the sacraments: he termed this view 'obsignation', something closer to Zürich than to Geneva. As a healthier viewpoint, more than once he recommended what Hooker had to say about the sacraments.[72] When the moderate Puritan and future bishop Joseph Hall preached the keynote sermon to the clergy of the Convocation of Canterbury in 1624, he placed Hooker in a succession of twenty-one leading scholarly lights of the Church since the Reformation; together they made the learning of the English clergy '*stupor mundi*', the wonder of the world. The list began with Jewel, and thereafter it was weighted towards Reformed heroes, so that Hooker was to be found cheek by jowl with the great Puritan best-seller William Perkins as well as with anti-Calvinist John Overall, but even more remarkably, with his erstwhile tormentor Andrew Willett![73]

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[69] Collinson, 'Hooker and the construction of Christian community', 158.

[70] G. Hakewill, *An apologie of the power and providence of God in the government of the world* (3rd edn. Oxford: University Press, 1635, *RSTC* 12613), sig. A2v; Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 41. It is interesting to find Gauden, the deliberately moderate biographer of Hooker, reviving the 'triumvirate' trope in 1662: *Works of Hooker*, ed. Gauden, 10.

[71] See Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 533, and Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 27–9, for a number of examples.

[72] Spinks, *Two faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology*, 164–5. For Hooker's later influence on sacramental discussion by the Calvinist Edward Reynolds, see B. Spinks, *Sacraments, ceremonies and the Stuart Divines: sacramental theology and liturgy in England and Scotland 1603–1662* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

[73] Text cited in P. Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants: the Church in English Society, 1559–1625* (Oxford: OUP, 1982), 92n.

But Hooker the respectable Protestant divine could be challenged by Hooker the Protestant ceremonialist and theologian of the middle way, in order to aid and comfort the growing power of Laudianism in the English Church in the last years of James I and in the reign of Charles I. On ceremonies, Hooker did not entirely chime in with Laudian preoccupations: he couched his defence of them too much for Laudian sensibilities in terms of legal validity and 'things indifferent', rather than affirming their directly divine institution.[74] However, his exhaustive discussion of ceremonies in Book V could hardly be other than a resource for the ceremonially-minded, and there was much else in Hooker for Laudians to savour. All those avant-garde aspects of his work which Covell had emphasised against Willett were there for the heirs of Covell and Buckeridge to seize on and develop, much to the shock and fury of the conformist mainstream in the Church hierarchy.[75] The Laudians increasingly emphasised their own centrality at the expense of the Church's old guard—and not simply in the English Church, but a wider centrality in the riven state of Latin Christianity. Laudians developed the ecumenicism promoted by King James by repositioning the Church of England as the representative of true Catholicism, standing aloof from most Protestants as well as from the Church of Rome. Thus in July 1624 one of the most uninhibited spokesmen of the movement, Richard Montague, said that he sought a Church of England that would 'stand in the gapp against Puritanisme and Popery, the Scilla and Charybdis of antient piety'.[76] This was the beginning of *via media* discussion, which would have a major future in the Anglican tradition. Hooker's precocious irenicism towards Rome and his constant stress on the Aristotelian mean were of great use here.

Besides Hooker's irenicism, his moderation was important. That had been part of his literary self-image, and undoubtedly it formed an authentic part of his personal style in life. The earliest effort at quasi-biographical description of him, John Spenser's preface to the 1604 edition of the *Lawes*, had stressed his 'soft and mild disposition'.[77]

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[74] Cf. Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 496–7. Prynne and Burton were quick to seize on this contrast between Hooker and the Laudians: Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 31–2.

[75] For examples of such reaction, see Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 533; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 28–9 (on Robert Sanderson).

[76] *Correspondence of Cosin*, Surtees Soc. 1869, xxi, cited in Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 21.

[77] *FLE* 1:347.

Given the Laudian claim to represent the centre ground of English religion in the face of opposition from much of the rest of the Church, it was particularly useful for the Laudians to celebrate the moderate style and measured learning of Hooker. So it seems to have been the Laudians who first made much of the adjective which would come to characterise the man: 'judicious Hooker'. An early instance came in 1631, in a book by the Laudian William Page aimed against William Prynne and defending bowing at the name of Jesus.[78] Not long afterwards the sacramentally-minded Kentish gentleman William Cowper, who with the encouragement of his Laudian incumbent finally provided a monument for Hooker at Bishopsbourne in 1635, added the description 'judicious' to Hooker's name when he made an English translation of a Latin epitaph for him. By 1675, after much emphasis on the 'judicious Hooker' in Izaak Walton's biography, it was enough of a cliché to need no explanation in the title of a Hooker selection entitled *Judicious Hooker's illustrations of Holy Scripture.*[79]

Laudian celebration of Hooker brought him his most socially exalted admirer yet: King Charles I. Sir Philip Warwick, servant to the King during the 1640s, reminisced that 'Bishop Andrewes, Laud and Hooker were this Prince's three great authors'.[80] This is not surprising, given the crucial role of Lancelot Andrewes at the beginning of the 1620s in turning Charles away from the international Reformed tradition in which his father and elder brother had stood: a role satisfyingly exposed recently by Peter McCullough.[81] Andrewes, one of the literary executors and consistent champion of Hooker, would naturally point the King to his work; after that, in the 1630s Andrewes and Hooker were destined habitually to be paired by Laudians as reliable precursors of their own activity.[82] Laud himself naturally reinforced Andrewes's message about Hooker. In 1636, as Chancellor of Oxford, he masterminded Charles's

[78] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 30: W. Page, *A treatise or justification of bowing at the name of Jesus* (Oxford: John Lichfield, 1631, *RSTC* 19096), dedicatory.

[79] Wing H. 2634: no editor is named. Cf. Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 52 for another instance from the 1650s, by the Laudian Sir Robert Shirley. On John Warner, incumbent of Bishopsbourne in the 1630s, ibid., 31.

[80] *Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642*, ed. Fincham, 42

[81] McCullough, *Sermons at Court*, 200–9.

[82] E.g. in the charge by Bishop Skinner of Bristol to his Dorset clergy in 1637: *Early Stuart Church*, ed. Fincham, 81. For Laudian adaptation of Andrewes to their purposes in a similar fashion to Hooker, see N. Tyacke, 'Lancelot Andrewes and the myth of Anglicanism', in *Conformity and Orthodoxy*, ed. Lake and Questier, 5–33, especially 7 and 12.

visit to the University with his brother-in-law the Elector Palatine. The University authorities made a point of presenting a copy of Hooker's works to the exiled Elector while Charles looked on: a delicate instance of their habitual sensitivity to the enthusiasms of the great and the good.[83] Charles's devotion to Hooker was displayed as much in the worst as in the best of times. In an appendix to his supposed meditations before his death, the mammoth best-seller *Eikon Basilike*, his daughter Princess Elizabeth recalled that in their last interview 'Hee bid mee read Bishop Andrew's Sermons, Hooker's Ecclesiastical Politie, and Bishop Laud's Book against Fisher'.[84] So Hooker was thereafter canonised by association in the martyrology of a Laudian saint. The association would moreover suggest that Hooker's undoubted defence of reverent ceremonial was paired with an advocacy of the sort of divine right principles advocated by the martyred King: an assumption which, as we have already begun to note, was not justified.

At the same time, Hooker took on a different valence. He became a hero of the loose grouping of intellectuals who gathered round the second Viscount Falkland at his Oxfordshire mansion at Great Tew, notably the polymath scholar William Chillingworth. The group equally deplored Reformation dogmatism and the new clericalist ceremonialism of the Laudians, even though Chillingworth was a personal friend of Laud. Chillingworth, a convert to Rome who had then thought better of it, was well aware of the misuse of Hooker by Brereley and similar Catholic writers, and the chief themes which they had explored were also what attracted him in Hooker: the discussion of reason, to which Hooker appeals so much throughout his work, and of moderation, a quality which meant much to the Great Tew circle. Reason and moderation were concepts equally important to Laud and his associates, but they heard very different things when they read of these concepts in Hooker. The contrast was at its most stark on the subject of reason. For Chillingworth, reason was principally a faculty of the individual mind, brought to bear on problems of scriptural authority as a final court of appeal; it became virtually his primary authority in matters

[83] P. Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus, or the history of the Life and Death of… William by divine providence, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury…* (London: A. Seile, 1668; Wing H. 1699), 318. For an early instance of Laud quoting Hooker in a sermon before James I, see his Court sermon of 24 March 1622: McCullough, *Sermons at Court*, microfiche listing of sermons, s.v. 24 March 1622.

[84] [J. Gauden], *Eikon Basilike…* (London, 1649, Wing E.277A), appended material, 9 (copy in my possession; pagination is irregular).

of belief. For Laud, tussling with concepts of the Church's authority promoted by Roman Catholics in his 'conference' with 'Fisher the Jesuit', reason was a communal wisdom, to be associated closely with the tradition of the Church. Church tradition was not something which was divinely instituted, but controlled by God's gift of reason. In this three-cornered contest for the meaning of reason and authority between Chillingworth, Laud, and the Jesuit Fisher, Hooker was an ambiguous force, whose pronouncements were sufficiently capacious for all sides to be able to quote him.[85]

The crowning testimony to Hooker's early Stuart reputation, finally nailing into place his authority in relation to the Church of England, came paradoxically from a set of fierce critics in Scotland. Their venom had been aroused by the political crisis provoked by Charles I's mishandling of his northern kingdom and imposition of a new Prayer Book in 1637. In the national revolution which followed, the Scots' aim was to reject what they saw as English arrogance and ecclesiastical imperialism. Charles I's theological hero made a good figurehead to attack. When in 1637 George Gillespie published his *Dispute against the English-Popish ceremonies obtruded upon the Church of Scotland*, Hooker was the first English theologian whom Gillespie named as part of the assault on Scottish purity. With Gillespie, as Condren observed, we have returned to the Hooker of Willett's assault. Brydon has pointed out that significantly Gillespie's vitriol was republished in 1660: it became part of the Presbyterian effort to resist a partisan Anglican settlement of the Church question in the three kingdoms.[86]

Other Scots were perhaps more discriminating than Gillespie in their hostility to Hooker, but only because they hated Archbishop Laud more. So Robert Baillie in his vicious literary attack on Laud in 1640 contrasted the work of Laud and his associates in virtually restoring the mass with the earlier and slightly less offensive eucharistic discussion of 'Andrews, Hooker, Mountague, or the grossest of the English Divines'.[87]

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[85] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 45–6; Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 71–4.

[86] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 42–3: G. Gillespie, *A dispute against the English-Popish ceremonies obtruded upon the Church of Scotland, Wherein not only our own arguments against the same are strongly confuted, but likewise the answers and defences of our opposites, such as Hooker, Mortoune, Burges, Spring, Paybody, Andrewes, Saravia, Tilen, Spotiswood, Lindsey, Forbesse &c., Particularly confuted* (Edinburgh [Leiden: W. Christiaens], 1637, *RSTC* 11896). Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 60.

[87] R. Baillie, *Ladensium autokatakrisis, the Canterburians self-conviction*…(Amsterdam, 1640, *RSTC* 1206), 109.

There is much truth in the aphorism of Conal Condren that Hooker's reputation as authoritative representative of the Church of England was 'assured by an uneasy alliance of his church's enemies'—Jesuits on the one hand, and angry Scots Presbyterians on the other.[88] It was an astonishing turnaround in the fortunes of the man who at his death had seemed to be the author of a large and unsuccessful work of conformist propaganda. In the forty years from 1600, Hooker's big book had been transformed into a great book. Protean Hooker had become a standard-bearer for a bizarre spectrum of moderate Protestants, high-flying Laudians, gentle rationalists at Great Tew and converts to Roman Catholicism. But there was more to come.

With the outbreak of civil war in 1642, England dissolved into more than political and social confusion: the new and uncontrollable situation produced ideological confusion and bewilderment. Any writer like Hooker who represented stability and continuity was therefore at a premium. His varied old admirers predictably clung to him throughout the next two decades. So apologists for the old Prayer Book like Anthony Sparrow, Henry Hammond or Peter Heylyn found him their mainstay.[89] Admirers of the shattered episcopal Church of England began taking a belated interest in finding out who Hooker actually was: so Thomas Fuller in his *Church-History* of 1655 began to scrape together what he could find about the man's life. Even the defenders of what little stability had been re-established in the 1650s tried to use Hooker's name: nervous Presbyterians worried about Independents and the excesses of the radical sects, and apologists for Interregnum governments who were trying to persuade recalcitrant Anglicans to offer de facto allegiance and ecclesiastical conformity to the new order in church and state.[90] The one significant silence comes from the man who most passionately sought stability after the national catastrophe, but did so in his own distinctively bleak fashion: Thomas Hobbes. It is not surprising that the sacramental mysticism of Hooker's theology, his moderation and his defence of the Church's distinctive identity, should hold little appeal for the expounder of an ultra-Erastian absolutism.

Nevertheless Hooker was beginning to take on wider political significance because the full scope of his writings was now being put

[88] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 43.
[89] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 66–67; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 47–8.
[90] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 88; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 42–4, 51.

into print. It will be remembered that at his death, three of the eight books of the *Lawes* were still in manuscript. Despite several proclamations of intent to get these properly published, nothing had been done, for reasons which are still not entirely clear, but which to begin with had a great deal to do with the vicious infighting and lawsuits among Hooker's heirs and literary executors.[91] The monument put up to him in 1635 made a point of stating that the three last books 'desiderantur', were lost, but that was not true. There may indeed have been a deliberate ambiguity in the inscription, for a second resonance of the verb 'desiderantur', if the epitaph had added a qualifying 'adhuc' ('still' or 'hitherto'), would be that the books were looked for, and that their absence should be ended. Part of Book VI was indeed lost for ever during the early seventeenth century, and what remained of it included a long section on the practice of confession which now seems curiously incongruous with the general thrust of the *Lawes*, since it is directed against Roman Catholics rather than presbyterian Puritans.[92] However, Books VII, on episcopacy, and Book VIII, on church and state, remained intact, although to varying degrees not in a final polished state. They were always well known to some through manuscript circulation: Lancelot Andrewes, for instance, was able to quote from Book VIII in a sermon preached before James I in 1606, although he did not acknowledge the citation in print.[93]

What is interesting is that after the dust of the Hooker family lawsuits had begun to settle in the 1630s, and the manuscript books were safe in the hands of reliable leading churchmen like Archbishop Laud, they were still not finally put into print. This may well have been not because they were unknown, but because their content was only too well known. In Book VII Hooker had been unacceptably minimalist in Laudian eyes on the apostolic origins of the episcopate, in line with the fact that in Book III, he had already written off episcopacy in James VI's Church of Scotland. Equally, in Book VIII, he did not uphold the universal divine right of monarchs, and he enlarged on the theme of an

[91] There has been much recent sensible discussion of this complicated problem: for the most definitive analysis, see *FLE* 3:xiii–lxxv, but see also Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, *passim*.

[92] For a useful analysis of the problem, see A. S. McGrade, "Repentance and spiritual power: Book VI of Richard Hooker's *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*", *JEcclH* 29 (1978): 163–76.

[93] *FLE* 3:xix, n. 10. Steven McGrade lists various examples of stylistic incongruity in Book VII in *FLE* 6(1):309n; see also his discussion *FLE* 6(1):243–46.

original contract between governed and governors. His stance should not surprise us. The man who had financially underwritten Hooker's original publications, his friend Edwin Sandys, was an enthusiastic conformist in the religious terms of the late Elizabethan Church, but Sandys had gone on after Hooker's death to be a major thorn in the side of Jacobean government: suspected by some of republicanism, and capable in 1614 of asserting that a king was elected 'with reciprocal conditions betweene King and People'.[94]

With such associations, an extended version of Hooker was not what the ruling clique in church and state wanted to read in the 1630s. Laud's Victorian admirer John Keble did his best delicately to extenuate what he clearly suspected was deliberate suppression on Laud's part: 'a false notion might prevail, of undue countenance likely to be afforded to the innovators by certain portions.'[95] There were indeed many who gave the missing text an eager audience; manuscripts of Book VIII were in particular demand.[96] It is possible that when the Westminster Parliament confiscated Laud's copies of Hooker's manuscripts in 1641 and put them in the hands of the leading radical preacher Hugh Peter, the intention was to publish them in order to damage Laud and the King's party. In the end publication of Books VI and VIII had to wait until 1648, and it was the responsibility of Archbishop James Ussher, former discreet opponent of Laud and now focus for many of hopes for a moderate Protestant settlement.[97]

With this 1648 publication began a new and paradoxical phenomenon: the efforts of some High Churchmen and exponents of royal divine right to combat or discredit the newly-revealed message of Hooker; this was matched by an interest in Hooker from some who supported the new order in church and state. The leading contribution on divine right was the work of Sir Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha*, which during the 1650s gradually emerged into the general political consciousness in the same manner as Hooker, through the circulation of manuscript copies. Filmer, probably originally writing in the early 1630s, had argued that absolute monarchical power derived from the original power enjoyed

[94] *RHC*, 308n, 340.
[95] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.xxiv.
[96] On the popularity of Book VIII, *FLE* 3:xxix. Keble also noticed this phenomenon: *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.xxiv–xxiv.
[97] On Hugh Peter, Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 41. On Ussher's earlier publication of a minor Hooker text in 1641, see R. P. Almasy in *RHC*, 183–201.

by fathers over their households: an idea which Hooker explicitly rejected. Encountering the manuscript versions of Hooker's Book VIII, with their objectionable message of an original contract, Filmer could hardly belittle the great man, given the reputation which the published portion of Hooker's work enjoyed among Laudians. His reaction was to express rhetorical respect for Hooker's authority, ranking him along with Aristotle as a giant, while describing himself as a dwarf in their company: this was a springboard for selective and minimal quotation from Hooker's work.

Already in 1658 Edward Gee, Presbyterian propagandist for Interregnum government, could in response use Hooker in his attack on Filmer's still-manuscript work, in order to propound a theory of government based on original consent by the people: even to justify the deposition of usurpers.[98] This was prophetic of how the political Hooker would be positioned in the future. Equally prophetic was Jeremy Taylor's silence in January 1660 about Hooker's last three books. With the exciting prospect of a new religious dispensation in the three kingdoms, he recommended to Irish friends a list of books to form the basis of a reliable Anglican library. He must have known of Archbishop Ussher's 1648 publication of books VI and VIII, but he only mentioned Hooker's first five, highlighting Book V on liturgy.[99]

For now in 1660 came the collapse of Interregnum government and the restoration of Charles II. The immediate problem to be solved was the future shape of English religion. Could the English Church be rebuilt on the basis of episcopacy, yet heal the wounds of the previous twenty years and recreate the Protestant comprehensiveness which it had enjoyed in the reign of James I? There were many who wished this to happen: both episcopalians and moderate Presbyterians. Others among the returning royalist exiles and among the royalist gentry of the English provinces were determined to take revenge on those who had helped to destroy not just the king but the old Church and commonwealth, and as part of that revenge, they intended to draw the boundaries of conformity as narrowly as any pre-war Laudian would

[98] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 89–90; Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 47–9. Both provide other examples of radical uses of Hooker during the Interregnum. See also Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 36, on Henry Parker, and J. Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft shaken: the Church of England and its enemies, 1660–1730* (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 204, on James Harrington.

[99] C. McKelvie, 'Jeremy Taylor's recommendations for a library of Anglican theology (1660)', *Irish Booklore* 4.2 (1980): 96–103 (I owe this reference to Jessica Martin).

have wished. Among this latter group was a determined set of clergy led by a politician of genius, Gilbert Sheldon, who soon became Archbishop of Canterbury: we may safely call them Anglicans, and soon the most extreme and politically active among them would acquire the label of High Churchmen. The question now was which party could most effectively shape the identity of the new Church. It will be no surprise to discover that the identity of Richard Hooker was part of the answer to that question.

The moderates did their best to claim back Hooker for themselves, just as their predecessors had tried to do in the 1620s. They included no less a figure than Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, a veteran of the pre-war Great Tew circle, and despite much bitterness which he had accumulated over two decades, now doing his best as chief minister of the Crown to stem the tide of Cavalier extremism and the hard line of the clerical grouping around Gilbert Sheldon.[100] It is well known that the opening sentence of Clarendon's *History of the Great Rebellion* is an imitation of the opening sentence of Hooker's Preface in the *Ecclesiasticall Politie*; Hugh Trevor-Roper went so far as to say that Clarendon intended his work 'to be the secular counterpart' of the *Lawes*.[101] However, Dr Jessica Martin's research has revealed two other significant examples of the same phenomenon: the first sentences in biographies of two moderate Protestant figures of the pre-1640 era, Bishop Thomas Morton and Robert Sanderson.[102] Biography was now to prove the chief battle-ground for Hooker.

The cue in this had been given by the biographical fragments published from 1655 onwards by Thomas Fuller. Despite the compliments which Fuller heaped on Hooker, the result was by no means hagiography. Not once but twice Fuller alludes to the story of Hooker's blackmail by a London prostitute, part of the hidden reputation of the great divine which had not previously surfaced in print. Notably, in Fuller's extended account in the *Church-History* of the row between Travers and Hooker, there is more praise of Travers than of Hooker, including the fact that Travers was a much better preacher, and there is a definite suggestion that Hooker came off worst in the whole affair. Fuller was also careful to minimise the hostility between the presbyterian

[100] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 72 and n. 31.

[101] Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans*, 191.

[102] J. Martin, *Walton's Lives: Conformist commemorations and the rise of biography* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 81–2, 231.

and the conformist, a strategy with obvious resonances in the 1650s.[103] Significantly, in the changed conditions of 1662, in the revised account provided in his *Worthies*, Fuller felt more inclined to stress the conflict between the two men, so it was then that he added his famous phrase contrasting the sermons of pure Geneva and pure Canterbury.[104] But already his earlier work had been subsumed into a pioneering attempt to write a full life of Hooker, by Bishop John Gauden: the introduction to the first complete assemblage of the surviving text of the *Ecclesiasticall Politie*.

Gauden had been the ghost-writer of Charles I's best-selling *Eikon Basilike*, and he was rewarded at the Restoration with the bishopric of Exeter for keeping reasonably quiet about his work. He was nevertheless a moderate episcopalian who had managed to conform throughout the Interregnum, and already as plans for the King's Restoration were gathering momentum, he had published an extended study of how the new Church might move forward in a comprehensive way; Hooker played an important supporting role in his case.[105] He was an ambitious man who was no doubt eager to seize the chance of promoting his abilities in such an important literary venture as the Hooker edition, but he was to be disappointed in hopes of advancement by his efforts: his introductory biography appalled Sheldon and resolute High Churchmen when it appeared in January 1662. It is indeed a strange production. In its forty quarto pages of rambling moralising and shameless padding, it adds virtually nothing to the scraps which had already appeared in print, apart from a guess at Hooker's exact birthplace in Exeter (culled from one of Gauden's recently-acquired flock in that city), and (alarmingly) more than a page fleshing out in detail Fuller's hints about the blackmail attempt, exploiting undergraduate gossip from Gauden's youth.[106] Gauden also takes his cue from Fuller in being less than hagiographical, particularly on the subject of Hooker's dull

[103] T. Fuller, *The Church-History of Britain . . . until the year MDCXLVIII* (London: John Williams, 1655; Wing. F.2416), Bk. ix, 216–19, 235. Cf. discussion in Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 52. It is interesting that Fuller did not attempt a life of Hooker in his *Abel Redevivus* of 1651, even though he did include lives of Lancelot Andrewes and Hooker's tormentor Andrew Willett.

[104] Fuller, *Worthies*, ed. Freeman, 133. Still in this post-Restoration work, despite a snarl against Presbyterians, Fuller could add 'But be it reported to the judicious whether, when all is done, a reserve must not be left for prudential supplies in church government.': ibid., 134. This is clearly a reference to 'judicious' Hooker.

[105] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 63–5; Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 70.

[106] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Gauden, 7, 32–3.

preaching. He gives a broad hint that he finds Book V of the *Lawes* fairly tedious, and his encomium of Hooker is less than overwhelming: 'in whom some things were admirable, many things imitable, and all things commendable'.[107]

Perhaps more offensive and dangerous in the eyes of observers like Archbishop Sheldon was Gauden's aggressive moderation. He was openly and repeatedly rude about pre-war Laudianism, giving it its share of blame for the catastrophe of the 1640s:

> the strength of the Church of England was much decayed and undermined, before it was openly battered; partly by some superfluous, illegal and unauthorized innovations in point of Ceremony, which some men affected to use in publique, and impose upon others, which provoked people to jealousie and fury…

Such remarks were paired with irenic remarks about moderate nonconformists of the 1590s, who were carefully distinguished from doctrinaire Presbyterians.[108] Hooker was repeatedly presented as a counterweight to excess, and Gauden's own view of episcopacy remained resolutely pragmatic: 'Episcopacy rightly managed, is manifested to be the great Interest of Gods glory, and our Saviours honor, as they have by precepts and examples constituted a visible Church, regular Flock, and orderly Family in this world'. His parting exhortation to his readers (whom he envisaged as 'us…Bishops and Presbyters') was that they should be inspired by Hooker, 'Neither losing friends by negligences in the main concerns of holiness and peace, nor multiplying enemies by causeless exasperations and extravagancies'.[109] Amidst the triumphalist Anglican crackdown of 1662, this was subversive talk. Something would have to be done, and when in the same year Fuller's *Worthies* appeared, correcting his own errors on Hooker, which Gauden had copied, the perfect excuse was provided.

The result famously was that Gilbert Sheldon commissioned Izaak Walton to write a replacement life. It was a labour of love which Walton had in any case previously contemplated undertaking; it proved a delightful and masterly shaping of what was known about Hooker into an image which back-projected Walton's own gentle sacramentalist

[107] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Gauden, 22.
[108] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Gauden, 4, 5.
[109] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Gauden, 25, 40.

Anglicanism onto the gentle divine of the previous century.[110] The life was first published separately in 1665, but from 1666 it permanently shouldered aside Gauden's biography from the collected edition of Hooker's works: a rather feline introductory epistle from Walton regretted Gauden's 'many material mistakes, and more omissions'.[111] Even Walton's title-page for the whole work was subtly remodelled in appropriate fashion from the title-page of Gauden's edition, while broadly identical to it. Gauden's Hooker had there been described as 'learned, godly, judicious and eloquent'; Walton's Hooker was just 'learned and judicious'. Gauden's Church of England had been 'duly Reformed'; Walton deleted that whole phrase. 'Godly' and 'Reformed' had the wrong sound in the Anglican world of Sheldon.

One of the most remarkable features of Walton's work was its deliberate effort to undermine the authenticity of the three last books of the *Lawes*, which contained such unpalatable material on divine right and episcopacy; indeed Walton devoted a substantial appendix to arguing the case against the three books. Using circumstantial anecdotes and statements derived from partisans in the family feuds of Hooker's heirs, Walton did his best to show that Books VI to VIII had been tampered with by ideologically-motivated subversives, and so they did not now represent Hooker's true intentions. It was a remarkable exercise in having one's cake and eating it: Hooker the defender of Anglican ceremony and of the established polity of the Church of England could continue to provide authoritative aid and comfort to high-flying Anglicanism, while his problematic political statements could be quarantined. Some royalists who had embraced ideas about political contract in their earlier days and who now wanted to affirm their fervent belief in divine right, found it very convenient to discover the problematic status of Book VIII: they could now claim that they had been misled by a spurious work.[112]

Few editors can have striven so hard as Walton to shake their readers' confidence in the work which they had edited, and few can have achieved such success in their aim. Commentators of radical or

[110] Equally masterly are the accounts of that shaping now provided by Martin, *Walton*, 227–72, and by Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 82–92. An older account is D. Novarr, *The making of Walton's Lives* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958).

[111] The epistle to the reader of 1670 and 1675 is more outspoken, and also openly says that Sheldon commissioned Walton to correct Gauden.

[112] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 74–5.

Whig sympathies, such as the young Samuel Taylor Coleridge or the constitutional historian Henry Hallam, were always able to point out the self-serving nature of High Church doubts about the last three books.[113] Yet thanks to the affection in which Walton's work was held, the authenticity of these sections of Hooker's works was still in question right down to the twentieth century—quite unnecessarily.[114] The story of Hooker's reputation and influence after the Walton biography now becomes two stories, distinct although repeatedly overlapping: one his reputation as ecclesiastical authority, the other his usefulness as a political theorist of consent and contract. Those who commented on the ecclesiastical strand tended to reject or ignore the last three books; those who commented on the political strand would affirm their authenticity. Both camps were nevertheless anxious to apply Hooker's now axiomatic authority to the repeated crises which they faced. The result was to pitch a gentle, clerical High Church Hooker against a Whig, contractarian Hooker.

Ecclesiastically, as Michael Brydon comments, 'The century began with the assumption that Hooker was within a moderate reformed tradition, and ended with the belief that he was a distinctive Anglican figurehead'.[115] Those old-fashioned enough to continue to uphold Calvinism in the Church occasionally appealed to Hooker's statements on predestination in order to recall their former dominance in English theology, or to embarrass his High Church and Arminian admirers, but theirs was very much a minority voice.[116] Nonconformists, many of them heirs of the moderate Reformed tradition which had once embraced his writings, generally lost interest in the ecclesiastical Hooker following the events of 1662.[117] This was understandable, particularly

[113] For Coleridge and Hallam, see Sisson, *Judicious Marriage*, 186–7. Sisson misdated the Coleridge remark, which is a marginalium to British Library, Ashley 5175, biographical preface to the 1682 edn. of Hooker's *Works*, 28; this can be dated to Coleridge's radical years in 1790s Cambridge, not to the period of his later Toryism. I am indebted to Luke Wright for discussions on this point.

[114] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 11, points out that the 1906 Everyman edition of Hooker printed only the first five books. Cargill Thompson still felt constrained to argue against the fallacy in 1973: Cargill Thompson, 'Hooker's knowledge of Marsilius of Padua', 81 and n. 2.

[115] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 24.

[116] Cf. J. Edwards, *Veritas Redux*…(London: Robinson, Lawrence, and Wyat, 1707), 539; Edwards, *The doctrine of faith*…(London, 1708), 313–14. I am indebted to Stephen Hampton for pointing me to these references.

[117] For discussion of Hooker and late seventeenth century nonconformity, see Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 67–9, 74–5, 98–100; Condren, 'Hooker's public authority',

after a new wave of Anglican anti-nonconformist publications sparked by the political crisis of 1679–81 which sought to exclude James, Duke of York from the throne: Hooker figured largely in this High Church publication drive, with much selective quotation and a new edition of his works in 1682.[118]

By contrast, politicians standing up against the claims of divine right theory were stimulated to embrace Hooker by the fact that their chief ideological enemy Sir Robert Filmer had both attacked and distorted him. During the Exclusion Crisis, Filmer's *Patriarcha* was put into print, as a central polemical statement for the Tory grouping supporting James. The republican-minded Algernon Sidney in his opposition to Filmer gratefully drew on Hooker as a respectable authority for his own views, although in the process of advocating the rule of aristocracy against arbitrary monarchy, he pushed Hooker's political thought out of its political context almost as radically as Filmer had done.[119] Of greater long-term significance was John Locke's contest with Filmer, part of the same Exclusion Crisis literature. As in Sidney's work, Locke used Hooker as a respectable traditional authority opposing the sort of absolutism championed by Filmer, as a testimony to the existence of an original contract behind government, and then as a smokescreen for his own more radical conclusions. Where Hooker had spoken of the paramountcy of consensus and custom in political activity, Locke in his *Two Treatises of Government* emphasised individual rather than corporate possession of political wisdom. He stripped natural law of its intimate association with the active divine will, and he stressed the natural rights of an individual, neither of which premisses were part of Hooker's mental furniture.[120]

50–1; in particular, on Richard Baxter's confused and complex relationship to Hooker, Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 55, 92, 100, 111–113.

[118] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 116–117.

[119] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 95–6; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 108–110.

[120] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 95–6; A. P. Monahan in *RHC*, 215. Michael Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 149, n. 26 speculates as to how extensive or profound Locke's reading of Hooker really was; he notes that none of the citations in *Two Treatises* extend beyond Book II of the *Polity*, which might suggest that he gave up reading it at that point, and may never have properly examined the promising material in Book VIII. However, Steven McGrade points out to me that Locke at various points did at least possess three different editions of Hooker's works: *The Library of John Locke*, ed. J. Harrison and P. Laslett (Oxford Bibliographical Society publications new series xiii, 1965), 157, nos. 1490–2.

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 succeeded in ousting James where Exclusionists had failed. As an anxious political nation considered how to explain to itself what it had done in ejecting King James, it was not at first the radical contractarianism of Locke's *Two Treatises* which provided the answer. The new Whig establishment did not want to endanger its fragile alliance with Anglican Tories who in desperation had backed James's removal, nor did it wish to suggest that it had done anything as radical or populist as had emerged in the Civil War. It therefore looked away from Locke, to seek a more conservative model of government emphasising the role of the elite: a lawfully constituted parliament and not a popular uprising had brought the change of regime, and so had saved England from extremes both of radicalism and Roman Catholicism. Tony Claydon has furthermore reminded us of the pervasively providential religious rhetoric employed by the Revolution's defenders: William III was God's agent in defending the English Church. Given these preoccupations, Hooker was a reassuringly conservative figure to quote, particularly if one emphasised that James and not his opponents had brought unwelcome innovation into English politics.[121] As the nation painfully regained its composure in 1689, at least two provincial quarter sessions grand juries were treated to doses of Hooker in their charges from the presiding justice: at Cambridge, Sir Matthew Dudley praised Hooker as having refuted those 'dangerous spirits' the Marprelates, lauded his 'charity and meekness' and quoted the first sentence of his Preface. The Earl of Stamford in Leicestershire garnished the published version of his Grand Jury charge with a citation from the 'incomparable Hooker' and his (of course unquestionably authentic) Book VIII: 'There is the best Established Dominion, where the Law doth most rule the King'.[122]

The aftermath of the Glorious Revolution also finally destroyed the reality of the polity which Hooker had described. Hooker had known a Church which had embraced virtually all the Protestants of the nation, and despite his polemical rhetoric which implied that Puritans were

[121] Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 98; Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 53; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 144; T. Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 4–6, 28–33, 83–7. Even the image of Charles I could be pressed into service to defend the Revolution: see K. Sharpe, '"So hard a text"? Images of Charles I, 1612–1700', *Historical Journal* 43 (2000): 383–407, 401–3.

[122] *Charges to the Grand Jury 1689–1803*, ed. G. Lamoine (Camden 4th ser. xliii, 1992): 30–1, 41–2. For later Whig uses of Hooker in Grand Jury Charges, see ibid., 255, 267, 434–5.

separatists, he had in reality been addressing opponents who were part of the same broad national Church as himself. Indeed, his text implied that everyone in England, Catholic recusants included, were part of that same ecclesial body.[123] With the failure of the Comprehension Bill in the wake of the Revolution, this was no longer the case even for Protestants; a comprehensive Protestant Church was not rebuilt. Protestant Dissenters there had been, ever since the completion of the Anglican Settlement in 1662; now they were to form a permanent feature of the national religious landscape. The Toleration Act which was passed in 1689 would have to deal not with a small minority of separatists as had been intended, but with a substantial proportion of the Protestant population. The eighteenth century evangelical revival and the gradual separation of Methodism from the Church of England only exacerbated the situation. In Judith Maltby's phrase, 'in 1689 a *national* church was finally replaced by the more pragmatic idea of an *established* church'.[124]

Far from rendering Hooker obsolete, this new situation added yet further dimensions to his usefulness. If Whigs used him to discuss original contracts, then Tories nostalgic for a truly national church would look to him as part of their ongoing attempts to restore the Church of England to its old position of virtual monopoly. Other Tories, however, had been unable to cope at all with the new political order. They had taken the radical step of leaving the established church to remain faithful to their oath of loyalty to the Stuarts, and had formed the Church grouping known as the Non-jurors. As time went on, some of them even began to profit from their separation, to glory in the unsullied purity of their Church, and to assert that there was no necessary link between Church and State. Now Hooker could be used against the Non-jurors by those Tories who had accepted the post-1689 regime and remained within the establishment, because Hooker had insisted on an undivided Church and State in a Christian society. That did not stop some Non-jurors reading his defence of episcopal government

[123] '…there is not any man of the Church of England, but the same man is also a member of the *Commonwealth*, nor any man a member of the *Commonwealth* which is not also of the *Church* of *England*': *Lawes* VIII.1.2; 3:319.16–19.

[124] J. Maltby, *Prayer Book and People in Elizabeth and early Stuart England* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 235.

as a basis for their insistence on the sacred commission of bishops to preserve the integrity of the Church.[125]

Thus Hooker entered the eighteenth century a moderate Whig, a Lockean Whig, a moderate Tory, a ceremonialist parson, and a Nonjuring defender of the Church's apostolic government. By now indeed anyone in English politics who wanted a name to command instant respect or who wanted to score a debating point for their cause was ready to quote Hooker: even Socinians and Deists tried it on.[126] Virtually any commentator could have said what was in fact said by a Whig, Sir John Willes, when defending England's constitution on the basis of Hooker, just after Queen Anne's death: 'Mr Hooker is an Author of unquestionable Credit, and has been always esteemed a Man of great Learning as well as a truly Orthodox Divine: And therefore his Authority will be of much greater Weight than any thing that I can say'.[127] Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the noisiest claimants for Hooker were whoever happened to be in power. During the brief Tory renaissance under Queen Anne, it was his Tory aspect, the organic union of Church and State, which was most stridently proclaimed. Once the Hanoverians were on the throne and the Tories routed, then variations on Hooker the Whig re-emerged as paramount. As Locke gradually became more widely esteemed by the establishment, many read Hooker through his eyes.[128] The arch-Whig Benjamin Hoadly had little time for Locke, but he devoted a whole book in 1710 to *A defence of Hooker*, which was a defence of a Latitudinarian Church given its shape by a single act of consent safely back in 1689, and of an Erastian Church securely under the control of the Crown in Parliament.[129]

However, Bishop Hoadly provoked church controversies which frightened many of his fellow-Whigs looking for a quiet life in Church and State, and his extreme Erastianism offended Whig clergymen who may have been Whigs, but who were still also clergymen. A creative answer

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[125] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 156; J. Gascoigne, 'The Unity of Church and State challenged: responses to Hooker from the Restoration to the Nineteenth-Century age of reform', *JRH* 21 (1997): 60–79, 62.

[126] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 157, 160–1. For use by the Erastian Deist Matthew Tindal, see Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 61.

[127] *The present constitution and the present succession vindicated: in answer to a late book entituled, the Hereditary right of the Crown of England asserted* (London: J. Baker, 1714), 1, qu. Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 185. Cf. also ibid., 188.

[128] Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 163–4. On Hooker during Anne's rule, ibid., 166–89.

[129] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 55; Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 102–5.

to this problem, and an acceptable reformulation of Hoadleian themes, was provided from 1736 by Bishop William Warburton, quintessial establishment or Court Whig cleric of Hanoverian England. His *Alliance between Church and State: or the necessity and equity of an Established Religion and a Test-Law demonstrated* first appeared in 1736, and was thereafter expanded to become a best-seller.[130] Warburton was not an especially original thinker, but there is an engaging realism in his analysis of the Hanoverian constitution which gave his work a lasting popularity. In the third edition of his work, he boasted about this pragmatism to his dedicatee the Earl of Chesterfield: 'I have still kept our own happy Constitution in my eye: And, under the direction of so safe a guide, I was secure from the danger of those visions, by which the best Writers who have treated these subjects only in the abstract, have been misled.'[131] His pedestrian representativeness merits extended consideration.

Warburton's realism included the startlingly simple insight which has eluded most English commentators on the British constitution over the last three centuries: the existence of an established Presbyterian Church in Scotland as an essential part of a united kingdom. It was a body with a very different ethos from the Church of England, and Warburton felt little warmth towards it, talking sourly in the *Alliance* of the Kirk's reluctance to cooperate with the State.[132] However, the Kirk was unavoidably there after the constitutional deals of 1689 and 1707, and it represented the majority of the Scottish population, just as the Church of England did in England. It thus provided a justification for the English Church's continuing privileged position, as well as providing a bulwark against the Jacobitism of the Scottish non-juring Episcopal clergy. As the index in the 1741 version of the *Alliance* succinctly put it, the alliance of Church and State 'must always be with the largest Religious Society, if more than one in the same state; in England with the Episcopal, in Scotland with the Presbyterian'. This, then, was a

[130] W. Warburton, *The Alliance between Church and State: or the Necessity and Equity of an established religion and a Test-Law demonstrated*… (edns. from 1736). Principal enlargements of the *Alliance* as an independent text after 1736 are 1748 and 1766. Its original text had been designed as part of Warburton's much larger work *The Divine Legation of Moses*, which first appeared in full in print in 1738, although begun at the end of the 1720s. Cf. useful discussion in Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 63–6, and J. Van Den Berg, 'Thomas Morgan versus William Warburton: a conflict the other way round', *JEcclH* 42 (1991): 82–5, 84.

[131] Warburton, *Alliance* (1748 edn.), dedication to Philip, Earl of Chesterfield, unpaginated.

[132] Warburton, *Alliance* (1741 edn.), 63, 88n.

primary basis of what has been termed Warburtonianism: the alliance of Church and State was an association (Warburton preferred to talk of a 'convention' rather than a contract) which had been freely entered into by two separate societies, one secular, one religious. The State should have the greater voice in the association, but the association was not irrevocable. Nor did association imply an exclusive Church which included all worshipping Christians: an established Church had a leading and privileged role, guaranteed by Tests, but it also guaranteed the rights of other Christians. A Church was established only as long as it commanded majority support.[133]

Such clear-sighted observations of eighteenth century Britain were fundamentally opposed to Hooker's vision of Elizabethan England. Warburton's state had no divine character; like Locke before him, he had attenuated the connection between natural law and its divine origin. Consequently when Warburton wrote about Hooker, he neatly exemplified all the tensions which the post-1689 Settlement embodied in relation to the judicious divine. In early versions of the *Alliance*, he ignored the problem. He used Hooker a great deal in standard moderate Whig ways, praising his attacks on fanaticism, ridiculing High Church distortions of his views on episcopacy, and making admiring citations which are largely decorative. He also defended Hooker against what he saw as unjust criticisms by the Dissenting historian Daniel Neal.[134] However, during the 1740s, Warburton's tangled relationship with the Tory political writer Henry Lord Bolingbroke erupted into a bitter feud, and eventually provoked Warburton into further expansions of the *Alliance*. Bolingbroke had cited Hooker extensively in his campaigns against the great Whig Robert Walpole, and naturally Bolingbroke's Hooker was a Tory exponent of the organic union of Church and State.[135]

In the 1766 edition of the *Alliance*, Warburton confronted Bolingbroke in various respects, partly asserting that he had misread Hooker.

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[133] Warburton, *Alliance* (1741 edn.), 113–114—to which the index entry refers. Obviously the relationship with the Church of Scotland was not the only issue shaping Warburton's distinctive alliance theory. Unnameable in his text, although undoubtedly in his mind, was the confessional Lutheranism of the first Hanoverian monarchs. However, this was a diminishing reality (unlike the Church of Scotland) as the *Alliance* underwent its years of extended development.

[134] Warburton, *Alliance* (1741 edn.), 30; Eccleshall, 'Hooker', 76. On Neal and Warburton, see *The Ecclesiastical Polity and other works of Richard Hooker*…, ed. B. Hanbury (3 vols. London, 1830), i.xxxvii–xxxix, and Warburton, *Works* (1788 edn.), vii.898.

[135] Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 56.

However, he also decided that on the basic principle of the organic union of Church and State, Bolingbroke was all too accurate in his perception of Hooker: both writers must now be refuted.[136] Warburton in other respects reaffirmed his admiration for Hooker: he now called him 'the BEST GOOD MAN of our order', noted his incompatibility with Filmer and emphasised the authenticity of Book VIII. Nevertheless, unlike Warburton himself, Hooker had failed to discover 'that capital idea of an ALLIANCE', and he 'was wrong in thinking, church and state was only one society under different names.' In a remarkable rhetorical sleight of hand, Warburton managed to link Hooker, Elizabethan Puritans, Thomas Hobbes and Bolingbroke in a common Erastianism, a catch-all list which also had the advantage of silently reproving the missing name, the obstreperous Bishop Hoadly, for being excessively Erastian. Warburton also pointed out (perfectly correctly) that any conception of organic union between church and state such as Hooker's led inevitably to the principle of persecution for religious opinions.[137]

Warburton's work never achieved universal admiration, for all its usefulness to the mid-eighteenth century Whig establishment. It disturbed the illusion of Anglican country clergy that they still served a national and not an established Church; in any case, many of them distrusted members of the hierarchy like Warburton who were more realistic than they were, and they also loathed Warburton's clear intellectual debt to Locke.[138] Warburton's attack on Hooker therefore focussed High Church and Tory devotion to Hookerian principles of Church and State, and this devotion in turn was given a far more dramatic and urgent stimulus by the catastrophe of the French Revolution. When a king was executed and a national church overthrown, Warburtonianism was at a discount. When Edmund Burke described the Church as 'an oblation of the state itself', one hears a very different note from Warburton's exposition of

[136] The new excursus on Hooker occupies 180–7 of Warburton, *Alliance* (Vol. iv of 1788 edn. of Warburton, *Works*, reprinting the 1766 edn.).

[137] Warburton, 1788 edn. of *Works* iv.180–1, 186–7, 243, 304. Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 65, suggests that Hooker may have primarily been a straw man for Warburton to make a veiled attack on Hoadly. This may well have been part of his intention, but 1766 seems a late date for such an impulse, and at *Works* iv.180–1, Warburton explicitly makes the connection to his clash with Bolingbroke, referring to material found in his Postscript from 1766 edn., pr. ibid. iv.300–4.

[138] S. Taylor, 'William Warburton and the alliance of Church and State', *JEcclH* 43 (1992): 271–86; P. Nockles, *The Oxford Movement in context: Anglican High Churchmanship, 1760–1857* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 56.

a secular state in free alliance with a majority church.[139] Pre-Tractarian High Churchment like Bishop Samuel Horsley, Hutchinsonian divines and the Hackney Phalanx were contemptuous of Warburton, whom ironically they viewed as an extreme Erastian: they praised Hooker, but also toyed a little uncomfortably with the highflown sacramentalism and clericalism embodied in Non-juror theologies of the Church.[140]

The debacle for such Hookerian High Church hankerings came with the transformation of the basis of British national government in 1828–32: a series of legislative measures extending a raft of civil and political rights to Protestant Dissenters and even Roman Catholics dealt the death-blow to the long-wounded idea of a confessional English state. Not merely Tories were affected: the Whig interest disintegrated, and Hooker's long association with Whig political preoccupations became relegated to intellectual history. Among Tories, one reaction to the developing new situation was that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge in his *On the Constitution of Church and State* (1830). Here Coleridge, a great admirer of Hooker, may be said to have creatively misunderstood him. Coleridge envisaged a national church which had a cultural as well as a religious function, a church which could be distinguished from the church of Christ: if the two had any relationship, it was 'a blessed accident'. Coleridge then identified his two faces of the church in Hooker's discussion of the visible and invisible church. But Coleridge's visible church, whose primary role is as bearer of a nation's civilisation, is hardly the same as Hooker's visible church, the embodiment of divine truth and divine action in the world.[141]

Coleridge was in any case idiosyncratic in his relationship to the older High Church grouping to which he had in some sense returned after his unitarian years. More representative and also an epitaph on the Hookerian ideal of Church and State, was W. E. Gladstone's monumental and ill-fated work *The State in its relations with the Church* (1838). Gladstone was aware that Hooker could not be fitted directly on to the situation of post-1832 England: 'church and commonwealth' could no longer be 'personally *one society*.' Nevertheless he drew the conclusion from Hooker 'the great doctrine that the state is a person,

[139] Nockles, *Oxford Movement in context*, 63; cf. Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 67–8.

[140] Nockles, *Oxford Movement in context*, 64–5. Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 67; Condren, 'Hooker's public authority', 56.

[141] Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 69–70.

having a conscience, cognisant of matter of religion, and bound by all constitutional and natural means to advance it', and he scorned Bishop Warburton for his contrary secular vision of the state.[142] Yet in defending British church establishments in this way, Gladstone was the last advocate of a world which had already disappeared: the England in which to be fully English was to be a member of the Church of England, not a Dissenter or a Roman Catholic. Characteristically, when he found that virtually no-one else in the country agreed with him, he rewrote his book at twice the length just to make sure that he had not been misunderstood. Still no-one agreed. By the late 1860s, Gladstone himself had abandoned his theoretical justification of church establishment, and he outraged his constituents in Oxford University when he spearheaded the disestablishment of the Protestant Church of Ireland.

If Hooker's political legacy was effectively dead from the 1830s, his ecclesiastical and liturgical arguments continued to be useful to the Church of England as it rethought its role in the nation. The Oxford Movement was one distinctive and innovative response to the new situation: an attempt to rescue the Catholic character of the English Church from liberal and rationalist distortions, while showing a flexibility towards the notion of an intimate union between Catholic Church and confessional State which had sustained High Church theology since the days of William Laud. Much inspiration for the Oxford Movement's new departures came from its explorations of Non-juror spirituality and theology, coupled with a re-examination of the Church of England's past in order to find inspiration for the present. Who better to explore than Hooker?

Therefore central to the Oxford project in the 1830s was a new edition of Hooker which would have a contemporary relevance: it was undertaken by John Keble, an old High Churchman who was prepared to move beyond the world which he knew, and who was openly determined to rescue Hooker from the multifarious uses to which he had been put over the previous century. The particular trigger for Keble's project was a three-volume edition of Hooker's works published in 1830 by Benjamin Hanbury, an accomplished Congregationalist historian. Hanbury naturally felt that the sixteenth century English Reformation had been incomplete, and that the Church Establishment was its least

[142] Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 76.

desirable feature. He admired much about Hooker, with the very considerable exception of his views on Church and State and on episcopacy; his annotations to Book VII of the *Lawes* are notably different from the rest of his editorial work, and amount to a considerable critique of the text. No doubt with that particular part of Hanbury's labours in mind, Keble described the edition in his own preface as 'executed . . . with considerable spirit and industry, but in some parts with a degree of haste, and in many with an expression of party feeling, tending to lessen its usefulness greatly'.[143] He would also have been annoyed by Hanbury's clear-headed summing-up of two centuries of Hooker's reputation: 'in Politics what we understand by the term a Whig, but in Church affairs a Tory'. In reaction to this, Keble denounced 'the rationalists . . . and the liberals of the school of Locke and Hoadly', as the chief kidnappers of Hooker: Hanbury had indeed specifically asserted that Hooker was 'ably supported by Locke and Hoadly'. As a result Keble was slightly disingenuous in wanting Hooker 'to become more generally read and known': his edition was intended to supplant Hanbury's and to make Hooker's works known in a particular way. '[S]urely the better they are known, the more entirely will they be rescued from the unpleasant association, and discreditable praise, just mentioned'.[144]

Keble's edition, a monument of meticulous scholarship for its day, was the most important event in Hooker scholarship since Izaak Walton's biography, yet its one notably traditionalist feature was that Keble (unlike Hanbury) strongly upheld Walton's reliability and thus prolonged the old High Church case against the last three books of the *Lawes*. Keble adopted wholesale the attitudes of Laudians who had annexed Hooker from the Reformed mainstream in the early seventeenth century. He saw Hooker as training up successors in the Church from Laud onwards, to whom 'we owe it, that the Anglican Church continues at such a distance from that of Geneva, and so near truth and apostolical order'.[145] Keble said with little equivocation that the English Reformation was a deplorable event, inspired largely by foreigners, and that Hooker had been raised up by God to undo its unfortunate consequences: repeatedly Keble contrasted Hooker with

[143] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.li.
[144] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.cv. *Works of Hooker*, ed. Hanbury, i.xiii.
[145] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.ii, civ. Contrast Hanbury's trenchant criticism of Walton: *Works of Hooker*, ed. Hanbury, i.cxviii–cxxii.

Archbishop Cranmer, to Cranmer's disadvantage.[146] Altogether Keble's editorial preface, despite its genuine insight and probing of previously unused manuscript sources, is a formidable exercise in special pleading designed to turn Hooker's ecclesiological, sacramental and liturgical outlook towards the best possible approximation to a Tractarian of the 1830s. Keble does not ignore the problems in doing this: he deals at length with Hooker's attitude to divine right episcopacy, his receptionist eucharistic views and his generally Reformed discussion of predestination, but the reader is left with the impression that such unfortunate features of the Elizabethan divine can more or less be nuanced out of sight.[147] Any regrettable aspects of Hooker's theology were in Keble's eyes more than compensated for by the mystical beauty of his sacramental outlook, a dimension which it was difficult otherwise to find in the heritage of Anglican High Church divinity.[148]

Keble was at his least happy with Hooker's views on church and state, which smacked to him of an obsolete Erastianism—a word fast becoming one of the most tainted in the Tractarian vocabulary. In this he was encouraged by the forthrightness of Hurrell Froude. Applying brutal logic to the post-1832 situation of the Church of England, Froude picked up the most radical stance of some eighteenth century Non-jurors in their rejection of the state link, and took it further. He produced assertions not merely of the Church's autonomy but of its supremacy; when his *Remains* were posthumously and perhaps unwisely published by his grieving friends, these sounded as startling as the pronouncements of any Roman Catholic ultramontane. Froude's contempt for Hooker's ecclesiology bred a more general irreverence towards him, and Froude was prepared to take on the great man on a wider front. In 1835, exalting the rule of bishops in the Church against any possibility of lay participation in synods, he said 'I don't know enough to have an opinion; but as far as I see I disagree with Hooker…Neither the laity nor the presbyters seem to me to have any part or lot in the

[146] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.lii, lviii, lxxxiii, xcvi.

[147] Cf. Keble's Preface in *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) *passim*, but esp. i.lxi–lxii, lxvii, lxix, lxxii–lxxviii, lxxxi, xcii. For useful comment, see also Gascoigne, 'Unity of Church and State', 73–4; Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 9; Nockles, *Oxford Movement in context*, 242, 250, 256, 264.

[148] *Works of Hooker*, ed. Keble (1836) i.lxxxix; cf. Nockles, *Oxford Movement in context*, 207.

government of the church'.[149] Such open selectivity also typified John Henry Newman's attitude to Hooker: rather than seek to explain Hooker's views on justification in a sense compatible with his own interpretation of what was Catholic, he simply said flatly 'since we are not allowed to call any man our master on earth, Hooker, venerable as is his name, has no weight with any Christian, except as delivering what is agreeable to Catholic doctrine'.[150] Soon, in any case, Newman was to leave behind Hooker's Church for the Church of Rome.

There continued to be some attempts to rescue Hooker from the Tractarian grip. Professor Renn Hampden, so much harassed by intolerant Tractarians in Oxford, must have enjoyed the moment when in 1844 he was able to fail a BD presented by the Tractarian R. G. Macmullen, on the specific grounds that Macmullen had not disowned a presence in the elements apart from their reception, as Hampden maintained Hooker had done.[151] Evangelicals also took up the cudgels. Some Evangelicals objected strongly to the wholesale appropriation by the Tractarians and their successors of the mainstream divinity of the Stuart Church of England. Henry Fish, in his diatribe *Jesuitism traced in the movements of the Oxford Tractarians* criticised E. B. Pusey for citing Hooker and Andrewes 'in confirmation of Mr Newman's views of Justification: whereas the views of both those men were the very reverse of Mr. Newman's.' Less confrontationally, Anne Tyndale, an Evangelical correspondent of Pusey, told him that the eighteenth century Evangelical Revival had represented a revival of the theology not merely of the sixteenth century Reformers but also of 'Hooker, Ussher, Hall, and other great divines of the early seventeenth century': an interesting succession which is a surprisingly accurate evocation of those moderate Protestant churchmen who had sought to appropriate Hooker in their day. There was indeed a Reformed Hooker to be rediscovered, as we have seen.[152]

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[149] H. Froude, *Remains*, ed. J. H. Newman and J. B. Mozley (4 vols., Oxford, 1837–9), i.415. For Froude's evolving attitude to Hooker, and his influence on Keble, see Nockles, *Oxford Movement in context*, 80, and W. J. Baker, 'Hurrell Froude and the Reformers', *JEcclH* 21 (1970): 243–59, esp. 251, 255.

[150] J. H. Newman, *Lectures on Justification* (London, 1838), 442; this is in an Appendix to the actual lectures. I am grateful to Peter Nockles for leading me to this reference.

[151] Nockles, *Oxford Movement in context*, 242.

[152] H. Fish, *Jesuitism traced in the movements of the Oxford Tractarians* (London: Hamilton, Adams, 1842), 61; cf. 26. Oxford, Pusey House, Pusey-Tyndale correspondence (uncatalogued). I am indebted to Peter Nockles for alerting me to these references, and for letting

Yet on the whole, the effect of Keble's magisterial edition was to cement Hooker firmly into Victorian High Church tradition. In late Victorian England, Anglo-Catholics rather than Evangelicals wrote Anglican church history. Different wings of a diverse Catholic movement chose different features of his works to exploit. Moderate Tractarians excavated him for discussion of the *via media*, a concept by then given canonical status in the Anglican writings of John Henry Newman. More extreme Anglo-Catholics selectively savoured what Hooker had to say about the eucharist and episcopacy. Others revelled in a theologian of the Reformation who was not afraid to cite medieval scholasticism and canon law, no doubt not realising how common this had been in the later years of the sixteenth century. The Church of England as a whole, no longer merely a national church, but enjoying a newly central status in a worldwide Anglican communion, was happy to find an Anglican saint viewed through the agreeable filters provided by Izaak Walton and John Keble. As statues of saints came back into architectural and theological fashion, and proliferated amid the newly restored or rebuilt Gothic of Anglicanism's churches, Hooker's statue was often to be found, usually clutching his great book.[153]

Perhaps one can see this final Anglican and specifically Tractarian victory in the contest for Hooker's identity as Pyrrhic. No-one else wanted to exploit him any more. The central assumption around which his theology evolved, a unitary church and state in which the national Parliament is the expression of the will of a Christian commonwealth, was gone for ever. It is notable that the main commentator from outside the Anglican tradition who chose to revisit Hooker's theories of government, Alessandro Passerin D'Entrèves, did so in because he wanted to explore alternatives to liberal political thought.[154] An added paradox in the story of his reputation is that no-one has ever wanted to adopt everything which he propounded; everyone has made choices


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me see his so far unpublished article 'Anglicanism "Represented" or "Misrepresented"? The Oxford Movement, the Reformation, and the 17th-century Divines'.

[153] For useful discussion on this theme, together with a listing of Hooker statuary, see Brydon, 'Evolving reputation', 9–11. To analyse the use of Hooker in Anglican contributions to ecumenical dialogue in the twentieth century would require another extended paper.

[154] A. P. D'Entrèves, 'Richard Hooker: a study in the history of political philosophy', Oxford DPhil thesis, 1932: publ. and transl. as *Riccardo Hooker: contributo alla teoria e alla storia del diritto naturale* (Turin: Istituto giuridico della R. Università, 1932). Cf. W. J. T. Kirby, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 12.

to suit themselves. There is no Hookerian Movement. Yet it would be a mistake for theologians entirely to leave Hooker to the historians. Hooker's intricate discussion of what constitutes authority in religious matters gives him a contemporary usefulness. The disputes which currently wrack Western Christianity are superficially about sexuality, social conduct or leadership style: at root, they are about what constitutes authority for Christians. The contest for the soul of the Church in the West rages around the question as to how a scripture claiming divine revelation relates to those other perennial sources of human revelation, personal and collective consciousness and memory; whether, indeed, there can be any relationship between the two. Hooker provides one major discussion of these problems in one historical context, and it would be foolish for modern Christians to ignore such a resource. But finally, if one feels any gratitude for the shape of modern Anglicanism—its exhilarating variety, its engaging inability to present a single identity, its admirable unwillingness to tell people what to do—much of this is to do with the protean nature of Richard Hooker: for no-one since his death in 1600 has been able permanently to pin him down or to say what exactly constitutes the message of his huge, his enormous—his great book.



Engraved title page from the 1705 folio edition of Hooker's *Works*. This engraved title page was created for the first Stansby edition of 1611 and used on all subsequent folio editions through 1723.

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